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PART I.



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Proposed

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IN MEMORIAM : WARREN HASTINGS

DURING the recent celebrations of the bicentenary of the birth of Warren Hastings so many worthy tributes have been paid to his memory that any further contribution can hardly avoid seeming both trite and superfluous. Yet it is hard to let the commemoration fade away without endeavouring to add at least one leaf to the laurels offered at his shrine.

Of the great and lasting services rendered by Hastings, both to India and to England, nothing need here be said, for there is now general agreement as to their importance. Macaulay declared that "he had preserved and extended an empire. He had founded a polity. He had administered government and war with more than the capacity of Richelieu." Sir James Fitzjames Stephen has written that "if a man's ability is measured by a comparison between his means of action and the results of his action, he must, I think, be regarded as the ablest Englishman of the eighteenth century." And Mr. P. E. Roberts, after criticizing many points in Hastings' administration, concludes by pronouncing him to have been "perhaps the greatest Englishman who ever ruled India, a man who, with some ethical defects, possessed in superabundant measure the mobile and fertile brain, the tireless energy, and the lofty fortitude which distinguish only the supreme statesman."

The man himself is an interesting study. On one side compact of pure intellect and filled with ambition to justify his selection for high office, he yet imperilled his future by his passion for the wife of a needy German painter, by the divorce that ensued, and by his subsequent marriage to the lady. Although the union filled with sweetness a life that had been lonely and self-centred, this did not deter him from risking it all by provoking a duel with Francis. His nature was indeed

one of opposites. A master of vigorous prose, he could yet write and circulate a quantity of mediocre verse. With all his administrative abilities, his carelessness regarding his own finances was remarkable; he spent lavishly, and the ever-mounting costs of his trial did not prevent him from laying out £60,000 in building and rebuilding Daylesford House. From his portraits shines a calm and impressive dignity, yet he cut no figure in Calcutta society, for (as Hickey tells us) he was "uncommonly shy and reserved." These human touches, however, detract in no way from his essential greatness. During the past ninety years his career has been scrutinized by a succession of able writers, both hostile and friendly. As the result, the fame of Warren Hastings stands at the present moment higher than ever before, and he has passed into the company of those heroes of our race whose immortality is unquestioned.

W. FOSTER.

THE QUESTION OF THE STRAITS*

By PHILIP GRAVES

MY LORD CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
In this paper which I have the honour of reading before you to-day I have first dealt with the history of the question, its origins, and its dependence on geographical and economic factors, and I have next endeavoured to give a brief summary of the methods by which it has been solved or by which its solution has been attempted until our day.

Finally, I have allowed myself some speculation as to political developments within the region in which the question of the Straits may at any time become an issue of the highest political and economic importance.

I

As soon as men began to use the sea instead of merely collecting salt on its shores and combing the beach for eatables, even before technical advances in boat building allowed them to take risks instead of hugging the shore on fine days, straits were important as points where migrating hordes might be checked, and as meeting-places where men met men for barter or negotiation. With each technical improvement marking the advance from dug-out and paddle to the plank-built galley, sail, and rowlock, their importance increased, and settlements multiplied on their shores; with closer settlement came increased cultivation, trade, and fortification to protect the trader and cultivator.


The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles furnished an excellent example of this process. Before the legends of the foundation of Troy and the Golden Fleece took shape, out of the first contacts of the Greeks with the peoples of the Marmora Basin and the Black Sea coast, the cultivators of Transylvania and the Danubian Basin generally were trading directly or indirectly with the peoples of the Ægean. If, as archaeologists are inclined to believe, the Danube was the chief channel of this trade, we must place the beginnings of this "Question of the

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 5, 1932, Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby in the Chair.

Straits" in the third millennium before Christ. It is probable that with the domestication of the horse and the development first of pack transport and then of wheeled transport, the Straits in question gained vastly in commercial and political importance. The Anatolian plateau may have been one of the first regions from which horsemanship spread east and west. The effects of this new discovery on the region of the Straits must have been enormous. It accelerated land transport and thus increased the commercial Hinterland of what we may as well call Troy. It gave the horse-using peoples a military advantage and made settlements on either side of the Straits more vulnerable to attack from the Russian Danubian plain or from the Anatolian plateau. The Trojan War is a struggle between the sea-peoples of Greece and a "horse-taming" Phrygian aristocracy who have entered Asia Minor from the Balkans, for the control of the trade-route to the Black Sea. It is the opening of one of the chief themes in the drama of the Straits. The theme reappears when Venice uses the Fourth Crusade to overthrow the Byzantine monopoly of the Black Sea trade; and again when the Turks, after conquering the remnant of the Byzantine Empire, close the gates of the Black Sea for centuries against foreign traders and foreign naval penetration.

But this is only one side of the problem. Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula are by no means the only regions commercially served by the trade route through Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Behind Constantinople is the Black Sea, and on its European shore the great plain that stretches from the Carpathian to the Altai. Here you have a region which is destined by nature to be a political and an economic unit. No sharp natural obstacle breaks its unity. In this immense region you have vast areas suited for cereal cultivation and for cattle ranching. It holds great mineral riches—the Donetsk Coalfield and the mines of the Ural, for example—others lie within easy access, like the oilfields of Baku. Up to a point communications with the south are excellent; great rivers flow into the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and the Black Sea does not freeze in winter. The Volga runs into the closed Caspian, but by the Caspian Sea the masters of the plain can outflank the Caucasus barrier and reach the wealth of Transcaucasia. But for this region there is only one natural trade route to the Mediterranean, and that is the sea way via Black Sea, Bosphorus, and Dardanelles.

Here therefore is another factor in the problem. We have begun with the struggle for control between the people on the Mediter-



anean side of the Straits and the people holding the Straits, Greeks against Trojans, Venetians against Byzantines and then against the Great Turk; we might call it the struggle of the Mediterraneans against the Byzantines. But as soon as the vast region beyond the Straits begins to organize itself politically a third element takes part in the struggle for their control.

Let us call this element the Scythians or, better, the Russians. To begin with, their importance is commercial. Even in the days of Herodotus the Scythian rulers are exporting corn to the *Ægean*. The first signs of political organization appear when Mithridates of Pontus extends his Transcaucasian kingdom into South Russia, enriches himself by the corn trade, and builds the first Black Sea fleet. Later we have the Gothic episode. But when I said that the Great Plain was naturally destined to be a political and economic unit, I should have added this reservation—"given the will to unite and given the technical factor of relatively rapid communication between the extremities of this area." Without these conditions the Great Plain was no more than a disturbed tribal sea, although its spring tides were a constant danger to its shores. That was its history until the definite triumph of its latest master, the Slav agriculturist. As long as the struggle between the herdsman and the corn-grower for the mastery of the plain remained undecided, so long the Russians were not a constant factor in the Problem of the Straits. I must also remark that, while the "Russians" exercised no continuous influence on the "Byzantines" until the eighteenth century, the danger of a sudden flood from the North was a factor in the policy of the Byzantines from the time when the Roman Empire fell apart into a "Mediterranean" and a "Byzantine" division. The elaborate fortification of Constantinople, the maintenance of strong naval bases in the Straits, the constant attempt of the rulers of the Straits to make the Danube their Northern frontier, all show that Russia or, as they then called it, Scythia, was regarded as the region from which horrid surprises were always possible. Remember that one of the waves from the plain took the Huns to France. After the Hunnish nomads had driven the Goths westward the plain became a cattle ranch, and in the eighth century the Byzantines were exporting corn to Russia. Then comes the episode of the first Russians, Slavs with Scandinavian leaders, who push agriculture southward, almost become a danger to the Byzantines, but finally are driven from the greater part of the plain by fresh nomad swarms. Then in the

thirteenth century we have something different, the great Mongol-Tartar attempt to unify the whole plain from North China to the Danube. We know from contemporary evidence that the Mongol rulers, Jenghiz and his immediate successors, were more than mere destroyers. They destroyed abundantly, but their atrocities were inspired by policy; they founded an organized empire which for three generations was the strongest power in the world; and its influence on the future development of Russia was of immense importance. The Mongols bequeathed the idea of the political unification of the Great Plain to the Tsars, who succeeded to their power and finally conquered the plain right up to the Amur in the reverse direction to the Mongol movement. The Russian Princes who used to do homage to the Great Khan of the Mongols and later to the chief of the Golden Horde must have learnt much from their masters.

But there were limits to Mongol power. They were emphatically a continental people and plainsmen. They had no interest in the sea; their only overseas campaign, that against Japan, came to utter grief; in the Black Sea they contented themselves with a commercial and political *entente* with Venice. But their failure to found a more permanent power over the plain was not, I think, military, nor was it necessarily the difficulty of communication that broke up the unity of the Empire. After all, the Russian rulers of the eighteenth century were no better off for transport than the Mongols, yet they ruled effectively over an almost equally large empire. It was the conversion of the Western Mongol States to Islam that in my opinion chiefly broke up Mongol unity. Once the Tartar master was divided by a religious cleavage from his pagan relatives on the Chinese side, and was prevented by religious prejudice from fusing with his Christian subjects on the Russian side, his defeat was certain. This explanation will not please the Marxians, whose prophet gave Mohammed and his revolution less than a line in the introduction to *Das Kapital*, but it is up to them to find a better one.

Islam put the cowboys of the western side of the plain into permanent opposition to the farmers, and in the later stages of the struggle the remnant of the herdsmen were clients of their Turkish co-religionists. The Turks thus threw out a flank guard against the Russians, but by the end of the eighteenth century the Black Sea was a Russian lake and the Turk, once undisputed master of the Straits and the successor of the Caesars and the terror of Europe, seemed on the point of becoming a Russian door-keeper. But it did not suit the

chief Mediterranean Powers, France, and later Great Britain, that Turkey should fall under Russian dominance, or that either Turk or Russian should be in a position to bar the Black Sea to their trade or their war-vessels. The French and other Mediterranean sea-powers had been forced to put up with this exclusion in the days of Turkish greatness, and though Francis I. secured some privileges for French commerce from the Turk, these privileges were strictly limited. The Méditerranéens were not minded to risk a repetition of this situation. The British, when they became "Mediterranean minded," were equally unwilling to agree to the closing of the Straits, and therefore of the Black Sea, to their warships. It is true that Napoleon and not the Russians brought them into the Mediterranean as permanent naval residents. His threat to India terrified the British capitalists who had sought to recoup themselves for their American losses in India. But when the Napoleonic wars were ended it was against Russian dominance over Turkey that British diplomacy worked with unremitting industry. In 1774 the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji had given the Russians the right of interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The secret article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, signed in 1833, gave the Russian fleet the freedom of the Straits, and closed them to every other fleet save the Turkish. These treaties led to the Crimean War, in which Great Britain and France combined with Turkey against Russia. The Treaty of Paris, which left Russia navally at the mercy of Turkey in the Black Sea, was an outrage against common sense. It was denounced by Russia in 1870, but the British Government was no longer disposed to fight for the neutrality of the Black Sea. Something had happened in Egypt that made the Straits less important for the moment to Downing Street. That was the construction of the Suez Canal. It made the British occupation of Egypt practically certain. And that occupation finished British influence in Turkey, and gave the utmost importance to the fourth and latest factor in the problem of the Straits—the Danubian or Austro-German factor.

The Russian plain was made to be united politically and economically. The conditions in the Danubian Basin were totally different. They were the reverse of uniform, as were the affinities of its many peoples. They made for political division. But the Danubians of the middle and upper basin of the river had advantages denied to the people of the Russian plain. They were nearer the centres of European civilization—indeed, Vienna was one of these centres—they

had always possessed a better technical equipment and a more constant tradition, and they had abundant refuges from the nomad hordes. However, their political and racial disunion nullified these advantages until well into the Middle Ages. Till then only one Danubian people, the Bulgarians, exercised any influence on the question of the Straits for any appreciable time, and they were more often a buffer state for the Byzantines or unwilling subjects of Constantinople than serious rivals to the Eastern Empire. When the Turk took the Byzantines' place he promptly made the Danube his frontier, and from his advance up to and across the river sprang the long struggle between the Sultans and the Holy Roman Emperors of the Hapsburg House. Now the Empire was part of the West European system of States, but the Hapsburgs looked East, and fifteen years after the end of the Thirty Years War they had begun their counter offensive which was to compensate them for their losses in Germany. Thereafter until the end of the eighteenth century they were generally the allies of the Russians against the Turk.

In the nineteenth century the Austrians drew away from the Russian alliance. There have been two different currents in Russian diplomacy. One led to the Straits and the Mediterranean; the other led to the Balkans and was consequently a danger to the expansionist plans of the Hapsburg monarchy, and eventually to the Hapsburgs' hold over their own Slavs.

Alone the Austro-Hungarians could not hope for victory against the Russians, but when United Germany, highly organized, patriotic, wealthy, mighty in industry and arms, became their ally, the combination promised immense profits. Bismarck had already encouraged the Austrian *Drang nach Osten*, for he wished to keep Austria from any attempt to renew the interference in German affairs which had led to the war of 1866. His successors saw in Asiatic Turkey a field for German enterprise and discreet German colonization. The naval policy of the Empire would arouse British hostility. That hostility must be met by counter-irritants, and these could be supplied with German promptings by the Moslem world.

In that world the Turks were chief. From 1882 onwards their diplomacy was governed by two motives. One was their fear of Russia. The other was their determination to keep as much of Asia as they could if they must lose Europe. The larger and potentially richer part of their Asiatic Empire was Arab; losing the Arabs, they lost their religious prestige; they also would lose a multitude

of military and civil jobs which maintained countless Beys and Effendis and their dependents in agreeable if uncultured ease. They felt that the British occupation of Egypt was a threat to their hold over the Arabs, and they were right. So the failing Byzantines called in the Austro-Germans against the Russians and the British Mediterraneans who threatened them in Asia, and the Germans dreamt of a great transverse block of states controlling and defending the Straits against the Russian Plain and the Mediterranean peoples and extending from North Sea to Persian Gulf. So came the War.

Of the conduct of the War in the Near East I will only say two things: first, that it was decided there when the defeat of Bulgaria and Turkey uncovered Austria-Hungary and brought about a collapse of the Austro-German alliance. Secondly, that Russia suffered from the duality of her objectives. Publicly these were Pan Slav, the detachment of the Slav peoples from Austro-Hungarian rule. Behind the scenes Russia sought and obtained the consent of her Mediterranean allies to her annexation of the region of the Straits, including Constantinople. But for diplomatic reasons this was not made public in Russia, where Pan Slav enthusiasm had declined, until the beginning of December, 1916, and by that time the only fire burning in Russia was the Revolutionary one.

Russia emerged from a welter of defeat, civil war, and anarchy as a Communist dictatorship as much governed by a hook and as faithful to a prophet as were the Moslems in their first days of conquest. The Mediterranean victors were bled too white to impose their will on the Turks. The experiment of using the Greeks to do their work for them broke down disastrously and drove the Turks into the arms of the Russian Dictatorship. The Treaty of Sèvres died at birth. Now let me pass to the present and future of the Question of the Straits.

II

Different methods of solving the problem presented by the passage of a most important waterway linking two seas through a territory controlled by a single power have been attempted by three of the different groups interested in the solution. The Mediterraneans have generally worked for full freedom of the Straits to their commerce and to their warships. This is not to say that individual Mediterranean States have not attempted to obtain special advantages from the holders of the Straits, but human theory is not

always wedded to practice. The Byzantines or holders of the Straits have, on the other hand, worked for the strict control of such foreign commerce as used the waterway, and during the greater part of the historical period have aimed at reserving the trade within the Black Sea to their own merchant navy. The Turks, who in their day of power simply closed the two Straits, the Marmora and the Black Sea, to foreign commerce, regarded these seas and channels as reserved territorial waters; but they were only improving on the practice of the last strong Byzantine rulers, the Comneni, who allowed Italian trading ships to come up to Constantinople, but retained the monopoly of trade in foodstuffs in territorial waters and excluded foreign merchantmen from the Black Sea. The Turks, moreover, insisted to the last on the "ancient rule of the Empire in virtue of which it has at all times been forbidden for ships of war of foreign powers to enter the Straits." They insisted as long as they could insist on the closing of the Black Sea to foreign merchantmen. In 1700, when Peter the Great demanded the right of navigation on the Black Sea for his trading ships, he was told that the Black Sea was "a chaste virgin inaccessible to everybody."

Naturally these claims could only be enforced by a power formidable on land and sea, but even in their decadence the Turks fought for them. It took nearly three generations and four wars before the Russians obtained the right to use the Black Sea and the Straits for commercial navigation on the same footing as the chief Mediterranean Powers, to whom the Turks had given concessions in the hope of enlisting their support. On the ancient rule they stood firm until the signature of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833. There was much to be said for their firmness. If men had stuck to long bows and catapults it might have been possible to allow foreign fleets to pass through Turkish territorial waters and through what was, in fact, a high street of their capital. But the invention of gunpowder made it dangerous to grant such permission save to allies, and then only in exceptional circumstances such as were foreseen in the Treaty of London in 1840.

Now for the attitude of the Russians. They had reached the sea, but they were not at home on it. Their attitude throughout the nineteenth century and later suggests a complete lack of confidence in their ability to wage naval warfare or protect their commerce against any strong naval power. Goryainoff, the best Russian historian of the Question of the Straits, wrote: "For Russia the famous Eastern

Question may be summed up in the words—on what authority are the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles dependent? who holds that authority?" And he makes it clear that the last thing the Russians wanted was the opening of the Straits to war vessels of the Mediterranean Powers. What they seemed to have obtained from the Turks by the secret article of the Treaty of Alliance of Unkiar Skelessi was the exclusive right to pass through the Straits in either direction, while the Turks would impose the "ancient rule" on the warships of other powers. Palmerston defeated the Treaty by the Convention of London, in which the Sultan affirmed his resolution to maintain the "ancient rule." Then came the Crimean War, forced upon Russia and Great Britain by Napoleon III. and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; the Russians lost their Black Sea fleet and had to begin all over again.

Russian policy did not change—nor the Russians' bad luck. They denounced the Treaty of Paris in 1870; they began to build big iron-clads in the Black Sea in the early 80's, and by 1900 they had a numerically respectable Black Sea fleet. They established political *ententes* with the two chief Mediterranean Powers, first with France and, much later, when the Germans were becoming a formidable sea-power, with Great Britain. In 1911 they proposed to the Turkish Government an alliance on lines similar to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The British and French Governments having been sounded, informed the Porte that they would consent to this departure from the Rule of the Straits if the Porte agreed, but if it did not agree they would exercise no pressure on Turkey. Germany and Austria-Hungary strongly supported the Rule, and the Porte refused the Russian offer. But the Russians had learnt that in easily imagined circumstances they could count upon British and French support of their claim to the Straits. They obtained that support in March, 1915, even though the cession of Constantinople and the Straits must indispose three possible Balkan allies of the *Entente* in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece; Italy afterwards consented—but Russia fell.

Of the policy of the Austro-German or Danubian combination towards the Straits there is nothing to say. Until the War they supported the Turks in upholding the Rule. Had they won the War But they did not. Though it was abortive, the Treaty of Sèvres deserves more than passing mention. For the first time the idea of international control of navigation through the Straits was mooted, and there was much to be said for the assumption on which the Treaty was based—namely, that the retention of control over the

Straits and the Marmora by a single power was injurious to the general interest. The greater part of the European shore of the waterway was therefore to be ceded to Greece and the whole coastland of the Straits and Marmora with the islands near the Dardanelles was to form a special zone wherein only the three Mediterranean Powers, Britain, France, and Italy, were to maintain armed forces. The navigation of the waterways was to be open in peace and war to all ships and aircraft without distinction of flag. These waters were to be exempted from blockade or from any warlike operations save in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations. An international commission composed of representatives of the Great Powers, except Germany, and including the United States and Russia (should she join the League), of Greece, and of the Black Sea littoral powers other than Russia, if members of the League, was to control navigation within the Straits and would report any interference with the liberty of navigation to the representatives of the three Powers at Constantinople.

Now, little as the Turks or the excluded Germans or the Bolshevik Government of Russia liked this proposal, it must be said that, apart from certain obvious crudities—which would have been remedied in time—it did offer an international solution of a problem which had been found insoluble on purely national lines. The actual solution was very different. The Treaty of Lausanne extinguished the territorial guarantee provided by the division of sovereignty over the Straits area, as well as the military sanction placed in the hands of the three Mediterranean naval powers.

The shores of the Straits were demilitarized, but not the coasts of the Marmora, and the Turks may maintain a naval base at Constantinople. Warships and military aircraft retain complete freedom of passage in time of peace and, if neutral towards Turkey, in time of war, though neutral aircraft will be bound to alight to submit to investigation. The maximum force which any one power may send through the Straits into the Black Sea must not be greater than that of the strongest fleet of any one of the Black Sea Powers, and no squadron sent into the Black Sea shall exceed three ships in number, of which no ship shall displace more than 10,000 tons. The signatories, and in any case Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, acting in conjunction, agree to protect Turkey from any untoward consequences of the demilitarization of the Straits and to protect the freedom of navigation of the Straits and the security of the demilitarized

zones against attack or danger thereof by all means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for the purpose. The League is represented by the Straits Commission under the perpetual Presidency of the Turkish delegate and composed of the representatives of the four Black Sea Powers—Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan—the United States, Greece, and Yugoslavia. The Commission's business is to see that the Convention is duly observed and to report regularly to the League.

On paper it is not a very satisfactory settlement. So far as I can see the Commission, though charged *inter alia* with the supervision of the demilitarized zone, has no right of precautionary inspection of that zone; moreover, the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the European shore puts it in the power of the Turks to close the Straits if they are at war with a maritime power and are ready to take the risk of defying the League. On the other hand, Turkey has lately joined the League; her policy towards her neighbours and indeed generally has been increasingly pacific and reasonable. At present, if there is danger, it comes from Russia. Completely as that country has changed its political and economic shape, its foreign policy remains unchanged in the matter of the Straits. At Lausanne the Russian delegate urged that the Straits should be closed to all warships coming from any quarter and attempted to represent the Convention as a threat to Turkish independence; his Government had previously signed a Treaty with Turkey which provided *inter alia* that to guarantee the free commercial passage of the Straits a Conference of the riverain states of the Black Sea should draw up an international Statute governing the Black Sea and the Straits, and safeguarding the sovereignty and security of Turkey and her capital. Not Unkiar Skelessi, but a step towards that Treaty. However, neither the Bulgarians nor the Rumanians wished to be locked up with the Turks and the Russians; and at Lausanne even the Turks, though they disliked the limitations of their sovereignty imposed by the Convention, began to feel disturbed by the effusion with which Russia took up the defence of Turkish interests. The Russians retired protesting from the Conference. In 1923 they became a protesting party to the Convention. Still they never ratified it, and have not yet sent a representative to the Straits Commission. They supply the information required of them by that body through the Turkish delegate.

III

The Future

Any attempt to foretell the future development of the Straits Question must be speculative as long as there is complete uncertainty as to the direction in which Soviet Russia is moving and as long as a political and economic "small state confusion" prevails in the Danubian Basin. I will deal first with the Danubians. Without going into the minority problems raised and the ambitions left unsatisfied by the post-war treaties, I should like to point out that for the Austro-Hungarian Empire there has been substituted a group of states divided by sharp national jealousies and by ever-rising tariff walls.

The exploitation of the conflicting nationalisms of Eastern Europe by grammarians and General Staffs has furthered political disunion; the errors of Western Capitalism have produced general economic suffering in most of these states and equally in Bulgaria and Rumania, with the result that the peasant proprietor who, far more than the banker or the factory owner, is the bulwark of capitalism on the Continent, is being driven in the Communist direction in sheer despair. The possibility of a return of the Hapsburgs or of some sort of economic alliance between industrial Central Europe and agricultural Eastern Europe may disturb many politicians, but without some such unifying force the Danubians, who should have a say in the solution of the Straits Problem, remain powerless. As to Russia, I would submit that we do not know where she is going, because we do not know the real intentions of the present leaders of the Russian Communist Party. It may be argued that the Five Year Plan has been adopted because Stalin and his group have come to the conclusion that the world Revolution is as far off as ever, and wish to divert the hopes and energies of the young Communists from Messianic dreams to the herculean task of industrializing Russia. Some observers interpret the better treatment of technical experts, the wide introduction of the system of piecework and of unequal wages and other changes as a sign of a diplomatic return towards capitalism. Moses, they hint, is leading his people back to the fleshpots of Egypt and hopes that the Red Sea will not be too rough. One cannot help feeling that in all this the wish is father to the theory. It is equally possible that the Russian Communist leaders are simply stepping back a bit for a running jump; that the concessions they have made are

merely tactical; that the younger Communists, brought up in blinkers, fanatical and ignorant of conditions outside Russia, may yet ask their rulers to "show value" and to "get on with the world Revolution" which never begins. A slow return towards capitalism should mean—I do not say it will mean—an improvement in Russian foreign relations and a greater chance of a fair settlement of the Straits Question. The growth and intensification of Communism will produce the contrary result.

Meanwhile, I would like to emphasize five points concerning the attitude of Russia towards the Straits.

I. The economically important regions of Russia lie for the most part in reach of air attack from the Straits or from bases on the Black Sea littoral. These are the great cornfields of the Ukraine and its grain depots; the Don coalfield; the Baku oilfield. It is possible that the range of aircraft may be sufficiently increased to bring the arsenals on the lower Volga and even the metallurgical industry in the Urals into the danger zone. This furnishes the Soviet Government with reasons for endeavouring to do away with any arrangement like the present one, which admits the stronger naval powers into the Black Sea in peace and war and for endeavouring to make Turkey into an ally or a vassal.

II. If Russian foreign trade improves, the greater part of it will, as formerly, pass through the Straits, giving the Soviet Government an additional reason for desiring to control their shores directly and indirectly, but at the same time furnishing other powers with reasons against attempting to control the Straits in an anti-Russian sense, an attempt which would result in an explosion.

III. Whatever the value of the Russian army and air force—the Red navy is not good—there can be no question that the Five Year Plan will give Russia greater power of manufacturing munitions, arms, and other war material than she previously possessed.

IV. Given the defensive power conferred on a nation with a weak fleet by torpedo-carrying aeroplanes, submarines, and mines, it appears improbable that any maritime nation hostile to Russia would risk its fleet in the Black Sea until it was assured of at least the friendly neutrality of Turkey and preferably of the friendship and alliance of Turkey.

V. The incident of January, 1930, when two of the strongest Russian warships from the Baltic entered the Straits without notifying the Straits Commission, but unquestionably with Turkish foreknow-

ledge and consent, showed that the Russian Government could, if it pleased, increase the strength of its Black Sea fleet and thus disturb the balance of naval power in the Black Sea and potentially in the Eastern Mediterranean without any contravention of the present Straits Convention.

The feelings of the Turks towards the Straits Commission are mixed. Turkish *amour propre* is offended by the restrictions imposed at present on Turkey by the Straits Convention and by the activities of the international Straits Commission in her territorial waters. So far, however, her leaders have taken the practical view, and have not forgotten that the representation of the Mediterranean sea-powers on this body may be a safeguard rather than a danger. League Membership may strengthen this feeling. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the capital of Turkey is no longer on the Bosphorus, and that, if Russia sought to reach some formal agreement with Turkey on the lines of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the sentimental objection to this would be less strong than in Sultan Mahmud's days. But whatever may happen when the great General and reformer who rules Turkey is no more, there seems little likelihood of any Turkish adventure while he lives. The Turks are, and wish to continue, on good terms with Russia, but this is but common prudence on their part. They are members of the League, but who could blame them if they doubted the readiness of the powers composing the League to assist them in case of a Russian movement into Kurdistan in spite of collective resolutions at Geneva? And they have to remember too that not only Constantinople, but also Angora and Eskişehir, are in reach of long-range bombers from the Crimea. At the same time a very natural respect for Russian strength and a kindly recollection of the aid given by the Soviets to Turkey in 1919-1922 will not persuade the Turks, an independent and proud people, to follow blindly in the Russian wake. If they do it will be through ambition rather than fear; but the example of moderation shown by the Ghazi after his astonishing success in 1922 is not likely to be lost on the present generation in Turkey. Still, who can say by what hands the sword of Osman will be wielded when the Ghazi joins Cromwell and Napoleon?

Finally, what of the Mediterraneans, ourselves included and indeed first? How do the Straits interest us? Doubly, because a hostile power or combination of powers holding the Straits could threaten our most direct line of communications with the East and with

Australia and New Zealand, perhaps the Suez Canal, almost certainly our air route to the Persian Gulf and India, and quite certainly the Mosul oilfields, which may before long become the chief source of our supplies of naval fuel; and also because as members of the League we might be called upon to resist aggression from the Black Sea aiming directly or indirectly against the Straits. Such aggression might not take the shape of official warfare—although during the last year we have seen warfare without a declaration of war in China and a war in all but name is raging in South America—but it might stir the League



to more genuine activity than the Manchurian troubles or the quarrel between distant Bolivia and Paraguay, and I doubt whether the most pacific British Government could look unmoved at a Russian advance into Anatolia or the Balkans.

What then should British policy be in the matter of the Straits? Clearly support of the present Convention, for though it is an imperfect instrument it would not be easy to modify it and "*le mieux est toujours l'ennemi du bien*"; also the maintenance of friendly relations with Turkey, with Greece, now friends, and with Bulgaria and Rumania. And if something on a large scale is needed, why should we not support some Central European economic combination between the agricultural and the industrial states? Would such a combination guaranteeing the German cereal and cattle market to the Danubian peasant and guaranteeing the German industrialist a market for his

wares from Austria to the Black Sea do us any real harm? Would it not rather stabilize economic conditions in a part of Europe where economic distress is the chief cause of the political malaise that is alarming every good European? Of the other Mediterranean, the French, though less interested in the Question of the Straits than we are, must nevertheless be affected by any untoward development. They have an ally in Rumania, the most exposed of the Balkan states; like us, they have large commercial interests in the Levant; their Asiatic Empire and Madagascar are of high importance in their national economy; they are likely to retain a hold on the Lebanon, whatever happens to Syria proper, and they have a share in the Mosul oil.

Admiral Sir RICHARD WEBB: I am entirely in agreement with everything that our lecturer has said. At the same time, speaking as a sailor, I should like to underline the point about the threat to our line of communication to India and the East—the threat from the Dardanelles. So long as there is a strong ruler in Turkey, so long there will be no threat, but one must remember that European countries have difficulty in seeing eye to eye on Near Eastern questions. There is evidence of this forthcoming almost every day. We squabble amongst ourselves, and seem to forget that so long as Russia is the enormous question-mark that she is to-day, the threat to our Empire is a very grave one indeed.

I do not think we take it quite gravely enough, because it does not stick out quite as much as it should. We have so many other difficulties to solve, but Mr. Graves has made it clear that the threat is tremendously grave, and will continue so long as a solution is not forthcoming.

The difficulty does behave us if we can to put our personal claims and our little personal rights in the Near East on one side, and to try to come together as a real League of Nations, so that we shall be united, when the time comes that the strong leader goes, and ready to meet the threat that may arise should Russia try to solve the problem of the Dardanelles in the way that she tried unsuccessfully before, that is by the solution of the sword.

Captain ARMSTRONG: I would not have had the temerity to speak here this afternoon if I had not been invited. I accepted because I hoped to have the opportunity of heckling Mr. Philip Graves. As you

know, Philip Graves is a member of *The Times'* staff and, like a parson in his pulpit, he can say whatever he likes and we cannot answer him back. I thought that today I would have the chance to get at him, but in reality, having heard his speech, I find nothing on which I can heckle him, and I can only give him my sincerest thanks.

Now the Straits are the neck of a bottle—and a bottle which is not merely the Black Sea but all those vast countries behind it—Bulgaria to the Crimea, and the Black Earth lands beyond, away to the Caucasus with its oil, and even away to Baku and Krasnovodsk and the Oxus. There are other ways out of the bottle. There is the way from Van down to Alexandretta, and by Bessarabia to Salonika, and by the Slav Road across to Fiume. But these routes are all extremely difficult, and the real neck and outlet to the bottle is by the Straits.

That bottle is today filled with the most explosive force known to mankind—nations in all stages of development coming near to the starvation line.

There are in the world sufficient necessities, and even some of the luxuries, for everybody; but while corn is being destroyed in New York, fish thrown away in the North Sea, and cattle killed and buried in the Argentine, there is a shortage of bread, fish, and meat in many parts of the world. The means of production have been vastly increased, but the means of distribution are breaking down. The roads of distribution have been blocked artificially and deliberately by tariffs and laws.

The Straits are one of the great roads of distribution of the wealth of the world, and it is from this aspect that I am asking you to consider this question.

Today the Turks control the Straits. You may imagine that this is done by the Straits Commission, but the Straits Commission is a farce.

The Turks treat the Straits not as though they were the international guardians of one of the great roads of distribution of food and wealth, but as a fortress to be defended, a military possession, and a door to be slammed in the face of anyone with whom they disagree. They hold the Straits by the right of conquest—for they defeated not only the Greeks, but they chased us all out, the Italians and French and the British.

They have, moreover, no conception of the value and wealth of the Straits. Constantinople has been emptied while Athens and Salonika have their harbours full. The Turks, by their foolish laws imposed

without due consideration as to the result, by their custom and stevedore regulations, have made trade impossible, and by their unconcealed dislike of foreigners a state of insecurity. They treat Constantinople as a city of traitors because the Sultan was there, because it is full of Christians, because it has opposed Angora. They dare not come to Constantinople for fear of the Great Nations, and they have become essentially a land-state, with the Straits only as an annex.

Now many of us believe that an individual has no right to handle his personal wealth in such a way as to hold up trade, but we know that it is an international crime to allow the Straits, which affect the prosperity of millions, to be controlled in this fashion.

As to the future of Turkey. Some of you may have read, or even heard, Ismet Pasha talk about the industrialization of Turkey—how one day Turkey will be full of factories and smoking chimneys and hundreds of thousands of workers and great streams of gold flowing in to make Turkey rich and great. We have in English a word "bosh." The Turks have a perfectly good Tartar word which means empty or futile or "bosh." What Ismet says is "bosh," and for three very good reasons. Firstly, it will take many generations before the good, sturdy Turkish peasant develops the factory mentality. I pray that he will never develop it. If Ismet, and Stalin too, would do a tour in Lancashire or along the Tyneside I doubt whether they would talk so glibly about industrialization. Secondly, because Turkey has not the necessities of creating a factory-country. Thirdly, because the Turks are so far behind, and even if they produced the best products in factories there is no one who wants to buy them.

Turkey, if she is to succeed, will not be a great industrial nation; she will be a peasant state and a small and poor peasant state at that.

Accept that fact and face the future. The nations in the bottle behind the Straits will once again be great and rich and expanding. Russia, Bolshevik or National, will demand its way out into the warm, rich southern sea. The little Turkish peasant state will be the porter on the door.

You or your children will have to decide whether you will help the porter to close the gate. Whether with one hand you will give up India and with the other you spend millions and perhaps fight a war to keep the road to India open.

I am lecturing here on November 16. I will tell you then what I consider should be your answer. I shall have one great advantage. I am nearing middle-age, and someone has said, "The advantage of

being a middle-aged reformer or prophet is that one is unlikely to see one's reforms or prophecies."

The CHAIRMAN closed with a warm vote of thanks to Mr. Graves for one of the most stimulating lectures the Society had had, and hoped Mr. Armstrong would develop the points touched on when he lectured. The subject was one which needed the closest study if difficult complications and last-minute decisions were to be avoided.

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A TOUR THROUGH AFGHANISTAN*

By J. C. FRENCH, I.C.S.

NO doubt there are ladies and gentlemen here to-day who are well acquainted with Afghanistan, but there may be others who do not know it so well, so perhaps I had better start by mentioning a few salient facts about the country. In size, Afghanistan is larger than France. On its eastern and southern frontiers it has the British Empire, on its western Persia, and on its northern Soviet Russia. Compared to Europe, its northern limit is about level with Athens; its capital, Kabul, is Cyprus; and its southern limit is Cairo.

Alexander the Great invaded India through Afghanistan, and twelve centuries later came the Moslem invaders, who gave Afghanistan her present religion.

Through the succeeding centuries Afghanistan—or, at any rate, the Kabul Valley—maintained the connection with India which, either as rulers or ruled, had come down from the distant past. It was not until the nineteenth century, when Ranjit Singh captured Peshawar from the Afghans, that the frontier assumed its present form and Afghanistan was definitely cut off from all connection with India. Our three wars with Afghanistan bring us down to 1919, and ten years later came “the troubles,” as they are called in Afghanistan to-day, which intervened between the fall of the ex-King Amanullah and the accession of the present king, H.M. King Nadir Shah.


I entered Afghanistan by the Khyber Pass and went to Jalalabad, and from there over the Jagdalak Pass to Kabul.

From Kabul I went north to Charikar and then west to Herat and north again to the Ak Pass. I came back by the same way and then went south from Kabul to Ghazni and Kalat-i-Ghilzai to Kandahar. From Kandahar I went across the Argandab and Helmand to Gushik and Farah and then north to Sabzewar and Herat. I came back the same way to Kandahar and from there I went south to Chaman, in British Baluchistan, where I left Afghanistan. I travelled

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 19, 1932, Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the Chair.

everywhere by motor. My route from Kandahar to Herat was along the exact line of Alexander's invasion of India, so I was literally travelling in the footsteps of Alexander.

As we have a long journey before us, I shall hurry over the journey from Khyber to Kabul. But I must mention the kind hospitality of the British Minister and Mrs. Fraser-Tytler at the British Legation. The bazaar inside Kabul City is most picturesque. The rich and deep, yet vivid, tints of the Central Asian china and cloths make a picturesque setting, but what particularly attracted my notice was the



The general positions are indicated on the above map, not precise internal details.

pose of one of the shopkeepers. For all that he was a Son of the Prophet and an orthodox follower of Islam, the way that he sat there gave an exact picture of a statue of Buddha. Knees outstretched, hands crossed, body easily upright, complete passivity of facial expression, and in the eyes a look strange, remote, and aloof, as though the sitter were gazing through and beyond the spectator at something immeasurably remote in space and time; the whole attitude was that of the Buddha approaching Nirvana. It is from this region of Afghanistan and its neighbourhood that the earliest representations of Buddha come. They are in stone, and there has been much controversy as to

whether they have not really to be attributed to a Greek origin. But anyone who has seen this teashop keeper in the Shau Ruz of Kabul City has little doubt as to the indigenous origin of the pose of the seated Buddha. My photograph does not do justice to the original as I first saw him. In place of profound absorption, there is to a very slight degree, but still present, the somewhat self-conscious and strained expression which every conscious victim of the camera displays.

This talk of the living Buddha leads naturally to my next destination in the Hindu Kush Mountains—Bamian, the place of the stone Buddhas.

I left Kabul by the northern road. Thirty-five miles from Kabul a road branches off to the north-west to Gulbahar, twelve miles away. It is in this direction that the Hindu Kush can be crossed at its lowest point. The driver of my lorry was a Sikh, and he told me that in the mountains above Gulbahar there is a shrine which marks the place of a visit from Nanak, the founder of the Sikh religion, more than 400 years ago. Leaving this road on my right, I went north to Charikar, from there I turned west via Ghorband to the northern side of the Safed Koh, "White Mountains," to see Bamian, the place of ancient Buddhist sculptures, in the heart of the Hindu Kush. As the road goes on it passes and passes again through terrific gorges. I remember one in particular, thirty-seven miles from Bamian, a wild brown gateway with the rocks almost meeting overhead. To the right was a precipitous rock carved by wind and snow to an almost exact resemblance of a castle, while to the left was a really complete counterpart of a mediæval tower in the rock.

As one approached Bamian the colours of the rocks, always strangely variegated in the Hindu Kush, became positively kaleidoscopic—pink, red, brown, blue, slate grey, and yellow. In the cliffs were caves used as houses.

It is impossible to imagine more magnificent prospects than those disclosed on both sides of Bamian Valley. To the north are the cliffs, which contained the colossal statues of Buddha, one of them 120 feet high. They are not less than fifteen centuries old. Above the cliffs of the colossal statues lies the main range of the Hindu Kush Mountains, culminating in snow-capped peaks. To the south is a view of the great Safed Koh range, the southern branch of the Hindu Kush, also presenting a great white wall of snow.

It is astonishing that so much of Buddhist art has survived here, considering that the last fanatical idol breaker to try his strength on

the statues was the Mogul Emperor Aurangzeb, less than three centuries ago. The marks of his artillery can still be seen on rock face and on the statues. Their massive constructions and the remoteness of the locality alone preserved them from destruction in the stormy sea of Mohammedan fanaticism which has for so many centuries raged round them. But under the present enlightened rule of Afghanistan these ancient cultural relics are at last secure.

The people who live in Bamian belong to the Hazara tribe. Their features, though still of an Indian type, have a certain Mongolian suggestion.

From Bamian I was taken seventeen miles up the road to the Ak village and pass, the boundary of Kabulistan and Afghan Turkestan, at present the limit to which one can motor. This road is the main route to Mazar-i-Sharif, the capital of the northern province of Afghanistan, and from Mazar-i-Sharif it goes on to the river Oxus and Bokhara and "silken Samarkand." It is hoped to make it motorable up to the Oxus next year. Such a statement was made yearly under the régime of the late King Amanullah, but I venture to think that it means much more under the present Government of Afghanistan, and I shall not be surprised if motors are travelling from Kabul to the Oxus in 1933. It is interesting to note that even in this remote spot the progressive policy of the Government is being actively carried out. I was told that 30,000 men had been employed on the road this year. At Ak the Himalayas and India are definitely left behind and one arrives in Central Asia. There is no longer a question of merely a Mongolian *suggestion* in faces, for the villagers are pure Mongols. The headman had a perfectly smooth face, destitute of a single hair, and others had long thin moustaches like the traditional picture of a Chinaman. The country also ceases to be Himalayan and becomes Central Asian. In place of wild ravines and jagged edges are rounded hills and smooth ascents. The word *Ak* is also revealing. It means "white" in the Turkish language of Central Asia, while *Safed*, the "White" on the White Mountains, Safed Koh, just to the south of it, is a Persian-Hindustani word. I had been brought to Ak to see the fishing there. The river consisted of a small snow stream, narrower than a Scotch Highland trout burn, and with an even faster current. The fishing consisted in one man standing in the icy water and holding a basket towards the current, while another man waded downstream towards him poking the water under the banks with a stick to stir up the snow trout and drive them into the basket. To catch anything in this way

seemed to me to require an unusually obliging disposition on the part of the quarry, but I was told that they sometimes got small fish.

From Bamian I came back to Kabul, and then took the southern road leading to Kandahar. Fifteen miles down this road I turned west and went into the mountains for twenty miles to Ser Chasma (Head Spring), a pleasant place with a number of streams flowing among poplars. The real source of the Kabul River is the Ubai Pass in the mountains above Ser Chasma, and it is interesting to see the brown snow water flowing down from it mingle with the clear and sparkling streams from the springs. But the place shown as the source of the Kabul River to visitors is a small tank some twelve feet square, filled with fish and continually replenished by a mountain stream. Ser Chasma is a favourite place for picnics from Kabul. I returned to the main road and resumed my way to Kandahar. After five miles or so the road rose into a high upland and I had a fine farewell view of the Hindu Kush. The way ran along a broad green valley with hills on either side. I was reminded of Inverness-shire. A clear atmosphere, a cool breeze, and a blue sky made as perfect a day as can be imagined. In the afternoon the high walls of Ghazni came in view, and I noticed the resemblance to the old Mogul forts in India in the way in which houses are placed on the top of towers and battlements. This is one example of the way in which one is continually reminded of India in Afghanistan. I was hospitably entertained in a pleasant bungalow to the west of the city. The town of Ghazni is now but a shadow of its former greatness in the days when the "Idol Breaker," Mahmud, made it his headquarters for his invasions of India. The walls of Ghazni are of mud-covered brick, with towers of the same material. In the city are narrow covered bazaars meeting in a central covered cross-roads. Ghazni is on the borders of the Ghilzai country, and the wild tribesmen were all round me. Picturesque, quaint, fresh, queer-looking bearded fellows and wild-looking youths gazed at me with a somewhat perturbed though not unfriendly astonishment. The variety and novelty of the human types were the main elements of interest in Ghazni; the town is the poorest I saw in Afghanistan, the shops and the goods in them were drab and ordinary. The only industry is blanket making. Nowadays all trade in Afghanistan is pulled either northward or southward—to Soviet Russia or British India—and so Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Herat have plenty of trade; the central position of Ghazni, which formerly made it important, is now a disadvantage. But the coming of the motor-car,

which has arrived so recently that it has not had time to make its influence fully felt, may alter things, and restore to Ghazni the advantages of its central position.

After walking through Ghazni City I visited the tomb of the famous Mahmud of Ghazni, the world-renowned conqueror, invader of India, and "idol breaker." Mahmud did more than any other man to smash a line through Hindu defence and pave the way for the Mohammedan empire in India. The tomb is two miles west of Ghazni City. On the way are two towers built by Mahmud; they are minarets, built for the Muezzin to proclaim the hour of prayer. They are decorated with a simple arabesque design, but have sugar-loaf tin roofs—a modern addition. These towers are interesting as the most ancient Mohammedan monuments in Afghanistan. They date from the eleventh century. On the way also is the tomb of Sultan Sabuktigin, father of Mahmud. It is a graceful, white building of cement on mud-covered brick, and has been so much renovated and restored that in appearance it is quite modern.

Mahmud's tomb lies inside a walled town which is said to have been the original Ghazni City, while the present city was used as a gaol for criminals. The probability is that when Ghazni was a capital and a great political and military centre, the city included both places, and the two miles of desert and barren hillside which now divide them were a mass of lanes and houses. Mahmud's tomb is an ordinary domed building in a garden laid out in the old Indian style. It is built of mud-covered brick, and the general impression it gives is the same as that of Sultan Sabuktigin's tomb—namely, that it has been restored and renovated to such an extent that it has failed to retain much trace of its original character. When I arrived a Malang fakir was wandering round giving vent to his devotion by loud cries. He wore a garland of flowers and a classical fillet of parti-coloured silk round his forehead and carried a heavy truncheon. These Malang fakirs are wandering Mohammedan ascetics, devoted to a religious life. They are to be found all over Afghanistan; I met some more in Herat, and some of them come from Baluchistan in British India. When this one saw me he stopped his howling for a moment and offered me a rose as a welcome. He was a picturesque figure, and I asked if I might photograph him. In reply he gave me another rose and with a howl rushed away. However, a gigantic young Ghilzai tribesman, standing well over six-foot-six, kindly posed against the tomb building when I took it. He was holding a rose in his

hand, like the figure of some old Indian Mogul painting. There are two headless stone lions at the door of the tomb from some old Hindu or Buddhist temple; the Idol Breaker decapitated them and set them in their present place as a perpetual sign and monument of his victory over the gods of the Unbelievers. Just outside the town I saw another relic of the old Hindu days—a broken Makara or lion-headed water-spout, through which water was flowing.

On the way back I met some Hindus going for an evening stroll outside the city. Merchants and moneylenders, they are to be found in every city and large town in Afghanistan. All banking and much piece-goods business are in their hands.

In the evening the setting sun shone on Ghazni Fort, framing it in the blood and gold associated with the city's name, and throwing it up in magnificent height above the city. Ghazni stands in a wide fertile plain. "The land here is good, better than the people," as my motor driver pithily remarked. For the Ghilzais who inhabit these parts have the reputation of preferring theft and brigandage to hard work, and tracts of uncultivated land seemed to bear out this assertion. But the steady progress of motor road and telephone under the present régime must have its inevitable effect in diminishing the "romance" of the older days, as robbery and brigandage are sometimes called.

At every stage of fifteen miles down the road to Kandahar there is a fortified caravanserai—a square of mud-covered brick walls, with the corners rounded like towers, and one strong gate for entry. Inside there are rooms all round the walls, forming a square or court, in which the animals of the caravans—camels, horses, and mules—are tethered for the night. This is a scene that in space can be seen repeatedly far through Central Asia, and in time goes back indefinitely through the centuries. Abraham and the earliest Pharaohs could have used such hostelry. The "inn" of our Gospels was indeed one of them. It is a curious thing that in every caravanserai there is a white cat. My attention was drawn to this fact one night when one of these animals climbed into my room and tried to steal my food.

South-east of Ghazni is a region called Zurmat, a name reminiscent of Switzerland. After Ghazni the road ran through high and barren country until the watershed was reached. The stream flowing north reaches the Kabul River and eventually the Indus and the Indian Ocean. The stream flowing south joins the Argandab and through it the Helmand, and its eventual goal is lost in the swamps in the deserts of the Persian province of Seistan. At 10.15 a.m. I reached

Kalat-i-Ghilzai, which consists of a fort on a hill with a village street below. Though 5,500 feet above sea-level, it was hot. It is, of course, lower than Ghazni, which is 7,000 feet high. Below it I crossed a small stream by a queer old bridge, with an arch of the type seen in old fifteenth-century buildings in India and known in that country as the Pathan style. After Kalat-i-Ghilzai, as the road descends, the verdure vanished and the country became dry and brown like Arabia. The hills were soon left behind and we entered the great Kandahar plain. At 1 p.m. the walls of Kandahar City began to loom into view, and by 2 p.m. I was in the British Consulate in that city.

Kandahar City is in the form of a square surrounded by a wall with gates and towers. From each of the four principal gates, which represent the four points of the compass, a broad straight road runs to the Charsau (cross-roads), as the centre of the city is called. This Charsau is roofed over, but the broad roads leading up to it are open; indeed, they are too broad to roof, and one of them is a boulevard with trees. In no other city or town in Afghanistan have I seen such broad roads. The shops in Kandahar resemble those of Jalalabad in being full of the produce of British India. It comes up by motor-lorry from Chaman, the British railhead in Baluchistan seventy miles to the south. From Kandahar to India there is a big fruit trade—grapes, peaches, and apricots, both fresh and dried.

I was lucky to see Afghan towns with their walls and gates still intact, as there are proposals to demolish them, since they are considered an obstacle to the proper ventilation of the towns and to be no protection against modern weapons of war.

The chief public buildings in Kandahar were constructed about thirty years ago by the governor, General Mahomed Osman Khan. The style is pleasing and some of the domes and minarets have a graceful line. The builder, in the "troubles" of 1929, was one of the last men to be hanged by the "Water Carrier's Son," Bacha Sakao, before that brigand usurper went the way of his many victims.

The principal monument in Kandahar is the tomb of Ahmad Shah Durani, lieutenant of the famous Persian King, Nadir Shah, and founder of the Durani dynasty of Afghan kings. It is a large mosque-like building, similar to others of the same period in India. Near it is a very sacred shrine, which contains a piece of the mantle of the Prophet. This place is so sacred that it is an asylum for criminals. I saw three men who had taken asylum there. They were not very desperate criminals. Two were in debt and dodging their creditors,

and the third had accidentally killed a child while driving a motor-lorry and was waiting for the parents to come to terms. The present enlightened Governor of Kandahar, General Mahomed Gul Khan, has a great dislike of this right of sanctuary, and endeavours to restrict it as much as possible. But he considers, and probably wisely, that Afghan public opinion is hardly sufficiently advanced to make its total abolition advisable just yet awhile. I had an interview with this gentleman in the evening, in the Governor's house built by his murdered predecessor. General Mahomed Gul Khan is a Mohmand, the son of a landowner in the Afghan territory which adjoins the British frontier north of the Khyber country. His personality is most impressive. He is zeal and earnestness personified, and the key to his character is the depth and sincerity of his Afghan patriotism. His great desire is for peace, and he hopes that civilization will abolish wars and give Afghanistan a chance to progress. He said: "If by the blessing of God there should be peace for twenty years, the future of Afghanistan will be safe." He is a great believer in the making of roads, the old Roman instrument of civilization. I asked him if he was fond of shooting, and he replied in a serious tone: "I never fired twenty shots in my life for pleasure."

Until he assumed his present post he was an officer in the Afghan Army. The conversation was in Persian, but as we left, the Governor's aide-de-camp replied to our farewell "Salaam" with "Bon soir."

This Governor has been most successful in establishing peace and order in his province. When he arrived last year the tribesmen were playing some games on the road of a rather old-fashioned kind—shooting drivers and robbing motors. The Governor dealt with the situation promptly. He had the criminals caught, tried, sentenced, and hanged in public at the gates of Kandahar City. Robbery under arms ceased like magic.

Outside Kandahar I visited the Chehil Zina ("Forty Steps"). This consists of a cave carved out of the solid rock at the top of a hill so steep that it can only be climbed by cut steps. Hence the name, though the steps are more than forty in number. The wall of the cave is covered with inscriptions recording the victories of Baber, conqueror and first Mogul Emperor of India. A mass of Indian place names are to be found among them, including Agra, Gwalior, Delhi, Chitor, Muttra, Paniput, Lahore. They were written some four centuries ago. The cave itself is vastly more ancient, and the two headless monolithic lions on either side of the platform outside indicate that it was origin-

ally a Buddhist shrine. This place is about two miles south-west of Kandahar, and just beyond it is the site of the old city of Kandahar. This old city, which is said to have been in existence in the time of Alexander the Great, has been a mass of ruins since it was sacked by Nadir Shah, King of Persia, two hundred years ago. But it is still possible to trace out the design of the city—gates, walls, main streets, and, in particular, the fort or citadel on a steep hill overhanging the city. This citadel bears an unmistakable resemblance to a Greek acropolis, and supports the tradition of its ancient origin.

On the way from Kandahar to the Chehil Zina one passes a number of whitewashed posts, marking the site of the late King Amanullah's proposed new city. His fall in 1929 prevented this utterly unnecessary extravagance.

I visited the shrine of Syed Babarwali, a Mohammedan ascetic of 150 years ago, five miles west of Kandahar. Near it is the rocky hill called Babarwali's Elephant, on account of its shape. It was in this locality that Lord Roberts won his victory in the Second Afghan War fifty years ago. From the shrine there is a fine view of the Argandab river and valley, a mass of trees and orchards as far as the eye can reach. This is where the fruit which is the mainstay of Kandahar trade is produced. It is most unusual to see such a mass of green in Afghanistan.

After I had been a couple of days at Kandahar I heard about a Hindu place of pilgrimage called Sheu Bolan, ten miles south-east of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. A Hindu shrine in Afghanistan, a proverbially fanatically Moslem country, was a sufficiently strong inducement by itself, but I was promised other wonders. I was told that a narrow entrance led inside a hill to great caves which contained images of the Hindu gods, including snakes (Naga) and a man milking a cow (Krishna). There was said to be an underground waterfall and a pond so deep that a Hindu ascetic who went into it came out in the Ganges in far-off Hindustan. I was naturally most anxious to visit the place, and so I started off in a car early. When we got to Kalat-i-Ghilzai I called at the office of the *Hakim*. The *Hakim* was away, but I met his *Vakil*, a fine-looking man with delicate, clean-cut features reminiscent of a bronzed Frenchman. The Governor of Kandahar had kindly sent word that we were coming, and the *Vakil* most hospitably supplied us with a guide. With a "Khuda Hafiz" (God protect you) from the *Vakil* as a farewell, we started off for the Hindu shrine in the heart of the Ghilzai country. For six miles we went along a

tolerable track until we came to the village of Lurgar. Here we had to turn off into open country, and four very rough miles brought us to the village of Asham Khel. The way will soon be improved, as the Governor of Kandahar is making a road for the convenience of Hindu pilgrims. The villagers of Asham Khel brought out milk and Afghan bread, and after refreshment we went to the caves. A small hole in the hillside led to a steep tunnel, down which I clambered like a miner upon hands and knees, for some forty feet, and then came to some large stalactite caves with a pool in one of them. I could see no real carving, but a little scratching here and there. But the place was certainly a natural curiosity.

I quickly reached the Argandab River, and found men wading it waist deep and sheep swimming. But it was too deep for my car, which had to cross on the ferry boat. The country looked to me a desert at the time, but in this respect it was nothing to what I saw further on, and I remember that on the way back it looked comparatively fertile and cultivated. Eighteen miles west of the Argandab River I saw a herd of gazelle. Further on in a barren tract I saw the ruins of a house. I was puzzled why anyone should live in such a waterless place, but the explanation was that thieves lived there in the old days. Not far on, at a place called Yakau, I saw a building which had been put up for an ice factory in King Amanullah's time. There was no water there either. A more amazing site for any sort of factory, let alone an ice factory, it would be hard to discover. The horizon to the north of our route was bounded by the mountains of Central Afghanistan, and up there lay the district of Maiwand, where a British brigade suffered a defeat in the war of 1880. To the south lay a desert which stretched to British Baluchistan and Persian Seirvan.

At 5 p.m. we reached the swift-flowing Helmand, and crossed on the ferry boat. Once over we soon reached the village of Girishk, where the *Hakim* received us most hospitably and gave us a pleasant lodging in a house in a garden. All round the village and on both sides of the Helmand there are mounds and ruins which indicate the existence of ancient buildings, and as all this country is directly on the line of Alexander the Great's invasion of India, excavations would yield rich results. The inhabitants of Girishk are Nurzais, a branch of the great Abdali tribe, from whom the royal Afghan house of the Duranis are derived. After Girishk, a thirty-five miles waterless stretch brought us to some small hills and a pleasant little stream, with good grazing. A camel caravan was taking advantage of it. The loads

were arranged in a circle and the animals were grazing, while the men strolled about making thread from camel's hair on sticks. It is usual to talk of waterless tracts in these parts as *desert*, but they are not really so, as there is no sand or salt. The soil is hard, dry, pebbly ground, similar to that known as *Pat* in British India, and which the Sukkur Barrage scheme is now developing in Sind. Irrigation would make these Afghan lands equally fertile. Nothing but water is wanted, and with the presence of swift-flowing hill streams and rivers and mountains not far away, it does not require much gift of prophecy to forecast that in the future great developments may be expected. Meanwhile, this *Pat* provides an ideal natural motoring road, where unbroken by water-courses forty miles an hour is possible.

In this waterless region west of Girishk I saw several herds of gazelle. The track was marked by the bones of animals in true desert style. Here and there the slopes of small hills were covered with a small purple flower, which in the distance gave the effect of heather.

Eight miles further on, beyond the first stream after Girishk, we came to the Talkak caravanserai. There is a fine spring of fresh water beside it, and on the rock above is a Persian inscription of the minister of the first Afghan King, Ahmed Shah Durani. Thirty miles further on we come to Dilaram (Heart's Ease), a small river flowing south from the Thieves' Mountain, ten miles to the north. Formerly, as the name indicates, thieves made the mountain their den for attacking the Kandahar-Herat caravans. In the bed of the river was a mass of vegetation, grass and bushes, a relief to the eye after the dull brown of the desert. The clear, sparkling waters of the small river were full of fish, and altogether the place was worthy of its name, "Heart's Ease." On the western bank above the place where the road crossed the river is a caravanserai in the usual style, a square courtyard, bounded by a high wall, with a single strong gate for entrance.

The feature of the Dilaram, which gives its whole significance and character, and, indeed, its name, is the cool, swift-flowing mountain stream on which it stands and which makes it an oasis in the desert. Such places make one understand the enthusiasm in the classics for fountains, springs, and streams.

Dilaram, in the days before the Mohammedans invaded Afghanistan, is said to have been the castle of an old Hindu king, and certainly there are ruins about the place.

About half a mile to the north-east of the caravanserai there is

a ruined building with small arches. It cannot be rebuilt, for whatever work is done in the day falls down in the night. The story is that in the old days a chief named Sadi Khan lived there and was loved by a fair woman from the north, and the story of their love is like that of Laila and Majnun. A Hindu woman lived there, and her dark southern daughter also loved Sadi Khan. There was a tragedy, and the house fell with its master, and the memory of what happened is so strong that it cannot be rebuilt.

After "Heart's Ease" came another forty miles, dry except for two or three streams at long intervals. At the caravanserai known as Sultan Bakwat Ziarat, the only water available was stagnant water from a ditch. Near here I saw an imperial grouse, a fine big bird, the sunlight emphasizing its colours, bright and dark brown. Other typical desert incidents were some locusts being blown into the car and a mirage of pools of water in the distance.

At Aiau, three marches from Farah, I was struck by the strongly marked Semitic character of the features of the villagers, recalling the claim of some Afghan tribes to be Ben-i-Israel, one of the lost tribes of the Jews.

The next town was Farah. The old city walls and gates are intact, but everything inside is in a state of absolute ruin. Farah is a remote place, two hundred and seventy miles from the nearest railway stations of Kushk in the north and Chaman in the south-east. Quaint old-world sights were around one—two men riding one horse, and an old man, with a long white beard, riding a cow. The last reminded me of an old Chinese painting of the Sung or Yuan period. The Farah Bazaar, where the shops are and the business is done, is a square enclosure with a high wall round it like a fort. We went in by a gate, and all round the walls were the shops, forming a sort of market square. When shopping centres have to be fortified in this way it indicates a certain insecurity of life and property. But in the open country outside the gates I saw several shops, and more were going to be built; this indicates a growing confidence in the capacity of the present Government to maintain peace and order. In the bazaar I was shown a Farah rug. It was dull red, purple, and brown, like the Sabzewar and Herat rugs, but coarser and rougher than either. The rug industry at Farah has almost died out.

After crossing the Farah River we ran over a flat plain. Numerous mounds and ruins would tempt the archaeologist. Thirty miles took us to the end of the plain, and the road entered a hilly tract. Just at the

entrance were some Kuchi gipsies camping in black tents. They had come there to reap the crops. At 4 p.m. at Sialat we reached the end of the desert and entered a well-watered tract. It really requires a stretch of desert to make one appreciate running water as it deserves. After the utter aridity of the brown kingdom through which we had passed it was delightful.

We now traversed a picturesque route, with hills of wild, steep, jagged outline bounding the road and small mountain streams cutting across it. Cornfields and occasional gardens, watered by willow-fringed streams, provided welcome patches of green. In the evening we met a villager mounted on a fine donkey, one of the largest I have ever seen. He and his mount really composed an old Persian picture, and they might both have stepped from some old Oriental illuminated manuscript.

Just before dusk we reached the town of Sabzewar. Twisting through narrow lanes we arrived at the house of the *Hakim*, who hospitably invited us to stay with him. I was given a room in the roof of the house. The door was four feet high and there were two little windows, one arched and one square. Both windows were hermetically sealed with paper against the winter cold. On the walls were false arches, mihrab (small arched recesses in the wall, on which water-jugs, cups, and similar objects can be placed), and floral decorations painted on the stucco which concealed the mud-covered brick walls. On the floor were rugs made in Sabzewar. The whole effect of the room was distinctly Gothic. Next door was the Darbar (official reception) room, in which was the telephone which goes to Herat. All the crockery in the house was Russian, marked with the hammer and sickle.

Sabzewar town is half in ruins and the fort is a complete ruin. Evidently it used to be much more important than it is at present. Perhaps the arrival of the motor will revive its former prosperity. The plain is fertile and well-watered, and carries excellent crops. In the morning I went for a ride with the *Hakim's* clerk. I was given a stout little pony from the Badakshan province, north of the Hindu Kush. We rode to the Fort of the Black Daughter, picturesquely situated on the edge of a tremendous precipice dominating the road from Farah to Sabzewar. The fort was a complete ruin, but the view was magnificent. On the way back we went into the village of Mirzakasim to see the rug weaving. The villagers knew all about the difference between the old vegetable and the new aniline dyes. Only the latter are used nowadays, though some weavers pretend to use the old colours. I was

interested to see these Sabzewar rugs being made. The villagers frankly admitted that they got their dyes from Sabzewar bazaar. The colours are dull and dark—dark blue, purple, and dark rose, and there is sometimes a brown colour in the border. Similar rugs of a rather better quality are made in Herat, while in Farah they are worse. In fact, in the last place the industry barely survives. At Sabzewar, as at Ak in the Hindu Kush, the traveller has left India behind and is in Central Asia.

After Sabzewar the road goes north to the river and caravanserai of Adraskand, and then through some hills and over a high pass into the Herat plain. Herat in size is second only to Kabul among the towns of Afghanistan. It is a mile square, surrounded by high walls and a broad moat, and with four principal gates. The fort is an old one and is built in the way usual in Afghanistan, with mud-covered brick. Formerly it was covered with bright enamelling, like the Lahore Fort in India, and traces still remain. Starting from the four gates, as in Kandahar, the four principal streets of the city meet at Charsau, "Cross Roads" or "City Centre," but unlike Kandahar they are narrow and entirely roofed over; the structure of the roofing, a broad pointed brick arch, reminded me of similar arches in the Pathan period of architecture in India. Each of the main streets from the four city gates is one long bazaar, with a double line of quaint little shops, some of them no bigger than a big box. Central Asia is stamped all over them. The china is all Bokharan, and the piece goods Tashkent. I was struck by the queer semi-Chinese design on some cottons and enquired their place of origin. "Russia," was the reply, and this was true of many other articles. Even the sweet shops were full of Russian sweets. The most interesting thing about Herat Bazaar is the human element, the people to be seen there. There are horsemen in the old costume, swinging proudly along as in the ancient days. There are Turcomans in old Cossack costume and in their natural setting, rifle in hand, looking as if they had stepped out of some old Russian play. These Turcomans come from Afghanistan north of the Hindu Kush, from Afghan Turkestan. Though they exactly resemble the Turcomans north of the Oxus in Eastern Turkestan, they are Afghan subjects. There are women veiled from head to foot in white, a contrast to the Kabul black. There are Jews dressed in the old Jewish costume still to be seen in Jerusalem and Baghdad, the long black coat reaching to the feet and the curious, tall, square-topped hats. There are dwarfs, donkey-boys driving hordes of donkeys and perched on top of a load

on one of them, long-haired Central Asian camels, and all the varieties of Afghan tribesmen—all this daily medley produces a pageant which recalls the day of Haroun al Raschid. But it will not go on for ever. It is no more immortal than Diaghlieff's Russian Ballet, which, indeed, it so much resembles. And I have seen the magician's wand which will terminate it, for one day I was in Herat Bazaar when suddenly there was a tremendous uproar. Horses, camels, donkeys, pedestrians were pushed in all directions, and there was a crash of a flimsy shop collapsing. A motor-lorry was turning round. The Arabian Nights and the internal combustion engine do not agree. I was only just in time to see the old Herat.

Soon after my arrival in Herat I had an interview with the Governor, General Abdur Rahim Khan. His predecessor was murdered in the troubles of 1929, and he was appointed by Bacha Sakao and confirmed in office by the present King. He received me most kindly and hospitably and offered me every assistance in viewing the antiquities of Herat. He introduced me to the general commanding the Herat garrison, a Brigadier General from Kabul.

I was lucky to get a photograph of the interior of the Jama Masjid, the chief mosque of Herat City. It is a building of fine proportions. Traces of enamelling still remain, and there is stone facing round the arches. But in the rest of the building the surface over the brick is cement or mud. It is said to have been built in the tenth century and repaired by Sultan Hussein Baikara in the fifteenth, but it has been recently restored, and the characteristics of the early periods have been muffled. While I was in this mosque I was struck by the atmosphere of old-world grace and beauty which still lingers in the manners of the people of Herat. I remember in particular two Moulvis meeting and the inclinations of dignified grace with which they saluted each other. Herat is a place of old-world charm. A servant will sometimes deliver a message kneeling on one knee, like a page in the Middle Ages. If a Herati wishes to thank you, he bows with his hand on his heart, with a natural ease and grace which would be the envy of an actor in romantic drama in Europe.

I visited and photographed the shrines and old buildings outside the city. The finest of these is the tomb of Sultan Hussein Baikara, known in Herat as Sultan Hussein Mirza Usbek, who reigned from 1468 to 1507 A.D. The decoration is the beautiful enamelling of the fifteenth century, clear, bright, delicate blues and strange rich purples, like a page out of an illuminated Persian manuscript. Formerly the

whole of the outside of the building and the seven tall minarets around it were enamelled in the same style. Visitors in former days to Herat were enthusiastic about it. Baber, the Mogul conqueror of India, praises it. But in 1885 the Governor of Herat, Abdul-Rahmān, practically destroyed it when he fortified the city against the Persians. What remains of it strongly resembles the tomb of Timur at Samarkand.

I also went to the Ziarat of Khwaji Abdulla Ansari, some four miles north-east of Herat, and a prominent landmark on the hillside. Outside the shrine is a round white stone, some six feet long, slightly shaped at one end to give the suggestion of a head. It is a stone lion which, in its extreme simplification and in the slightness of the clues as to the identity of its subject, might be the work of some ultra-modern sculptor in Europe, and is an example of the affinity between Oriental art and *l'art nouveau*. The story about this stone lion is that 300 years ago a man came to visit this shrine and brought his dog with him. When they got to this spot the dog was turned to stone, and this is the stone dog. Sir Percy Sykes has told me that this stone image is similar to the work of tribes in North-East Persia.

Here and there in the building of this shrine are traces of the same enamelling as is to be seen in the Massala. There are some tombs inside, including that of a son of Genghiz Khan, the famous conqueror, and also one of Dost Mahomet, King of Afghanistan, and also a stone tomb elaborately carved with arabesques and dated 700 A.H., but nameless. Such carving in stone is held in high esteem in Afghanistan, as it is not very common. The main shrine is a fine lofty building, and is said to be 800 years old. There can be no doubt that there has been a building on the site for that period, but it is difficult to be certain that the present building really represents the one originally set up. A structure of mud-covered brick requires so much renovation and repair that it is unusual to find it representing anything beyond its own contemporary period.

This is true also of the Ziarat Sultan Meshed, outside the southern wall of Herat City. It is said to be 800 years old, but from its appearance it might be of any age. West of the Massala is the building containing the tomb of Abdul Rahman Jan, said to be 400 years old. All these shrines have pleasant gardens of pine trees, and there is a similar garden at the Takht-i-Safar, a terrace built in the hillside west of the Ziarat. From this terrace there is a magnificent view of the city and plain of Herat and the long line of mountains of Central Afghanistan.

In the treeless hills the pines are a welcome relief, and demonstrate that trees can grow well in Afghanistan. A fine avenue of trees leads up to the Soviet Consulate, half a mile outside the city, and the road further on joins a road which goes to Kushk, the Soviet railhead. It is interesting to realize that nowadays Kushk is only four days by motor from Chaman, the British railhead in Baluchistan. How long will the old ways and the old methods of transport be able to hold their own in Herat? Camel caravans come in from the north, from Balkh and Afghan Turkestan, or from still further north across the Oxus, from Bokhara, from Samarkand, or even from as far as Kashgar or Yarkand in Chinese territory. But I saw the first threat of change in the methods of transport which have come to us from immemorial antiquity, for telegraph posts can be seen in the fields beside the road, and I myself had motored there.

I was greatly struck with the splendid donkeys of Western Afghanistan, and was told that they were famed for their size and strength and that as much as Rs.200 would be given for a good donkey.

Rug-making is a great industry in the villages round Herat. Dull red, deep blue, dark brown, and purple are the most prominent colours, and for small objects such as saddle bags black is also used. There is a large trade in these rugs to India and they are often wrongly named Baluchi rugs, or when the purchaser is a novice they are even called Eastern Turkestan from Central Asia, north of the Oxus. These rugs are hand-made, and the fact that they are magnificently durable makes it all the greater pity that the weavers use aniline dyes to colour them. But I suppose it is asking too much of human nature to suggest that the weavers should go to the trouble of making the colours themselves, as their forefathers did, instead of buying ready-made German or Japanese packets.

I have now finished my account of Herat City, and with it of my tour through Afghanistan. All that remains for me to say is that I went back to Kandahar by the way I came, and from Kandahar south to Chaman, in British Baluchistan, the end of my tour.

Before concluding I have great pleasure in expressing my sincere gratitude for the kindness and hospitality which I received in Afghanistan and my hearty appreciation of the efforts which the Afghan Government are making for the benefit of their country. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN, in thanking the lecturer, emphasized the tremendous advance Afghanistan had made under Nadir Shah. Mr.

French had travelled without any hindrance all through a country where, twenty-five years before, he (Sir Michael) had been held captive because he had inadvertently overstepped the Border while out riding. He congratulated King Nadir on all he had done and wished him, above all, the twenty years of peace which Afghanistan needed for her fuller development. (Applause.)

RAMBLINGS IN PERSIA*

By DR. P. L. GIUSEPPI

IT is with some fear and trepidation that I venture to address this Society on my trip this spring to Persia. The route was overland to Brindisi in a 24-h.p. Ford, which was specially fitted up with boxês on the footboard to contain tinned foods, biscuits, and plant collecting outfit. The car had already covered over 30,000 miles, and on this occasion covered 10,000 miles, of which 4,000 were in Persia. With the exception of punctures and one broken spring the car gave us no trouble whatsoever. We travelled from Brindisi by the Lloyd-Triestino line to Jaffa.

Byron's lines :

"Eternal summer gilds them yet,
But all except their sun is set."

are true to-day of the Greek islands as on the day they were written. From Jaffa we motored to Damascus. The road at first was extremely rough, but soon improved and remained quite good until Damascus was reached. From Damascus we drove to Baghdad with the Nairn convoy. The desert is at first quite smooth, but beyond the Rutbah wells the track is very rough. The convoying car broke its back axle, and to add to our sorrows there blew up a sandstorm which lasted for a day. The road, or rather track, from Baghdad to the Persian frontier is not too bad; and here at the frontier I wish to deal with a few generalities. I should like to express my appreciation of all Sir John Simon did to make our trip a success. Wherever we went a letter from the Persian War Minister, which Sir John had obtained for us, smoothed our way, and at all frontiers we were allowed through without any custom formalities. Persia is a country of about 630,000 square miles, and a population of 9-10,000,000. The centre is a plateau varying in height from 5,000 to 6,000 feet, and from this plateau rise the high mountains, generally without foot hills, most of which are composed of bare rock, and few indeed are the trees on these barren heights. Encircling the plateau are the Elburz in the north, the mountains of Kurdistan and of the Bakhtiari country in the west, the frontier mountains in the east, and finally a high chain in the south. The

* Lecture given on Wednesday, November 9, 1932, Sir Arnold T. Wilson in the Chair.

resemblances between Spain and Persia are indeed marked. In both countries the centre is a plateau surrounded by high mountains, and across this plateau run further high chains. Both countries are, generally speaking, arid, have suffered invasions from the north and south, and have had their religion changed. In both the people are exceedingly conservative and fatalistic, and in spite of invasions they have maintained, practically unchanged, their ideas and ideals. Both are now undergoing a revival. The Persian character is very well illustrated by Omar Khayyám's lines,

"Here with a loaf of bread beneath its bough,
A flask of wine, a book of verse, and thou
Beside me singing in the wilderness,
And wilderness were Paradise enow."

The botany of Persia is very interesting, and can be considered under two heads, that of the plains and that of the mountains. The flora of the plains is characterized by the aromatic odour, the spininess, the brightly coloured flowers, and the large hollow seed pods which can be easily blown about by the winds. There are also numbers of bulbs and fleshy rooted plants. The alpine flora is characterised by the difference of the flora from mountain to mountain. This is doubtless due to the separation of the chains by the hot, arid plains. The particularly interesting feature of these mountains is the existence of a new genus of plants, the *Dionysias*, of which some twenty species are known, and of which only one is found outside Persia, in Afghanistan. *Dionysia* are closely related to the *Androsaces*, and how it is that a new genus of plants should be evolved in Persia, whereas all round this country only *Androsaces* are found, is difficult to explain. The probable reason lies, I think, in the nature of the mountains. I was attracted to Persia principally by my desire to study the *Dionysias* and if possible to bring them into cultivation, for *no* *Dionysia* has yet been brought into our gardens. We were detained but a short time at the frontier, and were soon on our way on quite a good road. We slept the first night at Kermanshah in a clean hotel and next day set out for Hamadan, over the high Asadabad pass of 7,800 feet. This was easily negotiated by our car, and that night we slept at the Hotel de Paris, known as the best hotel in Persia. Hamadan has one-way traffic in its only circus; and here, revolving round the central post of a little round house, the policeman waves the traffic on its way, even though only six cars, carts, or horses pass him in an hour. The police are the only real nuisance I met in Persia.

They stopped the car both at the entrance and the exit of each village and carefully took down all sorts of particulars on various dirty pieces of paper. Some of them were unable to read even their own script, and I suppose for this reason were suspicious of us. We discovered from sad experience that the only way to escape their unwelcome attentions was by leaving the town by 4 a.m., before they were awake, and by arriving after 10.30 p.m., when they were asleep. The road southwards to Shiraz, through Burujird and Isfahan, has, on the whole, a good surface. On our way south we slept for the first time at a true Persian caravanserai, and I think a description of this Persian hotel would be of interest. We arrived late to find an oil lamp waving in the wind above the front door. The caravanserai consisted of a large building of stables and rooms built round the four sides of a square and with one gateway closed by a very thick wooden door. We were allotted a tiny room some 10 feet square next to the kitchen, and here we enjoyed a real Persian meal, consisting of sour milk, boiled eggs, unleavened bread, and tea. These articles were to be our only food, with a few exceptions, during our stay in the country. The furniture consisted of raised earthen platforms, a few carpets, and an oil lamp.

It would, of course, be impossible to deal with the whole of the trip, and so I propose to mention a few of our experiences, which I think may be of interest.

The irrigation system of water channels, or qanats, is as far as I know unique. The streams are tapped close to the mountains, and led by underground channels at varying depths to the towns and villages. These qanats are channels cut in the soil without support of wood or stand and are maintained by numbers of men who pass a great part of their lives underground. As one approaches a town one can gauge its importance by the number of these qanats to be seen converging upon it from all directions. The course of these can be followed by the long rows of gigantic mole hills formed by the excavated soil, each with a hole in its centre, down which the workmen can descend. The water is raised by constructing a sloping path down to the water level, and up and down this path a bullock walks during the whole day, dragging behind it the skin of a cow which is filled with water in the qanat and emptied above into the dykes. The result of tapping the streams near the mountains is that most of the rivers of Persia are empty of water except during the rains. The village of Yazd-i-Khast, built on its rock in the midst of a level plain, is doubt-

less an interesting sight, but after reading the marvellous descriptions of many travellers I must confess to being very disappointed. Persepolis is being excavated by German scientists; its chief effect on me was to remind me of Shelley's wondrous lines :

" My name is Ozymandias, king of kings,
Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair.
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
The lone and level sands stretch far away."

At Shiraz we climbed three mountains. The first was Sabsti-Puschom, which we had to approach by walking first of all over the level bed of a dry lake and then by wading through a stinking marsh. The climb in the extreme heat was very tiring, and as only one tiny pond of drinkable water exists it was thirsty work. The views are extremely fine. Our second mountain, Kuh-i-Bamu, was also steep, and here I found my first cushioned Dionysia; the delight of this mountain is a tiny stream in an upland valley. Here, although frogs disport themselves in the water, we drank our fill of this refreshing stream. Our third climb was Kuh-Ajub, which is approached by an unmade and rough track which leaves the Isfahan-Shiraz road on its west, and approaches the mountain by the village of Majdabad, and then over the bare level plain to its very foot. This mountain, which rises suddenly from the plain, is composed of bare, water-worn, and extremely slippery rock. We could see many wild sheep disporting themselves above our heads on narrow ledges, and on our return we sighted four sheep on the plain. The car was sent racing along at 35 to 40 miles an hour in pursuit, and after cutting them off from the mountain we drove parallel to the rapidly running sheep, thus affording our guide shots at the animals; not one was even wounded! We proceeded to Kerman by the road which runs along Lake Niriz. This is an extraordinarily lonely road, and it is said that many robbers frequent it. After Niriz it traverses a very steep pass and then enters a true desert, and after a short time it passes through an oasis. We were stopped at the fort of Khurabad and slept in a caravanserai. Next morning we crossed the salt lake, which is about 4 miles wide. The salt is as white as snow and the surface of the lake itself is as smooth as ice, and for at least 2 miles we raced at 50 miles an hour. The car had to keep to the track lest it should sink through the crust of salt into the brine below. Kerman is beautifully situated at 6,000 feet between high mountain chains which are covered with snow, and thus enjoys

perfect weather for most of the year. Here at the British Consulate a wire awaited me saying that I alone was allowed to climb Kuh-i-Taftan. Hiring a Persian chauffeur, I left for Bam. The road is on the whole fairly good, and passed a delightful mosque at Mahun. Bam is an extraordinary town of walls surrounding gardens in which the houses are hidden. No house was visible as one passed down the narrow lanes. The crossing of the Lut desert was most tiring and difficult, and I doubt if it would be possible without mats and wire netting. From Bam on the tracks gradually got worse, and over the desert the only marks were those formed by the car wheels which have passed that way. We stuck three times and were extricated from the sand with difficulty. In the centre of the desert are two watch towers built by Nadir Shah, one has been felled and the other is being slowly demolished by the vandals who pass that way. It is built of bricks in pattern and is a useful landmark. After crossing the desert the track ascends a river bed, and is unbelievably rough. At the summit of the pass to which it leads it is so narrow that the car can just pass.

I climbed Kuh-i-Taftan from the tiny village of Sangun, which consists of the police station and one house. Here two camels awaited me, and escorted by a soldier and three Baluchis I proceeded on my way to the height of 8,000 feet, where I pitched my camp. At 3 a.m. next morning I was off to the summit. I passed three fumaroles, from one of which rose a river of boiling water charged with sulphur, which was deposited in yellow crystals on the rocks in the bed of the stream. The last 1,000 feet are very steep, but the views from the summit are so fine that one feels rewarded for one's struggles. At the summit, 13,500 feet, is a large fumarole, from which rises clouds of smoke charged with sulphur. Kuh-i-Taftan has been climbed but seldom. On the way back to Kerman I passed through Mahun and Jupar to the foot of Kuh-i-Jupar, a mountain of 9,000 feet, to the south of Kerman. This mountain is a paradise for botanists and would take weeks to explore fully. Water only exists in a few spots, which adds to the difficulty of the climb. The upper crags are covered with a beautiful yellow *Dionysia*. From Kerman to Isfahan the road is, on the whole, good, but most uninteresting. The mountains gradually fade from sight on the east and west. As the car approached Yezd a wonderful mountain appeared on the west, the famous Schir Kuh. We approached the lower slopes by a dreadful path, which ended at the village of Gurukh. The path ascends a valley of a thousand rills, and as one motored along in the dark the sound of running water was

never far away and reminded me of an alpine valley. The ascent of Schir Kuh is quite easy, and very soon I was on the summit. Schir Kuh is one of the richest mountains in plants I have ever climbed, but of only one flower do I wish to speak to-day, of *Dionysia ianthina*, which covers the rocks in countless thousands of cushions covered with hundreds of pink flowers. This plant is, I venture to say, one of the most beautiful of alpinists I have ever seen. From Yazd we motored to Teheran through Kum by a fairly good road, and of all the delightful sights, I wish to mention but one—the beautiful views of the snow-clad peaks of the Kuh Rud which one enjoys from the road. From Teheran we motored to Hamadan for our last climb, that of Alvand, which rises to a height of 11,000 feet above the town. The climb is quite easy, and one is more than repaid by the wonderful views and the still more wonderful plants which are to be found on this mountain.

Persia is not an easy country to travel in, and certainly climbing its remote mountains is difficult, but one is more than repaid by the beautiful and rare plants which one can collect. This short trip has been the means of bringing to England quite a good number of first-class plants which are new to cultivation.

LADY SYKES, who opened the discussion, said that she had enjoyed the lecture very much indeed and had especially appreciated the few beautiful flower pictures which had been shown. No country had more lovely wild flowers than Persia, and she had been able to send back a good number of bulbs and plants both to Kew and to private gardens, many of which had acclimatized themselves and were now flourishing plants.

THE CHAIRMAN said he hoped the Royal Horticultural Society would let members of the Royal Central Asian Society attend Dr. Giuseppe's lecture in the spring; it would be of very special interest, as nothing had as yet been written about the Persian flora. A handbook was badly needed; it would be welcomed both by many of the tourists, who were going in increasing numbers to Persia, and by business men, and by many Persians themselves. He hoped Dr. Giuseppe would go out again, make a longer stay, and complete his survey, thus filling a real want in the bibliography of Persia. He agreed with Sir Percy Sykes, who had protested against any detraction from the greatness and archaeological interest of the grand ruins at Persepolis and gave an amusing account of what a Persian might say of Oxford Circus and of the European cuisine, ending with an appreciation of Dr. Giuseppe's delightful lecture.

NINE YEARS OF REPUBLIC IN TURKEY*

By SIR A. TELFORD WAUGH, K.C.M.G.

THE other day—October 29 last—was the ninth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic. An obvious parallel is, of course, the ten years of Fascism in Italy, for in both countries there has been a National Rebirth during the last decade, and in both cases it is due to the personality and driving power of one single individual.

Now when Sir Percy Sykes invited me to speak to this Royal and learned Society about Turkey, it occurred to me that some of my audience would be well versed in recent Turkish history, while to others it might be more or less new. How, then, was I to interest both? I felt like the celebrated Nasreddin Khoja of Turkish tales. The Turks love these stories; it is the only kind of humour that appeals to them.

The Khoja was invited to preach in the mosque. When he got up into the pulpit he called out: "Ay, Muslimanler! Oh, Moslems! Do you know what I am going to say to you?" The congregation consulted together and replied: "Some of us know and some of us don't." "Then," said the Khoja, "let those who know tell those who don't"; and he came down from the pulpit. Now, as that course is not open to me, I must ask those of you who know to be a little patient if I go over ground familiar to you.

Ever since the Turks set foot in Europe some five centuries ago Turkey was ruled by a Sovereign, the Sultan; and the seat of government was Constantinople. Within the last ten years the Sultanate has been abolished, Turkey has been made into a Republic, the seat of government has been moved to a new capital, Angora—the very name Constantinople has ceased to exist. All this is the work of one man, the "Ghazi," as he is called, the Conqueror, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, first President of the Turkish Republic.

There have been three attempts made to bring Turkey into line with modern States. The first was made a century ago. It was known as the "Tanzimat"—the institution of a new set of laws for Turkey.

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 16, 1932. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond in the Chair.

This reform was the work of Sultan Mahmud, assisted by several enlightened statesmen. The second attempt took place not quite twenty-five years ago and was known as the Union and Progress movement—an attempt by young Turkish officers, assisted by mysterious Jewish influence. The third has been made by Mustafa Kemal, assisted by no one—only by the dilatory policy of the Allies.

This third attempt began thirteen years ago, in 1919. Now Mustafa Kemal was a soldier, nothing but a soldier in those days. He had distinguished himself in the Dardanelles campaign and elsewhere, but beyond that nobody had heard of him. But besides his military genius he possessed also the genius of a statesman. He had vision. He had the vision of a new Turkey rising out of the ruins of the old—a fantastic idea it might well have seemed at the time. For what, seemingly, were his chances of success?

In 1919 the state of the country was desperate. The Turks were a dispirited and beaten people, utterly sick of seven years of disastrous war; for there had been no breathing space for them between the Balkan War and the Great War. They were left with the broken remains of defeated armies, no money, no resources, and no friends.

Then the Allies all unwittingly placed a weapon in Kemal's hands. They planned to create an Armenian State out of the Eastern Provinces of Turkey. To put a Muslim population under Armenian rule was, of course, absurd on the face of it. Then Mr. Lloyd George put the Greeks into Smyrna. So there was to be Armenian rule in Eastern Turkey and Greek rule in Western Turkey. That was the one thing that could rouse the Turk. He could not and would not put up with domination by his own Christian vassals. The Greeks must be driven from Turkish soil. Thus Turkey was landed in a new war. This gave Mustafa Kemal his great opportunity.

In Constantinople there was still the Sultan, but he was powerless, and Constantinople itself was occupied by the victorious Allies.

If a new order of things was to be established, obviously some new centre must be chosen. Constantinople was under foreign control; besides it was steeped in the traditions of the old régime, and was certainly no place for the spread of the new. Moreover there was the strategical aspect to be considered. Headquarters must be at some point safe from attack. Thus Angora came to be the new capital of Turkey. In ancient times it had some importance as capital of the old Roman province of Galatia. I suppose St. Paul's epistle to the Galatians must have found its way there. But in 1919 it was merely a

small town in the heart of Asia Minor—of Anatolia, as the country is called today. This village was to grow into the capital of the Turkish Republic.

Now how did Mustafa Kemal accomplish the task he set himself? It took him three years to drive the Greeks out of Anatolia. The story of his rise to power is a fascinating adventure. He has told it himself in a lengthy document—five hundred and forty-three pages of close Turkish print—which he inflicted on the Turkish Chamber of Deputies in the form of a speech. It took him six days to deliver. Surely the longest speech on record! I do not propose to inflict it on you this afternoon; but a full digest of it is to be found in my book on Turkey. The other great authority on the Turkish struggle for independence is Turkey's most distinguished woman, Halidé Edib, now an exile from Turkey. She herself took part in it all and was one of Mustafa Kemal's small band of supporters. I commend her book to those of you who do not already know it. It is written in English and excellent English too—*The Turkish Ordeal*, by Halidé Edib.

There is one point which neither of these authorities mentions, and it had a very important bearing on the course of events. That was the dilatory policy of the Allies in spinning out the Armistice with Turkey for five years. When the Allies were leisurely debating what peace terms should be imposed on Turkey, a shrewd British official who knew the country well was asked his opinion. "If you are not careful," said he, "the question will be not what terms you will impose on Turkey, but what terms she will impose on you." The hearers laughed at the jest. Lausanne proved it to be the sober truth; for when the peace treaty with Turkey was negotiated there in 1923 the Turks were ready to fight again and the Allies were not. So the Turks got all they asked, except Mosul.

From the first Mustafa Kemal realized that time was on his side. By August, 1922, he had achieved great things in Anatolia. The Turkish army had been reorganized, the invading Greeks had been driven out, a Grand National Assembly had been formed at Angora. But his task was only half accomplished. In his speech he said: "My aim was to create a new State, but I had to educate the Assembly up to this, and it required time and caution, for the sentiment in support of the Sultan and Khalif was strongly rooted."

This brings us, then, to the next step in his programme, the abolition of the Sultanate and Khalifat. The Sultan, besides being head of the State was—as Khalif—head also of the religion of Islam. The

Arabic word "Khalif" means successor—successor to the Prophet. Sultans had been deposed many times in Turkey's history. But the simple traditional loyalty of the Turk to his Padishah was satisfied when (as the phrase goes) "Amurath succeeds to Amurath"—Sultan follows Sultan. But to do without a Sultan at all! Why, the very idea made every Turk draw in his breath.

The matter was discussed in the Assembly. Was it possible, or was it not, to separate religious from political authority? The question was referred to three commissions—on religious law, on constitutional law, and on civil law. The religious section said it was impossible. The discussion seemed interminable. Suddenly Kemal, who had been listening in a corner of the crowded room, jumped on the bench in front of him, raised his voice, and said: "Sovereignty is never gained through reason or argument, it is taken by force. Now the Turkish nation by rebellion has taken the sovereignty into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact. The Assembly would do well to recognize it. If they don't, the result will be the same, but there may be some heads broken." In other words, the Sultanate had already been abolished in practice; let them recognize the fact. A law to this effect was quickly drafted and passed the same day. Thus the abolition of the Osmanli Sultanate was accomplished. The deposed Sultan took refuge in a British warship, and placed himself under the protection of the British Government. Prince Abdul Mejid was named Khalif, but with no political power at all. *His* days too were numbered, for Mustafa Kemal had in mind the abolition of the Khilafat also at the first opportunity. This came about a year and a half later. On March 4, 1924, the new Khalif was by government order expelled at daybreak across the Turkish frontier. A great discussion in the Assembly had preceded this step, but Mustafa Kemal had again carried all before him. To those who still clung to the Khilafat he had replied: "It is an antiquated and useless institution, this Khilafat. What nonsense it is to call upon Turkey to support it! The business of the National Assembly is to look after the interests of the Turkish Nation and has nothing to do with the Moslem world outside."

Mustafa Kemal was, in fact, himself invited to become Khalif by a religious deputation which brought him a message from the Muslim population of India and Egypt. He had answered: "Certainly not. But I thank the people for their good feeling and affection. The people whose message you bring me are governed by Kings and Emperors. What would they say if I accepted your offer? Would

my orders as Khalif be obeyed? If not, should I not make myself a laughing stock?"

The actual date of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic with Mustafa Kemal Pasha as its first President was October 29, 1923. Five months later the last remnant of the Osmanli dynasty was destroyed by abolishing the title of Khalif, and by expelling from Turkey all the members of the Osmanli family.

"So far now—to sum up a minute—this is what Mustafa Kemal has accomplished. He has:

- Reorganized the army.
- Driven the Greeks off Turkish soil.
- Formed a Grand National Assembly—henceforward to be the Government.
- Changed the capital from Constantinople to Angora.
- Got rid of the Sultan.
- Got rid of the Khalif.

Thus Mustafa Kemal had swept away the dust of ages. He had cleared out what he considered lumber. It now remained to set his house in order, and the furnishing was to be in modern style.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The most casual observer could not help noticing one or two things which have changed the face of Turkey since Kemal came into power. The fez, as we all know, has gone. It was considered the symbol of hostility to Western ideas. Wearing the hat was to show that there was no difference between the Turkish world and civilized society. There is something in this idea, but on the other hand national dress stands for pride of race and has a certain value. Moreover, a religious significance attached to the wearing of the fez, and it went hard with the conservative population to be forced by law to give it up. Besides, the Turks do not like the hat and it does not suit them. They have evolved a way of wearing it which makes it look as much like their old headgear as possible. I am speaking, of course, of the peasants. The smart young man about town in Angora and Istanbul is turned out like a European. So the men of Turkey are now wearing any and every kind of hat. I have seen the Muezzin give the call to prayer from the minaret wearing a bowler hat. I have seen men go into mosques to say their prayers wearing tweed caps turned back to front, so that the peak may not be in the way when they bow the head to the ground.

It is the same with the women. The veil is taboo. In country districts, of course, tradition and prejudice die hard, and the change is

disliked; but in town it is welcomed. The Turkish woman's costume is no longer a shapeless mass of black draperies; she goes about in European society in chic attire. One curious result of emancipation is the change in ladies' figures. In the harem days Turkish ladies were plump, and were admired for it. That was the popular taste. The beggars on the Galata bridge used to accost one for alms with the prayer, "May Allah give you a wife like an orange!" Now slimness is the fashion. Gone is all the old paraphernalia which attended her the moment she stepped outside her house—the escort of women and eunuchs, who must never leave her for one moment, the special seat she must occupy in the tramcar or in the ferryboat, behind a dusty curtain, screened off from the gaze of men. All this has gone. She can move about freely as she likes. Probably she has the telephone in her bedroom, and can make her own appointments with her hairdresser, her manicurist, and go off to keep them unattended. She is, in fact, emancipated. She can vote at municipal elections, and public careers are open to her. She can be a doctor, a barrister in the courts, a judge on the bench, even a policeman.

It is perhaps in family life that the change wrought by Kemalism is most marked. The institution of the harem was the most prominent feature of the old system. We all used to think of the harem as a romantic mystery. It was a mystery, but not so romantic as Pierre Loti made it out. I knew a French naval doctor in Turkey who had been shipmates with Loti. He described Loti's books on Turkey as "fumisterie." As a matter of fact life in the harem was a very dull affair; and as for family life it did not exist. How could it in a polygamous household, where life was one round of intrigue and rivalry between the different wives, and of jealousy between the children of one mother and the children of another? Polygamy was part of the lumber of the old house, and must have no place in the new. Polygamy, therefore, is now abolished, and the most modern code of civil law has been adopted. As for children they had a poor time under the old régime. Boys were given a certain amount of education—not much; and the percentage of the population that could read and write was very small. As for girls, practically nothing was done for their education. They were veiled at fourteen, and at fifteen or sixteen they were married. Now there are primary and secondary schools throughout the country. Both girls and boys have to attend. Family life is beginning to take shape; but, generally speaking, little provision is made as yet for children as such. Rather they are treated at home as

little grown-ups. They have late dinner with their parents, they listen to grown-up topics, they know the rate of money exchange, they come to school carrying in their hands their own school fees.

In education I think the Turks realized that they had much to learn, and they have had the good sense to try to copy modern systems. Lausanne gave them the right of inspecting foreign schools in Turkey, and they must have gathered many hints in that way. They have certainly achieved much in the last nine years. A sign of the changed régime is the Boy Scout Movement, which has taken root in Turkey. Another sign is the picture in *The Times* the other day of Turkish school girls marching in procession with flags to celebrate the anniversary of the Republic.

Shortly before the war I met in London a Turkish statesman, who had been Grand Vizir, and was then negotiating an agreement about the Baghdad Railway. He had spent many months in London, and had evidently taken our measure. He said to me: "My stay in your country has convinced me of *one* thing. If Turkey wants to show England that she is making progress, her only way is to send over a football team." As a matter of fact, football has now become a most popular game in Turkey.

A friend of mine was travelling in the country districts of Turkey three or four years ago. In a small town he met a schoolboy and spoke to him in French. The boy seemed not to understand. "Oh, but you learn French now in your school, don't you?" said my friend in Turkish.

"We do French," said the boy, "but, you see, the master doesn't know French."

I tell this story not in any way to decry Turkish progress, but because it does show that achievement lags behind enthusiasm, so anxious are they to become modern and at such breakneck speed.

Another change, besides costume, which would strike the casual tourist in Turkey is the disappearance of the old Turkish alphabet. Ten years ago all notice boards in the streets had to be written in Turkish characters three times as big as any European letters on them. Now there is none of the old Turkish script at all; Turkish is now written in Latin characters. The change has made reading much easier to learn, although for the old Turks it has meant going to school again.

Now this change—writing Turkish in our European characters instead of the Arabic—brings Turkey another step nearer Europe. The

Ghazi carried it through with that amazing energy and drive which are characteristic of the man. To enforce the change, he himself took ship and toured the Turkish ports of the Black Sea. He would land at a small town, have a blackboard set up in the main street, call out the butcher and baker and himself with his own hand show them how they must write in future.

There is one great objection to the change from the scholarly point of view. A large number of words used in Turkish are Arabic. The Arabic language possesses a beautifully symmetrical method of forming words from a trilateral root, so that by knowing the meaning of the root one can always ascertain the meaning of any of the numerous words derived from it. The Arabic alphabet possesses several distinct letters which can only be transliterated by the Latin D, the same with S, the same with Z, T, and H. The distinction between the different letters is entirely lost in the new spelling, and so the derivation and proper meaning of words are obscured.

It is true that the Angora Government is trying to do away with the use of Arabic words in the Turkish language; but they will find difficulty in replacing them, unless they use the Greek and Latin words common to most European languages. The Turkish language was invented by a primitive pastoral people in the wilds of Central Asia, and its vocabulary was limited to concrete objects and simple acts, and had no expression for abstract ideas or modern technical terms. I can give, however, one instance in which the Ghazi has been successful in finding a simple Turkish substitute for a technical Greek word. The word "telegram" means of course something written from a distance. He has replaced it by the purely Turkish word *telyazısı*. "Tel" is Turkish for wire and "yazı" for writing; so that his word means "wire-writing"; not a bad way of describing a message sent by wire.

In addition to a new alphabet and a new vocabulary, the Ghazi is providing for Turkish schools a new History, written by himself. Not content with framing Turkey's present and future, he is anxious to construct or rather reconstruct her past also. He traces back world civilization to a Turkish origin. His idea is to teach the new generation that the creators of civilization were not Babylonians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Greeks, or Romans, but Turks. I was hoping to have his History in time to tell you how he managed this, but it has not come yet. Before I left Turkey I had a copy of a history book then being used in Turkish schools. It told of the old Mongolian conquerors, Genghiz Khan, Hulagu, and Timurlenk, whom it held up to admira-

tion; but it stopped short about the year 1300 A.D. The historian was unwilling to mention the Sultans. How the gap between 1300 and 1923 will be filled in, I am curious to see.

Now we come to another point—Religion. Religion has always played a great part in Turkish life. Islam is the most democratic religion in the world. There are no class or race distinctions in the rows of worshippers in a mosque. With its simple creed and forms Islam is well suited to Turks. As in all religions, superstition has crept into it in course of time. A rigid Pharisaical attitude was a bar to progress. It was against this that Mustafa Kemal set his face. Although he is himself, I believe, not a religious man, I see no reason to think that he aims at destroying religious belief. There is nothing of the wild Bolshevik anti-God spirit in Turkey. The expulsion of the Khalif, the dissolution of the dervish monasteries and the closing of the purely religious schools were not unlike the reforms carried out by Henry VIII. in England. Since I left Turkey I have read that the Quran is being translated into Turkish. This would have horrified the old-fashioned Ulema; just as the Bible in the vulgar tongue shocked some Christians. But the Turkish poet Zia Gyuk Alp, a true patriot, wrote:

"A land in which the call to prayer resounds from the mosque in the Turkish tongue,

Where the peasant understands the meaning of his prayers,

A land where the schoolboy reads the Quran in his mother tongue,

O Son of the Turk, that is thy Fatherland."

No doubt there has been a great relaxation of religious observances, which public opinion in the old days rendered compulsory. But I like to think that the spirit of religion still lives and will live in the New Turkey.

To come to Trade. How has that fared under the new régime? The picture is less satisfactory.

In the golden days before the war Turkey was a big empire, and one of our best customers for cotton goods. Important Armenian firms with branches all over Turkey bought in Manchester and distributed our goods in the interior. Bradford was the principal buyer of Turkish mohair, and had agents in Turkey. Big British export houses in Constantinople and Smyrna bought and shipped Turkish barley, opium, dried fruit, and other produce. British coal was shipped to Turkey at low freights, the coal ships returning with grain cargoes from the Black Sea; and a large bunkering trade was done by British

firms in Constantinople. Many British insurance companies were established in Turkey. Now little remains of all this. Turkey has shrunk to a small State, the population is impoverished, the Armenian firms have been expelled, the coal bunkering trade and the insurance business have been driven away by vexatious regulations. Turkey, in common with other countries, is suffering from the world crisis, and has been compelled to enforce regulations restricting imports and controlling exchange like other countries. A letter I received from Constantinople last month says: "Trade is completely held up by the regulations which are continually being changed. Merchants do not know where they are and dare not operate."

The British Commercial Secretary in Turkey in his report on economic conditions, dated May 31, 1932, writes: "1931 will be remembered as one of the leanest commercial years of the Turkish Republic, and the present year does not show any marked improvement. The principal purchasers of imported goods are the agricultural classes comprising three-fourths of the entire population; and the disastrous fall in prices of Turkish produce has naturally diminished purchasing power. Last November the Government introduced a quota system for imports. Its declared policy is to balance imports from each country with exports to it. It is making great efforts to stimulate industry with a view to rendering the country independent of imports from abroad. But the net result is that

The purchasing power is steadily declining;
Tax-paying capacity is decreasing, though taxes increase;
Revenue is falling in spite of increased taxation."

The Republic has come into the world at a very difficult time. It must be recognized that its failure to meet its obligations to the Bondholders of the old Ottoman Debt is due largely to the impossibility of transferring money without a crash of exchange. Perhaps the Government may be criticized for the inexperience of its Ministers and its suspicion of foreign expert advice. Its Prime Minister, Ismet Pasha, the Ghazi's devoted adherent, is a soldier too. His slogan is, Turkey for the Turks. He has failed to understand that Turkey's prosperity depends on trade, and that trade depends on confidence. Before the war Turkey's export trade was done by foreign houses established in the country. They used to make advances to the cultivators against produce. Repudiation of contracts was rare. Honesty was then a feature of the Turk. Now the Turks themselves are trying to take

the place of the foreign export houses. They have had no training in the difficult school of commerce, and their main idea of trade is to get rich quickly. The old traditional honesty can no longer be relied on. The Government by its endless regulations, taxation, and restrictions is driving the experienced foreign merchants out of business. I believe that Ismet Pasha is honestly trying to do his best for his country; but a Turkish soldier cannot be expected to deal successfully with such complicated questions.

I noticed a piece of news in *The Times* last week, which may be a good sign for the future. It was that the Turkish Government has engaged an American expert to reorganize the Turkish Custom House. During my forty-four years in Turkey the only foreign adviser who succeeded in his task was the late Sir Richard Crawford. He took charge of the Custom House shortly before the war and gained the complete confidence of the Turks and had his own way entirely.

Such men are rare. I can only hope that the new American adviser may possess his tact and be equally successful.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—These are the main events which led up to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, and these are the changes it has brought into Turkish life.

Now a word about the character of the man who created it. Captain Harold Armstrong, in a new book which will be widely read, has drawn a highly coloured fanciful portrait of him as the "Grey Wolf" of the old Mongol legend. A very clever, readable book, if I may say so, with three particularly fine chapters on the Gallipoli campaign.

The book I mentioned just now—*The Turkish Ordeal*, by Halidé Edib—is well worth reading, for the serious character study she gives of the man with whom she worked at close quarters during those years of preparation at Angora. The first half of her book is, as a matter of fact, not very good; she talks a lot about her own feelings, and is rather sentimental. The second half, I consider, is really good. This is what she says about him:

"Mustafa Kemal was harsh and extremely jealous of personal distinction. Like most men of destiny, he hated to see anyone in the public eye, even in a sphere which did not touch his; this feeling became with him a fierce resentment which took the shape of persecution the moment he felt strong enough.

"He must be on the stage, a unique actor perpetually astonishing the world.

"He never accepted the current standard of human morality, or saw

its necessity. Those people who professed moral ideas, or claimed to adhere to austere standards, were to him either hypocrites like the Khojas, or, if there were a few who were genuine and consistent, then they were just fools.

"Mustafa Kemal took pleasure in talking and showed himself in varying and contradictory moods. He would argue till he became utterly incomprehensible and then illumine some obscure problem with a flash of inspired clarity. After being hesitant to a degree which made one conclude he must be one of the most impotent of men who could do nothing but talk, suddenly he would make some instantaneous decision which marked him as the life force of a far-reaching movement.

"I can still see him standing in the middle of the room talking everyone to exhaustion, while he remains as fresh as the moment he began. He always wanted everybody to join in these talks, though he always managed to remain the central figure. He suspected both him who talked too much and him who talked too little.

"When he worsts his political opponents he tramples on every rule; ruthlessly attacks them by foul means or fair. But as a soldier one recognized at once in him the supreme artist and sportsman. He kept the rules of his game with dignity, with tact and with exactitude."

She sums him up: "Cynical, materialistic, ambitious, heartless, variable, superstitious, utterly unscrupulous, and satanically shrewd." A man of outstanding vitality, energy, and determination, who dominated by his driving power and by his instinct for seizing opportunity.

In spite of her severe strictures on his moral character, she recognizes that he was the only man in Turkey who could have pulled the country together and organized victory.

So much for the character of the man.

Now what does the Republic stand for?

In the first place it is not a Republic at all. It is a Dictatorship. The Grand National Assembly for all its grand name simply consists of nominees of the President's Party. Opposition is not tolerated. In the very beginning "notables from all over Anatolia for the first time in their lives found themselves in a responsible position, all jealously watching Mustafa Kemal and ready to oppose suggestions tending to his personal power." They judged him rightly, but he outjockeyed them. In his speech he explains quite frankly how he worked to create a party in the Assembly and then to destroy it when it no longer served his purpose.

"Sovereignty," he declares, "is never gained or yielded through reason or argument: it is taken by force and violence."

He has taken it and made himself a Dictator.

I think he has acted in the best interest of Turkey. The country is not yet educated for what Lord Lloyd has called "that system of Western parliamentary government which has wrecked every Eastern country that has tried it, is largely discarded in Europe and shorn of its prestige even in England." Better far a dictatorship than that.

It is pathetic to read how at the celebration in Angora of the ninth anniversary of the Republic peasants sat in the seats reserved for members of the National Assembly, and when told that those seats were reserved for Deputies, replied, "We are here ourselves today, we have no need of Deputies."

That spirit may bear fruit in the future, but the time is not yet.

The Dictatorship can, I think, be described as benevolent as regards the country as a whole. It is ruthless as regards opposition. The Ghazi is out to win for Turkey a place in the civilized world. He has won for her independence. He has maintained friendly relations with foreign powers. He has helped to heal the breach even with Greece. A strong independent Turkish State on good terms with its neighbours would remove a century-old danger to the peace of the world. Perhaps the Allies builded better than they knew in 1919, though no credit is due to them. The worst-laid schemes of mice and men sometimes turn out for the best.

The IMAM of the London Mosque: Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—We have heard with the greatest delight and extreme interest the wonderful address which has been delivered by one who has such intimate acquaintance with the subject. I should, however, like to say one or two things about some of the points.

For centuries past the Sultan of Turkey used to be looked upon by the Muslims all over the world as their spiritual master, and whether the acknowledgment of that supremacy or the allegiance that they professed to him did or did not result in anything tangible, yet the belief was there. Some of the more sensible failed to find any good in that profession of loyalty to the Sultan of Turkey while they were living under the sovereignty of their own kings and rulers.

In India we acknowledged Queen Victoria and the kings of Great Britain as our sovereigns, and we failed to see where the supremacy of the Sultan of Turkey came in. He took no steps to impart religious or

spiritual instruction to the people of India or of any other Muslim country, and it always seemed to be a mockery to speak of him as a Khalif to whom all Muslim people owed spiritual allegiance. I am in perfect agreement with Mustafa Kemal, therefore, that if he had consented to become a Khalif he would have placed himself in a ridiculous position.

The position of the Sultan as a Khalif was always an untenable one. One of the great Muslim leaders in India, Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, first of all raised a note of dissent, and said that there was no foundation for believing the Sultan of Turkey to be the Khalif of the whole Muslim world. Let me try to tell you how this mistaken impression arose.

As the speaker told you, the word "khalif" means a "successor to the prophet." The prophet Mohammed rose from a very humble position, and when he announced his prophethood he was subjected to so much persecution that after putting up with it for about thirteen years, he had to fly for his life to a town over two hundred miles away from his birthplace. Later on, in ten years' time, he returned to Mecca victorious, and then combined the high temporal position of kingship with that of a prophet of God.

At the prophet's demise he was succeeded by Abu Bakr. He and the Khalifs who followed him were spoken of on the one hand as Khalifs—meaning the prophet's successors—and on the other as Ameerul-mo'mineen—viz., the rulers of the faithful. It came gradually to be believed later on that whoever rose to the throne in succession to his line, not only rose to the position of kingship, but also to the position of spiritual successor. This was a wrong belief, but people are apt to accept things without personal investigation just as they find them and as the bulk of the people believe them to be.

A large part of the educated Muslims agreed with Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, but their attitude was at the best a passive one. It was, however, left finally to another great authority—viz., Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian—to explode this theory. He explained that the Islamic Khilafat was an institution which was spiritual in essence; that the Khalif ought to be a spiritual guide who should be inspired by divine revelation, and who would be endowed with the power to prove the truth of the religion of Islam to the world at large.

When the war broke out and Turkey joined forces with Germany, the Sultan sent out proclamations to the effect that he had declared a Holy War and called upon all Muslims to support him. He issued

these to the whole of the Muslim world, but they never reached India. Even if these messages had reached the Indian masses, I do not think that any real response would have been forthcoming. We did our duty at the time of the Great War, and that was to support the King-Emperor; I am glad to be able to say that this was recognized both by the administration of India and the Government of Great Britain.

• Later on, when the Khilafat was abolished by Mustafa Kemal, I must confess that it came as a great blow to those people who believed in it. At first they declined to believe the news that the Khilafat had really been abolished; they thought it was a political stunt in which Western diplomacy was indulging, and it took some little time to bring the conviction home to them. The Khilafat was abolished because it had no divine authority behind it.

Now I will not occupy much more of your time. I have very sincere admiration for Mustafa Kemal as a great general and a great administrator, but I deplore his interference in some things which he ought to have left alone. He has made a great mistake in substituting a Turkish translation of the Holy Quran in place of the original text in Arabic. It is not forbidden to translate the Holy Quran, and in India and elsewhere we have translations of it in various Oriental languages, but one thing that the Muslim world has always insisted upon is that the translation must invariably be accompanied by the original Arabic text, so that this latter will be rigidly preserved, and would not be likely to disappear or be otherwise tampered with.

Another thing about which I would like to say a few words is the so-called emancipation of women. It is a very common error in Europe to believe that Islam gives a very inferior position to woman, and I wish to take this opportunity of absolutely repudiating this idea.

We claim on the basis of the Holy Quran and on the basis of the commandments issued by the Holy Prophet that as a religion, Islam was the first which 1,350 years ago gave a status of honour to woman in her own right. In the Holy Quran woman is given possession of her own property, she is allowed to inherit a share of the property of her father, mother, husband, and in some cases from her own brothers, and to hold it in her own name. Because the Muslims may have abused their position, it does not mean that they are doing so with the authority of Islam. One of my learned English friends has stated publicly as the result of his own researches that the religion of Islam has acknowledged for thirteen hundred years the position which is now being granted to women in Western countries. Islam gives all neces-

sary and reasonable freedom to womankind. Learning is open to her in all branches. Mustafa Kemal in allowing women freedom in excess of what is allowed by Islam has, we believe, made a great mistake.

Captain H. M. BURTON: I feel very diffident in speaking after such a great authority on the subject as Sir Telford Waugh, and my only excuse for doing so is that in the short time I have been in Turkey I have been able to see Turkish life from an angle allowed to very few Englishmen.

I went to Turkey for the first time in 1927, to study the language, and spent nine months with Turkish families, which enabled me to see things through Turkish spectacles. Since then I have been four years in Iraq, and it has been most interesting to return each year to modern Turkey from a country where social conditions are much the same as they have been for hundreds of years.

Sir Telford Waugh has spoken of the Ghazi's ability as a soldier, and to this he undoubtedly owes much of his success, as the Turks are a military nation. But it seems to me that the success of his reforms is due even more to the rapidity with which he has carried them into effect, and to his own personal energy and determination. Time was not allowed for hesitation or opposition.

One of the chief criticisms one hears against the leaders of modern Turkey is their expulsion of the former trading classes—Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and foreigners. Many people contend that the Turks are incapable of taking the places of this class in business and commerce. It is certainly a policy of "sink or swim," but after nine years the Republic is still swimming. It is a policy which has at least compelled the Turks to work for themselves, which they perhaps never would or could have done as long as others were there to do it for them. Naturally it will take time for them to acquire experience; but I do not believe that they are incapable of becoming traders and business men. Everything must have a beginning.

With regard to language reforms: A congress has recently been held in Istanbul with the idea of substituting as far as possible old Turkish words for Arabic and Persian at present used. It is certainly possible to do this in the case of many words, but most young Turks prefer to use French, or English, when they wish to eliminate an Arabic word, or where the Arabic does not supply a modern term or expression. It would seem more likely that the natural evolution of the Turkish language will take place on these lines rather than revert

to the old Jaghatai Turkish of the Central Asian ancestors of the modern Turks, especially as nowadays most Turks go to some European country for part of their education and, whether they go to Europe or remain in Turkey, they all learn at least one European language. As the Turks moved westwards from Central Asia they assimilated Persian and Arabic words, and as they are now becoming "westernized" it would seem natural that they should assimilate European words.

*I was much interested, when visiting Konia last year, in the work of restoration on the old Seljuk mosques which the Turkish authorities are carrying on. Unfortunately I was unable to see some of them, as they were still occupied as military stores; but I was told that they would shortly be available for inspection. There is also a small, but very interesting, museum in the shrine of Mevlana, where the dancing dervishes used to perform, until dervish sects were abolished by the Ghazi.

In Istanbul I saw the work of uncovering the Byzantine mosaics in St. Sofia, which had been covered up for hundreds of years. The Turkish authorities are now showing much interest and enthusiasm in the preservation and restoration of ancient monuments and relics of all periods of history.


Probably the greatest revolution in the social life of Turkey is the complete emancipation of women, in the last few years, and the extraordinary rapidity with which they have adapted themselves to modern life. Turkish women now take part in almost every profession and business; in the shops, banks, business firms; as doctors, lawyers, and even judges. Whether this state of things is better or worse than the old order is a matter of opinion, and I agree with the last speaker that the life of women in Islamic countries is not the burden that many Europeans imagine it to be. But it depends entirely on what one is brought up to, and Turkey had reached a state of development where the old order was bound to change. The emancipation of women was the natural and logical sequence to the better education which Turkish women have had for some years past, and was finally brought about by the overcoming of religious prejudice as conditions of life changed. In Istanbul and Angora the veil is very rarely seen now, but in Konia, a large town, nearly all the women were still veiled last year.

It would be rash to prophesy as to the future of Turkey. The history of Turkey, especially from the Balkan wars to the present day, at

least proves that the Turks possess two great qualities—courage and endurance. From personal experience I can add a third, hospitality and kindness. I know that this will be supported by every other officer who has been out in Turkey on language study. I find that those who criticize the Turks most are those who know least about them, and to them I would say, "Bilmek istersen cihani, öğren ecnebi lisanı" ("If you want to know the world, learn foreign languages").

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF COMMERCIAL AIR ROUTES

By COLONEL H. BURCHALL, D.S.O.*



THE last time on which I had the honour to read a paper before the Royal Central Asian Society was in October, 1926, just prior to the opening of the Cairo-Karachi air service. My paper then described the route and what we hoped to do.

Six years have elapsed, and not only the Cairo-Karachi but also the London-Karachi air route has been in regular operation for a long time, and has become a recognized factor in long-distance travel to the East. So much so that it is taken for granted, and public interest has been turned for some time to the later and, in some ways, more difficult Africa route. Yet the Africa route has not presented the political

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 23, 1932. Air-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham in the Chair.

problems that have occurred on the India route, and it is of these that I have been asked to speak to-night. I should like to make clear, however, that I do not speak as a lawyer nor yet as one engaged in the settlement of the political problems, but purely from the point of view of the operator of air services.

The Law Relating to International Air Services

Before the influence of political considerations on air routes can be understood, it is necessary to consider the legal position that aviation has among the nations to-day.

Since quite early in the present century the legal status of air navigation has exercised the minds of jurists. In 1901 Fauchille wrote a treatise on this subject, and in 1906 his views were adopted by the "Institut de Droit International." These same views were expressed at the Institute of International Law in 1911. In the same year a Congress of International Law relating to aviation was held in Paris, and Great Britain passed the Aerial Navigation Act in 1911.

The Congress of International Law relating to Aviation met at Frankfurt-on-Main in 1913, and in the same year Great Britain and France also passed further Aerial Navigation Acts.

But there was no establishment on a sound basis of the international law relating to aviation until 1919, when the "Convention Relating to the Regulations of Aerial Navigation" was signed by the Allies. This Convention, usually referred to as the "Air Convention," forms, with its protocols, the basis of the present international law on this matter, and is of very far-reaching importance.

It was at first signed only by the Allied and Associated Powers, and was so drawn up that the Allies had a predominating voice in the regulation of air traffic, a feature that did not appeal to neutral and ex-enemy States. The Convention was, therefore, amended by three protocols, in 1921, 1922, and 1923.

In spite of this, a large number of States were not satisfied with the Air Convention, and this dissatisfaction led to two other Air Conventions, which were signed in 1926 and 1928.

The first was the Spanish-American Convention between Spain, Portugal, and the Latin American States. Twenty-one States participated in it, but so far it has only been ratified by five.

The second was the Pan-American Convention, between the United States and the Latin American States. Again twenty-one States took part and signed it, but it has so far been ratified by four only.

In 1929 a meeting was specially convened for the purpose of examining the text of the Convention of 1919 and considering what amendments should be made in order to facilitate the adhesion of non-contracting States. Thirty-eight States, including sixteen non-contracting States, were represented at the meeting.

A Protocol dated June 15, 1929, embodying the amendments that were agreed, was submitted to the Governments of the contracting States for signature and ratification. This Protocol has not yet been signed or ratified by Persia and not yet ratified by Uruguay and Chile.

The number of States that have become parties to the Convention now totals twenty-nine. Since 1929 three additional States, viz. Norway, Iraq, and Finland, have adhered—on July 1, 1931, October 1, 1931, and January 1, 1932, respectively—and one State, viz. Panama, denounced the Convention with effect from November 11, 1931.

The following is a list of States parties to the Convention :

Australia	Italy
Belgium	Japan
Bulgaria	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Chile	Norway
Czechoslovakia	Persia
Denmark	Poland
Finland	Portugal
France	Roumania
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Saar Territory
Ireland	Siam
Greece	Sweden
India	Union of South Africa
Iraq	Uruguay
Irish Free State	Yugoslavia.

You will note the important omission of Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Austria, and Hungary from among the nearer European States, and the U.S.S.R., Turkey, and China eastward, and the United States, Brazil, and the Argentine westward.

The Air Convention lays down as the foundation of international law—I quote the actual text—"that every power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory." This is the culmination of an argument which had been raging since Fauchille first set out his views in 1901.

On the one side there were the protagonists of "sovereignty," on the other the protagonists of "the freedom of the air." Before the War,

Fauchille and France generally were for freedom, Great Britain was for sovereignty.

During the War every State realized the capacity for offensive action that existed in every aircraft flying over its territory, however high it might fly, and this realization so impressed itself that the Air Convention of 1919 affirmed in its first article the principle of sovereignty. This ended the argument as far as international law was concerned, and there seems little possibility of it being reopened.

It is interesting to note that, although originally an exponent of sovereignty, Great Britain was found, in the discussions leading to the Air Convention, continually on the side of more freedom, and it was due to this fact that we find Article 2 of the Convention drafted as follows :

" Each contracting State undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting States, provided that the conditions laid down in the present Convention are observed. Regulations made by a contracting State as to the admission of the other contracting States shall be applied without distinction of nationality."

This article does at least pay lip service to the principles of freedom and equality of status for aircraft.

This brings us to the provisions of the Convention on which all political action depends. We now see that the basic legal principle is complete sovereignty of the air, and that freedom is left to the mercy of the other provisions of the Convention.

The next important proviso is found in Article 15, which I quote in full with a view to showing the distinction that is drawn between the operation of a regular air service and any other single flight.

" Every aircraft of a contracting State has the right to cross the air space of another State without landing. In this case it shall follow the route fixed by the State over which the flight takes place. However, for reasons of general security, it will be obliged to land if ordered to do so by means of the signals provided in Annex D.

" Every aircraft which passes from one State into another shall, if the regulations of the latter State require it, land in one of the aerodromes fixed by the latter. Notification of these aerodromes shall be given by the contracting States to the International Commission for Air Navigation and by it transmitted to all the contracting States.

"Every contracting State may make conditional on its prior authorization the establishment of international airways and the creation and operation of regular international air navigation lines, with or without landing, on its territory."

This gives every State the power to prevent a regular air service being established by refusing it permission. You will notice that there are no bounds set to this refusal, and the State need not have fair or just reasons for its refusal; in fact, it is not required to state any reason at all. It does not even require that the services of all contracting States shall be treated alike.

We shall see in due course that this latitude has led on the same route to some services being authorized and some being refused authorization.

It is this provision that causes the majority of difficulties when a regular air service is in course of being established. The permission of every country over which it is to pass has to be obtained, whether a landing is to be made in that country or not.

Another important provision, in Article 3, established the right of any State to prohibit the flight of aircraft over certain portions of its territory for military reasons. In effect, it gives, in conjunction with other articles, the right to determine the route over which any air line shall pass, including the points at which it shall cross the frontier, aerodromes at which aircraft shall land and courses between these aerodromes.

By the Protocol of 1929 an interesting amendment has been incorporated in Article 3. The amendment gives the right to each contracting State—to quote the actual wording—

"in exceptional circumstances in time of peace temporarily to restrict or prohibit flight over its territory . . . on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to the aircraft of all other States."

It is improbable that this clause would be used to stop a regular international air service, and one can readily visualize circumstances in which its aid might be rightly invoked either to prevent private fliers taking undue risks—e.g., flying through an area that had, from one cause or another, become dangerous—or causing embarrassment in the country they wish to fly over—e.g., flying in the vicinity of a religious festival. In the circumstances it would probably be unwise to attach undue importance to it, particularly as Article 15 appears to

provide all the power necessary to control the operation of regular international air services.

Prohibition of flight over an area of military importance, such as arsenals, dockyards, fortresses, etc., is also understandable, but it is the omission of any limit on the prohibition or on the refusal of permission for the establishment of regular air services that makes the establishment of such services difficult. To the layman it seems that it was the intention of the original High Contracting Parties to the Convention, that "freedom of innocent passage in time of peace" should be allowed. As international air services became established, it appears that their political importance raised misgivings as to the wisdom of complete freedom and led to the provision that their establishment should be subject to the prior authorization of the States flown over.

Luckily, the Convention established machinery for its own amendment, by the establishment, under Article 34, of a permanent International Commission for Air Navigation, usually known as the I.C.A.N. The Commission has its headquarters in Paris and has already held twenty sessions, and the twenty-first is fixed for May, 1933, in Rome. The Commission has freedom to hold its sessions wherever it may be convenient.

As originally constituted, the Allies had a permanent voting majority on this Commission, and this provision constituted one of the most serious obstacles in the way of neutral and ex-enemy States adhering to the Convention.

For that reason the voting power of representatives on the Commission was modified, and now each State represented on it has one vote; for this purpose the United Kingdom, India, and each of the Dominions is regarded as a separate State.

This Commission acts as a focus for all discussions on the subject of civil aviation, and as a clearing-house for information, regulations, and maps. It has specific power to amend the annexes to the Convention, which deal with such technical subjects as licences, air regulations, maps, wireless regulations, etc., when approved by three-quarters of the representatives present, providing that this three-quarters is also two-thirds of the total possible votes, if all the States were represented.

The Commission has not the power to amend the articles of the Convention, as distinct from the Annexes. Any proposal to amend an article must be sent to the Commission for examination, and, if approved, may be put forward by them to the contracting States, pro-

vided it has been approved by at least two-thirds of the total possible votes on the Commission.

Modifications to the articles of the Convention must be formally adopted by the contracting States before they become effective. Modifications to the annexes are, however, effective from the time all the contracting States are notified by the Commission.

It is clear then that the machinery for altering or adding to the Convention is there, and that to get more freedom it is now a question of persuading the contracting States that more freedom is desirable.

There are two more details that should be mentioned in connection with the Convention. The first is the definition of territorial waters, the second the reservations to its own national aircraft of traffic between two points on the territory of a State, which is analogous to coastwise trade in the marine world, and which is commonly called cabotage.

In Article 1, the second paragraph states that—

"the territory of a State shall be understood as including the national territory . . . and the territorial waters adjacent thereto."

The British interpretation of "territorial waters" is that water included between the coast and the three-mile limit. Great Britain has never admitted that territorial waters extend outside the three-mile limit, although certain agreements, notably that with the United States concerning trade in alcohol, have been made which allow territorial privileges outside the three-mile limit. On the other hand, several European countries claim wider limits, but, as far as this article is concerned to Great Britain and the majority of the nations, territorial waters means the three-mile limit.

Cabotage is a principle well known in shipping practice, and the similar reservation by a State, in favour of its national aircraft of the carriage of persons or goods for hire between two points on its territory, is sanctioned by Article 16 of the Convention, but is followed by a qualification in Article 17, in these words:

"The aircraft of a contracting State, which establishes reservations and restrictions in accordance with Article 16, may be subjected to the same reservations and restrictions in any other contracting State, even though the latter State does not itself impose the reservations and restrictions on other foreign aircraft."

This opens the door to bargaining between one contracting State and another, to excuse each other's aircraft from cabotage restrictions while keeping the restrictions on the aircraft of other countries. So far

there is no noticeable tendency to use this method of increasing freedom, but it is available for use when it is wanted.

It is the only specified departure from one of the great principles of the Convention, which is that all the contracting States shall be treated alike, and which is emphasized in the second paragraph of Article 2 :

" Regulations made by a contracting State as to the admission over its territory of the aircraft of the other contracting States shall be applied without distinction of nationality."

As already pointed out, the interpretation of the last paragraph of Article 15 leads, nevertheless, to dissimilar treatment of the regular services of contracting States through there being no specific obligation that authorization for international services shall be given without distinction of nationality.

This is a rough summary of the position of air services in international law. There are: First, each State has complete sovereignty over the air above its territory and territorial waters (Article 1 of the Convention); secondly, no air service can be established without the prior permission of the States over which it wishes to pass (Article 15), which permission may be refused without any reason being given.

The Effect of National Requirements on the India Air Route

We are now in a better position to understand the vicissitudes of all long-distance air routes—for they all suffer. To keep to the India route, which is probably that of greatest interest to this Society, will provide plenty of examples to show the interaction of political considerations.

In October, 1926, Imperial Airways had everything arranged for the start of the Cairo-Karachi service, but the service was held up at the Persian frontier for some months. My company had understood that Persia, which, incidentally, was a party to the Air Convention, was willing to let us fly along the coast of the Persian Gulf, but it transpired that they were not entirely satisfied. Negotiations dragged on, and at one time broke down altogether. Meanwhile we ran a weekly service between Cairo and Basra.

In 1929 the difficulty was overcome, and the Persian Government granted an authorization to Imperial Airways to fly for three years, once weekly in each direction, along the Persian Coast, subject to certain restrictions. At the same time arrangements were made to establish an air connection across the Mediterranean, which incidentally in-

volved an obligation for the service to go via Athens and via Tobruk in Italian Cyrenaica.

The Persian Government made it clear that they would not extend their authorization to fly along the coast after the expiry of the three years, as they had the intention to establish an aerial corridor through Persia, and, if we wished to continue to fly through Persia, we should only be able to do so by using the corridor. They considered that the period of three years would be ample for the specification of the corridor and for the organization of the company's ground services along it.

We know, therefore, that, unless the Persian Government reconsidered their decision before their authorization expired at the end of March, 1932, we should have to change our route or stop operating through Persia at all, and we applied from time to time to have the corridor specified.

In 1931 the corridor was specified and was as follows: Baghdad-Amara-Isfahan-Yezd-Bam-Gwadar.

This terrain is hardly encouraging for an air route, but, being anxious not to meet troubles halfway, it was decided to survey the proposed corridor, both on the ground and from the air. Unfortunately, our representative was unable to recommend even that the route be tried, and his report on it made certain what we had feared—namely, that it would be a prohibitively costly route for regular all-the-year operation. I will deal with the details of it later on in my paper.

As a result of that, the British Government applied for an extension of our authorization to use the coast route, and two extensions were granted, the first for two months, and the second for a further four. By that time our arrangements were complete for a change over to a route on the Arabian Coast. This change over was carried out on October 1 this year, and we now no longer fly over Persian territory. I shall refer to this route and its political problems later also, but I ought to mention that during the whole period of operations through Persia neither our personnel nor our service, as such, has given the Persian Government cause for complaint, and it was naturally a disappointment to us to find that the Persian Government were reluctant to allow us to continue to operate along the coast route.

It was not only in Persia that difficulties were encountered in the operation of the England-India route. As originally planned, the India mail and passengers left Croydon on a Saturday morning and flew to Basle, where they arrived in the late afternoon. From there they

travelled in the night train to Genoa, since Italy had not agreed to our aircraft entering Italy from France, although the French were using the route we wished to follow. On Sunday morning they left Genoa in a three-engined flying boat for Rome, Naples, and Corfu. From Corfu the service went via Athens and Crete to Tobruk in Italian Cyrenaica, and from there to Alexandria.

Our agreement with the Italian Government specified that an Italian company should also fly between Genoa and Alexandria, using the same route as ourselves, but in the middle of the week instead of at the week-end. In this way there would be a bi-weekly service between Genoa and Alexandria.

After nearly a year's operation, a proposal was put forward for pooling traffic between the two companies, which we could not accept. Owing to this disagreement, we had to give up flying through Italy and change our route hurriedly to one through Central Europe.

The Central European route ran through Vienna, Budapest, and Skoplje to Salonica by land plane. From there flying boats took the mail and passengers to Athens and Alexandria without touching at Tobruk. It was a satisfactory route during the summer, but the weather conditions were very bad in winter. The mountain area between Skoplje and Salonica is one of the worst in Europe from a flying point of view, and lacks meteorological, wireless, and night-flying facilities. In consequence, flying had to be confined to daylight hours, and in winter, when these were short, the mail and passengers were sent by a convenient night train over that sector.

After running on this route for eighteen months, a rapprochement occurred with Italy. It is perhaps unnecessary to go into details, but merely to state that in May, 1931, an agreement was reached under which we were authorized to revert to the Genoa-Naples-Corfu route for one year and thereafter to operate with aeroplanes from Milan to Brindisi and from there across the Mediterranean via Athens by means of flying boats.

Since the winter weather is better on this route than in Central Europe, we returned to this route in the same month, with, however, a certain amount of uneasiness about another change of route a year later. The proposed new route also produced another cause for uneasiness—namely, that the winter weather round Milan is particularly bad, and that in any case the aeroplane operating the Milan-Brindisi sector would be flying uneconomically and increasing the cost of the service we have to offer to the public.

These misgivings led us to investigate all the possible combinations of rail and air services between London and Brindisi, and this investigation showed that in the particular circumstances prevailing some marked advantages would be gained by using the train instead of flying between Milan and Brindisi. The expenditure that would otherwise have been incurred in operating the aeroplane between Milan and Brindisi could be allocated towards the cost of operating a second service each week from Brindisi across the Mediterranean, and so would permit us to separate entirely the Africa service, which by this time had been established, from the India service. In one stroke twice the capacity would be provided across the Mediterranean and two fast services a week instead of only one from London to the far side of the Mediterranean.

The separation of the India and Africa services would also allow us to shorten the route to India by flying from Athens via Castelrosso and Cyprus to the Sea of Galilee, and to avoid the detour through Egypt. By this means we should be able to avoid, except at the height of summer, any adverse influence on our time of transit by the employment of the train sector. By the provision of a link service between Cairo and Galilee, the interests of the Egyptian traffic in the India route would be safeguarded and a suitable connection would be provided for traffic between Africa and India.

Ultimately, therefore, it was decided to use the train from Paris to Brindisi, but you will note that this change was brought about by operational rather than political considerations. The separation of the India and Africa services and the operation of two services a week across the Mediterranean came into force in 1931, and has fully justified its inauguration, the single service by now being quite inadequate to cope with the traffic to be carried.

The Route in the Near East

As I mentioned earlier, we sent a representative in 1931 to survey the Persian Inland route.

From an orographical section of the route, you will see that it is not ideal for aircraft operation.

From Baghdad to Aligharbi (on the frontier) the route passes over the Iraq plain, following the course of the Tigris for a considerable part of the time. The plain is cultivated on each side of the river for a depth of about a mile; outside that strip of cultivation is sandy desert. After Aligharbi the terrain is entirely desert, and the surface starts to rise in hills up to 5,000 feet.

After passing Shustar, the Bakhtiari Mountains rise rapidly to 14,000 feet, and the River Karun winds its way through them at the bottom of precipitous gorges. The snow lies all the year round on the mountains, and the possibility of constructing intermediate landing grounds for use in bad weather or other emergency is remote, while to get supplies to such landing grounds or to provide amenities for passengers would in itself be an achievement. In addition to this, the crossing of the mountains is unpleasant, as the bumps are bad. There are no roads along the route as far as Isfahan, and such facilities as telegraphs or wireless are unknown.

Wireless and line telegraphy is essential for giving information about weather conditions if a service is to operate with regularity and without taking risks and, where bad weather is to be expected or where the country flown over is difficult, telegraphic communication becomes correspondingly of greater importance.

From Isfahan to Yezd the route follows the road. Most of the distance is across a salt-coated desert, which is soft underneath its crisp surface, and becomes a sea of mud in the winter, and for this reason Yezd is often cut off from the outside world for weeks at a time. There are also severe sandstorms in summer.

From Yezd onwards the plain becomes harder and gravelly, and water is only found at considerable intervals. After passing Robat the gravel gives place to heavy sand, and this persists till Kirman is reached.

After Kirman the route passes down a valley, the floor of which rises gradually to 7,000 feet, and then falls again to 3,500 feet at Bam. The mountains on each side of the valley rise to 11,000 feet, the valley in some places being only five miles wide.

From Bam to Bampur there is first a treeless and desolate plain; but as the altitude lessens there develops on this plain a thick jungle, and the ground is intersected by deep ravines. Between Bampur and Gwadar, mountains 5,500 feet high have to be crossed.

In all this route there is not a single wireless or meteorological station between Baghdad and Gwadar. Surface transport conditions for the necessary stores and spares are bad, and there seems little hope of their improvement in the near future.

In short, the route crosses mainly mountains, or desert, and even the landing grounds are not "all weather."

From this brief description you can see that such a route is unattractive from the flying point of view, and would be excessively

costly to organize and could only be adopted as a last resort, after all alternatives have been exhausted. We were, therefore, faced with a refusal of permission to fly by the coast, permission to fly over this difficult and excessively costly inland route and, lastly, the Arabian Coast.

The Arabian Coast route (as it is normally called) follows the line Basra-Kuwait-Bahrain-Shargah (in Trucial Oman) and from there directly along the Persian Coast, but outside territorial waters, to Baluchistan and India.

Being a coast route, no great difficulty or cost for the transport of fuel and supplies arises as shipping is available. There are already wireless stations not only on the shores of the Gulf, but practically every steamer in the Gulf could be called up by wireless telegraphy if required. Mountains occur only on the Oman Peninsula, and can be crossed at no greater height than 3,000 feet, while flying along a coast route is more comfortable than over a mountainous inland route. Weather conditions are also likely to be much more stable on a coast than on an inland route.

The Persian Coast route possesses these advantages also and is better from an operational point of view than that along the Arabian Coast. We should have been content to continue operating along it if we could have obtained a reasonable long period permit, but the Arabian route has, however, certain advantages, and once we decide to leave Persia its advantages can be fully exploited.

Although the Shaikhs at Kuwait, Bahrain, and Trucial Oman are independent rulers of their own territories, they are so closely tied to Great Britain by treaty and custom, that the air route is, in effect, under British protection. There are certainly stretches, such as the Hasa Coast, which are not under British control, but our relations with His Majesty King Ibn Saud are friendly and, in any case, our aircraft have more than sufficient endurance to travel between Kuwait and Bahrain without needing to refuel.

At the same time, although the Shaikhs of Trucial Oman are tied to the British Government by treaty, they are in a different category from the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Bahrain, who are in closer relation with the British Empire than the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast, rule in more settled and developed territory and are progressive and recognize the value of modern methods of transport and the trade they bring.

Looking at the map, it is obvious that a comparison in stages can be drawn between the Persian Coast route and the Arabian Coast

route. Bushire corresponds roughly to Kuwait, Lingeh to Bahrain, and Jask to some place on the Oman Peninsula, preferably on the east coast of that Peninsula. Beyond these points both routes converge on to Gwadar in Baluchistan—or, strictly speaking, to territory coming under the Sultan of Muscat, enveloped in Baluchistan—and so to India.

In our present time-table Basra is a night stop, and Jask was a night stop. Therefore, if the same schedule is to be maintained, the halt on the Oman Peninsula should also be a night stop. In present circumstances this night stop on the Oman Peninsula is the key to the Arabian route.

The Arabian Coast route can be operated either by land planes or flying boats. At first sight it might appear to be a better flying boat than aeroplane route, but actually there is not much to choose between the two when a service with four-engined aircraft is being considered.

However, the route was first surveyed as a flying boat route, as was natural since R.A.F. flying boats travel up and down the Arabian Coast regularly, and the route had come to be looked upon almost as a flying boat preserve.

Kuwait and Bahrain, fortunately, can provide alighting areas either for land plane or flying boat, and it is between Bahrain and Gwadar that the difficulty lies. The Trucial Coast is ruled by a series of minor shaikhs, who are independent, and the authority of the King of the Hejaz and Najd is restricted along this part of the Arabian Coast to the Hasa Coast. The Trucial Shaikhs are bound to the British Government by an agreement, in which they are to respect the truce by sea, to recognize the British authority on the sea and not to deal politically with other powers except through the British. In return, their independence is guaranteed.

The Trucial Coast inhabitants are deeply religious and are, of course, Moslems, although there are among them a few Hindu and Persian traders. They are backward, conservative, and stubborn people, devotedly attached to their political freedom.

When one learns that the inhabitants of one place forbade the use of a motor lorry, because motor lorries are not mentioned in the Koran, it is only to be expected that there might be opposition to the establishment of an air service.

A certain amount of geographical and historical detail—which I regret I can only give second-hand—is necessary to appreciate the problems of the negotiations with the Trucial Coast shaikhs. I would like here to pay a tribute to those whose duty it has been to carry out

these difficult negotiations, and especially to the late Sir Hugh Biscoe, whose untimely death occurred so tragically during the course of the negotiations.

At one time the Shaikh of Shargah (who is of the Jowasim tribe) ruled a considerable portion of the Oman Peninsula. His territory included not only Shargah, but also Ras-al-Khaimah on the west coast of the Peninsula, Dibah, Khor Fakkan, and Kalba on the east coast.

Owing to a dispute regarding the succession to the shaikhdом of Shargah, the other parts split off and became independent, and Shargah is left now with its own territory. Ras-al-Khaimah is independent, Dibah is also independent; Khor Fakkan and Kalba are ruled by the same shaikh, but are independent of the rest. These four shaikhs are all Jowasim, who seem to be of a more enterprising turn of mind than other tribes and more aware of the advantages of trade. South of Shargah on the coast lie the independent shaikhdoms of Dibai and Abu Dhabi.

The extreme northern part of the Oman Peninsula is territory officially belonging to the Sultan of Muscat. It is divided into two provinces, Khasab and Bea. Khasab is the more northern and includes both east and west coasts of the Peninsula. Bea is on the east coast only. Khasab is governed by a wali of the Sultan of Muscat, who is a strong and able man named Mdhafar. Bea is governed by its own shaikh, officially as wali for the Sultan.

The tribes of both these provinces are Shihu, and are more backward and wild than the rest of the tribes—in fact, the other tribes do not consider them Arabs at all, but say they are descended from Job.

Remembering that at first flying boats were considered for the service, a flying boat base on the Oman Peninsula was required. There were only three possible bases from a technical point of view, Dibai, Ras-al-Khaimah, and Malcolm Inlet, and the last was doubtful.

Ras-al-Khaimah is regularly used by the R.A.F., but the shaikh, while prepared to allow the use of his territory by the R.A.F., was not prepared to agree to a civil service passing through and staying the night in his territory.

The Shaikh of Dibai was more accommodating. Dibai is the largest town on the Trucial Coast; the British India slow mail service calls there fortnightly, and considerable trade is done. The shaikh realized that an air service would bring more trade, need provisions and fuel, as well as bring him a considerable income in the form of rent and landing fees.

Unfortunately the shaikh became ill, and thereafter changed his mind and declined to have anything further to do with the proposals.

Malcolm Inlet, the only other likely place, was also explored, as it appeared to offer sheltered water and an adequate area for flying boats to alight and take off. On the other hand, it is surrounded by precipitous cliffs and mountains, and is extremely hot in summer, and therefore was considered unlikely to be of practical use. As there was no other alternative in view, it was examined by officers of the R.A.F. flying boat squadron in the Gulf and also by a member of our Company, and it was agreed that the fears in regard to it were justified. Meanwhile the possibility of operating the route with land machines was being investigated and appeared feasible, provided that aerodromes could be found. In all these investigations along the Arabian Coast we had the unstinted help of the Royal Air Force, and it is a pleasure to be able to acknowledge publicly the very cordial co-operation they have given to us.

The present Shaikh of Shargah has always been well disposed, and he offered, on certain conditions, to allow us to establish an aerodrome on his territory and to build a resthouse, in which we could accommodate our passengers during the night stop. Officers of the R.A.F. reconnoitred the place and found a suitable stretch of flat sand, hard enough for our purpose. Unfortunately, Shargah is on the west of the Peninsula, and we would have liked our night stop to be on the east, say at Dibah. The advantage of Dibah over Shargah is that it is sixty miles nearer to Gwadar, the first aerodrome east of the Persian eastern frontier, and therefore its use would allow us to carry less petrol and more paying load. Dibah, unfortunately, does not meet our technical requirements.

In due course, therefore, the Shaikh of Shargah and his brothers signed an agreement for eleven years. The first result of this was that the British India steamer began to call at Shargah, doubtless to the chagrin of the inhabitants of Dibai, who will realize too late what a chance has been missed. Another result was that the building of the resthouse began. It will follow closely the lines of the resthouse established at Rutbah Wells, in the Syrian Desert, by the Iraq Government. It will, of course, be equipped with wireless telegraphy apparatus.

Once the agreement with the Shaikh of Shargah was signed, the major difficulty was over. We then had the regular stopping-places we required—Kuwait, Bahrain, and Shargah. As a result from

September 30, the date on which the authorization from the Persian Government and the two extensions finally expired, our air service ceased to operate through Persia and changed over to the route along the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf.

The Persian coast route has given a certain amount of difficulty through the Persian Customs and Public Health and Passport Regulations and the import restrictions that have been in force for some time past. It is hoped that difficulties of this nature will not be encountered on the Arabian Coast, and that in consequence passengers will enjoy more amenities and greater comfort than it has proved practicable to provide for them on the Persian side of the Gulf. In addition, the wireless apparatus established at Bushire and Jask did not give, in the hands of the operators appointed by the Persian Government, the service that we hoped, and we anticipate a better wireless service from the Arabian coast stations, which will be under effective British control.

The main stopping-places having been satisfactorily settled, there now only remains to be provided intermediate landing grounds for occasional use.

The distance from Gwadar to Shargah is 440 miles, and an additional refuelling station on the east coast of the Peninsula would be an advantage when exceptional adverse winds are encountered.

Dibah again would be the ideal place if it were not for the technical difficulties. There is no place further north; the mountains rise sheer out of the sea. To the south lie Khor Fakkan and Kalba under this one shaikh, Fujairah—also independent—and the Muscat territory.

Obviously the further south the occasional fuelling station is situated, the less use it will be. An aircraft captain would generally take a short sea crossing against a head wind and then follow the coast south to the emergency station. There is no satisfactory landing ground whatever at Khor Fakkan, which is surrounded by mountains, but just north of Fujairah the mountains recede from the coast. At Fujairah and Kalba are stretches of hard flat ground, the best being at Kalba.

While this paper is being written the matter of an occasional refuelling point on this coast is being further investigated.

Further negotiations for occasional landing grounds have been entered into with the shaikhs of Qatar and Abu Dhabi.

When the trans-desert air service was first established the tribes in the Syrian Desert looked with some suspicion upon it, and the same suspicion probably exists in the minds of the inhabitants of the Trucial

Coast, and the shaikhs have to bow to the popular will, even though they might themselves welcome the service.

Most people are apt to regard a shaikh as an absolute ruler instead of as merely the elected representative of his family, which is, in its turn, recognized as the ruling family. His brothers, uncles, and cousins have almost as much claim to the shaikhdom as he, and are sometimes prepared to exploit a grievance to their own advantage.

Perhaps the regular coming and going of aircraft carrying passengers, who do not interfere in any way with the local religious observances, or politics, and which, on the other hand, increase trade, may do much towards breaking down the distrust of the foreigner and establishing more peaceful conditions along the coast.

Concurrently with the establishment of the trans-desert air route from Palestine to Iraq, there seems to have been a noticeable improvement in the relationship not only between the tribes themselves, but also towards foreigners, and there appears to be no reason why the same improvement should not occur concurrently with the establishment of the Arabian Coast air route, and demonstrate once again that transport is civilization, and that the service is in no way detrimental to the interests of the countries flown over.

I have now described to you the various vicissitudes of the India air route that have arisen from political considerations, and would like to mention in passing the subject of extending it across India.

The Chairman, on the occasion of my previous paper in 1926, said at the meeting that he hoped the line to Karachi would soon be extended across India, but unfortunately it has not yet proved to be practicable, and political considerations have, in the main, given rise to the difficulties with regard to this extension.

Negotiations, however, are still in progress and appear to be taking a more hopeful turn, and you will doubtless have noticed that recently in the House of Commons the Under-Secretary of State for Air said that the proposed extension of the existing India air service to Australia had been and still was under active examination by the Governments primarily concerned, and that, while he was not yet in a position to make a definite statement, he was glad to be able to report that considerable progress had been made during the last few months and that he was hopeful of early further developments.

The Value of Freedom of Innocent Passage

In conclusion, I should like to offer a few observations on the value of freedom of air transport to the civilized world.

Undoubtedly, air transport can never hope to meet all calls made upon it until "freedom of passage in time of peace" is as world-wide in application to air transport as it is to marine transport. There are two suggested ways of expediting this condition of things, firstly by international ownership of air transport, and secondly by getting the Air Convention still further amended.

To discuss the former at the present time is perhaps to tread on dangerous ground, particularly as the subject is now being considered in connection with disarmament.

My own personal view, however, is that, as a measure of disarmament, international ownership of commercial air services could not achieve its purpose, since it would still leave untouched the much larger numbers of privately owned aircraft operating exclusively within each nation's own territorial limits, and would not prevent a nation bent on war from commandeering any internationally owned aeroplanes within its territory.

Quite possibly the sponsors of this proposal do not intend it to hinder air transport developments, but it is difficult to see how it could do anything except bring complete stagnation to commercial aviation.

Looking at the matter apart from its relation to disarmament, it is impossible to obtain in an international company that unity of policy and standards which we believe is essential for efficiency, and it is too much to expect assistance from national exchequers for an international company.

Even a national long-distance air service must, if it is to run economically and as a sound commercial business, be controlled by one board of directors as a single entity, with uniform standards of service, comfort, speed, and consideration for the passengers, and conditions of employment for the staff. For this reason my company has always urged the need for unity of control over trunk British Empire air lines.

If this is not achieved, the commercial efficiency and economy are bound to fall to undesirable levels, and the passengers will have endless difficulties and never know where they stand.

How would it be possible to secure the necessary singleness of purpose in an international company, with the different mentalities, idiosyncrasies, and interests of a number of nationalities? Such a com-

pany would be influenced by political considerations even within its own board of directors, unless one nationality acquired a dominant position.

Orders for equipment and aircraft would have to be spread over the nationalities comprising the company, irrespective of whether all nations produced the same quality of equipment or not, and at the expense of efficiency. This is too high a price to pay for the freedom of the air, which would then only bear "Dead Sea fruit."

The better way is gradually to impress on the nations of the world that the freedom of the air is to each one's advantage, that the trade that air travel brings means more money for their exchequers, more facilities for their citizens, less fear of international friction.

Technical advances will in time produce such aircraft that the operation of air routes will become possible without subsidies. As soon as that time comes, air lines will cease to have that extreme national character which they have at present owing to their being fostered by funds from their national treasuries. Governments will not then be vitally interested in protecting them from competition, and they will, therefore, not be so anxious to hamper or restrict the activities of the transport companies of other countries.

The first step towards making air services self-supporting seems to be to amend the Air Convention in such a way that States may only refuse permission to the aircraft of other contracting States to fly over their territories on giving reasonable grounds for doing so. Governments will be much less inclined to refuse permission if their reasons for so doing have to be made public.

Restrictions, other than those necessary for military, police, customs, or quarantine reasons, should also be removed, and the fostering of other objects by means of special taxes extracted from air transport undertakings should be abandoned.

Our object should be to obtain exactly similar facilities for aircraft proceeding on their lawful occasions as are available to ships at sea, which are free to follow any course they desire outside territorial limits, and to pass unhindered through territorial waters to the port of their choice.

The benefits of air transport to the world in general cannot be over-estimated. There are innumerable cases when being able to make a journey by air makes it possible for the journey to be undertaken at all. By surface transport the time could not be spared. The best way to get agreement between people and to thrash out conflicting

points of view is for the people concerned to meet. The personal touch is still and always will be the finest producer of agreement and understanding, however great may be the advance in telephony, telegraphy, and even television.

In this busy world, when time is so valuable, it is air transport which will make the personal touch possible, where hitherto the speed of surface transport has not permitted it.

That is one of the great advantages that air transport has to give civilized countries, and it acts continuously in times of peace to avoid the development of friction that may lead to quarrels and international strife. This surely must be set against the somewhat over-estimated value that is put upon commercial aircraft for use as weapons of war. On balance the continuous and powerful potentialities for good of commercial aircraft far outweigh the minor potentialities for offensive action in time of war.

In uncivilized and wild countries, air travel is often the only alternative to painfully slow and tedious progress through desert or bush or jungle. Before the aeroplane came, it took weeks, where now it takes hours. Tracts of country, hitherto inaccessible, can be opened up by aircraft. Settlers scattered over wide areas can be kept supplied with letters, luxuries, medical assistance, etc., by aircraft in a way which would be impossible by surface transport.

Air transport, therefore, has a very definite place in the list of man's amenities, and it is a place that can be filled in no other way.

Our object must be to get all the nations of the world to see it in that light and to expedite the freedom of innocent passage in times of peace by all means in their power.

This conclusion was strongly emphasized by the CHAIRMAN in thanking Colonel Burchall for his extraordinarily interesting lecture.

Sir ROBERT BROOKE POPIHAM also spoke of the necessity of speed.

Questions were asked with regard to night flying, which Colonel Burchall said would come before very long, about the airways of other nations operating in Asia and about the Arabian Coast route, which would be further dealt with in Squadron Leader Bentley's lecture on December 14 on "The New Air Route to India."

SINAI: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FORTY YEARS' WANDERING OF ISRAEL

By MAJOR JARVIS

Lecture given on July 27, the Right Hon. Lord Lloyd in the Chair.

THE subject of my lecture—"The Forty Years' Wanderings of the Israelites"—is one that has puzzled Bible historians from the earliest days of Christianity, and the interest in the subject has increased considerably of late owing to the fact that a large number of people have actually visited Sinai and the difficulty of reconciling the story of the wanderings with the recognized route has become apparent to them all.

In the first place I should like to make it quite plain that I am not a Bible student, neither am I a historian nor an archaeologist, and to deal with the subject properly I feel that one should be one or the other, but at the same time it is not much use studying the documentary evidence unless one studies also the site. In this respect I do not think one could get to know Sinai thoroughly, to understand its climate, its possibilities and disadvantages in less than three years, and it is extremely unlikely that any qualified historian will be able to expend three years of his life studying the Peninsula? My only excuse for being here is that I have lived in Sinai for ten and a half years and during that time have wandered all over it, have seen it in drought years, have seen it in wet years—I have got extremely sick of it, especially when leave time draws near and one's leave is postponed for some political crisis, and political crises in Egypt invariably occur during the leave season—and I have also during that time found that Sinai has grown upon me, as it were, and that there is a charm about its vast open plateaux and rugged mountains that one does not find elsewhere. With the solitary exception of Colonel Parker, my predecessor, I have been longer in Sinai than any other European.

With regard to the documentary evidence I think I am right in saying that the only first-hand evidence existing is that contained in the two books of the Old Testament, Exodus and Numbers. I believe there is a considerable amount of doubt as to how these books came

into existence, by whom they were written, and at what date. They may possibly have been an actual diary of events as they occurred; they may have been compiled by some historian immediately after the Wanderings on the statement of actual eye-witnesses; or, and I imagine this is the generally accepted belief, they may have been written some centuries afterwards on the legendary stories handed down from father to son in the same way that Arabs to-day hand down tribal legends? From the point of view of my paper it is immaterial when they were written, and I purposely offer no opinion on the matter, as I have found to my cost that there are several schools of thought on the subject, all most intolerant of the views of any others.

In any case I think we may say that these two books are what lawyers call "Best Evidence," and that, though the Wanderings are frequently mentioned in other and later books of the Bible, I do not think they can be regarded as anything but references to what is recorded in Exodus and Numbers and cannot be accepted as throwing any new light on the subject, nor to refute any statement that occurs in those books.

There is no corroborative evidence from other sources despite the fact that it is a story that concerns two nations, for though the Israelitish scribes deal with it as an epoch-making event, the Egyptian records, which, considering the lapse of time, are fairly complete, make practically no mention of the Israelites in Egypt except as foreign labourers, and their flight from the country is completely ignored. The Exodus of the Israelites was probably a far more important matter in the eyes of the Israelites themselves than in those of the Egyptians; and, if one may say so, the impression one gets from reading Exodus is that the Israelites had no small idea of their own importance in the general scheme of things. Egypt in those days was a great nation, and it is most unlikely that she viewed the emigration of a discontented party of foreigners as a vital blow to her prestige—as we are led to believe from the Book of Exodus. One may safely assume that the Government of the day was considerably annoyed at their flight and took steps to bring them back; but there is no record of any Egyptian Pharaoh having lost his life by drowning at that period, so that if the king himself did accompany the punitive army he was certainly not one of the casualties.

There is therefore no other evidence available except that of tradition, and everyone acquainted with the East is aware how unreliable that type of evidence is. Presumably no attempt to locate

the site of the Wanderings was made till shortly after the dawn of Christianity in the first century A.D., and one gathers that about that time various devout pilgrims journeyed into Sinai in search of a great and terrible mountain. This was a matter of fifteen hundred years after the occurrence, so that local tradition by that time must have been extremely unreliable. These pilgrims found in the south of the Peninsula several peaks with the characteristics they were looking for and then gave the old Biblical names of the halting places to various wells, palm groves, etc., on the route. This route having been definitely accepted, all the Bible historians who in recent years have made the journey to Sinai with possibly only a month or so at their disposal have been taken along this road, and have therefore been handicapped in forming an unbiased opinion. Places have been pointed out to them as being Marah, Elim, and Paran, and these they have been forced to accept for lack of time to study any other route. It should be borne in mind also that Gebel Musa or Mount Moses is not by any means the original selection, as at different times between the first and fourth centuries other peaks such as Gebel Serbal, Gebel Caterina, and Gebel Um Shomer have been accepted as the mountain of the law. Till quite recent years therefore the theory has been universally accepted that Moses and his host, having crossed the Gulf of Suez in the vicinity of Suez, journeyed southwards via the Wadi Feiran to Gebel Musa, and, having received the laws, wandered in this barren mountainous region with occasional visits to Kadesh Barnea in the north, until they crossed over into Edom to seize Palestine. There is, however, every reason to believe that except for small parties with grazing flocks the Israelites never went to the southern part of the Peninsula.

It has been accepted generally by the majority of historians that the Israelites prior to their flight were settled in the Zagazig Wadi Tumilat area west of Ismailieh, and Succouth—the place from which they started the Exodus—has been, I understand, definitely located at Tel el Mashkuta, a matter of twenty miles west of Ismailieh. The Israelites at that time were a nomad tribe, and after Joseph's arrival in Egypt began to filter in from the desert areas, in the same way as Arab tribes do to-day, to a country where grazing and desert cultivation offered better opportunities for existence. Like all Arabs, they had a very marked antipathy to Government interference, and so long as they were left alone to lead their own lives in the Land of Goshen all was well. As civilization and irrigation increased in Egypt, during one of

her many periods of prosperity the Government of the day decided that the nomad Israelites should no longer be exempt from all taxation and service, but should do their share in supplying labour and the payment of taxes. The *corvée* or compulsory labour law of Egypt was then in force as it is at the present time, and the application of it to the Arab tribes that live along the fringe of cultivation to-day would arouse quite as much indignation as it did in the case of the Israelites.

One of the tasks set the Israelites was the provision of bricks for building granaries, and not only did they have to supply the labour but the materials as well. One of the constituents of the mud brick is *tibn* or chopped straw, which forms also the principal item of fodder for all animals in Egypt. Apparently the Israelites were unable to find sufficient *tibn* without robbing their animals, and were forced to collect grass and herbage, with the result that the bricks were unsatisfactory and refused by the overseer. Their hardships assumed gigantic proportions in their eyes, as is the case with all Arabs and nomads when called upon to render public service however slight, and the decision was made to escape from their serfdom, even though it meant exchanging the more or less fruitful land of Goshen for the wilderness of Sinai.

A short description of Sinai may help one to understand the very inhospitable country in which the Israelites spent forty years. It is a triangular peninsula 260 miles long, 150 miles wide at the north, and tapering to a point in the south. At the present time it may be geologically divided into three parts: first, a sandy belt of country some fifteen miles deep, stretching from the Mediterranean shore southwards; second, a high gravel and limestone plateau, intersected by wide wadis or dry torrent beds, which extends from the sandy belt to a point some 150 miles southward; and, thirdly, a tumbled mass of granite mountains rising to 8,000 feet which forms the apex of the Peninsula. The coastal sandy belt dies away a few miles east of El Arish, giving place to a light loam that yields excellent crops of barley, wheat, and millet. There is every reason to believe from the encroachment of sand that has taken place during the last twenty years that a great part of this belt is of recent origin, and that at the time of the exodus all the coastal area was capable of producing corn crops.

There is a generally accepted idea that Moses and his host wandered around Sinai for forty years, existing solely on manna and quails; but a study of the Book of Exodus will disclose the fact that at all cere-

monies and sacrifices bread, flour, meat and other commodities were plentiful, and it is safe to assume that the manna was eaten only during the first few months in Sinai before they had settled down to cultivate the soil and during those periods of drought when the corn crops failed. The presence of flour and oil, and such animals as oxen, goats, sheep, and donkeys, proves that they must have cultivated the land very extensively. In other words, the Israelites during their forty years' sojourn must have lived very much the same sort of life as is lived by the inhabitants of Sinai to-day, taking full advantage of those areas where the soil is suitable for corn crops, exploiting the date palm, and using the mountainous areas as grazing lands for their sheep and goats. They no doubt dispossessed the existing inhabitants of the land—namely, the Amalekites—who were very probably a nomad tribe similar to the Azazma or Sawarka, who at present occupy the south-eastern corner of the triangle of good cultivable land that exists between El Arish, Rafa, and Kossima. The battle with the Amalekites is described in Exodus, chapter xvii., verses 8-16, as taking place at Rephidim, and after this engagement we may presume that the Amalekites accepted defeat and had perforce to allow the Israelites to occupy their area. This is a situation that occurs to-day in Arabia, and, until Governments took an interest in Arab movements, in Egypt and Palestine also. The Midianites were probably the forebears of the existing Lehwat tribe occupying the area south of the Dead Sea and the south-east of Sinai. Moses having married a daughter of Jethro, the paramount sheikh, and the Israelites not desiring their territory, they lived on friendly terms with this tribe; and it was at Jethro's suggestion that Moses framed his laws and tribal organization, which to all intents and purposes are the laws and ordinances pertaining in the Arab world to-day.

The reasons for assuming that the Israelites never went to Southern Sinai but confined their wanderings to the north are as follows:

Firstly, before one accepts a new theory it is necessary to examine the discarded one and the evidence in its favour. So far as I can make out there is absolutely no evidence in favour of Southern Sinai beyond tradition and the location of the site by pilgrims in the first to the fourth centuries. There are, it is admitted, towering peaks in Southern Sinai that fit in with the description of a great and terrible mountain, but in Northern Sinai there are mountains 2,000 feet high, rising from a flat plain, which are quite as impressive when the surrounding country is taken into consideration.

Secondly, the question of cultivation. Southern Sinai is a tumbled mass of pure granite, and even if one allows for a considerably heavier rainfall than it receives to-day, it could never by any flight of the imagination have supported the vast herds of oxen, sheep, goats, etc., that accompanied the host without taking into consideration the question of corn. The only foodstuffs produced in Southern Sinai are dates and a few fruits, such as almonds, pears, etc., which are grown in some of the deep wadis in a soil composed of disintegrated granite, and there are probably not more than fifty acres in the whole area capable of producing corn. There is only one part of Sinai where corn can be cultivated in any quantity, and this is in the triangle El Arish-Rafa-Kossicma, which is clearly marked in my map. Also in the days of Moses when the frontiers of Sinai were not so clearly defined it is probable that the wilderness of Sinai extended as far as Asluj in Palestine. In this area to-day first-class crops of barley and wheat are produced, and it is evident from the traces of terracing in all the wadis that this area was in the past very much more extensively cultivated than it is to-day, and, moreover, was cultivated by a race who possessed a certain amount of civilization. There can be little doubt therefore that the sojourning place of the host was in this triangle. It is evident from a study of Exodus and Numbers that the different tribes of the Israelites differed in their characteristics—some tribes were religious teachers, others craftsmen, etc., and therefore one may assume that the cultivators and craftsmen of the host dwelt in this more or less civilized area, whilst the herdsmen moved about Central and Southern Sinai in search of grazing.

Against this theory it may be argued that the size of the host was such that it was impossible for this small area to support the three million souls who followed Moses out of Egypt, and three million is the figure one must accept if the first chapter of Numbers is read literally. After the Giving of the Law, Moses counted the fighting men of the tribes, counting every man over the age of twenty who was fit to take the field, and the total came to 603,550. Allowing to every fighting man a wife, two children, and an aged parent, which is a very modest estimate for an Oriental race, one arrives at the stupendous figure of three million. The absolute impossibility of moving a host of this dimension out of Egypt and supporting them in the desert has long been apparent to all students of the Wanderings, and Sir Flinders Petrie has a most feasible and ingenious explanation of how the misconception occurred. The Hebrew word for thousand—*alaf*—may also

mean family or section, and is somewhat similar in its meaning to the Arab word *oile* which is used in the same sense. In Numbers i., verse 21, we read:

"Those that were numbered of them, even of the tribe of Reuben, were forty-six thousand and five hundred," and so on. But with *thousand* translated as *family* we get:

"Tribe of Reuben, 46 families 500 fighting men—not 46,500.

"Tribe of Simcon, 59 families 300 fighting men.

"Tribe of Gad, 45 families 650 fighting men," etc.

It will be seen that in most cases a large number of families means a proportionately large number of fighting men—namely, Judah 74 families 600 men and Dan 62 families 700 men. There are some exceptions to the rule, but on the whole the theory holds good. If one allows four dependants to each fighting man, one arrives at the moderate figure of 27,000, which is a host that could be transported without great difficulty and which could quite easily support itself in the cultivable part of North Sinai, it being, in fact, the approximate number of inhabitants in that area to-day. The argument that the numbers must have been nearer thirty thousand than three million is proved by the fact that Moses acted as judge and mediator in every dispute, and that there were only two midwives to the whole host.

There are frequent references to Kadesh Barnea in Exodus and Numbers, and Kadesh Barnea has been located as the existing Ain Kadeis on the Palestine frontier south of Kosseima. Ain Kadeis, however, is an insignificant little spring, nothing more than two water-holes in fact, and it is practically certain that Kadesh Barnea is the present Ain Gedeirat, five miles to the north, where a strong little brook flows through the valley for a distance of a mile and a half. A properly organized host of 27,000 could water at Ain Gedeirat in one day—it would take them a month to do so at Ain Kadeis. In the Wadi Gedeirat there are traces of extensive cultivation and irrigation, a huge reservoir, the remains of a masonry dam, and a fort, the stones of which have so disintegrated that it is impossible to date it. I am not suggesting that any of these ruins are the work of the Israelites, as that would be a very dangerous statement to make, but the valley is obviously a place that has been permanently occupied and cultivated extensively throughout the ages, and it would make a most excellent headquarters for a race living in the triangle of cultivated land in North-East Sinai.

The third point against Southern Sinai being the site of the Wanderings is the manna; the manna has been accepted by most scientists as being the deposit left by a small insect that feeds on the tamarisk tree at certain seasons of the year. The small white grains, the size of a coriander seed, are still to be found in some quantities under the tamarisk bushes in the spring. It is not exactly an appetizing form of diet, but would no doubt serve to keep body and soul together. In Southern Sinai there are very few tamarisks to be found, but on the Mediterranean coast they are plentiful, and before the sand dunes invaded this area it is obvious from the stumps of semi-fossilized trees found in the sand that there must have been a veritable forestal belt of tamarisk, which would have supplied manna for the Israelites. At the same time, I do not feel very sure about this point, as the deposit I am talking about does not fit in to my mind with the manna as described in Exodus, and also from time to time one reads in the newspapers of falls of real manna in different parts of Africa. Whether these reports can be believed or not I cannot say—I certainly have never seen a fall of manna in Sinai.

The fourth and strongest argument concerns the quails, and, as a matter of fact, this argument is so convincing that to my mind it definitely settles the matter.

On two separate occasions—once after leaving Elim and once, considerably later, at Kibroth-Hataavah—the Israelites fed on quail that came in from the sea in a cloud and settled near the camp. This is a sight that may be seen on almost any part of the Mediterranean coast during the autumn migration. In the months of September and October, shortly after dawn on almost every morning, one may see a cloud of quail coming in from the sea so completely exhausted that they pitch on the seashore and stagger into the nearest scrub bush for cover. It is possible when the birds are in this condition to catch some of them by hand, and in a year when the migration is good it would be quite possible for a host as numerous as the Israelites to eat their fill; and, what is more, the birds being very fat and oily, it would not be surprising for a surfeit to cause gastric trouble, which apparently happened at Kibroth-Hataavah. All this could quite easily happen in North Sinai, but it could never have happened in South Sinai, for the simple reason that the quail pitch on the Mediterranean shore and nowhere else in Sinai. I have occasionally seen an odd bird in Central Sinai in the high desert during the migration, but when thousands are passing overhead in a migratory flight there are always a few odd

individuals that fall out and die. The point is that they do alight regularly on the shore in the North Sinai in millions and are never seen anywhere else in the Peninsula.

Another point against Southern Sinai is the fact that, though the Egyptians of those days ignored Northern Sinai, as is proved by the complete absence of temples or buildings of any kind, they were very considerably interested in Southern Sinai, where they had turquoise and copper mines, also pearls, peridots, and other semi-precious stones. There are the remains of at least five mines in different parts of the apex of the Peninsula, and at Serabit el Khadim there is a temple and the ruins of army barracks, the date of which proves that at the time of the Exodus Southern Sinai was garrisoned by Egyptian troops for the protection of the mines.

Moses was well acquainted with Sinai before he led the Israelites there, and during one of his stays in the Peninsula he had married the daughter of a Trans-Jordan Arab—namely, Jethro. It is most unlikely that he would have taken his people into a country garrisoned by his enemies. Incidentally, the barracks at Serabit el Khadim are only a matter of fifty miles from Mount Moses itself, and the Israelites, according to the Book of Numbers, were encamped at the foot of the mount for over a year—in other words, within striking distance of the Egyptian troops.

If one searches for a suitable mountain in Northern Sinai for the site of the Law-giving, Gebel Hellal, thirty miles south of El Arish, at once suggests itself. It is a most imposing limestone massif over 2,000 feet high, standing in the midst of a vast alluvial plain, and, though very much smaller than Mount Moses, it is far more impressive and dominates the whole of the surrounding country. Mount Moses, on the other hand, is set amidst a cluster of some eight peaks of similar size and is neither the highest nor the grandest of the range.

The name Gebel Hellal is of peculiar significance, as the Arabic word *Hellal* means lawful, and is generally used in connection with the slaughtering of animals; namely, if an animal is correctly killed by having its throat cut it is deemed *hellal* or slaughtered according to the religious law. As the Mountain of Moses is firstly connected with the Giving of the Law and secondly with many sacrifices of animals killed in the Jewish manner, which incidentally coincides with that of the Mohammedan, the name *Hellal* suggests that this mountain may be very possibly the actual site of the Law-giving. Arabic scholars may ask if the name is not *Hilal*, which means crescent, but I have taken

particular trouble to find out from the local Arabs, and the name is definitely Hellal.

In Egypt and Palestine the majority of the place-names have a meaning. For instance, Luxor is a corruption of El Aqsar—The Forts; Bir Sheba means the Seventh Well, Tel el Kebir means the Big Hill, and tradition always has an explanation of the meaning; but in the case of Gebel Hellal the local Arabs have no explanation. They tell you it is the place of lawfully slaughtered animals, but on being asked when the animals were slaughtered they can only say: "*Wallahi, min ari?*"—"By God, who knows?"

Another important point that favours Hellal as the site of the Law-giving is the fact that three days after the host left the Mountain of the Law the quails descended on them at Kibroth-Hataavah. I estimate that a large party of nomads trekking with their kit, women, and animals would not cover more than ten miles a day, and this would put the Mountain of the Law definitely about thirty miles away from the Mediterranean coast. Gebel Hellal is exactly that distance from the sea at El Arish.

In the newspaper reviews of my book, *Yesterday and To-day in Sinai*, one or two have criticized my selection of Gebel Hellal, as it does not fit in with the description of a great mountain "altogether on a smoke," which they maintain denotes volcanic action. I have since found that there are a very large number of people who attribute all the fiery manifestations in Sinai, the Burning Bush, the Pillar of Fire and Cloud, and God appearing to Moses in a cloud of Smoke to volcanic action; and because Southern Sinai has been very obviously subjected to a very violent volcanic upheaval in the past, they maintain that the south of the Peninsula must have been the scene of the Wanderings. In this respect one must bear in mind that Gebel Hellal is just as volcanic as the south and was thrown up at the same time, but in any case the theory falls to the ground altogether, as Sinai ceased to be volcanic at least a million, and probably two million, years ago, and my authority for this is Dr. Ball of the Desert Survey of Egypt, whose opinion on such matters is unquestioned. He has surveyed Sinai both topographically and geologically and knows the Peninsula well.

I think the explanation of Gebel Hellal appearing to the Israelites as being great and terrible and all on fire may be attributed to the fact that they had come from the perfectly flat and featureless country of the Nile Valley, and none of them, with the exception of Moses himself, had ever seen anything higher than a twenty-foot mound. To a people

bred in such surroundings a 2,000-foot mountain would look colossal and awe-inspiring. The fire and smoke, I imagine, was one of the violent local thunderstorms that Gebel Hellal never fails to attract if there is stormy weather in the air. Thunderstorms are rare in the Nile Valley, but common in Sinai, and the Israelites no doubt first saw Hellal with its head wreathed in smoke-like clouds and mist, rent every half minute or so with flashes of forked lightning and rolling with thunder. This is a very common sight, and I have frequently stood in brilliant sunshine and watched a violent storm strike Hellal. I may mention that on these occasions I do not stay and admire too long, as in a very short time every wadi is a roaring flood, and it is as well to get home while the going is good.

Whilst on the topic of names it is interesting to note that in the list of halting places given in chapter xxxiii. of Numbers in the order in which they were visited, there is only one place in Southern Sinai that resembles any of the places so mentioned. This is Wadi Feiran, which is supposed to be the wilderness of Paran, where the Amalekites were defeated. In Northern Sinai, however, there are to-day a considerable number of names that mean nothing in Arabic, and which closely resemble places mentioned in Numbers. They are Kadeis, which has already been accepted as Kadesh Barnea; Hazira, which may be Hazeroth; Hariedin, which resembles Haradna; Libni, which may be Libnah; Rissan Aneiza-Rissah; Arish-Alush, etc., and all these places are situated in the triangle of cultivated land I have suggested as the probable sites of the Wanderings.

On reading the Wanderings, mention is found of the wilderness of Sinai, desert of Sinai, wilderness of Shur, wilderness of Paran, etc. These I have studied most carefully, but I regret that it is absolutely impossible to arrive at any conclusion as to where the Israelites imagined these various wildernesses and deserts began and ended. The Books of Exodus and Numbers are vastly interesting and marvellous examples of the literature of those days, but as a convincing road report they leave much to be desired. It is absolutely impossible to map out correctly the route that the Israelites took, and any attempt to do so leaves one completely fogged.

Twice, however, mention is made of the Red Sea, once as the site of the engulfing of the Egyptian host, and once when the Israelites returned to halt there after leaving Elim—this being the occasion when the first cloud of quail descended on the camp. It is this definite mention of the Red Sea that has always led people to suppose that,

ipso facto, the destruction of the Egyptians must have occurred near Suez and the Wanderings must have taken place in the south. But in the Hebrew script Red Sea is translated from the Hebrew words *Yam Suf*, and the correct translation of *Yam Suf* is not Red Sea, but Sea of Reeds. There are no reeds whatsoever in the Red Sea, and certainly the Gulf of Suez part of it with which this narrative is concerned, is freer from sea-weed, or any marine growth than any sea in the world, so that there is therefore not the slightest reason to connect *Yam Suf* with any part of the Red Sea. The only place that in any way suggests a sea of reeds is the vast Bardawil Lake on the Mediterranean coast between Port Said and El Arish. On certain parts of the shores of this lake there are big areas of rushes, and, if we can accept Lake Bardawil as the *Yam Suf* of the Hebrew script, the wanderings of the Israelites, the quail and manna episodes, the law-giving, and even the engulfing of the Egyptian host fit into each other like the parts of a jigsaw puzzle.

There are a certain number of people who like to accept the miracles of the Old Testament in simple faith and who believe that the Almighty actually did open up the waters for the Israelites and roll them back on the Egyptians. There are others, however, who see the Israelites as a fanatical race steeped in superstition and imbued with the idea that they were the chosen people of the Lord, who attributed to the direct intervention of the Almighty practically every occurrence that to their ignorant minds could not be explained, and these people very naturally ask for a common-sense explanation of all the miracles that happened to the Israelites.

The striking of the rock at Rephidim by Moses and the gushing forth of the water sounds like a veritable miracle, but I have actually seen it happen. Whilst on patrol in Southern Sinai some of the Soudanese Camel Corps had halted in a wadi and were digging in the loose gravel accumulated at one of the rock sides to obtain water that was trickling through the limestone rock. The men were working slowly, and the Bash Shawish, the Colour Sergeant, said: "Give it to me," and, seizing a shovel from one of the men, began to dig with great vigour, which is the way with non-commissioned officers the world over when they wish to show their men what they can do, and have, incidentally, no intention of carrying on for more than two minutes. One of his lusty blows struck the rock, and the hard polished face that forms on weathered limestone when it is kept moist cracked and fell away in huge slabs, exposing the soft porous rock beneath,

and out of the porous rock came a great gush of clear water. It is regrettable that these Sudanese Camel Corps, who are well up in the doings of the prophets and who are not particularly devout, hailed their N.C.O. with shouts of: "What ho, the Prophet Moses!" This is a very feasible explanation of what happened when Moses struck the rock at Rephidim.

The theory that the site of the Wanderings was in the north of Sinai and not the south is by no means a new one, as it has been accepted by a large number of theologians for many years, though at the same time there are far more who dispute this theory. All that I have done so far is to confirm this theory in the light of ten years' residence in Sinai, and to bring some fresh evidence to support those conclusions. The really puzzling part of the Exodus is the drowning of Pharaoh's host, where it took place, and how?

The most popular theory is that a particularly low tide, helped by a strong east wind, drove back the sea from the mud flats near Suez, leaving them dry for the Israelites to cross, but a change of tide and presumably of wind also brought the sea back in time to catch the Egyptians in much the same way that King John's army was caught in the Wash. The other theory is that the disaster took place in the Great Bitter Lake from the same cause, but these theories are difficult to understand, as in neither place would a strong east wind displace the water to any great extent—a heavy gale might lower the level on the windward side a few inches, but no great expanse of mud or sand would be left exposed.

On the Mediterranean coast, however, on the suggested route of the Israelites, there is the vast Bardawil Lake, forty-five miles long and thirteen miles wide, that provides a very credible explanation of the occurrence.

The Bardawil Lake has large masses of rushes in places along its southern shores, and therefore may very possibly be the *Yam Suf*, the Sea of Reeds in which the Egyptians were engulfed. The name therefore is in its favour. It is really an enormous clay pan some six to ten feet below the level of the Mediterranean Sea and separated from it the whole length by a very narrow strip of sand which varies in width from one to three hundred yards. At the present time the Lagoon is used as a mullet fishery and is kept filled with water artificially by cutting channels through the sandbank, but the normal condition of the lake is a vast salt-encrusted pan. During the war, when Sinai was invaded by the Turks, the fishing in the lake was

stopped and it soon returned to its natural state. The channels connecting it with the sea silted up and the lake quickly dried, leaving a hard clay crust which would support a man in parts, but which would most definitely not support a car or a mounted man, though many unwary soldiers thought it would.

During heavy gales the sea broke through in various places and flooded the lake, but the breaks silted up and in a few months it was dry again. So here we have a narrow pathway along the sandstrip which leads directly to the cultivable part of Northern Sinai, and which is still one of the main tracks to El Arish and Palestine.

In the days of the Exodus the Pelusiac branch of the Nile flowed through what is now Kantara into the sea at Mohammediyah. Mohammediyah is now nothing but a name, but it was the old port of Gercha, and the stone-built quays can still be seen on the seashore, while a little way inland and to the west are the ruins of Pelusium. Here it was that the invading Mohammedans first met the Romans, and Pelusium was the first city in Egypt to fall.

The flight of the Israelites from Egypt may therefore be considered as having started when they crossed the Pelusiac branch of the Nile and struck out into the desert, and their objective was obviously the rich lands of Southern Palestine.

Having crossed the Pelusiac branch, Moses had to decide whether he would take the route on which the present railway runs, via Romani and Bir El Abd, or the track that lies along the seashore; both are equally used by camel men to-day. It is possible that in those days the main track lay via Romani, owing to the existence of wells. At the present time the route is more or less covered with sand-dunes, but as the sand is believed to be of more or less recent origin it is possible that in those days it was a recognized and well-trodden highway. Moses very probably selected the route along the seashore as being further away from the Egyptians, and thus providing him with a few extra hours in his flight.

Exodus, chapter xiii., verses 17 and 18, rather lends colour to this view :

"And it came to pass that when Pharaoh had let the people go, that God led them not through the way of the land of the Philistines, though that was near; for God said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt.

"But God led the people about by the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea; and the children of Israel went up harnessed out of the land of Egypt."

I think it is a reasonable explanation of those two verses. If you have a perfectly straight route with wells every twenty miles that is recognized as the road to Palestine, I think you may decide on the more circuitous route with only one well on the road round by the north of the Bardawil Lake as being "about through the way of the wilderness of the Sea of Reeds."

It is stated that the Israelites were overtaken by the Egyptians whilst encamping by the sea at Pi-Hahiroth before Baal Zephon, which is between Migdol and the sea. The exact site matters little; Pi-Hahiroth may have been Mohammediyah itself or Galss, twenty miles farther to the east on the causeway of sand between Bardawil Lake and the sea. The point is that the Egyptian Army, setting out from Memphis or possibly some military station in the vicinity of Zagazig, were trying to overtake the Israelites, and as the Israelites were fleeing along the coast-line the obvious thing to do would be to take a short cut and try to head them off. The short cut would take them through Kantara via Katia to the southern side of Lake Bardawil, which at this spot is narrow. The Bardawil was then in its normal state—namely, a dry clay pan. It was the spring of the year, April, and April weather in Egypt is always most unsettled.

In Exodus, chapter XIII., it is said that a pillar of cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night accompanied the host. Sir Hanbury Brown, in his book *The Land of Goshen and Exodus*, explains this as being the torches carried by caravans when crossing the desert to mark the route for stragglers, the smoke showing for miles in the clear desert air, and at night the reflection from the torches on the cloud of smoke gives the appearance of a column of fire. This is a very feasible explanation, but I rather prefer the view that the pillar of cloud and pillar of fire was something that to the Israelites suggested the hand of God rather than the hand of man.

In Sinai when heavy weather is impending there is frequently a most remarkable cloud formation—namely, a huge column of cumulus, black in the centre with hard white edges. This column, which begins at the skyline and extends to the zenith, is most impressive, as it is constantly rent with lightning and at night is an intermittent blaze of fire—in other words, a pillar of cloud of fire. The cloud forms out at sea, and it does not matter if the wind is north, east or west, as whatever the direction, it slowly moves southward towards the land. I have seen this cloud this year and every year since I have been in Sinai, and I have known it in existence for three days before the

storm burst. It is quite probable that this cloud appeared to the Israelites as a sign from the Almighty to show them the way, and it also proved their salvation as it heralded the heavy weather that accounted for the engulfing of the host.

The scouts of the Egyptian Army brought in the information that the Israelites were on the shore-road; possibly they could see them, so Egyptians started to cut across the clay pan to head off the Israelites, and were almost immediately in difficulties. Exodus, chapter xiv., verse 24, says: "And it came to pass that in the morning watch the Lord looked into the host of Egyptians through the pillar of fire and cloud and troubled the host of the Egyptians."

Now according to the old theory, the theory that we were all taught as children, a pathway in the midst of the sea was opened up for the Israelites, and they were followed along this pathway by the Egyptians, and when the whole army was in this narrow corridor with the sea piled up on either side the walls of water suddenly fell in on them and engulfed them. When one reads verses 24 and 25 it is very difficult to understand how this belief first started. I have been accused of irreverence because I say that Exodus does not recount the disaster as having occurred in that way at all. Exodus definitely tells a story of an army that has got into difficulties in soft going and is already thoroughly disorganized when the waters come in on them. In what way did the Lord trouble the host? Verse 25 explains.

"And took off their chariot wheels that they drave them heavily; so that the Egyptians said, Let us flee from the face of Israel."

I submit that this is a very good description of an army that has got bogged in soft-going; the chariots sunk to their axles in the mud and the horses floundering girth deep. And this is exactly what would happen to an army if it attempted to cross the clay pan of Lake Bardawil. The salt clay crust looks the most excellent going, and it is not till one has travelled half a mile or so towards the centre that the crust gives way and lets one through to the bottomless mud beneath. In an earlier verse it is stated that the Egyptians were entangled in the land; this obviously should have been translated as caught in the mud.

Verse 20 mentions that there was a cloud between the Israelites and the Egyptians, and that it was white and shining on the Israelites' side and dark on the Egyptians'. This is an excellent description of

one of the violent cloudbursts that are peculiar to the Sinai desert. These cloudbursts, which are extraordinarily local, usually deluge with an enormous amount of water a small area about four miles square, and the cloud that brings this squall is always intensely black, but outside the area of its scope the sun shining on the falling rain makes it appear as a shimmering silver curtain. This heavy squall of rain would have the effect of covering the clay pan of the Lake Bardawil to a depth of two inches or so, and this would add enormously to the difficulties of the Egyptians.

There is so far no mention made of the sea having returned, and yet the whole Egyptian Army is thoroughly disorganized and trying to retreat.

The next three verses read :

" And the Lord said to Moses, Stretch out thine hand over the sea, that the waters may come again upon the Egyptians, upon their chariots, and upon their horsemen.

" And Moses stretched forth his hand over the sea, and the sea returned to its strength when the morning appeared; and the Egyptians fled against it; and the Lord overthrew the Egyptians in the midst of the sea.

" And the waters returned and covered the chariots and the horsemen, and all the host of Pharaoh that came into the sea after them : there remained not so much as one of them."

The explanation of this to anyone who knows the Bardawil Lake is obvious. The strong east wind that causes a very heavy sea on the coast of Sinai had caused the waves to break through the causeway of sand in six or seven different places—an incident that occurs two or three times every year—and the whole Bardawil was flooded to a depth of six feet. It is not suggested that the water came down like an avalanche, as the flooding of this vast area takes time, and it all depends on the size and number of the channels whether the lake fills rapidly or not; but it may be taken for granted that this was quite an exceptional storm and that the flooding was extremely rapid. In any case, whether the lake took a day or a week to fill, the fate of the Egyptians was sealed. They were hopelessly bogged to start with and with several feet of sea water to contend with as well as the mud; it is quite conceivable that every chariot and horse was lost, and that possibly only a few of the men saved themselves by swimming. This is a catastrophe that could quite easily happen to-day if an army tried to cross the Bardawil with heavy weather in the offing.

Verse 29 says :

" But the children of Israel walked upon dry land in the midst of the sea; and the waters were a wall unto them on the right hand and on their left."

This is precisely the impression one gets if one walks or rides along the narrow strip of sand that divides the Bardawil Lake from the Mediterranean. The southern shore of the lake is out of sight, and one has the illusion of walking along a very narrow highway with the sea on either side. One can easily understand the superstitious Israelites thinking that the pathway had been specially opened up for them by God.

In the next chapter of Exodus Moses sings his song of triumph, and in the circumstances one must excuse a little poetic licence when he talks of the flood standing upright in a heap. Despite the rather high flown style, he, however, reiterates the statement that the earth swallowed the Egyptians as well as the water, and confirms the impression that they were bogged. In any case I understand that the song of Moses was written some centuries after the occurrence, and may be no more correct verbally than the remark attributed to Wellington that the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, or the famous " Up, Guards, and at 'em " fable.

Immediately after the escape from the Egyptian Army the Israelites came to Marah, where the water was bitter; they probably turned southwards directly they reached the eastern end of the lake and found the wells at Mazar, which are undoubtedly bitter. The water is so bad that it cannot be used for the engines of the Palestine railways.

From Marah they struck northwards again and camped at Elim by the sea, which is probably the present Masaid. Here they found plenty of water and scanty palm trees, which aptly describes Masaid. Here also the food shortage became acute, and they were miraculously saved firstly by the manna and secondly by the quail.

Exodus, chapter xvi., verse 13, merely states :

" And it came to pass, that at even the quail came up, and covered the camp; and in the morning the dew lay round about the host."

From which one gathers that the quail were not particularly numerous, which fits in with the April return migration when the quail, flying northward across the desert, rest for a day on the coast

before crossing the Mediterranean. This migration is not nearly so marked as the outward migration which takes place in the autumn.

Numbers, chapter xi., verses 31, 32, and 33, says :

"And there went forth a wind from the Lord, and brought quail from the sea, and let them fall by the camp, as it were a day's journey on this side, and as it were a day's journey on the other side, round about the camp, and as it were two cubits high upon the face of the earth.

"And the people stood up all that day and all that night and they gathered the quails : he that gathered least gathered ten homers : and they spread them all abroad for themselves round about the camp.

"And while the flesh was yet between their teeth, ere it was chewed, the wrath of the Lord was kindled against the people ; and the Lord smote the people with a very great plague."

This happened much later after the Giving of the Law, and was no doubt in the autumn migration when the birds arrive in clouds and are also very fat, which would account for the distressing outbreak of acute gastritis from which the host apparently suffered. The statement that they were two cubits high upon the face of the earth cannot, of course, be taken literally, as forty miles of quails three feet deep is ludicrous. The explanation would appear to be simple, and that is that they flew at the height of three feet from the ground—the normal height at which tired quails fly—so that it was comparatively easy to knock them down with palm branches.

Beyond Elim I make no attempt to trace the Wanderings, as most of the name-places have disappeared, and the account as rendered in Exodus and Numbers is so extremely vague it is impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion. There are, however, only twenty-seven camping places given in Numbers, and the places mentioned earlier in this paper, which resemble the names of places now existing, are not consecutive, but appear at all stages of the Wanderings. The contention therefore is that finding the triangle El Arish, Rafa, and Kossiema the only part in Sinai in which a host of that size could exist, the Israelites remained there till such time as they were strong enough to attempt to conquer Palestine, and that the places mentioned are not the movements of the whole host, but merely the sites of various camps at which Moses, as paramount chief, accompanied by the Ark, had his headquarters.

KURDS, ASSYRIANS, AND IRAQ*

By CAPTAIN PHILIP MUMFORD

IRAQ is to enter the League of Nations within the next few weeks, and the first of the "A" Mandates will have reached its inevitable and logical conclusion. This afternoon I want to bring forward a few points regarding the position of the Minorities in that country.

These Minorities are the Kurds (500,000), local Christians and Assyrians (78,000), Jews (86,000), with smaller sections, bringing the total up by a further 42,000. To these should be added the Shia Arabs, who may be described as belonging to the unorthodox sect and who actually outnumber the Sunnis by some 60,000. The Government is, to all intents and purposes, Sunni. There is only time to-day to deal with the Assyrians and the Kurds, but the arguments and deductions made in their favour hold good for the remainder.

The Assyrians, numbering some 40,000, are in an alien country owing to their participation on the side of the Allies during the War. Half of their number are, or will be, homeless, whilst the remainder are scattered throughout the north, and their future safety is a matter of grave concern to all those who have interested themselves in their welfare.

During the past ten years the Assyrians have served the British in the Iraq Levies and have been under active service conditions on some fifteen occasions. They have served us well, but this service has increased their unpopularity in the country of their adoption. Failing further safeguards and some hope for the satisfactory settlement of the remaining 13,000 of his people, the Mar Shimun, their leader, has threatened to take them out of Iraq and throw them upon French or other protection.

The Kurds, as already stated, number some 500,000, and are con-

* Members' Meeting on September 26, Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold Wilson in the Chair. In introducing the Speaker, the Chairman referred to Captain Philip Mumford as one who had been for seven years intelligence officer in Iraq, and was in a position to speak on this matter from personal knowledge. He would describe recent events which had a direct bearing upon the immediate future, and on the prospects of the Minorities after the forthcoming admission of Iraq to the League of Nations.

centrated in the mountainous areas in the north. They have always been hostile to the idea of being placed under an Arab Government, as, although Moslems, they are racially, linguistically, and temperamentally different from the Arabs.

Are they and the other minorities satisfied with their prospects? This question was answered quite definitely when the Anglo-Iraq Treaty was published in June, 1930, and they realized that British withdrawal was imminent. Petitions from all sections were received by the Mandatory Power and by the League of Nations, asking for further safeguards before the withdrawal of British officials.

Why are they dissatisfied? What are the promises, or encouragements, which they consider have not received their fulfilment?

Let me take these promises point by point :

(a) The Iraq Government passed a resolution in 1932 which was as follows : No Arab officials (except technicians) shall be sent to the Kurdish area.

(b) The election of Kurdish members to the Iraq Parliament in 1924.

(c) The decision of the League Council in 1926 which awarded the Mosul area to Iraq and was based upon the rights of Minorities.

With regard to (a), this has been translated into *Kurdish-speaking* officials, and in a country where the majority of the inhabitants can speak two or sometimes three languages, this practically annuls the safeguard. Further the Iraq Government has been in the habit of occasionally posting Kurdish officials to the southern Arab areas, and claiming that this justifies the corresponding transfer of Arab officials to the north.

With regard to (b), we must ask ourselves what protection the written constitution of Iraq gives to these Minorities. Most of you have personal experience of Asia, and doubtless have your own views as to the practicability of European democratic institutions in that part of the world. It is not seriously disputed that up to the present they are not working at their face value in Iraq, and the Minorities cannot be blamed if they have little faith in any protection from this source.

This also holds good for the last point.

What other protection can they hope for?

They have only such guarantees as Geneva can offer them when Iraq becomes a member of the League of Nations, and whether these work satisfactorily depends upon the good faith of the Iraq Government.

Without being unfair to the present Iraq Government, we must face

the fact that it is comprised of men brought up under pre-war Turkish institutions, and that the Western ideas which we have brought them—and have tried to teach them—are scarcely skin deep and may fade as quickly as sunburn. These men have developed ardent nationalist ideas—Arab nationalism; they fear, and are hostile to, their Minorities, and their methods of dealing with them do not coincide with the views and declared intentions of either the Mandatory Power or the Permanent Mandates Commission.

What has happened during the past two years?

As already mentioned, the Anglo-Iraq Treaty governing our relations with Iraq after that country became independent was published in June, 1930, and resulted in petitions and further signs of unrest amongst the Kurds and others.

The Kurds attempted, wisely or otherwise, to boycott the elections due that summer.

This agitation ended in a riot, when the Iraq Army fired on a Kurdish crowd. Sheikh Mahmud took this as an excuse for breaking out into open rebellion. Mahmud asked for a limited form of autonomy under British protection and protested against direct rule from Baghdad under the Arabs.

It was hoped that the Arab Government would be able to deal with the situation unaided, but it soon became obvious that, owing to the depth of Kurdish feeling and the inefficiency of the Arab Army, this was out of the question.

The Royal Air Force had to bear the main brunt of the operations, and the bombing of villages was unavoidable if the rebellion was to be crushed; even so, it was eight months before Mahmud surrendered.

But more was to follow. There was another Kurdish chief powerful enough to cause the Iraq Government much uneasiness, Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan. This man was no worse than the average mountain chief in backward areas, and the British, who had been responsible for him for the past fifteen years, had seen no reason to get rid of him. He was, however, attacked by the Iraq Government early last winter. The attack was a failure.

An Iraq Army column was therefore sent against him last spring. This also was a failure, and consequently the position had grown very serious, especially in view of the necessity for the Iraq Government to present a peaceful and satisfactory picture to the League of Nations in the coming autumn.

Once more the Royal Air Force had to come to the rescue, and

intensive bombing was inaugurated in Ahmad's area, with the result that he was forced to leave Iraq and give himself up to the Turks last June.

It will be seen, therefore, that operations against the Kurds during the past two years have been almost continuous, operations against Sheikh Mahmud taking place from September, 1930, to April, 1931, and operations against Sheikh Ahmad intermittently from November, 1931, to June, 1932, being intensive from April to June.

Let me quote an extract from the anniversary lecture to this society, given by Sir Arnold Wilson on June 8:

"The growth of nationalism amongst the Arabs of Iraq will result in the emergence of a ruling class of a new type, and a form of autonomy for the Kurds for which the Iraq Government is not yet ripe, judging from the pertinacity with which (notwithstanding declarations at Geneva) the R.A.F. have been bombing the Kurdish population for the last ten years, and in particular the last six months. Devastated villages and slaughtered cattle bear witness to the spread—in the words of a special correspondent to *The Times*—of a uniform pattern of civilization."

The greatest credit is due to the Royal Air Force for the efforts which they made to carry out their unpleasant task as humanely as possible, but the question arises whether the bombing of villages, with its unavoidable loss of life to non-combatants, including women and children, is justified for internal disturbance on behalf of any foreign Power. Sir John Simon, speaking at Geneva this spring, stated that aerial bombardment of towns was *not* justified, but he was referring to hostilities between independent States, and that is beside the question of the moment.

I do submit, however, that if there is any shadow of doubt as to the justification for these methods in the latter case—which may involve the very national existence of some Power—the matter is quite different when the enemy is a small minority who dislike their own government, and, further, a primitive people who have no medical facilities to alleviate the suffering caused.

Remember, the chief crime of these Kurds was to ask for our protection, or at least the fulfilment of the promises made by our Government and the Permanent Mandates Commission.

But that is all passed. What of the future?

After Iraq's entry into the League of Nations, certain British forces, mainly units of the Air Force, are to be retained in Iraq to guard our

lines of Imperial communication and protect Iraq from *external aggression*.

Is there any danger that they will still be used as they have been during the past two years?

As matters stand, there is such a danger, and it will be a more serious one, for we shall have lost what little control we still possess over the internal policy of the Iraq Government, and further, owing to the withdrawal of British officials, we shall have little knowledge of their true aims and actions in outlying districts.

It must also be recognized that the Iraq Government will be less likely to deal with its Minorities in a generous spirit if it feels that it can always rely on force as being quicker and more effective generally than liberal and probably distasteful legislation in the Minorities' favour.

Let me quote an extract from a leader in *The Times* of September 23 :

"It is true that the Treaty provides for the maintenance of British military air bases in Iraq during its life of twenty-five years. But a study of its text clearly indicates that it is *not intended* that the Royal Air Force shall have any other military function in Iraq beyond the protection of the country from foreign aggression and the defence of British air communications."

Note the words "it is not intended." I doubt if the situation of the last two years was "intended." It should be made perfectly clear that such a situation will not be tolerated, otherwise we shall be bombing the Kurds once again and quite possibly our old allies the Assyrians.

I have attempted this afternoon to draw your attention to the Iraq Minorities, and to show why they are not contented.

I have drawn a rough picture of what has happened during the past two years, and from that have inferred the danger that lies ahead. I am not criticizing the policy of withdrawal—it is necessary and inevitable—but I do say that there is urgent need to impress upon the Iraqi nation that their own safety and prosperity must lie in the political wisdom of their Government, unsupported—if that wisdom fails—by British military assistance in their own internal affairs.

Following on Captain Mumford's address, Professor Gilbert Murray, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union in this country, spoke as follows :

I should like to make one or two remarks about this most serious and dangerous situation. The first problem is that produced by the

termination of the Mandate, and the fact that Iraq is going to stand by itself as an independent nation. It is satisfactory to know that we have abandoned the Mandate and that we did not regard it as the same thing as an acquisition of fresh territory. It is unsatisfactory in another way, for I fear that in certain respects a State like Iraq is not yet fitted to be a member of the League. I have once or twice protested against the admission of certain nations to the League. A case in point was whether Abyssinia should be admitted on the promise that she would abolish the slave trade, or whether we would accept her admission after abolition had been accomplished.

The admission of Iraq to the League of Nations involves some deterioration in administration. If you put an Iraqi Government in place of a British Government, the internal administration will suffer. I contend that Great Britain will still have a special responsibility towards Iraq. I was surprised to find the Foreign Office take the view that Great Britain has no greater responsibility than any other member of the League. Their view is that, as we are giving up this Mandate, we should give it up completely rather than attempt to superintend this and that—giving it up in name and retaining it in fact. There is obviously some weight to be attached to this; yet I think it is clear that we have a special responsibility. We are leaving an Air Force there; other nations are not, and this, therefore, constitutes a special position.

The League of Nations Union recommended that Iraq should be asked to make a declaration binding itself to give certain privileges and rights to the Minorities. It was easier to have a Declaration than a Treaty. This declaration binds them in the same way as a treaty. Any other nation which considers that the stipulations are not being carried out has the right to bring the matter before the League. We drew up a declaration, and after a while sent our proposed document to the British representative on the Minorities Committee. The declaration was signed almost exactly as we first laid it out. There was one difference—in our declaration we laid down that in Kurdish and Assyrian districts the Governor should be Kurdish or Assyrian, but in the declaration which was signed the Governor only had to be a native of the place. The difficulty is to see that these promises are carried out effectively.

When the Iraqis were asked to give certain promises they said, "We will undertake any responsibility that has already been undertaken by European nations." They have signed the declaration, but there will be no means of finding out whether it is being carried out or not. The only way yet suggested of making that effective is to have a Resident

Agent of the League. I was inclined to favour that course, but strong objections were urged against it in many quarters.

The position of the Air Force in Iraq is unsatisfactory. We want it there, as I understand, to protect our own communications, but I imagine also that the Officer Commanding would have a great deal more power than that position suggests. That is the most comforting element in the situation. I cannot believe that the British Air Force would be required to do anything that it considered wrong, even though appealed to by the Iraqi Government, and the fact of its refusing would probably have a great effect.

The war has on the whole liberated the underdog, and sometimes has put him on top. We sympathize with the underdog, but he is often not as good as the one that was on top before him.

The CHAIRMAN reminded the audience that the Air Force has up to now been at the disposal of the High Commissioner, who is *ex officio* Commander-in-Chief. In the future it will, no doubt, be at the disposal of the British Ambassador, although he will scarcely be *ex officio* Commander-in-Chief.

In anticipation of their entrance to the League of Nations, the Iraq Government had of recent years committed itself to a forward policy, and had more than once in its relations with the Kurds found itself in an *impasse*, when its troops could be extricated only by the British Air Force. In such cases the British High Commissioner was apt to find himself in a dilemma. If he refused to allow the Air Force to be used to restore the situation, he would be accused of imperilling the stability, even the existence, of the Government; if he allowed the Air Force to help, he was allowing, in effect, unrestricted aerial bombardment of civilians and non-combatants, because in the nature of things it is impossible to restrict military operations of that sort once started.

This raised the whole question of unrestricted aerial bombardment. Sir John Simon's speech in the Commons on March 20, 1924,* emphasized the fact that in international law, under the Hague Convention of 1907, bombardment "by any means whatever" of undefended villages and buildings was prohibited, and in the British Manual of Military Law of 1914 this prohibition was and is still obligatory on the British Army.

During the very months in which declarations on the subject of aerial bombardment were made at Geneva by Sir John Simon, scores of tons of high explosives were dropped on Kurdish villages. Warnings

* Reprinted in his *Comments and Criticisms*, 1932.

are, indeed, always given if possible to the villages beforehand, so that the women and children may be removed, but this is not really relevant. Delay action bombs were used to prevent the inhabitants from returning to get food or bedding. These bombs had caused deaths months after they had fallen. In the words of Sir John Simon, to attempt to strike fear into a civil population and to use aircraft, not against military units, but against undefended villages, will inevitably lead to our condoning in a future war the very things we condemn in theory to-day at Geneva.

Sir ROBERT BROOKE POPHAM: In 1928, when I went to Iraq, I was shown on the map an area (Barzan) where the Iraq police had not yet penetrated. It was realized that sooner or later this would have to be brought under control. We meant to do so in due course by peaceful penetration; the hand of the Iraq Government was, however, forced by the fact that Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan attacked and slaughtered a number of neighbouring tribesmen, and that is why operations were started. It is quite a mistake to regard him as a sturdy patriot defending the rights of a minority; his own tribesmen suffered severely under his oppressive rule. It is very wrong to imply that the R.A.F. sought to attain their object by killing women and children. We aimed, as always, at the minimum of casualties and at making the normal life of the people impossible until they submitted. Delay action bombs were used to prevent the tribesmen from returning to the villages to get food, and ample warning was given both of the intention to bomb and of the likelihood of explosion hours after the bombs had been dropped.

We have a responsibility for something more than the Minorities; the Iraq Government which we established needs our support as well.

Anyone who has seen the Assyrians as I have cannot fail to have the greatest admiration for them and to be immensely attracted by their romantic history. All the more reason to keep facts in mind. The Assyrians were brought into Iraq by us as refugees and are being settled, but the idea of settling them all in one enclave is impracticable. They must live in the hills; the available areas are limited, and it is not practical politics to turn out the present inhabitants. An unoccupied district where they could all live together simply does not exist, so they must be dotted about where room can be found for them.

Those who have their interests at heart can best serve them, not by encouraging aspirations that can never be achieved, but by helping them to become a real part of the Iraq nation.

The terms of the treaty with Iraq expressly lay down that Iraq is

entirely responsible for the maintenance of her own internal order, and there is no fear of the R.A.F. being used to bolster up misgovernment.

A MEMBER then put the following question: The last speaker has dealt with the action of the R.A.F. in the past, but what is their action going to be in the future, and how will they carry out their actions?

Sir ROBERT BROOKE POPHAM: I am afraid that I can only answer that indirectly. The Royal Air Force will not be employed except under the directions of the British Ambassador, and I am assured that they will not be employed "to bolster up misgovernment." They are there according to the terms of the treaty and to guard against external aggression. Anyone who has seen a raiding party coming over the desert knows that bombing is the only policy to adopt.

Captain A. H. RASSAM said: As an Assyrian, I claim that Great Britain has a responsibility for the Minorities. The Assyrian nation was the first to adopt Christianity in the first century. She has maintained it against every obstacle. I am glad to say that the new Bishop in Jerusalem will include the Assyrian Church within his See.

Secondly, may I remind you of the action of the League of Nations in allotting the homes and villages and churches of the Assyrians to Turkey at a moment when the Turks were, as they knew, massacring every man, woman, and child of the Assyrians?

I maintain that Great Britain has a special duty as the greatest Christian nation, and I am sure that something could have been done by us during the past fourteen years to do something better than to settle the Assyrians in the malarial villages of the Mosul plains. I have seen men and women, all of them young, rendered sterile by malaria, and if these conditions are not improved it will not be long before the race is exterminated.

A MEMBER observed that Captain Mumford had said that he did not consider that the Iraq Army would be able to beat the Kurds in a fight. What about their Air Force? Did he think it possible that they would be able to do their own work?

Captain MUMFORD: The Iraq Air Force was started about a year ago, and it is too small at present to take action on a large scale. The country is very difficult to fly over, and engine failure nearly always means the wreck of a machine if not loss of life. It will be some time before the Iraq Air Force can take on this sort of work.

Another MEMBER of the audience then continued: We have heard a good deal about the inhumanity of bombing, but what should we put in its place? The pre-war frontier expedition never gave warnings.

They went into the area where the trouble was, attacked the villages, which were taken by surprise. There is very little doubt that facts can be produced to show that bombing is the most humane form of attack.

The activities of the R.A.F. are not only confined to bombing; they carry doctors and medicine when the need arises.

Bombing is cheaper, it is more effective, and more humane.

If the tribesman finds that he has nothing to fear from the R.A.F. he will be greatly encouraged to resist the Arab authorities.

Captain GRACEY said: I should like to point out that we are dealing in this discussion primarily with the future. It is a question of using the Air Force to keep the Minorities under subjection to the Iraq Government after that Government has become independent.

We, as a nation, have lost our prestige among the Minorities. Things have changed since the war. The Minorities do not look, as in the past, for kindness and friendliness from the British people. The fact that we have as a Government allowed the British Air Force to be used in bombing villages has been bad for our prestige.

We owe a real debt of gratitude to the Assyrian people for all they have done in support of the Allied cause.* We ought, I think, to find some way to ensure that justice shall be done to those old Christian peoples of the Near East. We should see that pressure is brought to bear upon the Government not to use our Air Force in any circumstances to bomb villages at the behest of the Iraq Government.

In summarizing the discussion, the CHAIRMAN, Sir Arnold Wilson, remarked that it was gratifying to know that forty villages could be wiped out with such small loss of life. Minorities in Iraq differed greatly from any other minorities in the world, in that there is no member of the League of Nations to bring up their claim or particular case at Geneva. A correspondent in *The Times* referred with complacency to the fact that nearly one hundred Kurds who fled to Turkey from our bombardments of Sheikh Ahmad were hanged without ceremony by the Turks, in pursuance of sentences previously passed for crimes committed when this country was in their hands some 18 years ago. The statement was quite obviously false, and its publication in *The Times* did little credit to the discretion of its correspondent. That the Turks should be allowed to do to death by a mock judicial process nearly one hundred subjects from an area over which we still had a mandate, without, as far as we know, any protest, was a lamentable feature of the situation that, however regarded, contained much that was obscure and distressing.

* See Note, page 167.

THE LYTTON REPORT: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY

By E. M. GULL

BY the time this issue of the Journal is published interest in the Lytton Report is likely to centre in its recommendations for a solution of the Manchurian problem rather than in its history and analysis of the question. The former, of course, are an outcome of the latter, and therefore the two are inseparable. Nevertheless readers in general have become more concerned with the practicability of the Commission's recommendations than with the justice of their findings. It is proposed, accordingly, to put the recommendations in the forefront of this review, which must necessarily confine itself to main points, dealing even with them briefly.

The Commission proposes that a solution of the problem should be sought along five distinct, though connected, lines. Of these the two which both parties to the dispute are likely to scrutinize most carefully comprise recommendations respecting the future political status of Manchuria and recommendations regarding Japan's rights and interests in the country.

As regards status, the Commission proposes that Manchuria should continue to be recognized as part of China. It recommends, however, that it should be given a large measure of autonomy. The Chinese Government, it thinks, should control foreign affairs and the postal, customs, and salt administrations, while other matters should be the responsibility of a Chief Executive (whom China would, in the first instance, appoint) helped by foreign advisers. As regards Japanese rights and interests the Commission proposes that one of the chief causes of the dispute, competition between Japanese and Chinese railways, should be eliminated either by the introduction of a co-operative system or by amalgamation. It also proposes that the circumstances in which the Japanese have hitherto exercised rights of settlement should be changed, either by allowing both Japanese and Koreans to settle anywhere in Manchuria and Jehol, but without extraterritorial rights, or by confining extraterritorial rights to Japanese settlers. The present position is that, under a treaty which the Chinese dispute, the Japanese have been settling in various parts of South Manchuria and

Jehol, meeting frequently with opposition from the Chinese; while Koreans have settled not only in South Manchuria but in North Manchuria too, the Chinese raising no objection in the case of those who claim Chinese nationality, but seeking to restrict those who are Japanese subjects to an area just north of Korea known as Chientao, in respect of which a special agreement exists. The Japanese, on the other hand, claim that, as Koreans are Japanese subjects, they are entitled to the same rights as they themselves possess, while they deny the right of Koreans to throw off Japanese nationality and become Chinese subjects.

The third and fourth methods by which the Report proposes to settle Sino-Japanese differences are, first, a commercial treaty which would contain an undertaking by the Chinese Government "to take all measures within its power to forbid and repress organized boycott movements against Japanese trade, without prejudice to the individual rights of Chinese consumers," and, secondly, a Sino-Japanese treaty of conciliation and arbitration, non-aggression and mutual assistance, which would "provide for a board of conciliation, whose functions would be to assist in the solution of any difficulties as they arise between the Governments of China and Japan."

The fifth procedure recommended by the Commission is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, in the production and stabilization, that is to say, of a strong Central Government.

It is necessary to fill in this outline with certain details.

In regard both to Manchuria's status and Japan's rights and interests the proposal of crucial importance relates to the maintenance of peace and order. Normally that is the duty of the sovereign Power. The Commission, however, proposes to entrust it to a special gendarmerie, organized with the collaboration of foreign instructors, and supervised by a foreigner engaged by the Chief Executive from a panel submitted by the Council of the League.

The Report could not be expected to specify the nationality either of the instructors or of the supervisor. Nor does it make quite clear whether the latter would take his instructions from the Chief Executive alone, or from the Chinese Government also.

"The employment of foreign advisers and officials," it says, "is in conformity with the policy of the founder of the Chinese Nationalist Party and with that of the present Nationalist Government. . . . But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the

presence of the foreign advisers and officials here suggested . . . merely represents a form of international co-operation. They must be selected in a manner acceptable to the Chinese Government and one which is consistent with the sovereignty of China. When appointed, they must regard themselves as the servants of the Government employing them."

As we have seen, it is the Chief Executive who is actually to engage the foreigner entrusted with the supervision of the police. The Chief Executive himself, however, is to be appointed by the Chinese Government, from whom he is to derive his authority to carry out "the international engagements entered into by the Central Government of China in matters under the administration of the autonomous government of the Three Eastern Provinces"—which together comprise Manchuria. Presumably, therefore, the Chinese Government would require to be consulted as to the powers which the police adviser would have, and if the manner of his appointment is to be consistent with her sovereignty it would be necessary to devise either a formula by which she voluntarily divested herself of all power in relation to police matters, or one which left her some say in them. A formula of the first kind must necessarily prove difficult to reconcile with the maintenance of China's administrative integrity, which the Report considers essential. In the latter case what is to happen if and when there is any dispute between the Chief Executive and the Chinese Government? Whom in such a situation is the head of the police to obey? If he is to be in any degree responsible to the Chinese Government, may not that involve precisely what the Japanese do not want—on the one hand, dependence of Manchurian affairs upon the permutations and combinations which constitute Chinese politics; on the other, an uncertain outlook for Japanese interests?

By the time this is published discussion at Geneva may have thrown light upon these points, which the Report, purposely perhaps, leaves vague. "The powers of the advisers," it says, "would be defined in the Declaration"—the document, that is to say, in which the Chinese Government would signify its consent to the proposals submitted to it by an Advisory Conference of Chinese and Japanese, who would be charged with the duty of elaborating a scheme of government upon the principles and suggestions contained in the Report, such Advisory Conference being itself one of the suggestions.

Similar vagueness necessitates suspension of judgment in regard to the Commission's proposals for fiscal and judicial administration—the

two departments of government most dependent upon efficient police. As regards fiscal administration, the Report proposes, as we have seen, that the collection of customs duties and salt taxes should be placed under the control of the Chinese Government. These duties and taxes, however, are not the only actual, or potential, sources of revenue. Who is to control the other sources, China or Manchukuo? If some are to be controlled by the one, and some by the other, while all are to be supervised by a foreign adviser (who would then *ex hypothesi* be the servant of both Governments), might not confusion arise? It seems doubtful, at all events, whether the ablest adviser would have much chance of filling his dual rôle successfully without a considerable staff of foreigners to help him. Would such staff be wholly or preponderantly Japanese, or strictly international? The matter is capable of simplification, fortunately, owing to the fact that, until Manchukuo declared its independence, the collection of customs duties came under the supervision of the Inspector-General of Customs at Shanghai, while at one time the collection of salt taxes was also supervised by another British servant of the Chinese Government, the Inspector-General of the Salt Gabelle. All that would be necessary, therefore, would be a resumption of authority by these two officials. In that case, presumably, the sphere of the foreign adviser would in practice be narrowed down to the rest of the fiscal field, in which event his status too would be capable of clearer definition, and would be that, presumably, of a servant to the Manchukuo Government alone.

As regards judicial authority the Report is practically silent. From the fact that it omits judicial administration altogether from the departments of government assigned (on page 134) to the sovereign Power, one might conclude that Manchukuo is to have its own judicial machinery. If so, is it also to enact its own laws? It might have the one and do the other and yet acknowledge China's sovereignty, which would not suffer any practical diminution were machinery and laws based upon, or assimilated to, China's. In Chang Tso-lin's time that was the position, as it is in the virtually independent province of Shansi. In the latter case, however, face-saving devices are not complicated by racial factors, nor were they in the former. But into the *régime* proposed by the League, which must necessarily have a strong Japanese element, racial feeling would inevitably enter, and that fact might well mar any attempt to give Manchukuo judicial and legislative autonomy without detriment to China's administrative integrity, the maintenance of which, as already noted, is in the Commission's view

one of the essential principles of a satisfactory settlement of the problem.

Over and above these ambiguities, and from a practical standpoint more important, perhaps, than any of them, is the Commission's suggestion regarding "temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China." On this point the Commission says very definitely that a strong Central Government in China is essential to the implementation of its recommendations. Is the emergence of such a Government, the Japanese must inevitably ask themselves, to precede implementation, or is Japan to agree to the Commission's proposals on trust, notwithstanding the fact that no part of the Report throws any light whatever upon the manner in which a strong Central Government is to be set up? The question constitutes a dilemma, the horns of which seem to the Japanese equally uncomfortable, unless, indeed, one of them can be rendered tolerable by arranging that, pending the constitution of a strong Central Government in China, Japan may continue to occupy the position she now holds. Failing that, she is in effect being asked to agree to a *régime* for which the Commission predicates conditions not yet in sight.

The actual words of the Commission are :

"Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world (as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international concern), and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen."

What is likely to be China's attitude towards this proposal? It is difficult to say. Nobody, however, who has read the *Three Principles* of Sun Yat-sen can find support in them for the view that China is likely to accept anything in the nature of foreign tutelage. If co-operation can be offered on terms which do not involve tutelage, except in purely technical matters, it may be welcomed. But what would such an offer imply? It would imply, would it not, that the basic ideas and dominant aims of any co-operative programme must be Chinese, not European. That in turn would imply that in the political field Chinese ideas of democracy and justice would have to be adopted. Since 1911 those ideas have undoubtedly moved towards Europe's, but if Sun Yat-sen's views are to guide us (and the Commission goes out of its

way to refer to them) the process of approximation seems likely to have very definite limits. Several passages might be quoted from the *Three Principles* in illustration of that statement. As that would make this survey too long the reader may be referred to pages 152-360 in Price's translation of the book, which is published by the Institute of Pacific Relations under the title of *San Min Chu I*. Is Europe willing to accept and abide by the limits therein indicated? Is she, indeed, psychologically capable of, or morally justified in, doing so? One may be excused for hesitation in answering the question. If, however, the answer is in the negative the only assumption upon which China is likely to agree to "temporary international co-operation," the assumption, namely, that her ideas and not Europe's are to form the groundwork upon which co-operation would be based, cannot be made. Yet if she does not agree, an essential condition of the Lytton Commission's proposals for the settlement of the Manchurian problem will remain unfulfilled.

To turn to the Commission's findings, which must be stated in very summarized form. They are:

1. That the military operations of the Japanese during the night of September 18 "cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence." These operations involved all the Japanese forces in Manchuria (and some of those in Korea), extended over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur and resulted in further operations which placed practically the whole of Manchuria under Japanese control.

2. That there is no general Chinese support for the Manchurian Government, "which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrument of the Japanese."

3. That, on the other hand, Japan has very considerable grievances. "This is not a case," the Report says, "in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighbouring country. The dispute has arisen between two States concerning a territory . . . in which both claim to have rights and interests, only some of which are clearly defined in international law; a territory which, although legally an integral part of China, had a sufficiently autonomous character to carry on direct negotiations with Japan on the matters which lay at the root of this conflict."

4. That as regards railway issues, which comprise the most important rights in dispute, "it is evident that a number of them were technical in character and were quite capable of settlement by ordinary arbitral or judicial process, but that others of them were due to intense rivalry between China and Japan, which resulted from a deep-seated conflict in national policies."

5. The Report shows that China's policy has been to a large extent governed by the consideration that "those who control Manchuria have exercised a considerable influence on the affairs of the rest of China—at least of North China—

and possess unquestionable strategic and political advantage." On the other hand, Japan's policy, the Report shows, has to a large extent been governed by the counterpart of that consideration, by the idea, namely, of "preventing Manchuria from serving as a base of operations directed against her own territory," and of being able "to take all appropriate military measures if in certain circumstances the frontier of Manchuria should be crossed by the forces of a foreign Power."

6. The Commission thinks that, but for these political considerations, the economic requirements of Japan and China (which are examined in detail and with scientific impartiality) would lead to "mutual understanding and co-operation and not to conflict."

Such in outline is the problem which the Commission has "put up to" the League. "It must be apparent to every reader," to quote the Report's own comment, "that the issues . . . are not as simple as they are often represented to be."

REVIEWS

Early Moslem Architecture. By K. A. C. Creswell, F.S.A., Hon. A.R.I.B.A. Part I.: Umayyads, A.D. 622-750. With a contribution on the Mosaics of the Dome of the Rock and of the Great Mosque at Damascus, by Marguerite van Berchem. Pp. cxxii and 414. 80 plates in collotype. 491 figs. in line and half tone. In folio. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1931. Price £10 10s.

There can be no doubt that the first volume of Captain Creswell's great work on Moslem architecture is the most important book on the subject—and for that matter on the kindred subjects of sculpture, mosaic, ornament, and so forth—which has appeared for many years. It is in every way a model of what such books should be. It is admirably printed and produced; at the head of each page is a title to the matter on that page; there are frequent headings in the text, so that the student who uses the book for reference can find what he seeks without difficulty; the certain dates are given in brackets after every monument and on every occasion, and not, as is so often the case, only once or twice in the whole book, so that there is no need to turn numberless inapposite pages in a frenzied search for a date of which one is not certain; the plans are clear in every detail; the plates are all made to a definite scale (printed on each), so that the size of the monuments reproduced can be taken with a centimetre rule, without any very elaborate calculation. The subject plates, moreover, are all grouped at the end of the volume, while the comparative material is illustrated throughout the text, thus acquiring clearness and efficiency and at the same time making the use of the book as simple as is possible. For the comparative material line drawings and half-tone blocks are used; for the subject plates collotype, which gives, of course, far more pleasing results than half tone. The only regrettable feature is the absence of an index.

And if the "apparatus" of the book is excellent, it is safe to say that the matter would lose none of its importance if divorced from its sumptuous presentation. Captain Creswell's method is straightforward. He tells us all that is known for certain about a given monument; he tells us all that has been written about it, and only then, by means of well-balanced and reasoned arguments, does he draw his own conclusions. The facts are in every case kept clear from

the theory, and nowhere do they seem to be biased by personal opinion or by a polemical spirit, as has unfortunately been the case with the works of many other writers on the subject. No field perhaps has seen such divergent views expressed with such violence as has that which is concerned with the origin of those features which characterize Byzantine and early Moslem architecture. To mention the chief features: vault; dome over circular and dome over square plan; the means of transition from square plan to circular base of the dome, the squinch, and the pendentive; the trefoil plan; the niche buttress. Each name calls to the mind of the student the ardent and often far-fetched theorizings with which the different authorities have supported the method or region of their predilection. To enter into this battle is not the purpose of this review. The problems have often been set forth, and Captain Creswell has done much towards their final solution; how much can only be fully appreciated by a careful study of his book. And to it every student must sooner or later turn. A brief summary may, however, prove of use to the more general reader or as a guide to one who seeks for information on some definite point only.

The Earliest Manifestations.—The first chapter deals with primitive Islam and shows how the first mosques were quadrangles in the Arab area, whereas in the Mediterranean lands churches were converted by the simple process of opening a door on the north side. The early sanctuaries of Mecca, Medina, Basra, and Kufa are discussed. In the latter certain elaborations are already beginning to appear, for marble columns were looted from the neighbouring city of Hira to support a room "built like the roofs of Greek churches" (p. 17). Captain Creswell thinks that these roofs must have been of wood, and he shows that the architecture of Northern Mesopotamia was at this date identical with that of Syria. Lammens and others have suggested that these "Greek church roofs" were vaults, covered inside with mosaics. The recent discovery of Christian churches at Ctesiphon and Hira, which appear to have been roofed by brick vaults, makes this suggestion the more likely as regards the lowland area, and the fact that mosaics were common in ancient Kufa was proved by the numberless tesserae which were picked up there by our workmen when we were excavating at Hira in the autumn of 1930. There thus seems reason to question Captain Creswell's conclusions on this point, and to make a definite distinction between the architecture of Northern and of Southern Mesopotamia.

The second chapter deals with the first mosque at Jerusalem, an unimportant edifice in the temple area. The conquest of Egypt is then discussed, together with the building of a first mosque at Fustat, and an historical introduction is developed in detail, both with regard to events and with regard to the evolution of certain architectural forms, the maqsura, the mimbar, and the minaret, which were at a later date to become characteristically Islamic. Yet at this date there was still no Islamic architecture worthy of the name, and had it not been for the entirely non-Arab character which the spread of the new religion assumed during the next century, it is probable that no mosque worthy of the name would ever have been built.

With the accession of Abd el-Malik (685-705), however, there is a sudden change, for it is to him that one of the finest of all Islamic buildings, the Dome of the Rock at Jerusalem, is to be attributed. Captain Creswell's third chapter (pp. 42-96) is devoted to a detailed description and analysis of it.

The Dome of the Rock.—The history of this building is fairly well known, monographs devoted to it having appeared in most European languages. Creswell himself has already dealt with its plan,* and he here elaborates his original conclusions. The evolution of the plan, a circle surrounded by an octagon within an octagon, is traced out from its simplest form, a circle surrounded by a circle. The portions of the building which are original and those which are due to later restoration are carefully distinguished, and the author shows that the theory recently revived by Sirzygowski that the outer wall is not original is definitely not to be believed. It seems, in fact, well-nigh certain that this wall was part of the original plan (pp. 54 ff.).

Our knowledge of the building is added to in numerous ways, but most important is the admirable collection of photographs and the analysis of the ornament of the copper sheathings which cover the tie-beams, hitherto unpublished. There are twenty-four beams in all, showing sixteen distinct varieties of design, and their publication forms the foundation for a "grammar of Umayyad ornament," which proves of the first importance in such a complicated question as the dating of Mshatta, a problem which has hitherto proved a formidable stumbling-block.

Descriptions of the original dome show that it was exactly the same as the present one, and on account of this a record that it fell in 407 A.H.

* *The Origin of the Plan of the Dome of the Rock*, British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem, 1924.

has sometimes been disputed. Creswell shows that there is no reason to doubt this chronicle, and the madness of the then caliph of Egypt would account for the fact that the dome was not rebuilt till 413 A.H., when, as an inscription records, the mosaics of the drum were also restored. This is an admirable example of how a knowledge of history may come to the aid of the historian of art in explaining some difficult problem.

The origin of all features to be observed in the building, tie-beams, pierced windows, wooden dome, and so on is then traced with exhaustive care. Some must be regarded as essentially Byzantine; others, more especially the wooden dome, were apparently to be found only in Syria in early times. Similarly, in the ornament, certain motives are paralleled in the Constantinople sphere, whereas the evolution of others is to be traced out on Syrian soil. (These researches form an admirable basis on which to found a study of the ornament and sculpture of the first seven centuries of the Christian era, a field which has hitherto been almost entirely neglected.) The results of the analysis are then tabulated (p. 89), and they show that, on a rough estimate, 20 per cent. of the features are Roman, 20 per cent. are Byzantine, and the remaining 60 per cent. are to be attributed to Syria. Features which are definitely to be assigned to the Middle East, Persia or Mesopotamia, are only to be observed in the decoration.

The chapter closes, as do all those dealing with individual monuments, with a complete bibliography of the building in question, the works being arranged chronologically from those of the earliest Arab historian to those of the most recent Western scientist.

Al-Walid.—The fourth chapter deals with the works of al-Walid, the mosque of Madina, of which we know little, but which was apparently very sumptuous, and the superb building at Damascus known today as the Umayyad mosque. Walid set about collecting workmen and material at the very beginning of his reign, and selected as the site for his greatest work the Damascus mosque, the most sacred in the city, which had been occupied in turn by pagan temple and Christian church. Certain portions of these earlier buildings were incorporated in the new mosque, and an excellent plan (facing p. 104) shows at a glance what is new and what is pre-Moslem. Creswell shows that the conclusions of Watzinger and Wulzinger (*Damaskus*, 1921-24), who thought that the whole covered basilica which we see today was actually the original Christian church, are unreliable. This theory seems, in fact, to have been conceived with the idea of creating

difficulties where none need exist; every logical argument points to the fact that the building, except for certain portions of the enclosing walls, must be attributed to Walid, just as much as the decoration of the court and the interior. The form of the ancient temenos, however, affected the plan, for the choice of which Creswell accounts partly on the grounds of its appropriateness to the site and partly because of Byzantine influence. The shape and appearance of the treasury, and the alternating columns and piers and the marble revetment in the mosque itself are features which must be directly attributed to Byzantium.

The Mosaics of the Dome of the Rock.—Chapter V. (pp. 147-252) is the work of Mdlle. van Berchem, who discusses the mosaics of the Dome of the Rock and those recently uncovered by M. E. de Lorey at Damascus. As she points out, the former have been curiously neglected, both by writers on Moslem art, for the origins of which they are so important, and by those on Byzantine art, of which they may well be considered a monument. De Vogué, Max van Berchem, Herzfeld, and Strzygowski are practically the only authorities who have done more than call attention to their existence, so that the present study bridges a gap hitherto void. Mdlle. van Berchem's work displays the greatest competence and technical knowledge, but, if a criticism may be permitted, one feels that in addition to the detailed analysis rather more matter of a critical and "art-historical" nature might have been included.

Apart from mosaics which once covered the outside, but which have now entirely disappeared, the decoration may be divided into three groups, the most important of which, that in the octagonal or outer arcade, is dated by an inscription to 691-692. A second inscription states that the mosaics of the drum were restored in 1027-28, and de Vogué and others considered that they were not merely restored but entirely remade at this date. Mdlle. van Berchem, in spite of the fact that practical difficulties made it impossible for her to give the drum as detailed an examination as she gave the arcade, found enough evidence to make it seem highly probable that the work in the drum and that in the spandrels of the circular or inner arcade is actually to be assigned to the first period, though restorations touched both these areas with a fairly heavy hand.

In the course of her study she examines the state of the mosaic art in Syria-Palestine before the Umayyad period, and to explain the paucity of monuments she suggests that mosaics were not popular in

the areas where stone was the usual building material, though they were profusely used as a covering for the more monotonous walls of brick in Italy and the Constantinople sphere. The recent discoveries of Crowfoot at Jerash, however, where every church had a floor of mosaic and where remains of roof and wall decoration in the same manner were found in most, show that her hypothesis cannot hold good. Moreover, recent work at Dura, at Ctesiphon, and at Hira in Mesopotamia shows that wall paintings were probably far more important in Syria and Mesopotamia in the first six centuries of the Christian era than we have heretofore supposed, and the æsthetic spirit which demands a painted decoration on the wall of church or temple is without doubt the same as that which calls for a more sumptuous decoration in mosaic. More extensive excavation is essential before assertions can be made, yet it would seem that Syria shared with the Byzantine area the love of brightly decorated walls. The decoration of Syria's buildings was probably just as much Byzantine as was that of the churches of Rome or Ravenna. It is to be regretted that Mdlle. van Berchem did not include the Jerash discoveries in a survey otherwise so comprehensive.

It has often been suggested that the mosaics of the Dome of the Rock and Damascus were due to workmen sent by the Byzantine Emperor from Constantinople, but Mdlle. van Berchem shows that the texts on which this supposition is founded are not to be entirely relied upon. In the earlier ones, in fact, it is to workmen of "Rum" and not to the Emperor that allusions are made, and she suggests that these workmen may well have been Syrians. She concludes, in fact, that the majority of the artisans were Syrians, though a few master-craftsmen may have been Byzantines from Constantinople. But this does not really mean very much, for although the art and architecture of Syria was distinguished from that of Constantinople by many a feature, Syria was nevertheless within the Byzantine sphere, and had it not been for Byzantine culture it seems certain that the erection of such magnificent mosaics would have been impossible. The tradition and skill which such monuments demand could only be maintained while there was a strong and wealthy control and a fairly constant demand for such work; where there was, in fact, a prosperous and highly civilized society. Such a state of affairs was the result of the Holy Byzantine Empire, and it was above all at the capital that the tradition was kept alive. Just as Ravenna had looked to Constantinople a century or so before, so did Syria look in the days of the early

Umayyads, and even if the later Arab writers exaggerate the debt beyond just bounds, the very fact that they unanimously stress the necessity of sending to Constantinople shows the indebtedness to the Christian capital. Three centuries earlier Antioch and Alexandria had given of their best to further the development of the new cultural centre of the universe; in the seventh and eighth centuries the rôles had become to a great extent reversed.

A description of the arrangement of the ornament follows (pp. 168-172), and the author shows how admirably the motives are selected to suit the areas they have to cover. The motives themselves are then analyzed (pp. 173-216), comparative as well as actual examples being profusely illustrated. The geometrical and interlacing schemes of developed Moslem art are entirely absent; naturalistic and similar motives are developed to an amazing degree. The chapter is one of great importance for the study of the evolution of these motives, and it provides a large mass of comparative material, as well as serving to show the original character of the Jerusalem work. Fourteen distinct naturalistic motives are noted, amongst them the interesting Sasanian wings which, though in the Dome of the Rock they are due to Persian influence, are actually to be traced back long before Sasanian times. They are not, as Strzygowski affirmed, "of purely Sasanian origin." In addition, the author describes conventionalized and composite motives, which, "by their originality and novelty, constitute a new and important chapter in the history of decorative art."

Pages 217-220 are devoted to a discussion of the technique, and no one could be better fitted to embark on this than Mdlle. van Berchem. The best work at Jerusalem is only equalled at Damascus; Rome, Ravenna, or Salonica seldom approach it. Yet along with this excellence, less accomplished hands are to be traced, the second-rate work being placed in less conspicuous positions. Almost childish work that appears here and there is to be assigned to some period of restoration. A full colour analysis is given; the methods of setting the tesserae are described; an account of the present state of the monument is added. The technical examination serves to substantiate the conclusion reached earlier on, that all the work is to be attributed to the same date, with the exception of restorations. It forms, in fact, so unanimous and exquisite a whole that its inspiration may well be attributed to a single mind, though the name of this great artist is lost to us for ever.

The Damascus Mosaics.—The study of the mosaics at Damascus, set up by Walid about 715, is only slightly less detailed than that of

those at Jerusalem. Although only the major parts of the decoration are reproduced, there is ample material to satisfy the general, even the particular, student. As at Jerusalem, the standard of work varies, for numerous artisans must have been employed. But apart from the variation in standard, one wishes that the author had stressed more the fact that there are two distinct systems, the one ornamental, like that at Jerusalem, restricted at Damascus to small and obscure spaces, the other vast and pictorial and infinitely rich; to its fantastic architecture, its palaces, cities, houses, rivers, and superb trees, we have been introduced only within the last few years, thanks to the work of M. de Lorey. In the conception and execution, in the combination of naturalism and fantasy, in the amazing success of this plastic yet aniconic decoration, we are confronted not only with one of the finest mosaic compositions, but also with one of the finest works of art of the world.

Mdlle. van Berchem examines possible models, paintings of Rome and Pompeii, early Christian mosaics of Italy and Greece, manuscripts, and finally the actual trees, towns, and buildings of Syria. She concludes that "the decoration of the mosque is above all a native product of the country where it came into being with a value and character peculiar to itself" (p. 231). The possibility of help from outside is, however, not to be denied (p. 251). We have already attempted to show how important Byzantium must have been in this respect, and though the figures of the Arab writers, some of whom say that as many as twelve thousand workmen were imported, are not to be believed, the fact that master-craftsmen were summoned from Constantinople must stand as definite. Certain of the buildings and the trees are without doubt modelled on those of Syria, and the suggestion that Hellenistic theatre-scenes of Alexandrine origin served as models for the more fantastic constructions is a very likely one. It is probably the influence of these sketches which accounts for the presence of similar architectural motives in other monuments, like the church of St. George at Salonica, though here figures are also included and the general effect is far less satisfactory.

Umayyad Secular Buildings.—The first part of Chapter VI. deals with Qusayr Amra. After describing the building and its famous paintings in detail (pp. 253-272). Creswell refutes once and for all the hypothesis of ninth-century date which was put forward by Karabacek in Musil's publication. There can be little doubt that the building and its decoration are to be attributed to Walid. This important

monument is thus established between 711, the date of the death of Rodorik, king of the Visigoths, who appears in the paintings as one of the defeated enemies of Islam, and 715, the date of the death of Walid.

The related but slightly later Hammam as-Sarakh (725-730) is then discussed. Both are to be traced back to earlier baths in Syria; the audience halls are additions due to the fact that these royal baths are in the country, whereas those of previous times were in the towns. The pointed arch which we see in both monuments is shown to be of Syrian origin—it is not Persian, as some authorities have suggested (p. 280). The roofing system, domes, and vaults, supported on cross arches, is of Syrian type, though the actual tunnel vaults are an Iranian modification. They take the place of the Syrian system, where flat slabs occupy the spaces between the transverse arches.

The small mosque at Qusayr al-Hallabat, first published by Butler, is shown to be of much the same date as the two bath-palaces, as are two others in the region (pp. 284-288).

There are two appendices to the chapter dealing with the zodiac which appears painted on the inside of the dome at Qusayr Amra. In the first (pp. 289-295) Fritz Saxl adds definite information to our knowledge of painting methods at this time. He shows that the zodiac was undoubtedly copied from a book illustration and that a similar model must have served the painters of mediæval astronomical manuscripts in the Vatican. In this light M. de Lorey's theory that theatre designs were used by the Damascus mosaicists seems well-nigh certain; they may well have been conveyed by means of book illustrations. In the second appendix Arthur Beer deals with the significance of the zodiac from an astronomical point of view.

Architectural Origins.—Chapter VII. and parts of Chapters VIII. and IX. are concerned with architectural origins. Although domes over circular plan were known at an early date in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Rome, they could never become important till some satisfactory means of transition had been reached which would permit of their use as coverings for a square or rectangular room. Attempts to effect the transition were made in various places before Christian times, but Creswell shows that the true pendentive, one of the two possible methods, was perfected in Syria in the second half of the second century A.D. It was only after this date that the dome began to become popular for general purposes. The study of the other method, the squinch, he leaves for his second volume. It is to be hoped that he

will meet (or approve?) Strzygowski's theories of Iranian origin with the same accumulation of definite material that he has collected to support his arguments as to the development of the pendentive.

The square minaret is shown to be a descendant of Syrian church towers (pp. 329-330). The joggled *voussoir* is common enough in classical and Umayyad times in Syria, though it seems to be little used in the intervening period. An instructive collection of examples is shown on figures 417 to 424. The *machicolis* originates in pre-Moslem Syria as a latrine, to be developed there in the Moslem age for defensive purposes and then transported to the West. More important is the evolution of the triple apsed hall, which we see at Mshatta (pp. 382-386). It has already been discussed by numerous authorities, but never before in so truly scientific a manner. The earliest examples are in certain Roman baths and mausoleums: slightly later there are more plentiful ones in Syria, and it would seem that the custom of using this plan for a throne room is to be attributed to that country. Creswell suggests that the further elaboration, where it forms the end to a basilica, is to be assigned to Egypt, though more numerous examples would seem desirable before it is possible to be certain of this point.

Mshatta.—The remaining buildings discussed are the minaret at Qairawan (pp. 325-328), which may not be as early as is usually supposed; the two forts, mosque and reservoir constructions at Qasr al-Hair (pp. 330-343), which are dated to the caliphate of Hisham; the desert palaces of Mshatta and Qasr at-Tuba, and the mosque at Harran. Plans, reconstructions, and a complete series of plates of the Mshatta façade are given and described in detail. Both here and at Qasr at-Tuba the rooms show the same arrangement in bayts—that is, three or five rooms round a small court. (The bayts of Syria are different from those of Persia, p. 386.) There are other features of similarity in the construction, and the little ornament that survives at the latter castle shows it to belong to much the same period as Mshatta. Creswell points out that the greater part of the carving here is to be attributed to Copts, though marked Persian influence is, of course, apparent, while the forms of the mouldings are paralleled in North Mesopotamia and North Syria. We thus see a complete fusion of most of the elements which were later so important in Moslem art.

The controversies that have been waged as to the date of Mshatta are well known. Creswell summarizes them (pp. 390-400), and then sets forth his own deductions in detail. In view of his evidence there can no longer be any doubt as to the Umayyad date of the building.

The volume closes with a few conclusions concerning Umayyad architecture, showing that there is practically no feature which can be attributed to the Arabs, though Persia, Egypt, Byzantium, and, above all, Syria, with its pure Hellenistic tradition, all played a part. A short appendix deals with the planning of the Dome of the Rock. The book is well dedicated to King Fuad.

D. TALBOT RICE.

Persia. By Sir Arnold T. Wilson. 8½" x 5½". Pp. x+180. Benn. 1932. 21s.

This is the latest volume issued by the publishers of "The Modern World" Series, under the general editorship of the Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, F.R.S.

It was common knowledge among the friends of the late Marquess Curzon that it was always his hope, were he spared to find the leisure, to write a supplementary volume to his *Persia and the Persian Question*, and he had collected a mass of material with that end in view, but fate, alas! ordained otherwise. Now, in the retrospect, the forty years which have elapsed since his monumental work was published prove to have been a period of phenomenal progress and evolution in the national life of Persia and in her position among the nations; and though, during the process, particular periods or aspects of her history have been handled, incidentally or specifically, by a number of writers, and more comprehensively by Sir Percy Sykes in his *History of Persia* (3rd edition, 1930), there was still a real need for a compact and accurate survey of the country as it is situated to-day.

That we have in the present volume, the scheme of which—though not, of course, the scale—seems to me to accord so well with that of *Persia and the Persian Question* that I cannot but think that its appearance would have been welcomed by none more cordially than by the lamented author of that work.

And surely the preparation of it could not have been entrusted to hands better equipped to do justice to the task. The fortunes of Sir Arnold Wilson's career have been so ordered that for a quarter of a century past he has been continually associated with Persia and Persians, and in most varied capacities; first as a young soldier and traveller; then as a political secretary in the Persian Gulf Residency, with opportunities incidental to his duties of studying the current relations of Persia with her neighbours and the western Powers; then again as a consular officer responsible for the safeguarding of his country's interests and nationals within his particular sphere; as a Delegate on the Boundary Commission despatched in the year before the war to delimitate, from the head of the Persian Gulf to Ararat, the long-disputed frontier between Persia and Turkey; later on the outbreak of the Great War, as an Intelligence Officer with the British Force operating against the Turks in Southern Arabistan; and finally as a representative of that great commercial organization, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which now for more than twenty years has been so closely, and so helpfully, associated with the rising fortunes of Persia. With qualifications derived from such diverse experience, and with the added gift of a vivid literary style, the author has been in a position to make a very valuable contribution to the series, and is to be congratulated on his finished handiwork.

As we learn from the brief introduction preceding each volume, the general purpose of "The Modern World Series" is to provide a balanced survey of the stage of evolution and of the conditions prevailing in our own generation in the

contemporary States of the world; but as regards this particular volume let me quote, if I may, part of the passage with which the author prefaces it: "Its primary aim," he writes, "is to throw some light, not on the history of Persia, nor on the characteristics of the country as it was twenty or even ten years ago, but as it is to-day. It is not intended for the specialist, and there are many such, who find in the study of things Persian a source of abiding interest and of inspiration in the intellectual pastures of their choice, but rather for the general reader who wishes to form his own judgment as to the present position of the Persian nation, the course it is likely to pursue in the future, and the nature of its contributions to the common stock of human values."

Regarded as a work of reference, it will be found to provide a wealth of up-to-date and accurate information on every subject of importance to the seeker after knowledge; but it is much more than that, and though in such a comprehensive survey it is not to be expected that all the chapters can be of equal interest to the average reader, the volume abounds even in the more technical chapters in apt quotation and passages of vigorous writing.

In giving a "Description of the Country," as he does in the first chapter, the author, strict though the limitation of his space be, cannot always be debarred from reference to the distant past. Thus, in describing the plateau of Fars, the birth-place, as he says, of the Persian Empire, he cannot but make passing allusion to the giants of antiquity—to Cyrus and the other great Achaemenids, and their resting-places at Persepolis. And again, coming down the centuries, to some of the heroes of the long-drawn struggle between England and European rivals for the mastery of the newly discovered trade route to the East, and in particular for the hegemony of the Persian Gulf.

With such brief diversions he passes quickly to the present and finds reason for a well-deserved tribute to the ready adaptability of the modern Persian in general with regard to the rapid changes which are taking place in the conditions of everyday life, as the result mainly of the introduction of motor transport. Nearly all the large towns, he tells us, have considerably widened their main thoroughfares, and have introduced municipal regulations for the improvement of the frontage of the buildings facing on to them. Electric lighting plants, too, are now commonly to be found, and workshops capable of executing repairs to passing motor vehicles and of other useful mechanical work. In this connection readers who served in Mesopotamia during the early days of the war will remember how surprisingly "quick" we found the inhabitants of the Shatt-el Arab, both Arab and Persian, in picking up the rudiments of mechanical knowledge, sometimes, I must admit, with dangerous consequences!

Speaking again of the modern Persians as a people, he emphasizes the success with which the spirit of national unity seems to raise them above all differences of race and language—and how independent of material circumstances is their sense of personal dignity and repute—a worthy habit of mind which post-war adversity is visibly inducing among us here.

Turning to the sphere of commerce and industry, it is interesting to note that though, as he tells us, the figures of population have remained practically stationary during the past thirty years, yet the value and volume of trade for the same period has substantially increased, owing apparently to the creation of fresh needs. Unfortunately British trade, in the face of lively Russian competition, does not participate in this increase. With reference to this fact the author quotes from a Report by Mr. E. R. Lingeman to the Department of Overseas Trade, in which the view is expressed that: "It is but natural that Russia, if only on account of her geographical position, should gradually reassume the dominating commercial

position which she held in Persia before the war. For reasons of her own, she has hastened the process by the simple method of undercutting her competitors with but little regard for landed cost."

Upon the beneficent working and influence of that great organization the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Sir Arnold Wilson's volume contains some most interesting paragraphs, Great Britain's official participation in the enterprise on the initiative of Mr. Winston Churchill, when First Lord of the Admiralty, being compared to her purchase of the Suez Canal shares, thanks to the courage and foresight of Benjamin Disraeli.

Persia, and she a non-combatant, is probably the only country which derived specific benefit from the events of the war, and that in the direction of improved communications carried out by the belligerents.

No one who knew the old Bushire-Shiraz caravan route, rising a matter of 5,000 feet in a stretch of less than 200 miles, and climbing one difficult pass after another, would have believed it possible that within a period of a few months it could have been made passable for motor-transport, and a journey of eight or nine days be accomplished in less than forty-eight hours if not in twenty-four. Similarly on the western flank, the presence of British and Russian troops for a period on the Baghdad-Caspian line resulted in the laying out of a wide and carefully graded and metalled road from Kaniqin to Kermanshah, and thence to Kazvin and the Caspian by the re-conditioning of the old Russian cart-road. The introduction of motor transport has, in fact, constituted the beginning of a new era for Persia, and has helped materially to strengthen the authority of the Central Government.

The allied problem of railway development in Persia is a time-honoured and well-worn theme, and, as will be realized from the author's remarks, it is one in regard to which the experience of Great Britain and her nationals has not been fortunate. That Persia has remained somewhat far behind in this matter of railway construction has, it must be admitted, been mainly due to the rivalry and suspicion of each other which for so many years distinguished the policies of Russia and Great Britain in Persia and Central Asia, and which constituted such a chronic anxiety to successive Persian governments. Under the vigorous rule of Shah Riza Khan Pahlavi the question of railway construction has become a more domestic problem; but if credence can be given to the Riga report referred to at p. 112 of this volume, the subject still commands our own interest and attention. This Riga report is worth quoting:

"The Soviet Government has approved an agreement recently signed by representatives of Russia, Persia, and Afghanistan, and Japanese financiers, for the purpose of building a railway across Afghanistan, from the Russian to the Indian borders. This line is later to be extended northwards to connect with the Turkish Siberian Railway, and a junction will be made with a line from Bander Abbas on the Persian Gulf."

Truly a comprehensive programme!

As regards the current Persian scheme for a railway from the Caspian to the head of the Persian Gulf with its southern terminus in the Khor Musa, of which construction is in progress from both ends and which is apparently estimated to cost twenty-four millions sterling, while sympathizing with the desire of the Shah and his Government to have an all-Persian alignment which will make the country independent of its neighbours in all that concerns international trade, the author is somewhat sceptical, like a good many others with local knowledge, of its prospects from a commercial point of view.

Persia's "Foreign Relations" provide material for a very interesting chapter.

Emphasizing at the start Great Britain's oft-quoted interest in the maintenance of a strong, independent, and friendly Persia, and the chronic obstacle to that desirable phenomenon presented in the past by the menace of Russian policy in Asia, he goes on to sketch the trend of foreign relations from the time of the "entente cordiale" with France in 1904, which marked a definite stage in those relations, in that it provided a *détente* for their readjustment. The result, as we know, was the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 in regard to Persia. But neither in regard to this Convention nor the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 were the Persian people willing to accept at face value what Russia or Great Britain were prepared to undertake "for their country's good." As regards the first-mentioned instrument, Persians were convinced that some secret compact underlay it by virtue of which Great Britain would have Russian support in the event of a European war. The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was of a different category; the Great War had run its course and left an aftermath of chaos behind it. Sir Arnold Wilson has rendered service by giving a juster appraisal of its merits and the circumstances under which it was concluded than has sometimes been accorded it. There was nothing behind the actual text of the document, and, as he remarks, it represented a reasonable and straightforward scheme for the rehabilitation of the Persian administration which the repercussions of the Great War had completely deranged, and which had no chance as far as could then be seen of gaining equilibrium without prompt and friendly assistance from outside.

"Such assistance as was needed," he concludes, "Great Britain was in the best position to afford, and in the clear interest of both countries she was prepared to afford it; but in the framing of the document concluded with that object in view, two phenomena ultimately accountable for its abrogation were not foreseen: firstly, the extraordinary stimulus imparted to nationalistic sentiments in all Muhammadan countries, already aroused by the events of the war, by the gradual realization of the portent of President Wilson's fourteen points; and, secondly, the sudden passage across the Persian firmament of a meteor in the person of Riza Khan Sartip, who as His Majesty Riza Khan Pahlevi has rehabilitated his country to such an astonishing extent during the past decade. Such luminaries are creations of the moment and give no warning of their coming; but notwithstanding that this phenomenon portended the doom of the Anglo-Persian Agreement we can now with all sincerity congratulate the Persian nation on the success already achieved, and on the prospect of a more august future under His Majesty's vigorous ægis than it could have hoped to achieve under an Anglo-Persian Convention however honestly interpreted by the parties to it."

After thus giving a vivid picture of the state of Persia, *qua non-combatant* during the war, the author goes on to treat of the remarkable progress of Shah Riza Khan's policy of "westernizing" Persia, but, be it well understood, always a "Persia for the Persians," and in the process of the gradual elimination of foreign influence which this aim connotes, Great Britain as the Power with the greatest stake in Persia suffers heavily.

In the chapters which follow, Literature, Judicial and Educational Systems, Finance and Population, the Possibilities of Irrigation and Mineral Exploitation, and the Military Forces of Persia, Past and Present, are successively dealt with. Space does not admit of more than mention of them here, but I would remark that the chapters on the Literature and the Military Forces are especially to be commended for their literary value and their interest to the general reader.

The tone of the whole work breathes affection for the country and the people, sympathy for its progressive efforts of to-day, and optimism in regard to what the

future may hold in store for her. The Royal Central Asian Society is to be congratulated on this latest product of the industry of one of its most distinguished members.

P. Z. C.

The Keys of Power: a Study of Indian Ritual and Belief. By J. Abbott, I.C.S. 9½" x 6". Pp. xi + 560 + 8 pp. Illustrations. Methuen. 1932. 21s.

The Keys of Power by Mr. J. Abbott is a most valuable contribution to the study of Indian ritual and belief. The object of the book, as stated in the Preface, is not to analyze Modern Hinduism or Muhammadanism, or to follow the side tracks of Hindu philosophy, "but primarily to record as many customs as possible before it is too late, and to attempt to show how the concept of a supernatural cosmic power dominates popular practice. The author has certainly succeeded in achieving those two objects. He has collected an astonishing number of facts with regard to both Hindu and Muhammadan customs and beliefs, and has shown successfully how dominant and widespread the idea of "a creative dynamic force or power in all things visible and invisible; in things animate and inanimate" has been in India as in other parts of the world.

This power or influence is called by the Hindus *śakti* and by the Muhammadans *qudrat*. But the concept itself belongs to the primitive inhabitants of India in the dim ages before the Aryan invasion and long before the days of Muhammad. Mr. Abbott links it on to the conception of *pśa* (life), which is still found among some of the aboriginal tribes in India. Whether he is right in speaking of both *pśa* and *śakti* as "earlier than animism" is open to question, unless animism is taken to mean modern Hinduism. But if the term is used to describe the belief in innumerable spiritual beings that swarm in every Indian village, it is very doubtful whether this ought to be regarded as a later development than the concept of *śakti*. As a rule the more abstract and general conceptions are later than the more concrete; and certainly the concept of spiritual beings is more concrete than that of *śakti*. It is, at any rate, a tenable hypothesis that the two concepts were contemporary in their origin.

Mr. Abbott speaks of *śakti* as "a diffused supernatural cosmic power." The illustrations that he gives suggest rather that it ought to be described as an important feature in primitive man's idea of nature itself.

The various manifestations of this cosmic force in life, man, woman, the ground, fire, metals, salt, stones, time, colours, numbers, trees, the weather, the operations of agriculture, of rain, animals, and, above all, the world of spirits, are illustrated by a mass of facts extending over about five hundred pages. They are admirably arranged and are full of interest. The large number of Sanskrit and Marathi terms used, however, makes the book rather difficult reading for people who do not know these languages. There is a glossary at the beginning, but it is very short, and might with advantage have been greatly enlarged. Three features in this concept of a universal cosmic force are clearly brought out with copious illustrations. First, that it "acts both for good and for evil; it may bring to man blessing or disaster." Second, that it is transferable. A man's *śakti*, for example, is transferred to his clothes or anything brought in contact with him, even to his shadow. It is dangerous for children to play about on a man's shadow, and to cut or beat the shadow is regarded as an effective method of injuring the man himself. This transference of *śakti* leads to an enormous multiplication of the rules to be observed in order to avoid its evil effects.

Third, that the *śakti* of one object can be increased or diminished by coming into contact with the *śakti* of other objects. The following is a quaint illustration of this. "The measuring of a man's shadow is one way of transferring any illness to another. In the actual length of the shadow there is something that is part of the self of the man himself, and if this be so, still more is the measurement of the man's body or part thereof an intimate portion of the man's individuality. A man's power passes into a thing made according to his measurements" (pp. 30, 31).

It is impossible in a brief review even to mention briefly the large number of interesting questions raised in this book. Mr. Abbott has provided material for discussion which anthropologists will be glad to have made available. He has thrown much new light on a phase of primitive thought and practice that has been far too much neglected by students of Indian life and thought. His facts have been collected almost exclusively in the Bombay Presidency, and many of the customs described would not be found elsewhere. But that does not in any way invalidate the value of his conclusions. The ideas which lie behind the facts are common to all India.

It must suffice to draw attention to one or two points which will make the book interesting and valuable both to anthropologists and the ordinary reader. First, it gives a vivid and painful impression of the bondage in which the minds and activities of the mass of the Indian people are held by the extraordinary growth and complexity of a perverted science, if we may dignify it by this name, and the hindrance that this is to ordinary social intercourse as well as to public and private business. For example, in the exercise of hospitality. Both Hindus and Muhammadans are naturally very hospitable people, and hospitality is regarded as a great virtue, a religious duty, and a means of acquiring merit. But what danger it involves for people who believe in *śakti*! A guest may have the evil eye. That does not mean that he is a bad man or that he is even conscious of exercising a baleful influence. But his glance may bring misfortune or even death to the first person or thing that he looks at when he enters a house. His *śakti* may be hot and so dangerous. On the whole, therefore, the entertaining of guests is a perilous business. "Various taboos on the conduct of a guest demonstrate his potentiality for evil. He must not leave the cuttings of his nails in his host's house. He must never count the rafters in the roof. . . . He should neither praise nor criticize the food that is offered him. He should not sit save where he is asked to sit, nor get up without the permission of his host" (p. 75).

In the last chapter Mr. Abbott controverts the views of Sir James Fraser, Mr. R. E. Enthoven, Mr. W. Crooke, and others on the subject of totemism in India. "There is probably no 'ism,'" he says, "that has played more havoc with the interpretation of Indian customs than totemism, and both English and Indian writers have constructed comprehensive theories of totemism on little more than apparent resemblance." He discusses the question specially with regard to the Maratha *devaḥ*, an elusive deity, hard to define. Mr. Abbott rejects the theory held by eminent authorities that the *devaḥ* is a relic of totemism, and maintains that the evidence warrants "the assumption that it is but a medium for the invocation of divine power" (p. 456). This controversy is an example of the somewhat revolutionary influence that Mr. Abbott's book is likely to have on the interpretation of Indian beliefs and customs.

H. WHITEHEAD
(Late Bishop of Madras).

Asiatic Mythology. A detailed description and explanation of the Mythologies of all the Great Nations of Asia. By J. Hackin and G. H. Marchal, S. Elisée, H. Maspero, C. Huart, H. de Wilmón-Grabowska, and Raymond Linossier. Introduction by Paul Louis Couchoud. Translated from the French by F. M. Atkinson. 12½"×10½". Pp. 459. 15 coloured plates and 354 illustrations. Harrap and Sons. 63s.

In Asia it is estimated that at least three-quarters of its works of art are religious and, without understanding the religion that inspires this art, no grasp of its real meaning is possible. Again, if we wish to understand religions, we must go back to the primitive myths which form their roots. This is the spirit with which the distinguished writers of this volume have been inspired and, under their guidance, we may "look over the fence" and reach the rock of primitive myth in Asia.

Persia is first dealt with, and we learn of the high ideals held by Cyrus the Great and by Darius, who worshipped Ahura Mazda "the Great God" and hated the "Lie." Persia gave birth to more than one religion. Among them was that of Mithras, who is represented as sacrificing a bull to secure fertility for the earth. Mithraism was a secret cult, to which no women were admitted, and, at one time, owing partly to the worship of the Roman Emperors inculcated by its tenets, it rivalled Christianity in the Roman Empire.

Islam, a pure and austere monotheism, embodied a good deal of the ancient Arab mythology, which is partly utilized to serve as a warning. The representation of the human body was forbidden, but this law was broken in Persia, and in the first coloured illustration we see Mohamed and Ali appearing in the form of flames, which also serve as halos. Many of the myths of Persia, such as the fight of Rustam with the White Div, probably represented a struggle against invaders from the north, the scene of the combat being located in one of the Caspian provinces.

After Persia we come to the remote inhabitants of Kafiristan, who were first mentioned by Benedict Goes, the Jesuit who travelled from India to Cathay during the reign of Akbar. Of Indo-European descent, these savage mountaineers were idolators, who lived on the products of their flocks, whose skins, serving as garments, are responsible for *Shakpoish*, or "Black garments," by which name these pagans were known. Examples of their idols, which represented deified ancestors, are given, and one can only regret that so little is known about this really primitive tribe.

Buddhism will appeal particularly to the Royal Central Asian Society, as it was owing to discrepancies in the Buddhist manuscripts in China that the heroic Hsuan-Tsang, in the seventh century A.D., crossed the Gobi and, traversing Central Asia, reached Gandhara, where the first statues of Buddha had been chiselled by Greek sculptors. Buddhism had suffered terrible shocks at the hands of the Ephthalite Huns, and the Moslems drove out its monks. Buddhism still remains in Ceylon, while, in the Far East, it has tamed the savage Mongols into forgetting their warlike virtues. Among the illustrations figure 4, the wheel surmounting a pillar, represents a preaching scene, the Buddha not being represented in the ancient Indian school. Among the most interesting of the coloured plates is one entitled *The Birth of the Buddha*. The subject is too deep for more than a passing mention, but India, the most religious country in the world, gave humanity a marvellous gift in the cult of Buddha, and her ascetics were undoubtedly the prototypes of the hermits and monks of Christianity.

To-day Brahmanism should be carefully studied by British readers, who should acquire some knowledge of what its aims and rules stand for.

Descendants of the Aryan conquerors of India, the Brahmins, as the priestly caste, established a very complicated cult, based on the ancient cosmic deities of Heaven, Earth and Space. The evolution of their deities was in direct opposition to that of the Aryans of Persia. In India, Ahura Mazda, the supreme god of the Persians, becomes the Asura demon, while *Deva*, the Indian god (whence our word deity), becomes a devil, or *div*, in Persia.

Varuna, the sky god, comparable to the *Ouranos* of the Greeks, was the master of the ancient Vedic pantheon. The sky was his garment, and he hated the lie. In later times Varuna loses his pre-eminence, while Indra, the god of the storm-cloud and the thunder, became more important than Varuna, possibly owing to the leading part rain plays among an agricultural people. Yama, the King of Hell and Judge of the Dead, is an ancient Aryan myth, which in Persia is represented by Jamshid, in which connection Persepolis, the capital of the Achæmenians, is locally termed the "Platform of Jamshid." Did not Omar Khayyâm write—

"They say the lion and the lizard keep
The Courts where Jamshid gloried and drank deep?"

Siva, the propitious, degenerates into a bloodthirsty god, the patron of ghosts and robbers. Parvati, the goddess of the earth, is generally worshipped as Durga, the goddess of destruction. Hsuan-tsang, the famous Chinese master of law, was once captured by bandits who prepared to sacrifice him to this dread goddess, when a storm arose and the frightened robbers fell at his feet and "repented them of the evil." One of the best coloured plates represents Siva and Parvati. Perhaps the most charming of the gods was Krishna, the shepherd, who, representing love and courage, is the most popular, and certainly the most human of the long line of gods.

We now scale the Himalayas and reach the upland plateau of Tibet, which is governed by Lamaism, a mixture of Buddhism and the ancient local cults. One of the coloured plates (opposite p. 174) represents a great sorcerer, and Figure 44 represents Buddha surrounded by eighty-four sorcerers.

Among the most interesting of recent discoveries are the relics of the Buddhism that was destroyed by the thunderbolt of Islam. The Indo-Hellenistic art of Gandhara (Peshawar) became influenced by Persian elements alike in Bamiyan and in Chinese Turkestan. One of the most beautiful of the coloured plates in the work (opposite p. 248) represents Kuanyin, a beneficent power and protector of men in calamity.

To conclude, it would be impossible to review a work of this importance, which embraces the mythology of Asia, in the space at my disposal, but I would strongly recommend it to members of the Royal Central Asian Society. Not only are the illustrations excellent, but the letterpress, written by leading authorities, well supports the high standard that is associated with French works of this character.

P. M. SYLLA.

Planned Money. By Basil P. Blackett. 7½"×5". Pp. ix+194. With two coloured charts. Constable. 5s.

Is Saul also among the prophets? Can a Director of the Bank of England be found in the ranks of those who think that the maintenance of the dollar exchange should not be the supreme object of monetary policy? Can he

bring himself to speak lightly, not to say approvingly, of the "dethronement of gold"? Such are the reflections suggested by a perusal of Sir Basil Blackett's courageous and remarkable work. It is all the more remarkable as coming from one who served his apprenticeship to finance in the Treasury, and who is now associated in the government of the Bank of England; and if it should so happen that, in his own words, "such of the ideas as are of value pass freely into the national circulation," it may well prove to be not only remarkable but epoch-making, to the great advantage both of the author's country and of the world generally. For it aims at nothing less than a revolution in the traditional outlook on currency policy and problems.

The first part of the book is a discussion of planning in general, and a plea for its substitution in the whole sphere of national life for the venerable and venerated doctrine of *laissez faire*. The author is at pains to show that such a change of system (the need for which, in various departments of human activity, is daily being more fully recognized) need not involve any diminution of economic, political, or spiritual freedom. We need not, however, delay over the philosophy of Planning in General.

The main part of the book deals with the subject, in which the writer is an expert—Planning in Relation to Money. It opens with a reference to the "desperate" plight in which civilization has been landed by Unplanned Money.

"The recent fall in prices has involved an increase so overwhelming in the burden of all money debts that in varying degree all over the world modification of money contracts begins to be looked on as a justifiable or even necessary corollary of the inequity of a continued payment on account of principal and interest." Sir Basil Blackett's concern is to guide the nation to a policy for the future rather than to criticize the policy of the past, which, for one in his position, would be a somewhat delicate operation, and he does not therefore examine how far monetary policy has caused or contributed to the fall in prices. There seems little real doubt what his own opinion is, but he does not go beyond pointing out that it is our "monetary system which, whether as villain or as victim, has translated the causes of the disaster, whether political, social, economic, or monetary, into the form of a catastrophic fall of prices."

It is a little unfortunate that the chapter in which these words occur should be headed "Unplanned Money." A better example of unplanned money would have been afforded by the lavish and unregulated issue of paper money during the war and the subsequent period of demobilization, which caused a rapid and most disturbing rise in prices. Memories are short. The whole country now, from the learned and expert authors of the Macmillan Report to the humblest shopkeeper or farmer, is convinced that only a rise in prices can prevent disaster. Twelve years ago the whole country with equal unanimity, backed by the opinion of economists, statesmen, and financiers, demanded lower prices, and an able body of monetary technicians devised a plan to give effect to the popular demand. The Cunliffe Committee, after full deliberation, put forward this plan, and successive governments with equal deliberation carried it out. It was a concerted plan to enable the pound to look the dollar in the face by enhancing the value of the pound—that is, by lowering prices expressed in pounds. It may be doubted whether the currency history of this country can show any clearer instance of "Planned Money" than the policy that brought about "the catastrophic fall in prices." Thus all depends on what the plan is, and the author leaves no doubt as to the policy he would adopt. This part of the work is constructive and is specially valuable, as it seems impossible that the advice of a Director of the Bank, with such experience of currency management as the

author enjoyed in India, should be treated as negligible by the financial world or be put aside with a few sarcastic words by a Chancellor of the Exchequer. But it does seem doubtful whether Sir Basil Blackett is fully conscious of the opposition that his proposals are likely to encounter in influential but not yet fully instructed quarters.

A brief attempt to summarize the proposals must be made in spite of the risk of unconsciously doing them an injustice. The world requires currencies that shall be fairly stable in terms of each other, and each separate country requires a currency that maintains prices at a fairly constant level within its own border. Unsteadiness of the exchanges disorganizes foreign trade; instability of prices is disastrous for internal business. Which object should be put in the forefront? Should the main object be steadiness of the exchanges or stability of the price-level, supposing that for the present it is impossible to secure both? Hitherto the foreign exchanges have been regarded as all-important; the financial world turns to them daily as the best barometer of business affairs.

"Of late years stability of the price level has been sacrificed to stability of the external exchanges. This is true of the period from 1870 to 1914 as well as of the post-war period. . . .

"The par of exchange is a phrase with which the business world has been long familiar. No one ever talks or thinks about the par of prices or parity of the price level."

The attractive possibility of restoring gold as the international medium of exchange is glanced at, but has to be put aside. The author's remarks on gold are emphatic and enlightening:

"What is astonishing is the extraordinary hold which what is called the gold mentality has obtained, especially among the high authorities of the world's Central Banks. The gold standard has become a religion for some of the Boards of Central Banks in Continental Europe, believed in with an emotional fervour," etc.

But where did this worship of gold start if not in this country? The Central Bankers of Continental Europe might well retort *Tu l'as voulu, George Dandin*. We have possibly escaped from the worship of gold since September, 1931, but only since then, and there are many Lot's wives, who look back. To see the gold religion in full vigour we need only go back to the Cunliffe Report of 1919-20, and it is the common impression, rightly or wrongly, that the mantle of Lord Cunliffe has fallen on the present Governor of the Bank. Further, in a recent work, Mr. Cole declares that:

"The Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Viscount Snowden, was an even more fanatical adherent of the gold standard than the officials of the Bank of England and the Treasury"; and there have been Pecksniffian references from time to time in Parliament to the failure of other countries to imitate the rectitude of our own in restoring the pre-war gold value of the currency. It will be a surprise as well as a relief if the gold mentality does not find much more emphatic expression in this country than our author seems to allow for.

The clear reasoning of this work forces the writer to discard the idea of a universal international money standard, at least while economic policies remain on an exclusively national basis.

"Internal commerce and the well-being of those dependent on it are far more important in the economic life of a nation than external trade."

"What might be called the natural currency arrangement for an independent state would be a local currency, owing its internal purchasing value to management by or on behalf of the State, and so managed and controlled as to retain

approximately the same purchasing power from year to year and from decade to decade, external trade being provided for by appropriate machinery which did not disturb internal stability."

The meaning of price-stability is discussed, and management so as to secure a reasonable degree of such stability is shown to be perfectly practicable in the opinion of an expert having the authority and experience of Sir Basil Blackett. If such a currency were established in this country it is probable that other countries within the orbit of sterling would follow suit, and more than half the nations of the world would then enjoy local currencies having a constant purchasing power within their own limits. With local currencies so stabilized it would follow that the exchanges between nations of the sterling group would also be steady over long periods.

This scheme for securing at once the steadiness of the foreign exchanges between the majority of the nations and the stabilization of internal price levels to an extent hitherto unknown is suggested as a definite policy for our Government to put before the world. Our abandonment of the gold standard makes such a policy our interest, and frees us to advocate it. It would not embrace the gold standard countries, and would therefore fall short of providing the universal measure of value that mankind has sought for, but better half a loaf than no bread.

Amongst the countries in which the Central Asian Society is specially interested, it would include India, and if China as a silver-using country seems to lie outside its scope, the position there would not be rendered any worse than at present and would probably be ameliorated. It is a great policy, and its adoption would place this country in the position of proposing a new departure, in which all countries of Sterlingaria might find the most hopeful means yet suggested of extrication from the abyss. The only question is whether in the short time now left for consideration the authorities can overcome the obstacles which gold mentality, vested interests, and inherited prejudices will raise in abundance.

JOHN O. MILLER.

Akbar. By Lawrence Binyon. 5½"×7½". Pp. 165. Frontispiece. 5s. Peter Davies, Ltd. 1932.

Akbar stands out pre-eminent as the greatest ruler that Asia has produced, one of the greatest that the world has seen. History tells us of his achievements; a mighty conqueror who established an Empire extending from Kashmir and Kabul to the Vindhya, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean; a consummate statesman who consolidated those vast dominions into a compact Empire by wise tolerance of the beliefs and customs of its heterogeneous races and in particular by abolishing the invidious taxes on the Hindu "infidels"; a skilful administrator who won the hearts of his subjects by his love of justice, by the security of life and property under his impartial rule, by his adjusting the burdens of taxation, not according to the limits of their capacity to pay, but according to a careful estimate of the value of their crops, the State share of which he fixed at one-third, and by his stern repression of official rapacity. As a conqueror, he is in the same category with his Tartar and Mogul ancestors, Timur and Jinghis Khan, without their inhumanity; with Alexander and Napoleon without their selfish ambition; in statesmanship and administrative capacity he was far superior to any of them, except perhaps Napoleon. Hence while their empires were shortlived, Akbar's was built on a

surer foundation; and, in spite of the defects of his successors, the first three of whom were men of capacity, endured for nearly 200 years. Even when the structure raised by him collapsed owing to foreign aggression and internal dissensions, the foundations of his admirable administrative system remained to furnish the basis on which an even greater Empire than his, that of British India, was established. All these achievements are duly chronicled in the many histories which deal with Akbar and his time. But, as Mr. Lawrence Binyon brings out in this excellent monograph, great as Akbar's achievements were, *the man himself is greater than his achievements*. Mr. Binyon has therefore set himself to show us the *man*, and in the brief compass of his 160 pages we learn more than from anything hitherto published of the real Akbar, his character, the working of his mind, his ideals; his relations with his three sons, in two of whom he was sadly disappointed, as they died of drink, while the third, Salim (afterwards Jahangir), was continually plotting against him, and contrived the murder of his Jonathan, Abu'l-fazl; his relations with his friends and ministers, whom he chose himself, Bhagwan Das, Mansingh (both Hindus), Abu'l-fazl and his brother (unorthodox Muslims), the Jesuits Aquaviva and Monserrati, from all of whom he derived something of the new religion which he promulgated as the "Divine Faith," in which he himself was at once both Pope and King. The extraordinary feature in this many-sided genius is that he was unable to read or write. But this defect seems to have been to him a help rather than a hindrance; it stimulated the spirit of intellectual curiosity, made him derive his ideas not from books but from men and the hard realities of life, so that even his philosophical and spiritual speculations never degenerated into the ineffective mysticism so characteristic of the East, but took shape in a definite attempt to formulate a new creed incorporating what he considered the best in the existing creeds of the West and the East. It is this interesting phase of his character that Mr. Binyon brings out with such clearness and sympathy. In doing so he has had the rare advantage of being able to utilize the estimates of Akbar's character and religious ideals formed by the able Jesuit Fathers who for many years were in the closest touch with the Emperor, and who had hoped to convert him to Christianity. The votaries of the various other creeds to which Akbar showed a sympathetic interest held similar hopes. All were disappointed. Mr. Binyon in a few illuminating sentences gives us the key to the riddle. He writes (pages 7-8): "The accounts given by the Jesuits of Akbar and his attitude to Christianity are so full and intimate, written, moreover, by an acute observer of high intelligence, that he may easily be led into laying a disproportionate emphasis on their influence over his mind. If he was attracted to the religion of Christ, he was not less attracted by the doctrines of the Jews and by the ancient Persian faith of Zoroaster, while he also followed the Hindus in some at least of their observances. To Islam alone he became by degrees definitely hostile. . . .

"With each religion he went so far that each in turn claimed him as a convert, or as being about to be converted; in each case he stopped upon the threshold."

That is truly and admirably put; his comprehension of and sympathy with the best in all these creeds—except his own creed of Islam—prevented him from accepting any one of them as a guide in this world and to the next. Hence his well-meant but ill-fated attempt to evolve a creed of his own, mainly perhaps in pursuance of his lofty ideal of consolidating hostile races and rival creeds into one great Empire, with himself as the spiritual and temporal ruler. That great scheme failed because it ran counter to human nature and the religious feelings of his time—perhaps of any time. But the failure was a glorious one. Akbar's

speculations as to the eternal Truth resemble those in Lyall's "*Meditations of a Hindu Prince*":

"Shall I list to the word of the Christ?ns who come from the uttermost sea?
The secret, hath it been told you, and what is your message to me?
It is nought but the world-wide story how the earth and the heaven began,
How the gods are glad and angry, and a Deity once was man."

As the result of it all, Akbar might have said with Omar:

"There was the door to which I found no key,
There was the Veil through which I might not see."

Akbar would have been more than human if he had succeeded in solving the mysteries of life and death; his failure in this and the tragedies of his three sons embittered the last years of a glorious reign, but they have brought him nearer to the ordinary mortal, and all who read Mr. Binyon's book must be grateful for his clear and sympathetic portrait of Akbar as a man.

M. F. O'DWYER.

The Loom of the East. By F. Kingdon-Ward. 5½"×5½". Pp. 208. Martin Hopkinson, Ltd., 1932. 5s.

Many of us know Captain Kingdon-Ward as a hardy and successful explorer and a Gold Medallist of the Royal Geographical Society; some of us know him as a botanist and plant hunter, who has introduced into Europe some very beautiful plants, and has in this direction done as much as any living man to extend our knowledge of Asiatic ecology. The present work bears no relation to the vivid and enjoyable works of travel and adventure which we have hitherto associated with his name. *The Loom of the East* is a compact if sometimes loosely written volume of some two hundred pages dealing on broad lines with some of the fundamental problems of Asia. It treats of realities, of tendencies and trends, interpreted in the light of personal experiences during eighteen years of residence and travel in the lands that lie between China and India, a region which constitutes probably the most formidable geographical barrier in the world. Yet, as Captain Kingdon-Ward has shown, it is being conquered by the automobile and the aeroplane, with results which we can but dimly foresee.

Burma is being brought into closer contact with China to the East, and with Tibet to the North. "Such will be the effect of separation (from India) that more and more will Burma turn its back on the sea, and cleave again to its old allegiance—to Further India" (Malaya, Siam, French Indo-China, and S. Yunnan). Bhamo is but two hundred miles distant from Talifu—two hours by flying boat—and but three hundred and fifty miles from the Upper Yangtze.

On Sino-Japanese relations he has much to say, from personal observation, of great interest.

"Japan would like the European nations to believe that her real ambitions lie in Manchuria. That is a delusion. She will, eventually, advance southwards from the rich and impregnable base of the Amur, with a persistence and ruthlessness that we have hardly begun to understand.

"China, after the ferment has worked itself out, will return to the old system. There will be fewer provinces. They will be even more independent and more powerful than of yore. . . . India likewise will settle down exhausted into

several independent dominions, under the British-Indian central government, while the native states may attain more independence than they at present possess. . . . The future of Asia lies with China rather than in India.

"In the not distant future there will be a powerful Japanese Empire, firmly entrenched on the mainland, with access to the heart of China in the Yangtze waterway."

On the problem of India and the impending separation of India and Burma he has much to say of profound interest and some things that are new.

"To account for the Asiatic imperialism of the Chinese on geographical grounds is not to discount it. There it remains, the imperialist spirit, the will to impose their culture on inferior peoples. No Indian race has ever held such doctrines. There is no Pan-Indian movement: the Indians are tolerant of all races except of each other, but the Moslems have tasted supreme power, have ruled a continent—the Hindus have not."

But it is not fair to quote further from the most suggestive, and in certain respects the best informed, book of its kind that has appeared of recent years. It deserves the fullest publicity and the most careful reading, if only as an antidote to the facile and superficial optimism of Sir Frederick Whyte on "The Future of East and West," and the pontifical views of Mr. Lionel Curtis in "The Capital Question of China."

A. T. W.

The Future of East and West. By Sir Frederick Whyte, K.C.S.I. 74' x 5'. Pp. 180. Sidgwick and Jackson. 3s. 6d.

"There is a profound diversity of ethical substance which cannot be truly appreciated by any of the usual standards of comparison; and it may be surmised that much of the misunderstanding between Asiatic and European arises from the Western propensity to prejudge the issue by approaching it with an assurance of superiority. Colour, for instance, is often the seeming badge of inferiority. . . . If colour were the only obstacle it would be surmounted. Outside the Anglo-Saxon world colour prejudice rarely prevents the marriage of brown and white, and only, so far as I am aware, in the United States and in British India is the offspring of such a union regarded as a pariah. I would go further and deprecate the use of the word *colour* altogether, for in modern controversy it has become synonymous with *inferiority*."

I quote one of Sir Frederick Whyte's forceful truisms in this masterly record of present problems in the East and Far East. This is a book to be read and re-read to-day. Delightful in style and convincing in every conclusion, I can conceive of no series of lectures more appropriate to contemporary politics. First we have "The Unchanging East Awakes," from which I take the above quotation; second, "India, the Central Battleground"; third, "The Revolution in China"; fourth, "Japan, the Janus of Asia"; fifth, "The Future: Appeasement or Conflict?" I visualize and hear Sir Frederick delivering these five lectures himself, allowing thirty-five to forty minutes out of the allotted lecture hour for questions. He is one of the best speakers I have ever heard anywhere. I can hear him explaining with complete conviction how in his view "political difficulties . . . often arise from failure to appreciate differences of culture and mentality which lie deep in the ages of history." His outlook throughout is realistic, and one of robust, sane sympathy. "These two" (the East and West)—to quote is irresistible—are the poles on which the world revolves, and unless the axis of their movement is stable the globe itself cannot turn in orderly progress." And then

again it is so pre-eminently true that "we shall neither understand the character of this apparent change in the East, nor be able to guess the probable effects on the world as a whole, unless we know something of the events and forces which wrought it." How many and who of us know anything of the definite truth of the events and forces which have affected, if not India, then China, or Manchuria, Japan, and Korea in the last twenty years? I have always found it difficult in the extreme, if not impossible, to be intelligently interested in the happenings, much less in the political history or constitutional events, of any country or portion of the world where I have not actually been and observed and learnt something for myself from personal knowledge from, and of, the people on the spot. Even a month or two in Hongkong, a day in a secluded Buddhist retreat inland from Kowloon, a trip across to Macao or Amoy; and before and after a few days by Japanese ship from Moji to Dairen and Port Arthur—days spent in Seoul, Korea, and Mukden—even such superficial journeys brought me contacts which introduced to me, and have forced me ever since to read and learn everything possible about, places and people formerly vaguely known to me only as names on the map.

Referring to the "geographical expression Asia," Sir Frederick aptly says: "If the traveller brings with him the preconceived notion of unity . . . he will soon relinquish it and find the chief source of fascination of Eastern sojourn in the inexhaustible variety, diversity, and contrasts of Asia. . . . Asia is, indeed, a 'house of many mansions.' Within it the three worlds of the Hindoo, the Musulman, the Mongol are more widely sundered than any of the nations of Europe. . . ." Why does everyone else still persist in writing Moslem or even Muslim?

It is a book so carefully and delightfully phrased, and so comprehensive and so closely written, with such real understanding and all the appreciation of a sympathetic and trained observer and statesman, that none but a most favourable commendation is possible.

Perhaps—and I may be wrong, and it may be because Sir Frederick did not have the same opportunities in Japan as he obviously had in China and India—if there is any bias to be noticed at all it weighs slightly against Japan. I sense this because I know Japan so much better than I do China, and at any rate Japan is, after all, a minute and united national entity as compared with the teeming and diverse peoples and areas which comprise China. In my two years I was probably able to get closer contact with all classes of Japanese expressing a sufficiently wide variety of views to learn something more about Japan than would have been possible in the same time and with the same opportunities in any unit of China.

Sir Frederick deals with the present and future problems of the East with remarkable and unerring precision, and covers almost every possible aspect of the problem, ranging his analysis from anthropological origins, historical relations, and geographical and religious thoughts and outlook, to the exclusion of Asiatics from America. To quote again: "And so deeply was the insult of exclusion felt that one distinguished (Japanese) friend of mine has since refused to set foot on American soil. The American policy was enacted with a ruthless disregard of Asiatic feelings . . . it must be acknowledged that the attitude of the Japanese Government under this provocation was beyond praise." And similar praise in my view is due to Japan on the attitude she has taken up in regard to the Lytton Report.

I strongly recommend this little volume to all concerned, whether student or politician or publicist, and most of all to commercial men and industrialists whose interests happen to lie in the East and Far East.

the subject is obviously not one that lends itself to light treatment, we can honestly recommend the chapters on "The F.O. School of Thought" and "Geneva and the Far East" as sheer delights. Here the author of that classical work *Houseboat Days in China* (one of those books no man should lend even to his best friend, as this reviewer knows to his cost) is at his best, and Mr. Bland's best is *hors concours*. Once again he deals faithfully with his hereditary enemies, the British Foreign Office, and setting up Secretaries of State and Heads of Departments like a row of ninepins he bowls them over right merrily. The extracts from correspondence with that austere department ending with the classic sentence, "The Secretary of State has nothing to add to the information furnished to you in earlier letters," brings back to many of us fragrant memories of bygone days. We should add that we use the word "enemies" in this connection in a strictly "Pickwickian sense," because we cannot imagine that Mr. Bland has enemies among those who know him. To these so-called enemies has now been added for chastisement a "coterie of doctrinaires" hailing from Chatham House (a list of their names is given to avoid misunderstanding) and down they go too, to keep the "closet philosophers" in Whitehall company. But we need waste no tears for they are well able to look after themselves!

For the League of Nations—except within certain well-defined limits of usefulness—Mr. Bland has little good to say, and many will agree with his estimate of their somewhat hasty and ill-advised interference in Far Eastern politics. As he points out, the spectacle of the present head of the Irish Free State solemnly lecturing China and Japan on the subject of the sanctity of covenants and treaties is a *reductio ad absurdum*, of which even the "pacific intellectuals" of Geneva must be painfully conscious.

This book, as we have said before, most certainly deserves to be read by all who would understand the position in the Far East as it is today, whether they agree with Mr. Bland's views or not. As far as we are concerned, while differing with Mr. Bland in some of his major conclusions, we can agree most heartily with all that he says about, for instance, the failure of the Kuo Min Tang party to set up a government more suited to the needs of the country and people than of their former Manchu rulers; the foolish and often disastrous attempts of Young China to run before they can walk; the childish and vicious excesses of the student movement; and the fears of China's "going Bolshevik"—all matters in regard to which Mr. Bland shows, if we may say so, a clear insight into the many problems with which China's rulers are now confronted.

We would draw special attention to the chapter on the Manchurian question, in which Mr. Bland presents a vivid sketch of the two litigants now before the bar of the League of Nations, and while inclining, perhaps naturally, to the Japanese side, points out the risk they are running in their Manchurian adventure of losing the substance of their valuable trade with China for the sake of the reflection of future expansion in Asia.

May we venture to suggest, in conclusion, that a decade or more having now elapsed—unless we are mistaken—since Mr. Bland paid his last visit to China, and seeing how quickly events are moving in that ancient Empire, he would be well advised to take another trip to the Far East and "check up" the views and impressions recorded in this book? We think the Chinese Government might do worse than pay the expenses of the journey of so candid a critic—shall we say, out of the Boxer Indemnity? And if he has time to visit old Peking and chances to meet one Edmund Backhouse, with whom he once collaborated in a book entitled *China under the Empress Dowager*, who knows

that the world may not be richer by a new and revised version of that famous work, in which the views of a confirmed optimist and an inveterate pessimist shall be nicely blended as in some chest of choice Soochong?

HARRY H. FOX.

Economic Rivalries in China. By GEORGE CLARK. 9" x 6½". Pp. 132. Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1932. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 11s.

In this book the author has attempted to give some account of the early contacts of "foreigners" with China, of the economic activities which followed on these contacts, and of the rivalries which developed from these activities; the competition at first being between the "foreigners" themselves only—China taking no part in it—but later, owing to the "tendency toward Chinese predominance in the modernized life of China," between China on the one side and the "foreigners," as a whole, on the other. But the "picture"—to use the author's own term for his work—is without "background"—the background of some description of the actual conditions and realities in the midst of which the "foreigners" pursued their activities—with the result that these activities, as presented, are, more often than not, thrown into an entirely false perspective. For instance, on page 100, it is stated that "modern Western trade with China was opened by the use of arms." But no account whatever is given of the degrading conditions, in those early days at Canton, to which all foreigners were subjected and which induced the British, who, in the words of H. B. Morse, "as had been the rule from the outset, bore the brunt of the battle in securing the rights of the West," eventually to resort to the "use of arms," the issue at stake being, in the words of Dr. Hawks Potts, "a struggle between the *ancient* East and West, the East refusing to treat in terms of equality—diplomatically or commercially—with Western nations, and the West insisting on its right to be so treated." These conditions rendered necessary, so it appeared to the American Commissioner in China*—the application of the principles of extra-territoriality—established by the American Treaty of 1844—and from extra-territoriality came the system of "Foreign Settlements" in the Treaty Ports, to which, presumably, the author refers as "bits of Chinese territory staked out by foreigners for their own use" (p. 3). In some cases, too, events are alluded to in the most inadequate manner, all reference to important facts having a very considerable bearing on them being omitted, with the result that definitely wrong impressions are liable to be gained by the uninformed reader.

For example, the author refers (p. 4) to the "Boxer Uprising" of 1900 as being "in essence an attempt to recreate the economic self-sufficiency" with which China had formerly been satisfied, and says that "foreign guns smashed this effort." H. B. Morse,† however, describes the "Boxer Uprising" as a "vague but aimless rising" . . . a "mad outburst" which "properly failed." And no mention is made by the author of the necessity which compelled foreign troops to "smash" their way through Boxer hordes to the relief of the beleaguered Legations in Peking!

Again, although in his reference to the "Battle of the Concessions," the author mentions the fact that "Americans had kept aloof" (p. 23), he does not

* *Modern Chinese History*, by H. F. MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, Chicago University.

† *Trade and Administration of China*, by H. B. Morse.

refer to the British attitude, concerning which Professor MacNair says: "England was opposed to the disintegration of the Chinese Empire, but was powerless, unless she resorted to actual warfare, to avert the changes. England's policy had always been . . . one of equal opportunities for all." Professor MacNair also records "that the lease of Weihaiwei was offered to England by China; that this offer was at first refused, but later accepted on account of the danger of Russian pressure on Peking." And here it may be noted, with regard to the "Open Door" policy (p. 21), that while it is true that this policy was officially "proposed" to the European Powers by the American Secretary of State, in September, 1899, the policy of the "Open Door" was of British and not of American origin. For, more than a year earlier, in May, 1898, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, in a speech delivered at Birmingham, had publicly announced the British policy in China to be, as it always had been—that of the "Open Door" and "equal opportunities for all."

Mr. Grover Clark's knowledge of his subject does not appear to be very deep, and many of his opinions seem to have been formed from too hasty a study of his "authorities."

J. S.

Land and Labour in China. By R. H. Tawney. 8½" x 5½". Pp. 207. Allen and Unwin. 1932. 7s. 6d.

A newcomer, whose mental equipment qualifies him to form a sympathetic and discriminating opinion, may be a better judge of Chinese conditions and offer a clearer diagnosis of Chinese needs than one who has spent long years in contact with a single aspect of the country's life. Mr. Tawney realizes the immense gulf which separates, in material and perhaps also in spiritual relations, the undifferentiated and unprogressive mass of the villagers from the Chinese townsmen and intelligentsia who have so hurriedly been modernized by foreign education or by economic circumstances and whose mind is consequently a medley of the old and the new. Away from the coast and the main commercial routes, the peasant lives on a tiny holding of five or ten acres, scattered in patches all around his villages, uses no cattle or machines, and produces several crops a year by the untiring labour of his own body and that of his households. Famine, flood, or bandits may destroy him and everything that he has, but China thinks in centuries where Europe thinks in decades; the deserted land is re-occupied and the void is filled. A life of poverty and struggle, of contentment or resignation, of multiplication and early death: such is the picture which Mr. Tawney's study presents to a Western reader. And since "political organization rests on economic foundations," a government which is to remain stable under the pressure of international forces will only be evolved by continued and steady work, on a thoughtful plan, for improvement of the ordinary Chinese citizen's livelihood and happiness. Fine laws have been passed but are not in force, because the guiding principle of the olden Chinese administrators is still to avoid conflicts by permitting the evasion of the law. Mr. Tawney's advice is that foreign experts be employed to train competent and conscientious civil servants, who will set to work to carry out the law, and to administer efficiently the new apparatus of railways, factories, etc., with which China is providing herself.

Emigration is only a partial remedy. The overflow into Manchuria, great as it has been, makes a slight impression on the four hundred or four hundred and fifty millions of China. Birth control is contrary to all Chinese tradition

and unlikely to be adopted; but Mr. Tawney may have underrated the prejudice which birth control has overcome in the West, and may yet see a great and sudden change in Asia. Even industrialization is limited to the accessible regions and takes for the most part the form of small workshops rather than great factories. The right line of advance, he believes, is through the improvement of communications and transport, which will render possible the production and sale of agricultural produce from the remoter provinces, will convey enlightenment to the people and facilitate the task of government. Co-operative organization will assist the peasant and the small craftsman to buy and sell on fairer terms, while trade unions and the enforcement of factory laws will prevent the underpayment of industrial labour from pressing down the already low standard of life in the villages.

Mr. Tawney, very rightly, propounds no thesis. His book is based on a memorandum drawn up for the Pacific Institute, and intended to provide material for discussion rather than a solid conclusion. It is full of suggestive matter, in which many of the unsatisfactory and slipshod articles in Chinese periodicals have been usefully summed up. If there is a general weakness in the treatment, it is perhaps that Mr. Tawney reckons in sub-continent and provinces where the critical area is the village. When civil servants have been made honest and efficient and education is concerned with Chinese conditions and requirements, when law and order have been established and communications opened up with the interior, who then is to adjust to the tiny rural unit the new knowledge of the West, so far as it is applicable at all? Not the National Economic Council at the apex, nor the civil servant in his busy office; there must be some unofficial agency to serve as the intermediary between the people and the State. It may be a village council, a rural community council in each district, or a group of social and moral no less than economic co-operative societies, linked to a Federation, prudently guided and keenly audited. For lack of direct administrative experience in the East, Mr. Tawney perhaps is not aware of the gulf which suddenly yawns as the official reformer approaches the village. It would, however, be ungracious to make too much of a lacuna in an otherwise excellent and reflective study.

C. F. S.

The Co-operative Movement in India. By Eleanor M. Hough. With an Introduction by Sir Horace Plunkett. Foreword by Professor Kaji. 9" x 5½". Pp. xxvii + 340. P. S. King. 15s.

At the moment when political power is passing into the hands of Indians, a review of the most beneficial of all activities (other than the establishment and maintenance of peace) undertaken by the British Government in India is peculiarly appropriate. The increased wealth secured to the people by roads, railways, and canals is unquestioned, but brings no happiness if it is swallowed up by the moneylender. The benefits which an improvement of agriculture, education, and wealth will confer upon the masses are immense, but the offer of these advantages is useless if the small cultivator, the labourer, and the artisan are too spiritless and disorganized to accept them. It is for this reason that the introduction of co-operation in India was due to a policy of government rather than to a popular demand, and Dr. Hough, whose thorough and discerning account of the movement is the best which has yet appeared, quotes the slightly unfavourable comment of Sir Horace Plunkett on this difference between India and Europe.

She notes, however, that India is not alone in this policy. An examination of the co-operative organization in Japan, Siam, British Malaya, and Ceylon would show an equally strong official interest, and where in Asia (Java, Philippine Islands, China) Government control has been either lacking or ill-adjusted, the consequences have not been fortunate.

The contributors to the first Co-operative Year Book of India, edited by Professor Kaji, represent for the most part the "de-officializing" view, and there can be no doubt that further steps in this direction will be taken. The pace of the change ought to depend on the competence of the unofficial unions and organizers which will replace the official staff, and on the capacity of the co-operators, especially in the villages, to manage their societies without continual supervision and advice. Dr. Hough at all events realizes that an immediate withdrawal of Government is impossible, and points to the collapse of Burma, and the weaknesses in several British provinces and Indian States as evidence of the need for further training and guidance.

The "policy" was adopted on account of the urgent need for rural reconstruction. In the beginning the relief of debt was the main object in view, and the Act of 1904 provided for credit societies only. A few years' experience proved that a much wider vision should be used, and the Act of 1912 contemplates every type of co-operative body. Nevertheless, so heavy is the debt-burden, so paralyzing its influence on the minds of the villagers and the poorer classes of the towns, that until it has been lightened, until at least the possibility of eventually shaking it off is grasped by the debtor's mind, he will make no genuine effort to raise his standard of living, to alter his methods of cultivation or craftsmanship, to educate his children or protect his family's health. It is consequently unusual to find in India rural societies of sale and purchase or urban stores (the predominant forms of co-operation in Europe and America) except where co-operative credit has made substantial progress in strengthening the character of the borrower and broadening his outlook; and for the same reason the "moral" or indirectly economic co-operative societies of India—societies of compulsory arbitration, of compulsory education, of health precautions, of thrift and better living—possess a particular significance and convey India's message to the co-operative world. Professor Kaji and his colleagues, being themselves resident in the country, grasp this fact more fully than Dr. Hough, whose tour and study, though prolonged, were directed towards the winning of an American degree. The Indian problem, which is for the most part a rural problem, will not be solved by a single organization or a single Government department. The problem is one of rural reconstruction in the fullest sense, which calls for the co-ordination of every agency in a concerted attack on rural evils. The function of co-operation, as an indispensable partner in this alliance, is to prepare the minds of the people to receive new ideas, shaking off their apathy and giving them hope, and then to create a framework, a local group of thoughtful men and women who will listen to the agricultural expert, the schoolmaster, and the doctor, and interpret their strange sayings to the less open-minded members of the village. Education, not economic gain, is the first aim of the organizer in India, but his definition of the term is very wide.

The actual achievement up to date, though imposing in its figures, is only a fraction of the whole task. Dr. Hough appends tables of 1930 (those slow wheels of government!) which show more than 100,000 societies, over 4,000,000 members, and a capital of £75,000,000—no mean result of twenty-five years' work in an illiterate country. Yet not all these societies are exemplary, nor all

these members free from debt or loyal to their marketing societies; Professor Kaji's Year Book is full of zealous and somewhat optimistic proposals for the removal of such defects. Thousands more of credit societies have to be created, and the marketing field is scarcely touched. Consumers' societies, with the fine exception of Triplicane, are a failure. No great blame attaches to the organizing staff, official or unofficial; there have been errors and setbacks, but the road is long and the hill steep. The danger, on the contrary, is that of impatience and haste. Mortgage banks are tempting, but will the villager repay a twenty-year loan, even if he can? The experiment is being tried. Professor Kaji argues for the "multiple" society, doing all the co-operative business of the village, instead of a number of specialized societies for different objects, and Dr. Hough is prepared to follow him to some extent. The world's experience goes the other way, and it looks as though the multiple society was an enthusiast's short-cut. What is really needed is patience and hard work on lines proved to be sound. Legislation can do little. Publicity of moneylenders' accounts will be helpful, but legal limitation of the rate of interest is never effective. Regulation of markets and of weights and measures is good, if the Inspector cannot be squared. Character and understanding is at the root of the problem, and Dr. Hough knows this better than some of the Year Book writers. Men cannot be made thrifty or wealthy or intelligent, but they may be encouraged so to make themselves, and the best of all stimuli for the simple man, living in a narrow community, is the opinion of his neighbours, linked together in mutual support for a common object. It is this support and this stimulus which the co-operative society lends to the Indian peasant, and if Nationalist India will rein in the reforming hotheads and refuse to build an economic top-storey until the foundation of character is firm, she will be justified in her co-operative policy.

C. F. S.

Review of Rural Welfare Activities in India, 1932. By C. F. Strickland, C.I.E. With a Preface by Sir Francis Younghusband and a Foreword by the Lady Irwin. Post 8vo. Pp. 58. Oxford University Press, London: Humphrey Milford, 1932. 1s. 6d. net.

This little pamphlet is packed full of information, invaluable to those who wish to know what is being done to make life brighter and healthier for the Indian peasant as well as by practical methods showing him the way to improve his land and such rural industries as bee-keeping, chicken farming, and egg production.

Details gleaned from Government departments, unofficial organizations, and individuals are here tabulated and the work carried out in the different provinces reviewed.

As is only natural in such varied conditions as prevail in rural India, the methods in different provinces vary very considerably, and the success achieved is not always equal, but the facts and information gathered by Mr. Strickland should have the effect of encouraging those whose efforts have not been crowned with so much success to try for the greater co-ordination of others more successful.

Mr. Strickland rightly lays special stress on the work in all departments being so arranged that collapse does not follow the withdrawal of any one individual.

The Indian Village Welfare Association is doing much useful work in bring-

ing home to people in England what is being done for the peasant class in India and the crying need for such work, and this pamphlet, published under their auspices, will do much to further their object.

C. FRASER.

Land of the Gold Mohur. By Lady Lowther. Illustrated. Pp. 231. London: Philip Allan. 1932.

A diary kept at the time, supplemented by vivid memories of places and people visited, go to make up the account here given of the author's two months in India.

But this is not all; Lady Lowther went to India equipped with a knowledge and appreciation of Eastern architecture, which make her descriptions of mosques, temples, and palaces interesting as well as delightful.

The personalities she met, English and Indian, and her keen and at times amusing accounts of her interviews with them are entertaining reading.

In Bombay, Delhi, and Calcutta she was a guest at Government House, and her sightseeing was done under the most favourable auspices, but it is the keen enjoyment she took in every little detail of a new and strange land that most strikes the reader.

Three native States—Bhopal, Udaipur, and Jaipur—give an opportunity for her descriptive powers, and she does full justice to the fairy-like palaces of Udaipur in its quaint mediæval setting, the picturesque Amber, the old capital of Jaipur, with Galtā, and its many temples and monkeys. Ellora and Ajanta are well described, the latter chapter, by the way, being a reprint from the *National Review*. To one who has himself visited these scenes this book brings back delightful memories and to those not so fortunate it will bring up a vivid picture of that land of Romance.

The photographic illustrations are unusually good.

C. F.

The 'Iraq Levies, 1915-1932. By Brigadier J. Gilbert Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O. 10" x 7½". Pp. 88. Two illustrations and three maps. Published by Royal United Service Institution.

AN APPRECIATION

The 'Iraq Levies need no introduction to members of the Royal Central Asian Society, for no writer on recent events in the Middle East has omitted to mention their splendid work, and no traveller who has journeyed through the land over which the Levies have kept watch and ward has failed to pay them tribute. Within the short space of seventeen years this small unit has in its own small way and within its restricted sphere added a page to our military story. That being so, it is only right and fitting that their last Commander, Brigadier J. Gilbert Browne, should have published their Regimental History under the title of *The 'Iraq Levies*.

Here, then, is their story from the days of 1915, when first they came into being. In that year Major Eadie of the Indian Army recruited forty mounted Arabs from around Nasiriya for duty under "M.I." That little force of forty men was built up into a Levy Brigade, 6,199 strong in 1922. They have served under various names, Mounted Arabs, Mounted Guards, Shabana, Muntafiq Horse and Militia, until in 1919 they became Levies.

But whether recruited from Arabs of the marsh lands, or Arabs of the sown land, or with Yezidis, or Turkomans, or Assyrians, this unit of all sorts and kinds of men, different in religion and of varying political impulse, have nevertheless been dominated by two ideals: first, an intense loyalty to their British officer, and secondly, a loyalty to what in some indefinable sense we still can only call the British Raj. Right or wrong, this type of man "falls in" and asks no questions. It is no new phenomenon. You found, and one hopes we still find, the same spirit in India in spite of everything—no doubt we do. You get it in the King's African Rifles and in the Royal West African Frontier Force, and doubtless in every other force officered by the type of young man the Army sends out to command. There it is: one word, loyalty, to somebody, to some ideal, which lies at the back of the mind of these men. They will go anywhere with their officer. And they will stand being howled at in the market-place. Their families may be in danger—often are, in fact. They stick it out. And thank heaven, if any harm has come to their kith and kin, they take it out of the other side in the end.

Fortunately the rabble has a glimmering of what may befall in the long run, when the tide turns, and behaves like the yelping cur it always is.

And so in the course of his story the Brigadier tells of rebellion and constant small wars; and always he has to talk of brave deeds done by brave men. As an instance there was that little affair around Koi Sanjak in September, 1922, when the losses of the column were twenty-seven killed and thirty-two wounded. In May, 1927, Hookcol was attacked at Waliawa. One C.Q.M.S., Baitu, early on was wounded and taken off to the ambulance. Would he stay there? He belonged to the Levies! He escaped from the ambulance and went on with his fighting. There is no purpose here in showing how the Force developed from its small beginning until it became a composite force, with horse, foot, and artillery, together with its own administrative services, medical, veterinary, and ordnance. There was no organized Chaplain's Department in this conglomeration of Muslims, Early Christians, fire-worshippers, devil-dodgers, but if you wanted to find a bishop you had only to look about among the mulattos and you might easily find one.

Of recent years, of course, the Levies have chiefly been heard of and talked about in connection with the Assyrians. No one could assert that these strangers from over the Turkish border have been popular in Iraq. They arrived as refugees in 1918.

One of the Assyrian characteristics, it is to be feared, is to allow someone else to do the spade work for him; but when it was suggested turning them into soldiers, after they had seen there was no "catch" in it, they tumbled to it heartily. And certain tribesmen definitely made good soldiers. So long as what Brigadier Browne so aptly terms the "electric hare" could be produced for them to chase, they were splendid fellows. They enjoyed fighting and chasing Kurds up and down hill. Sheikh Mahmud for years acted as the electric hare for the Levies and many a good meeting have they had. They caught it, in fact, several times, but each time the management beat bounds off. It might have been most unwise to have let them tear it to pieces.

Never mind, the crowd has gone home; the lights are slowly being put out. The electric hare has been put away.

Even the duplicate, Achmer, that Holy Man of Barzan, now lives in peace and contemplation in Istanbul. The long dogs, the short dogs, all sorts of them have gone to kennel or been disbanded and given a bit of land here and there. And those of the Assyrians who have forgotten how to till the land or

tend the vine drive taxi-cabs in Baghdad or lorries for the oil company. Iraq is now a land of peace. Law and order extend from the Khabur to the Gulf and from Beri Bidan to Deir-az-Zor or to the new geographic line.

King Feisal has many men to thank for his security and for the coming prosperity of his land. He cannot and will not forget the Levies. But they were Imperial Troops, remember. What remain still are, but the Levies as a unit has closed down. Another name—it does not matter what it is—"The Air Defence Force," has come into being. But the tradition and the spirit of the Levies remain. Brigadier Browne has done his work well. The book is very well got up in a khaki-coloured binding, with the two blue stripes representing the two great rivers of the Plain—the Levy colours, that is—running from corner to corner across it.

The style of his writing is soldierly, clear, and concise in statement; no frills or furbelows. It is a worthy addition to regimental history.

D. S.

Baghdad Sketches. By Freya Stark. Illustrated by E. N. Prescott. Pp. 132. The Times Press, Ltd. Baghdad. 1932.

The authoress went to Baghdad, where she lived for a while in the depths of the native quarter. She quickly made herself at home with her neighbours, entered into the life of the city, and even attended the Government school for girls in order to improve her Arabic; later she visited various parts of Iraq and saw something of the tribesmen in their own surroundings. She now gives us the record of her observations in a series of delightful, entertaining, and vivid little sketches. In one picture we are shown the apparently overwhelming advantages of being in the fashion in politics; the modern system of education too is thrown on the screen—the system which seemingly deliberately sets itself to produce lawyers, politicians, and journalists in great numbers, although there is not nearly enough work for them all, with the result that they naturally turn to political agitation for an outlet. The passing of the old order has not escaped the authoress's notice. She recognizes the inevitableness of the displacement of the feudal chief by the town-bred effendi, and she discerns in this one of the causes of Britain's difficulties and misunderstandings of late years. The administrators of our empire, she says, had many points of contact with the tribal chieftain; the reign of the effendi is a new thing and it is not to be wondered at that we now and then have hitches in dealing with it. In Oriental cities sanitation or the lack of it plays an important part; the sketch concerning Smells deals with this delicate subject in amusing fashion. The book has twelve delightful illustrations by E. N. Prescott, and is well worth reading.

E. A.

Grey Wolf: Mustafa Kemal. An Intimate Study of a Dictator. By N. C. Armstrong. 9" x 5½". Barker, Ltd. London. 1932.

Grey Wolf is described on the title page as an intimate study of a Dictator, and the sub-title reveals his identity as "Mustapha Kemal." The outside of the cover is adorned with a terrifying caricature of Mustapha Kemal, while on the frontispiece one is permitted to gaze on the classic features of Captain Armstrong himself, as he revealed himself to Mr. Augustus John, R.A.

On the back of the cover is a fantastic enumeration of the alleged achievements

of Mustapha Kemal, which will certainly not bear scrutiny. It is quite untrue to say that Mustapha Kemal overthrew the Sultan. He was certainly on the staff of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, during the historic march from Salonica to Constantinople, but his part in the Revolution of 1908, which preceded the downfall of Abdul Hamid II., was quite insignificant; nor was it until 1920, during the Allied occupation of Constantinople, that Mustapha Kemal found his opportunity.

It is now a matter of history that, on being sent to Eastern Asia Minor to occupy the official position of Inspector, he seized the opportunity thus afforded for turning the tables upon his country's enemies, and ultimately liberating the soil of Turkey from the power of the invader.

If *Grey Wolf* were described as a political novel, or romance, based upon the career of Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Captain Armstrong's brilliant narrative would silence criticism; but he claims to be an authority on Turkey, and a historian, and, from this point of view, he fails.

The book is too redolent of sensation-mongering to be taken seriously. While, here and there, it is slashed with unnecessary and most unpleverent details, which add nothing whatever to the interest of the story or the force of the argument.

Amongst the sensational achievements enumerated on the back of the volume we are told that the Dictator "battered the British Empire off Gallipoli." Now, the withdrawal from Gallipoli was undoubtedly an acknowledgment of failure on the part of Great Britain. This strategic movement, however, corresponded with no victorious advance on the part of the Turks, nor did it prevent the ultimate defeat of Turkey.

The final statement that Mustapha Kemal has made "out of a crumbling Empire a nation," is also an exaggeration of language.

Similarly, the paragraph on the last page of the book shows the tendency to extravagance of utterance which mars the entire book. "He is Dictator" (we are told). "The future lies in his strong hands. If they fail, grow flabby, tremble, if though strong to destroy they cannot build, then Turkey dies."

Language such as this carries with it its own condemnation.

The Turkish Republic and its President are the creation of a combination of circumstances which bear a certain resemblance to the events which brought about the fall of Constantinople and the defeat of Constantine, the last Emperor of the Greeks, by Mohammed the Conqueror.

Unfortunately the Allied occupation of Constantinople was not characterized by the magnanimity displayed by the Turkish Conqueror. As soon as he had established himself in the city of Constantine, Mohammed II. guaranteed the Greek Patriarch in all his privileges, and from 1453 until the Great War, Mass according to the rites and ceremonies of the Orthodox Church continued to be celebrated, under the protection of the Caliph of Islam, in the city of Constantinople.

It is more than doubtful if the Armistice of Mudros gave the Allies any right to occupy Smyrna and Constantinople in the manner actually adopted. Any such occupation was only to be undertaken for the express purpose (should necessity arise) of protecting life and property.

We know what happened at Smyrna.

At Constantinople the Allied occupation can only be described as a combination of abuse of authority and paralysis of power, culminating in a melancholy display of impotence when the final evacuation was undertaken in circumstances as ignominious as the original occupation had been futile and unjustifiable.

The depths of infamy were plumbed when influences (whose origin it will not do to investigate) were brought, by the Christian Powers of Europe, to bear

upon the Moslem Ulema, to procure the Fetva of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, pronouncing Mustapha Kemal an outlaw.

It was this crowning blunder that sealed the triumph of the Dictator of Turkey, and enabled him to come down like a whirlwind, finally sweeping away Sultanate, Caliphate, and everything else that could in any way recall the accursed system to which he was determined to put an end.

Captain Armstrong's book is disappointing because he fails utterly to appreciate the true significance of the events with which he is dealing.

Mustapha Kemal is a mere incident.

The future of Turkey depends almost as much upon the policy of Great Britain, at this juncture, as upon the Dictator himself, who must shortly discover (if he has not already done so) that the consolidation of his power is only possible by means of trade; and that, in that consolidation, the revival of the age-long commercial relations between Turkey and Great Britain must necessarily bear an important part.

Grey Wolf bears traces of having been rushed through the press at lightning speed, in order to ensure its being in the hands of the public while Mustapha Kemal was still in the limelight.

The author is the victim of his own facility in writing. In a series of brilliant word-pictures he carries his dazzled, not to say bewildered, readers along with him, until it is almost impossible to believe that Captain Armstrong himself did not personally participate, or at least personally witness, the scenes that his vivid imagination so graphically describes.

Further editions of the book are already announced, so that an opportunity will doubtless be taken to correct the numerous mistakes to be found in the original publication.

Captain Armstrong is very anxious to justify his account of an interview (in the Hotel Adlon in Berlin) between Mustapha Kemal and Prince "Vaheddin."

The name of this Prince (afterwards Sultan) is, however, "Vahid-ed-Din."

Such a mistake as this would give cause for astonishment but for numerous other even more egregious blunders to be found in the text. One does not wish to make too much of mere misprints or printers' errors. On page 90, however, we read of the humble home in the "rue de la Aqueralla in Bechiktash," where the mother and sister of Mustapha Kemal lived "on the hills behind the city."

Where the "rue de la Aqueralla" may be future editions will doubtless inform us. Bechiktash, however, is one of the best-known suburbs of Constantinople. It lies on the shore of the Bosphorus, at the foot of the hill leading to the Yildiz Kiosk, and in the immediate vicinity of Dolma Bagtche Palace. How such a place comes to be described as "on the hills behind Constantinople" it is not easy to understand.

A more serious mistake, arguing carelessness or ignorance of a surprising character, is the description (on page 246) of the Aga Khan as an Indian Sunni Moslem. Now the Aga Khan (one of the best-known figures in English Society) is a direct descendant of the Prophet, through Ali, who married Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. He is revered as the sacerdotal head of the Shiah sect of Moslems; and to describe him as a Sunni is equivalent to describing the Archbishop of Canterbury as a Roman Catholic or a Dissenter.

Notwithstanding much that requires readjustment and correction, *Grey Wolf* shows the author to possess gifts which he might well turn to account in a manner which might be of use to the future relations of Great Britain and Turkey.

This question causes grave concern to many serious students of our international relations.

The historian of the "Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire" has yet to appear. It may well be that Captain Armstrong possesses qualifications fitting him for the part.

He must, however, restrain his weakness for sensation; chain the lightning; verify his surmises and (above all) have recourse to original sources for his facts.

Only in this way can he hope to be taken seriously as a historian.

In a single sentence he must strenuously avoid the methods of Edgar Wallace if he aspires to emulate the fame of Edward Gibbon.

PHILIP C. SARBELL.

The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development. By

A. J. Wensinck, Professor of Arabic in the University of Leiden. 8½" x 5½".

Pp. vii + 304. Cambridge University Press. 1932. 15s. net.

Although "Creed" and "Faith" are often used as synonyms, Professor Wensinck's treatise bears little resemblance to Sell's *Faith of Islam* and similar works, of which several have recently appeared. More than half is occupied with translation of and commentary on three collections of "articles of religion" ascribed to Abu Hanifah (ob. 150 A.H.), of which the first is regarded by the Professor as embodying Abu Hanifah's real opinions, whereas the others have little claim to genuineness. To these collections there is prefixed an introduction sketching the history of Islamic theology, and there is appended a chapter dealing with later developments. The writer's profound acquaintance with Islamic Tradition, of which he has compiled a Concordance, is exhibited throughout the work.

Extreme simplicity is indeed claimed for the Muslim symbol, which consists of two propositions, but the implications of those propositions proved by no means simple, and presently gave rise to whole groups of theological and metaphysical systems. The views of those who gave their names to sects are mainly known from the works of controversialists or heresiologues, of which several have recently been made accessible; implicit reliance cannot indeed be placed on their statements, which, however, enable us to estimate the subtlety and variety of the doctrines adopted. Some Islamic authors suppose that metaphysical theology was deliberately introduced into Islam by unwilling converts, who hoped thereby to ruin the new religion. Similarly the Caliph who organized the translation of Greek literature into Arabic is said to have been warned of the disastrous effect which this enterprise would have on Islam. It is indeed likely that difficulties which had arisen in the development of Christian theology were suggested to Muslims in their intercourse with Christians; Professor Wensinck has called attention to many remarkable parallels in the speculations of the two communities. Yet it would seem that the foreign philosophy was rather called in to aid in the settlement of difficulties which had arisen spontaneously than that it was the source of those difficulties. Fakhr al-din al-Razi found that the opening Surah of the Qur'an, of seven clauses, suggested no fewer than 10,000 questions.

The number of Articles of Religion which ultimately formed the content of orthodoxy did not reach anything like that number; the collections which Professor Wensinck has handled fall short of our own modest thirty-nine. He has shown great ability as well as conspicuous erudition in detecting the heresies against which the articles were directed, in assigning probable periods to the successive formulations of the Creed, and elucidating the opinions associated with the names of the Muslim theologians. His work will be regarded as a very solid and original contribution to its subject.

D. S. M.

The Andaman Islands. By E. H. Man. 9"×6". Pp. xxxii+73. Illustrations and map. First published in 1885. Reprinted, 1932. Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.

Students of anthropology will welcome the appearance of the reprint of this book. Though it may not appeal to a wide circle of readers it retains its position as one of the most reliable works of reference relating to the Andaman Islands and the aboriginal inhabitants of those little-known islands. Their interest will always be great as being the home of one branch of the widely scattered negrito race, a race whose origin is lost in the mists of antiquity.

The Andaman Islands have always possessed a somewhat sinister reputation since the days when they were described by Marco Polo—not from personal experience. Later from their violent storms and consequent danger to shipping, and more recently as the Penal Settlement of the Indian Empire, and the home of the *Anopheles*, or malarial mosquito. In spite of these drawbacks there are many worse stations to-day in the Far East, as the writer can testify. Mr. Man describes the customs, religion, and peculiarities of the Andamanese with meticulous care. There is little to criticize in his preachment of the subject; the plates are good and informative.

The general conclusion is that the Andamanese are a primitive, not unpleasant people when left to themselves. The efforts to bring them closer to civilization have met with little success and their resistance to the diseases of civilization seems to be nil. They have built up a resistance to malaria, however, which is lacking in the case of those foreign to the islands.

One could wish that the book would have a wider public, but there are few people, one fears, who are interested in this little-known corner of the world, and fewer still who have visited it. Perhaps the re-issue of this serious and important work may stimulate some interest.

H. St.C. S.

Twenty Years in Tibet. By David Macdonald. Seeley Service. 18s.

There is a wonderful store of experience and real knowledge in David Macdonald's first book, *The Land of the Lama*. It probably gives the reader a quicker insight into the life and customs of Tibet than any other book on the subject. Everyone who has read it will welcome *Twenty Years in Tibet*.

This book may not be so valuable as a book of reference. It contains more personal and intimate experiences. There are, however, many chapters of absorbing interest, especially those describing the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, and the confidences of the Tashi Lama, now a fugitive in China.

The Dalai Lama's hurried journey, hotly pursued by the Chinese, makes one of the most romantic chapters in modern history. His relief on falling into David Macdonald's hands must have been overwhelming.

Into the small crowded British Agency of Yatung came His Holiness and his followers. A room was hurriedly vacated for him, but realizing the difficulties of accommodation, he insisted on his host sharing it with him. Prayers and religious ceremony proceeded regardless of the Christian onlooker. No other European has been privileged to enjoy such intimacies.

The reason attributed for the Dzungar assault on Samding, the home of Tibet's holiest female incarnation Dorji Phagmo, differs from the belief commonly held in Tibet. The author refers to the Dzungars as Mohammedans, and introduces the dislike of the pig as one reason for attacking Samding; Dorji Phagmo

being the incarnation of the sow-faced goddess. Tibetans assert that the Dzungars were followers of the Yellow Hat doctrine (Gelukpa) and that they were bitterly opposed to the Red Hat sect (Nyingmapa), of which Samding was a stronghold.

David Macdonald's two visits to Lhasa throw interesting light on conditions in that city.

In 1905 he accompanied the Younghusband Expedition. The Dalai Lama fled to China and Chinese Ambans exercised powerful influence in all affairs.

During his second visit with Sir Charles Bell in 1921 he found circumstances greatly changed. The Tibetans had freed themselves from the Chinese yoke, and the Dalai Lama, having accepted our protection in Darjeeling during the upheaval, welcomed Sir Charles Bell and David Macdonald as trusted friends.

The flight of the Tashi Lama and much pertaining to it has been dealt with. Tibet is sorely distressed over the absence of one of her essential godheads. Everyone including the Dalai Lama longs for his return. Without him the spiritual house can never be considered complete.

There is no enmity between the holy men themselves. All the mischief has been caused by attendant officials. The Tashi Lama's return would certainly help to ensure contentment in Central Asia.

There are many descriptions of influential people with whom the author came in contact during his remarkable life in Tibet. The long, smooth tide of descriptions of favours received from and of thanks offered to various Europeans is interesting to those who are personally concerned. One cannot refrain from wishing that the valuable space occupied by all this had been used for further reminiscences of real Tibet. The reader can never tire of these.

David Macdonald's style is simple and sincere. He is the friend of the most influential people in Tibet. He carries the reader with him on his magic carpet across the most enchanting country in the world.

THYRA WEIR.

LHASA,

November 11, 1932.

THE LEAGUE COUNCIL'S DECISION WITH REGARD TO ASSYRIANS IN 'IRAQ

GENEVA,

December 15.

The Council of the League of Nations to-day passed a resolution adopting the view of the Permanent Mandates Commission that the demand of the Assyrians for administrative autonomy within 'Iraq cannot be accepted.

The Council also "noted with satisfaction" the 'Iraqi Government's intention to "select from outside 'Iraq a foreign expert to assist them for a limited period in the settlement of all landless inhabitants of 'Iraq, including Assyrians, and in the carrying out of their scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians in 'Iraq under suitable conditions, and, so far as may be possible, in homogeneous units, it being understood that the existing rights of the present population shall not be prejudiced."

If these measures do not provide a complete solution of the problem, and there remain Assyrians unwilling or unable to settle in 'Iraq, the Council trusts to the 'Iraqi Government to take all possible measures to facilitate the settlement of such Assyrians elsewhere.—"The Times," December 16.

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
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR ROUTE IN THE PERSIAN GULF*

By SQUADRON LEADER G. W. BENTLEY,
D.F.C., R.A.F.

THE Persian Gulf is of fundamental importance to the British Empire as a link in the air route from Egypt to India because, without air bases in the Gulf, it would be difficult to move aircraft between these two countries. It has been said "The Persian Gulf stands to British air power in almost the exact relation as the Suez Canal to the Royal Navy, namely, as an essential link in our air communication to the East, particularly for the passage of air forces in time of emergency."

There are four alternative routes from Egypt to India :

(a) The Red Sea as far as Aden and then along the Southern Arabian and Makran coasts to Karachi.

(b) Across the desert to 'Iraq and along the South Persian littoral to Karachi.

(c) From 'Iraq to Quetta, across Persia.

(d) From 'Iraq, along the Arabian littoral to Oman, thence to the Makran coast and Karachi.

The disadvantages of the route via Aden are :

(i.) The distance is greatly increased.

(ii.) The climatic conditions along the coast of the Hadhramaut, which is affected by the south-west monsoon, are adverse during part of the year.

(iii.) Natural facilities for alighting and taking off along the coast of the Hadhramaut are poor in the case of flying boats and floatplanes.

The routes across Persia suffer from the disadvantage that that country might be unwilling to afford facilities for the transit of aircraft, whilst the distance to be covered is too great to allow aircraft to make the passage without alighting. It is true that the range of modern aircraft is ever increasing, and though in the near future

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, December 14, 1932, Air-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., in the Chair.

such a lengthy flight might present no obstacle to long range aircraft, it would be a breach of neutrality if a foreign country were crossed in the face of opposition by the Government concerned.

This leaves the Arabian coast route to be considered. The British influence amongst the tribes and states along the Arabian littoral is very strong, and we hope that it will increase rather than diminish. Some of the peoples show friendship towards us, whilst others display a marked respect.

Again, the distance to be covered along the Arabian coast, as well as its far-famed climate, vary but little from those of the Persian side. In one important respect the Arabian coast is superior to that of Persia, namely, it possesses numberless inlets and unlimited stretches of water sheltered by reefs and shoals which provide excellent bases and refuges for flying boats or floatplanes working over those waters. It seems clear, therefore, that from both the political and the air point of view this route offers a good solution of the problem, and it is with the development of the air bases along this route that my lecture is primarily concerned. No. 203 (F.B.) Squadron was the Royal Air Force unit entrusted with the task of establishing the route, and this narrative begins with the arrival of the flying boats at Basrah in March, 1929.

No. 203 (F.B.) Squadron, consisting of three Southampton type flying boats, flew out from England and arrived in the Shatt al Arab on March 14, 1929. A permanent base had been prepared for them at Ma'qil, some four miles upstream from Basrah, and the Squadron has continued to work from this base up to the present time.

Kuwait

The Principality of Kuwait, which lies in the north-west corner of the Gulf, with frontiers adjoining the Kingdoms of Iraq and Nejd, is an independent Arab state under British protection but is not a British Protectorate. The enlightened ruler, H.E. Shaikh Ahmad al Kabir, C.I.E. (who visited London in 1919 and was received by H.M. the King), preserves the friendliest relations with H.M. Government, who are represented in Kuwait by a Resident Political Agent. British influence is paramount in this principality, which thus presents no obstacle to the establishment of a refuelling base within its borders if this were necessary. In fact, a landing-ground already exists outside the town of Kuwait, and it has been used on many occasions by the Royal Air Force.

The Hasa Coast

South of Kuwait lies the coast-line of the Kingdom of Nejd, which is ruled by King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. It is known as the Hasa coast and is respected as foreign territory, that is to say, aircraft keep outside the three mile limit of its territorial waters. This coast stretches for a somewhat indefinite distance to the southward, but the only part which concerns the air route is that part which lies between the Kuwait frontier and the Bahrain Islands, a distance of about 200 miles, which presents no obstacle to the passage of aircraft. Throughout its length it abounds in sheltered water suitable for flying boats, and there is little doubt that there is much flat land suitable for aircraft landing-grounds. This is a matter of considerable comfort for those working along the route, especially as it is believed that though Ibn Saud demands that foreign aircraft shall not violate his territory, he may reasonably be expected to allow the hospitality of his shores to aircraft in distress. Thus the obstacle caused by this length of coast is somewhat diminished.

Bahrain

The Principality of Bahrain, which consists of one large island and several small ones, is an independent Arab state under the protection of H.M. Government, but is not a British Protectorate. Thus its status is similar to that of Kuwait. It is governed by Shaikh Hamad, C.S.I., the eldest son of Shaikh Sir Isa bin Ali al Khalifa, K.C.I.E., who abdicated in May, 1923, and who still lives in retirement at Muharrak, the second largest town in the islands.* Shaikh Hamad is assisted in the government by a British Financial Adviser, whilst several important posts, notably that of the Director of Customs, are also held by British Officers in his service. H.M. Government is represented in the state by a Resident Political Agent who exercises jurisdiction in respect of all British and foreign subjects, and very friendly relations are maintained both with the ruler and with the people of the islands. No restrictions are placed on the use of Bahrain by British aircraft, and its central position in the Gulf, together with the splendid facilities it can offer for both landplanes and flying boats, marks it as an important air base in the future; it is a key position to the Gulf Route.

* It was reported in the Press on December 14, 1932, that Shaikh Isa had died on December 9 and that he had been succeeded by Shaikh Hamad.

The Trucial Coast

The Trucial coast (so named because the small states which compose it are subject to a number of treaties with Great Britain binding them to a truce one with the other) is that part of the north-west coast of Oman from the Shaikhdom of Ras al Khaimah to the Shaikhdom of Abu Dhabi, and includes the Shaikhdoms of Umm al Qaiwain, Ajman, Sharjah, and Dabai. They are all independently administered tribal Principalities governed by independent Arab Shaikhs, and their relations with H.M. Government are maintained by the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who is represented on the coast by a resident native agent. Under the treaties which were negotiated by the British Government in the first half of the nineteenth century the Shaikhdoms bound themselves not to commit acts of piracy and not to war upon each other by sea. Later, in the treaty known as the "Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity," negotiated in 1853, they agreed that, in the event of aggression at sea by any one of them, the injured party would not retaliate, but would refer the matter to the British authorities. They further agreed that no party would make war upon another, but that they would refer their disputes to the Resident. These treaties have, in the main, been loyally observed, but each state remains strongly independent, and all are hot-beds of intrigue and potential strife. Thus negotiations for the establishment of a refuelling base on this coast were expected to be, and indeed proved to be, of a long and tedious character.

Muscat

The Sultan of Muscat and Oman, H.H. Saiyid Said, is an independent potentate, who recently succeeded his father, Saiyid Taimur bin Faisal bin Turki, K.C.I.E. Some of the peoples of the interior and of the coast east of Muscat dispute his authority, but the inhabitants of the important coastal strip known as the Batina acknowledge him as Sultan. Muscat has commercial treaties with France and the United States, as well as with H.M. Government, but the political treaties between Great Britain and Muscat have led to close ties which render British influence predominant. The Government was until recently assisted by a British Financial Adviser in the service of the Sultan, and the native levies are commanded by a British officer detached from the Indian Army. H.M. Government is represented by a Resident Political Agent who also holds a Consul's commission.

No obstacle is placed in the way of the development of aviation in the State of Muscat, and though the town of Muscat lies somewhat off the track of aircraft proceeding to India from the Persian Gulf, it is important as a point of departure for short range aircraft flying from the Gulf to Baluchistan and India.

The Task of No. 203 (F.B.) Squadron

The work which lay before No. 203 (F.B.) Squadron consisted of selecting and establishing the air bases along this route.

The political side was dealt with by the Resident, assisted by the officers of the Indian Political Department stationed in the Gulf. As may be expected from consideration of the political factors, their work was chiefly concerned with the Trucial Shaikhs of Oman. In this they were supported by the flying boats of the Squadron and by H.M. sloops stationed in the Gulf, both of which supplied the transport and accommodation required on the frequent political missions. These negotiations were nearly always protracted and painfully slow, and when temperatures were high with a humidity of 90 per cent. they called for a standard of patience not easily attained. Nevertheless, the political Officers upheld the fine traditions of their Service, and rare indeed were the occasions when any kind of ill-feeling was left amongst these turbulent Shaikhs or their unruly followers.

Technically the work of the Squadron consisted of selecting the sites of landing-grounds and flying boat anchorages, of marking out the landing-grounds, laying moorings and maintaining them, installing tanks or other arrangements for refuelling, arranging rest-houses, erecting W/T stations, and of dealing with many other questions too numerous to mention. Not the least part of the work consisted of gaining a thorough knowledge of the Arabian side of the Gulf, and it can be no exaggeration to say, at any rate so far as the physical outline of the coast, shoals, and shallows is concerned, that the accumulated knowledge of the Squadron must be almost without precedent. In a general way much useful work was done by flying over or visiting every town, village, or hamlet on the coast, creating good feeling with the Arabs and making them accustomed to the sight of aircraft and helping them to overcome their prejudice against mechanical contrivances. Many Arab Shaikhs and other notables were taken for short flights and occasionally on visits to distant places. The political officers also took passage in the flying boats whenever possible, as

it often enabled them to save days of travel when visiting distant or inaccessible points in their administrative areas. Medical officers sometimes accompanied the flights and gave the benefit of their skill to tribesmen.

The flying boats of No. 203 (F.B.) Squadron made their debut in the Gulf by a flight to Bahrain in April, 1929. This flight is of passing interest only as the first one, but it is important to note that the Shaikh of Bahrain showed his interest in flying by paying a ceremonial visit to his neighbour, the Shaikh of Qatar, by air. This visit of the flying boats caused much excitement at Doha, where the Shaikh of Qatar resides, many of the inhabitants wading far into the water to get a closer view of the boats. It is recorded that such a large crowd climbed on to the deck of a dhow which was propped up on the beach that the dhow fell over, scattering the occupants in all directions.

This flight was followed in May by a much more extended cruise, which, besides being a long one, was important because it lay the foundation of all the work which was carried out by the Squadron in the Gulf. The objects of the cruise were :

1. To select a site for a landing-ground at Bahrain and to arrange for a rest-house.
2. To select a point for refuelling on the Peninsula of Oman.
3. To reconnoitre the coast as far as Muscat.
4. To examine a proposed landing-ground near Muscat, to acquire a building suitable for a W/T station, and to arrange for refuelling and mooring facilities in Muscat Cove.

The task at Bahrain and Muscat was, as might be expected, comparatively simple, and during the months which followed rest-houses were fitted out and landing-grounds marked at both places. At Bahrain the old quarantine station on the south shore of Khor Khaliya was acquired and reconditioned for use by visiting R.A.F. personnel. The landing-ground selected was situated about half a mile from the rest-house, near the Shaikh's palace, and though it left a good deal to be desired, it was considered suitable for use by aircraft of the Royal Air Force making the passage to India. A larger and better landing-ground on the island of Muharrak, situated on the other side of Khor Khaliya, was noted but not developed because it was comparatively inaccessible from Manama. Moorings for flying boats were laid in Khor Khaliya immediately opposite the rest-house, and arrangements for refuelling were placed in the hands of a local firm. Khor Khaliya

is a splendid sheet of water which is almost land-locked, and is thus an excellent alighting and mooring place for flying boats. Like many other parts of the Arabian coast, the land is flat and there is but little protection from the force of the wind, but experience soon showed that the boats had no difficulty in riding out the strongest normal winds.

At Muscat a house was rented in the town and was equipped for service as a Royal Air Force W/T station as well as a rest-house. The nearest flat land suitable as a landing-ground was located amongst the hills at Beit al Falaj, some four miles from Muscat. It was not an ideal landing-ground, but no other flat land existed within easy range of Muscat, and as it was considered suitable for the limited use to which it would be put by aircraft of the Royal Air Force it was cleared of obstructions and marked out as an aerodrome. Moorings for flying boats were laid in Muscat Cove, near the coal yard, where a building was reconditioned as a fuel store, but otherwise refuelling arrangements were dealt with by a local firm.

Muscat Cove is not a good place for flying boats. It is surrounded by very high land and is too small for aircraft to use as an alighting or taking-off area. Aircraft, therefore, are obliged to perform these manoeuvres in the open sea, where the swell from the Indian Ocean is sometimes bad and in strong winds the sea becomes very rough. Consequently Muscat can never make a really satisfactory base for either landplanes or seaplanes, but both for political and domestic reasons it serves as a useful base for aircraft of the Royal Air Force working on that coast.

The nearest place suitable for flying boats is the splendid land-locked Khor Jarama, situated some 90 miles south-eastwards along the coast—near Ras al Hadd. Khor Jarama has the advantage of much flat land in its vicinity, and, in fact, a fine landing-ground already exists on Ras al Hadd itself. This landing-ground was marked out some years ago by the Royal Air Force Command at Aden, and though it has now been transferred to the operational zone of the 'Iraq Command, this locality belongs rather to the South Arabian route and therefore comes outside the scope of this lecture.

Bahrain and Muscat, then, were soon made suitable for use by the flying boats, and in 1930 crews were regularly visiting and living for short periods at these places. At Muscat a permanent staff of three airmen was retained for the purpose of operating the W/T station, and they were relieved at three-monthly intervals by fresh airmen from the signal staff in 'Iraq. Thus the Royal Air Force

possessed a good base in a central position in the Gulf and another useful one at the extreme eastern end of the Gulf route.

There remained the Oman Peninsula.

Before the arrival of the Squadron it was known that Ras al Khaimah possessed a good creek which would probably be suitable for flying boats, and also that near the creek there was a large area of flat land. Accordingly on the first cruise it was decided to visit Ras al Khaimah, examine its facilities for aircraft, and, if considered suitable, to negotiate terms under which the Shaikh would permit fuel supplies to be kept there with guarantees for its safe custody. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf accompanied the boats, and the visit is of interest, not only because it was the first of a long series, but because it marked the commencement of long and tedious negotiations with Shaikh Sultan bin Salim. The Residency Agent, Khan Bahadur Isa, was present to meet the travellers, and soon afterwards the Shaikh came to call on the R.P.G. All seemed well, but when the Shaikh was offered a flight in the flying boat he said that he would go only if the native Residency Agent would accompany him. This was agreed to and he made a flight, but it was the one ~~time he did so~~. Later in the day the R.P.G. returned his call, but the Shaikh was late in keeping the appointment and the Resident left without seeing him. Thus the general atmosphere was not promising, and after a letter of protest at his behaviour had been drawn up the flying boat left.

It was decided, however, to press on negotiations with the Shaikh. The creek seemed very suitable for flying boats, and near by there was a fine stretch of perfectly flat sand which seemed to be a ready-made landing ground for aeroplanes. Investigations showed that no other place along the Trucial coast possessed facilities equal to those of Ras al Khaimah. In due course each town was visited and its possibilities closely investigated. Even the inlets of the Musandam Peninsula were examined, but all these were very deep, surrounded by precipitous cliffs, and there was no suitable flat land near them. Moreover, it is probable that in summer living conditions amongst these sun-baked cliffs would be insupportable. The only towns on the Trucial coast which were at all suitable for flying boats were Umm al Qaiwain and Dabai, but both were much inferior to Ras al Khaimah. Nearly all had flat land near them, but it should be remembered that the route was intended for use jointly by flying boats and landplanes of the Royal Air Force, and if there was no sheltered water there could be

no question of a flying boat base. The open sea in the south-east part of the Gulf is not at all suitable for flying boats manœuvring on to or off the water because, apart from the ever-present possibility of rough seas, the prevailing north-west wind causes a long swell to roll up on the Trucial coast on a good many days of the year.

It is possible that Abu Dhabi might have been suitable for both types of aircraft, but its geographical position put it out of the question.

Ras al Khaimah was next visited by the flying boats in June, 1929. The Political Agent at Bahrain accompanied them, and on this occasion the Sheikh received his visitors quite correctly. Thereafter many visits were paid to the town—in fact, the flying boats seldom cruised in the Gulf without refuelling in the creek and sometimes spending the night there. Throughout 1929 refuelling was carried out from a bakara which brought the fuel from Sharjah, where it was stored under the care of Khan Bahadur Isa who lived in the town.

In 1929 also, an emergency landing-ground and refuelling base was selected at Sohar, a town halfway along the Batina coast, between Ras al Khaimah and Muscat. This refuelling base could not be used by flying boats owing to the swell which frequently rolls up on that coast, but it was useful for land aircraft operating between Ras al Khaimah and Muscat. There was no difficulty in arranging this ground; the Wali of Sohar holds his appointment under Muscat, and the small amount of work entailed in turning a bare stretch of land into a serviceable landing-ground was undertaken by him personally. An old tower near his residence was reconditioned as a fuel store.

It is worthy of note that in September, 1930, two flying boats made the 150 miles land crossing from Abu Dhabi to Sohar. The object of this flight was to reconnoitre the country between these two points and to gain some knowledge of it. The first few miles consisted of the comparatively flat coastal plain, but this was soon succeeded by sandy ridges, and then rough and stony ground. This was followed by the foothills and rugged mountains of the Western Hajar, which appeared to rise to about 5,000 or 6,000 feet. The flying boats then came out over the coastal plain of the Batina. It was a most interesting flight, though a somewhat anxious one, as a good deal of the country seemed quite unsuitable for even a land aircraft to alight on.

Other interesting extensions to the work of the Squadron included occasional flights to Karachi and, later, to Masira Island and Merbat, on the South Arabian coast, where a meeting was effected with air-

craft from the Aden Command. The South Arabian route is, however, rather outside the scope of air development in the Persian Gulf. On the flights to Karachi, the flying boats normally followed the Gulf route to Muscat and crossed from there to Gwadar, though on one or two occasions they made the direct flight between Ras al Khaimah and Gwadar. Gwadar, together with the surrounding area of some 300 square miles, is held by the Sultan of Muscat. It is governed by a Wali, and for several years Imperial Airways have used an aerodrome some miles outside the town. The flying boats alighted in either the east or west bay, whichever was free from swell or rough sea, and during these visits arrangements were made for storage of fuel and refuelling of flying boats. The section of the route from the Trucial coast to Karachi thus presented no difficulty, except to short-range aircraft, for which provision for refuelling was made at Sohar and Muscat.

Meanwhile negotiations with Shaikh Ras al Khaimah continued. At times he seemed disposed to agree, at others he refused to discuss the matter, and sometimes he maintained that, even if he consented, he would be unable to guarantee the safety of either fuel or flying boats if the Shihu and Bedouin from the interior took offence at his attitude and raided his town. Probably his real reason for withholding sanction was fear of giving political opponents in his own town a good opportunity for taking action against him, and also doubt as to the opinion of the other Shaikhs along the coast. This unsatisfactory state continued until May, 1930, when it was decided to locate a fuel barge in the creek at Ras al Khaimah. This barge, which had been prepared at Basrah, was towed to Henjam by one of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's tankers and from there was taken to Ras al Khaimah by H.M. sloop *Cyclamen*. She was then towed to the creek by a motor-boat, but soon after crossing the bar she grounded. At this stage a party of the Shaikh's men arrived and threatened to fire on the motor-boat if she attempted to continue towing; the barge was therefore anchored securely and left in that position. Such an incident could not be overlooked, and soon afterwards a flying boat conveying the Resident and the Senior Air Staff Officer, 'Iraq Command, and H.M. sloops *Triad* and *Lupin*, arrived at Ras al Khaimah. Meanwhile the Shaikh decided to make a demonstration. To do this he induced a mob of Shihu and other warlike inhabitants of the interior to appear on the scene and to make a show of force, and they were all ready to demonstrate when the flying boat and ships arrived. The

flying boat alighted in the lagoon to spend the night, and in the evening the crew had a splendid view of the Shihu executing their curious war dance on the bank 100 yards away. Lengthy negotiations followed, and at last the Shaikh, acting on the advice of his relative the Shaikh of Sharjah, agreed to allow aircraft to use the lagoon unmolested and to guard the fuel. It came to light afterwards that the Shihu then demanded handsome remuneration from the Shaikh under threat of attack, and the Shaikh was forced to pay. He afterwards complained to the Residency Agent that having spent a lot of money he had gained nothing. During the next month, July, the visiting flying boats saw a large number of Shihu outside the Agent's house and, on inquiry, were told that they were paying their respects and assuring the Agent that they would not engage in such a demonstration again. This may have been a personal affair with the Residency Agent, who was an influential man on the coast, but it gave a sign that these men harboured no particular hostility towards the flying boats.

After this incident our relations with the Shaikh continued satisfactorily until the early summer of 1931, when he reopened the question. At this time, however, the R.P.G. was absent from the Gulf and the Shaikh agreed to postpone representations until his return. Meanwhile, in July, 1931, two "Wapiti" landplanes from No. 84 Squadron, Shaibah, were escorted to Ras al Khaimah by the flying boats, and thus were the first land aircraft to alight on the landing ground there. The visit caused a good deal of interest at Ras al Khaimah: a large number of the inhabitants turned out to see the aeroplanes and a working party was engaged to refuel them. The Shaikh grumbled, but no incident occurred, and the aircraft left in the afternoon of the same day.


Flying boats continued to visit Ras al Khaimah, but later in the year (1931) the Shaikh definitely announced that he would not commit himself to an agreement for aircraft to use his territory. It was therefore considered profitless to continue negotiations, because although the Shaikh himself showed some disposition to come to terms, he seemed powerless to do so in the face of local opposition. The flying boats continued to use the creek, however, firstly because the fuel dump was located there and secondly because the Shaikh had said on several occasions that he had little or no objection to flying boats of the Royal Air Force using the place, but he would not allow civil aircraft to come. By this time, however, the prospect of Imperial Airways transferring their route from the Persian to the Arabian side of the Gulf was

in sight and it was imperative that a place should be found which could be used by them. Their agreement with Persia was due to expire on March 31, and it was proposed that they should use flying boats similar to those in use in the Royal Air Force. Several suggestions for flying boat bases were investigated, but were found unsuitable and rejected. It was then decided to try Dabai if the Shaikh would give his consent. Negotiations followed, and though at one time it seemed likely that an arrangement could be made with him, the attempt broke down. In February, 1932, the Government of Persia extended their agreement with Imperial Airways until May 31, and in March Imperial Airways came forward with a new project for using land aircraft instead of flying boats along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf. This materially changed the situation and, as the establishment of a landing-ground suitable for Imperial Airways assumed prime importance, the political and Royal Air Force authorities now turned their attention in this direction.

Efforts were then made to find an aerodrome in a suitable position on the Peninsula of Oman, without regard to flying boat requirements. Kalba on the Batina coast, Dibah at the foot of the mountains at the east side of Musandam and Sharjah, were examined. Dibah was the most suitable geographically because it was nearer to Gwadur, but of the three Sharjah was considered the most suitable from every other point of view.

Sir Hugh Biscoe, the Political Officer, therefore visited Sharjah in April, 1932, and opened negotiations with the Shaikh. Final agreement was not reached, however, and later the Shaikh refused to grant facilities. It subsequently transpired that the reason for this was that his relations threatened to murder him unless he handed over to them the major portion of the fees which it was proposed to grant him. It was also discovered that the inhabitants of Dabai and the Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah had brought strong opposition to bear against him: the people of Dabai because they scented the possible rise of Sharjah to greater importance than their own town; the Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah because of jealousy. After resisting months of patient negotiation by the Resident and missing a great opportunity of increasing the importance of his town and enriching himself, it is not difficult to imagine his feelings when a neighbouring Shaikh seized the chance.

In consequence of the breakdown the Resident, with two flying boats, visited Sharjah in May, and such a measure of agreement was reached that later in the month two "Wapiti" aircraft of No. 84



THE PERSIAN GULF (EASTERN SECTION)
AND THE GULF OF 'OMAN, INCLUDING
TROCIAL 'OMAN

(Bomber) Squadron flew down from Iraq and landed on the aerodrome. The townsfolk of Sharjah took a friendly interest in the aircraft, but the visit gave the Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah an opportunity to take definite action. A few days later he threatened the life of the Shaikh of Sharjah, and a party of men acting under his orders visited the aerodrome and destroyed the landing-circle. An immediate and serious warning was delivered to him, and it had the desired effect. At this stage the Persian Government extended their agreement with Imperial Airways until October 31.

In June the Resident again visited Sharjah with every expectation of concluding a satisfactory agreement. He found, however, that the Shaikh's brothers were still maintaining an obstructive attitude and, in addition, great pressure was being brought to bear from Dabai, whose people feared that the mail steamer's port of call might be transferred from there to Sharjah. The people of Sharjah, on the other hand, were most anxious that the steamer should call at their port, and it seemed certain that if the transfer could be arranged they would strongly support their Shaikh. The signing of the agreement was again held up, but the Shaikh promised to collect building material for a rest-house and to permit an engineer to be sent down.

In July, on the eve of the conclusion of the agreement which he had worked so patiently and unremittingly to achieve, Sir Hugh Biscoe died on board H.M.S. *Bideford* when he was on his way to Sharjah. By his death the country lost an able administrator and the Royal Air Force a staunch friend.

Negotiations were continued by the Political Agent from Kuwait, and on July 22 the Shaikh of Sharjah signed the agreement for the establishment of a landing-ground at his town.

Under the agreement the Shaikh accepts full responsibility for the protection of the rest-house and aerodrome and, in return, he is to receive payments for the guard, for the use of the aerodrome, and as rent for the rest-house. Thus the last remaining difficulty on the Arabian coast air link through the Persian Gulf was overcome, and henceforth aircraft may pass along it without difficulty or hazard.

In conclusion, the interest and assistance of H.M. sloops in the Persian Gulf were greatly appreciated. Their presence in those waters, ready at all times to assist the flying boats, was a support to the Squadron, and provided one of the best demonstrations of co-operation between sloops and flying boats that has yet been given.

In opening the discussion, one member said: We should remember why we first came to the Persian Gulf at all and why and how the Trucial coast got its name; I was out there and made the original survey of the land.

The first name of that coast was the Pirate coast, and the East India Company could not risk any ship going up the Gulf on account of the pirates. So the Navy was called in and, as a result of the British Government's naval action, the piracy was stopped and the truce made with all the chiefs which our lecturer rightly said gave the coast its new name. Now there is safety and the possibility of commerce being carried on in peace, and it is entirely due to the action of the British Government during the past 150 years.

The Shaikhs on that coast in the old days usually succeeded by murdering the rightful heirs. I would say that about 60 per cent. of the chiefs hold their positions either by murdering their brothers or having them murdered. You can see from this that they are not a homely, genial lot, and it is entirely due to the British Government that the conditions are such as they are now.

Another member said: With regard to initiative and co-operation, I should like to recall a note in my diary in August, 1930. A flying boat left Basrah when the temperature was 125 degrees in the shade and flew to Bahrain, where they spent three nights; the crew were unable to sleep because of the heat. They were asked to take on board a sailor who was suffering from heat exhaustion; they flew him back to Basrah, where he made good recovery. That is only one of their useful services.

When we first arrived in 1929 with flying boats, as new-comers we were dependent upon others for advice, and were greatly indebted to Sir Hugh Biscoe for his help. I want particularly to acknowledge the hospitality and assistance we received from Captain Prior at Bahrain and the Political Agent at Muscat, and also the hospitality we received from other officials in the Gulf.

I should like to say that the nature of the surface on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf is very suitable for flying, being flat.

I think the speaker referred to the good work on the part of the flying boat crews. The temperature in the hull of one of the boats was 90 degrees during the day. If you take into account the humidity I think you will agree that the work of both officers and men was worthy of praise.

The Chairman then said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—The fixation of this route along the Gulf is one of the romances of the British Empire. It is also an extraordinary example of co-operation between the Government and the Royal Air Force; the fighting services and the political side.

Squadron Leader Bentley uttered two sentences which I should like you particularly to notice. The first was: "If you persist you find no difficulties." He did not mention what these difficulties were, but there were all sorts of things—housing for flying boats, fittings going wrong, the heat, etc.—he has made light of them all, as was done by No. 203 Squadron in doing their job. We might well remember this sentence to-day. The second sentence was, "One of the jobs was to create good feeling." This had to be done in all kinds of ways, as well as in diplomacy. So the R.A.F., the youngest Service, has continued the tradition of the Navy in the Persian Gulf.

APPENDIX A

Climate and Meteorology

The climate of the Persian Gulf is too well known to need much recapitulation: it is not only very hot at times, but is extremely humid during the hottest months of July, August, and September. In winter the weather is good, punctuated at infrequent intervals by windy and rainy conditions similar to those experienced in the English Channel, though not so cold or quite so boisterous.

The prevailing wind is the north-west Shamal, which blows for about nine months in the year, whilst in June and July it is almost incessant for about forty days. The Shamal brings much dust from the plains of 'Iraq, and on occasions the hazy conditions thus set up persist even as far as Karachi.

In winter a south-east wind, called the Kaus, alternates with the Shamal and brings with it gloomy weather accompanied by squalls and sometimes a good deal of rain.

Fog sometimes occurs in the mornings near the coast and adjacent desert, but it seldom rises above a few hundred feet and only lasts a few hours. Aircraft normally fly above it. The Persian Gulf fogs are very wet and, like the heavy dews which occur there in summer, they saturate everything which is exposed to them.

The Gulf is not altogether unhealthy for Europeans and, curiously enough, the summer seems to be more healthy than the winter. This is due to the prevalence of fevers in winter, which are a more serious matter than the comparatively harmless but aggravating complaints such as prickly heat and boils which are common in summer.

Speaking generally, flying conditions in the Persian Gulf are good. The winds rarely attain a force sufficient to interfere with the movements of aircraft and seldom cause inconvenience of any sort. The open sea, like any other large marine area, becomes very rough at times, but a flying boat is not designed to alight on, or take off from, the open sea: she requires sheltered water for this purpose. Here

the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf shows one of its best characteristics. Throughout its length it has endless stretches of sheltered water caused by inlets, projecting islands, sandbanks, and shoals. It is also by no means impossible that closer investigation might reveal that within the vast shoals which protect some parts of the coast there is ample shallow water suitable as refuges for flying boats. As regards alighting areas, then, the west side of the Persian Gulf favours flying boats probably more than any other area over which British flying boats operate.

Dust, though somewhat disconcerting to a new arrival, never attains the intensity of a desert dust-storm and rarely seriously inconveniences airmen experienced in flying over these waters. The chief difficulty is encountered when attempting to identify points on some featureless and probably inadequately charted part of the coast, but here good navigation and experience generally solve the problem. Briefly, it was the experience of No. 203 (F.B.) Squadron that, in spite of the reputation of the Gulf and of all that has been said of it by travellers, the flying boats were never prevented by weather from keeping to a prearranged programme if it was urgently necessary for them to do so.

APPENDIX B

The Flying Boats

From 1929 to 1931 No. 203 (F.B.) Squadron consisted of three Southampton-type flying boats, which were succeeded in 1931 by three Rangoon-type boats.

The Southampton is a comparatively small flying boat, carrying normally a crew of five, which consists of two officers, a fitter, a rigger, and a wireless operator. The hulls are built of duralumin, and as no inflammable material is kept inside, cooking arrangements are installed and the boon of smoking is permitted. The rigger generally acts as cook because, as a rule, his duties are less exacting than those of the other two airmen. A cook who is skilful in combating the back-draught in the hull can turn out a good meal when the aircraft is in flight, and in No. 203 (F.B.) Squadron breakfast and other meals in the air resulted in much saving of time when long flights were in progress. A comparatively large supply of water is carried by flying-boats working in the Persian Gulf.

Sleeping arrangements consisted of two or three cots slung against the aircraft's side and a couple of canvas hammocks which when in use were slung between the engine bearers. In practice the cots were not used, because the hulls were too small for such refinements when the whole crew was on board, and as the smallest saving in weight was important in those heavily-laden aircraft, the cots were dispensed with. In winter the crew slept head-to-foot throughout the length of the hull, and their bedding consisted of specially light sleeping-bags and flying-jackets. In summer all hands slept outside on the centre-section of the lower plane.

Living conditions in such cramped quarters were necessarily difficult, especially under adverse weather conditions, both hot and cold: as so often happens in such cases, however, the crews maintained a wonderful spirit and became surprisingly skilful in managing things to the best advantage. Although warm weather conditions predominated and, at their worst, the heat and humidity were very hard to bear, they never defeated the flying boats' crews, and the sight of the fitters working on their engines in the broiling sun, or the wireless operators tapping their keys inside hulls where the temperature is best left to the imagination, might well be an inspiration to others whose work calls for less physical endurance.

This, however, presents only one side of the picture; on the other side was

lovely weather, with fresh breezes and clear skies. But whatever the conditions, the cheeriness and good-fellowship of the crews remained constant, and it was a never-ending source of pleasure to work with them.

With the arrival of the Rangoon flying boat living conditions afloat were much improved. The hull of this boat is a good deal larger than that of the Southampton and is equipped with a certain degree of comfort. The crew consists of two officers, two fitters, a rigger, and a wireless operator, and in the two cabins which take up the major portion of the hull sleeping-cots are provided for all of them. Large scuttles let in plenty of light and air to the cabins, so that in some of the worst of the hot weather members of the crew can work, eat, and sleep inside the hull. Nevertheless life, even in these large boats, is not a bed of roses for the crews and in no way lessened their pleasant contemplation of unlimited water, comfortable beds, and long drinks when they returned to their base.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROWANDUZ ROAD*

By A. M. HAMILTON

FIRSTLY, let me explain the objects of the Rowanduz Road. The countries adjoining Northern 'Iraq are Syria, Turkey, and Persia. 'Iraq is bounded on the north and east by the Zagros range of mountains. The Zagros contain the head waters of the Tigris. The northern part, which is divided amongst Turkey, Persia, and 'Iraq, forms the highlands which are inhabited by the Kurdish people. They are a race with a language of their own, as most of you are aware.

North Persia, which has the largest cities, such as Tehran and Tabriz, and the wealthiest province, which is said to be Azerbaijan, is rather inaccessible except from Russia. A railway from south to

* Lecture given on January 18, 1933, General Sir Percy Sykes in the Chair. The LECTURER: Mr. Chairman and Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel it is a great honour to be asked to speak to you this afternoon about the Rowanduz Road.

I propose firstly to tell you where this newly completed highway is, and why the 'Iraq Government decided in 1927 to commence its construction.

Secondly, I hope to give you, with lantern slides, some idea of the engineering part of the work, and to tell you how the local labour of mixed nationalities tackled such technical jobs as bridge erection, rock drilling, and blasting.

Thirdly, I wish to try and give you some idea of the influence of this road work on the Kurdish mountain tribesmen, through whose territory the road passes, and of the influence of engineering activity upon the country generally.

Fourthly, I have much pleasure in being able to tell you that, owing to the kindness of Mr. Clay and Major Stubbs, you will be shown this evening the only cinematograph films of the mountain scenery of the Rowanduz and Berserini gorges, and I cannot sufficiently thank them for helping me.

Major Stubbs was formerly Inspector of Medical Services to the 'Iraq Army and he is a very fine amateur photographer.

Mr. Clay was formerly Director of Public Works in 'Iraq, and under his capable directorship the Rowanduz Road project was conceived and carried out, together with a vast number of other works such as buildings, bridges, water supplies, roads, and blockhouses, in the deserts and in the mountains, which will mark a new epoch in the history of that ancient country.

Five engineers including myself were at one time or another in charge of the Rowanduz Road work. In 1928 the 63rd Field Company of Madras Sappers and Miners assisted greatly with well-trained Indians. The untiring energies and high-principled fairness of Major W. A. Pover, O.B.E., Engineer in Charge of the Northern Division of 'Iraq, had a great influence in gaining the respect and co-operation of the tribesmen and all others, and were of paramount importance to the successful conclusion of the work.

North of Persia has been commenced, but it is still far from completion. If a motor road could be made through the Rowanduz section of the Zagros it seemed very probable that trade would come from North Persia to the northern terminus of the 'Iraq railway system, which is at present Kirkuk and will later be Erbil or Mosul. Hence Colonel Tainsh, Director-General of the 'Iraq railways, keenly advocated the construction of this road, and provided the first survey party and staff which operated under the Public Works Department.

Useful as this road will be as a feeder for the 'Iraq railways, which will thus carry North Persian goods to Baghdad and Basra, it will have an even more important use in providing the shortest possible road line from Tabriz or Tehran to the Mediterranean Coast, via Rowanduz and Mosul, and thence to Beirut or to Alexandretta; or else to the Turkish terminus of the European railway system at Nisibin. To go by rail from Paris to Persia in these days, when rapid travelling is so sought for, will now take five days and nights from Paris to Nisibin, and only two days more by the Mosul-Rowanduz road to Tabriz, and it will be even less when a more direct route is made from Mosul to Rowanduz by bridging the Greater Zab at Bekhme Gorge. Thus Tabriz is now only a week's journey from Paris.

The Shah and the Persian Government have from the beginning been very enthusiastic about the completion of the Rowanduz-Tabriz road, and the Azerbaijan Department of Communications, under Taimur Bey, completed the Persian section of the road by 1931, a year before the 'Iraq party, in much more difficult country, was able to effect the junction at the frontier pass. The reason given for the Persian keenness for the new road is that, up to the present, Russia has had too much of a monopoly of the trade of Northern Persia and that a new outlet to the Mediterranean is greatly welcomed. The relations with the Persian engineers were always most cordial and help was exchanged whenever asked for. Although there are far too many trade and customs barriers between 'Iraq and Persia at the present time to allow the road to become a really useful trade route, it is hoped that some kind of free trade agreement can soon be arrived at; otherwise both countries are the losers.

Apart from the commercial, there are other aspects of the Rowanduz Road that were regarded as very important. The mountainous country through which it passes is inhabited by well-armed Kurdish tribes, who in older times were usually at war with each other or with the Turkish Government.


The British mandatory administration, which recently ~~terminated~~ promised the Kurdish leaders that the object of the road was trade and the establishment of peaceful administration, schools, hospitals, and industrial development. On this promise the Kurdish leaders were asked for their help in the building of the road. The help was given, even though the making of the road meant the breaking of the door of their natural stronghold for all time.

To have obtained the support of the people in this way was sound policy, but it involved a promise which must be made good. Up to the present time a lot of money has been spent on military activity in the Kurdish districts and all too little upon peaceful and constructive development. The cost of military operations in 1932 was sufficient to have educated every Kurdish child, and by removing tribal distrust would have removed the necessity for operations.

I will now give a brief description of the road work from 1927 to 1932, and of the kind of country through which the road passes. For a road line to reach the Persian plateau over the parallel foot-hills it must either cross the ridges in long zigzags, as on the Pirûm, the Mirowa, and the Spilik passes, or else the road line must follow the rivers through their canyons. Owing to the fact that the rocky sides of the canyons are often perpendicular or nearly so, the low levels near the water are usually inaccessible for pack animals, and the ancient tracks usually led up and down steep gradients. Considering the probable importance of the road, it was advisable to limit the maximum gradient to 1 in 20 as the general rule. Therefore, except where low passes could be used to advantage, the road was aligned near the river's edge. The chief difficulty in the construction was the cutting of the eighteen-foot roadway through the lower levels of the Rowanduz and Berserini gorges. Of the 116 miles of the road from Erbil to the Persian frontier some 40 miles lie in steep-sided gorges. The cutting of the road necessitated the excavation of nearly one million tons of earth and rock, a considerable proportion of which required blasting with gelignite, ammonal, and gunpowder.

The road rises in altitude from 1,200 feet at Erbil to 6,000 feet on the frontier pass of Zin-e-Shaikh. In the future, hotels will doubtless be built near the frontier as cool summer stations or for winter sports. Nearby is the Al Gurd, the highest mountain in Iraq, 12,229 feet high.

One of the most beautiful of the gorges near the frontier is the Berserini. It has comparatively densely wooded sides rising to high peaks on the sky-line, which in the winter are covered in snow. It was, before



the construction of the road, an unfrequented spot and a natural home for the ibex or mountain goat which here could defy the rather ruthless sporting methods of Kurds and Assyrians. In the springtime the lower slopes of the hills are coloured with patches of flowers and the mountain torrents rush down from the melting snow. Without doubt the Kurdish highlands will be a great attraction to visitors now they have become more accessible. In the mountains are deep caves, some of which discharge springs of water which rise and fall mysteriously, such as Kani Jindian, meaning "the wizard's spring."

The most famous of the gorges is the Rowanduz. It is a sheer cleft some 1,500 feet in depth through a mountain range. Five gorges enter from different directions and join together in a main rift. In one of these gorges an immense spring of water bursts from the rock and pours down a ravine into the Rowanduz river 300 feet below. It is called Kani Bikair, meaning in Kurdish "useless water," because it cannot be used for irrigation, but it could easily be used to provide hydro-electricity.

Work lasted two years in the Rowanduz gorge to complete eight miles of road and five bridges, the longest bridges being of 135 feet span. Modern pneumatic rock drills were used which drilled holes up to 24 feet in depth to receive the blasting charges. You will realize that to keep machinery running in such an isolated spot, with unskilled attendance, was not the easiest part of this road work. In addition to the use of machinery it was found to be advantageous, owing to the cheap cost of labour (eighteen pence a day), to do much of the rock drilling by hand, using the "jumping bar." This is a chisel-ended steel bar about 6 to 12 feet in length, lifted and dropped vertically with a turning motion of the hand. One man could usually drill a hole 6 to 10 feet deep in a day, and upwards of a hundred of such holes were usually charged with the explosive and fired off at the conclusion of the day's work. The loose rock shattered by the explosion was cleared away on the following day, and the process of drilling and blasting was repeated until the final level of the road was reached. As the side cuttings in the rock faces were sometimes from 50 to 100 feet high, a period of six weeks had often to be spent on a single rock. If the rock face was quite vertical a half-tunnel had to be ledged out by means of the pneumatic drills. The chief difficulty in the earlier stages of the work was to teach untrained overseers and untrained coolies and tribesmen to handle pneumatic machinery, high explosives, steam rollers, stone crushers, and bridge erecting plant that they had not previously

seen or worked with. Under an excellent Indian supervisor, Sujan Singh, the mixed road personnel of Persians, Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians, and one or two Indians proved itself quite able to learn the technique of the work, even though no fewer than seven languages were in common use—Arabic, Kurdish, Persian, Turkish, Assyrian, Hindustani, and English.

There were surprisingly few accidents with the machinery or with the blasting, and this in spite of extremes of temperature, from winter to summer of 5° or 10° of frost to 115° shade temperature, both these extremes being dangerous for the use of gelignite. When erecting bridges in the winter the men had to warm spanners and bolts over charcoal burners up on the steelwork to prevent frostbite, while in summer the scalding steel had to be cooled with water before it could be touched by the bare hand.

It was found that the mixed nationalities got on well together, rarely quarrelled, took a keen interest in their work, never objected to any job on account of its difficulty or danger, and never complained when called out to work overtime on urgent jobs such as bridge erection. Although there were only the most primitive conditions of comfort in their tents, soakings in the bitterly cold winter rains did not perturb them or cause much ill-health. Malaria and influenza were common epidemics, but there were comparatively few deaths. For medical and surgical attention (the latter being frequently required), the Indian Medical Officer of the First Assyrian Battalion, 'Iraq Levies, was permitted to treat urgent cases at Diana Military Hospital, and this concession, kindly granted by the Commanding Officer, Colonel Cameron, C.B.E., saved many lives. The Levy doctors also treated Kurdish tribesmen. This Assyrian Levy battalion was one of the last two battalions of the British Army of Occupation of Mesopotamia. The chivalry and tact of their British officers, even more than the fighting qualities of the Assyrian troops, went far to win the respect and confidence of the Kurds, without which the construction of the road would have been impossible.

The working gangs usually numbered from 400 to 1,200 men, and amongst these were machine drivers, drillers, winchmen, carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, time-keepers, blasters, storemen, clerks, overseers, and other officials. To supply the men were butchers, bakers, merchants, barbers, etc., all of whom came under comp jurisdiction. To keep order and to guard the money during payment there were usually only four 'Iraqi policemen and a sergeant, together with a few armed

tribesmen who were used as sentries. Occasionally there were crimes amongst the coolies, but not often, and this small guard was quite sufficient to deal with any trouble that arose. On the whole, the men were remarkably tractable and stayed year after year on the work, or, in the case of the Arabs, returned regularly each summer. After four years' association it was with great regret that, as the work finished, I had eventually to leave the staff and men whom I knew so well and who had worked so willingly. Nearly all of the Assyrians of the staff have, I am sorry to say, since been dismissed from the Public Works Department.

Before the bridges in the Rowanduz gorge were completed, some motor-cars, tractors, air compressors, and a quantity of bridging steel were carried across the gorge on wire rope cables, as this was the only possible way. The cars did good service in plying to Rowanduz and Diana some months before the bridges and the road were completed.

The erection of the several long-span bridges with the limited appliances available tested the abilities of the newly trained gangs. Bridges of the size and weight of the heavy Hopkins standard military spans were not easy to sling across the ravines without any support from below. The sides of the gorge, however, gave good anchorage for suspension cables, so the suspension method was used whenever possible. Before the process of slinging the bridges across, the winch operators had to be carefully trained so that some mistake would not allow a bridge to fall into the river. Similarly, the assemblers on the steelwork had to make sure of all slings and connections when they were working precariously in space. The men cheered with tremendous excitement whenever a bridge was finished. Their applause was not entirely disinterested, as I had to stand them a feast on any such occasions.

No serious trouble was met in launching any of the bridges, all of which are of a very strong type, capable of taking the heaviest motor-lorries that are likely to use the road for many years to come. Twelve steel bridges in all were erected. Bridging steel had to be transported 600 miles from the port of Basra, the last 100 miles being over the partially finished road. I may here remark that steel bridges are not really æsthetically in keeping with these remarkable gorges. Reinforced concrete arch spans would be ideal, but speed of erection and lower cost made it imperative to use steel bridges throughout the road.

The work progressed steadily and by 1931 a fairly well metalled road suitable for any weather was available to within thirty miles of

the frontier. There had been a steady improvement in the metalled surface as adequate machinery was gradually acquired. There are now six steam rollers, four stone crushers, and several tractors at work. To make the surface durable it has been finished with a layer of bitumen, one of the products of 'Iraq which should help greatly towards a high standard of road surfacing throughout the country. A good deal remains to be done, however, to complete the metalling and surfacing of this road, both in the 'Iraq section and in the Persian section. During the military operations of last spring scores of 'Iraq army six-wheeled lorries were running on this road, which was the artery for the attack upon Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan.

Kurdish Opinion on Road Construction

Quite the most pleasing feature of the Rowanduz Road work has been the enthusiasm with which it has been received by the Kurdish people through whose country it passes. Road construction has not been opposed anywhere in 'Iraq and working parties have not been molested. Though at first surprised at this helpful attitude, several years' experience have shown that all the Kurdish leaders have a very genuine wish for progress and education and are quite prepared to permit Government control even at the cost of much of their old tribal power. They realize only too well that they are backward, but they are by no means stupid and have been quick to see the advantages they gain by having good roads.

Throughout the effective period of the British mandate the tribal people had a surprising confidence in British justice, and they felt that the officers with whom they came in contact genuinely desired to help them forward—as indeed was the case. Inter-tribal fights became less frequent, because the administrative officers pointed out their absurdity. An understanding sprang up that any tribe could use the new roads without infringing the territorial rights of hitherto enemy tribes. Without loss to either side of their all-important tribal dignity, they could travel where they liked along these new roads without the customary tribal fighting, usually so costly to both parties. It was only when they took to the old routes that trouble still arose, as when one tribe attempted forcibly to penetrate the territory of the Barzan tribes in the autumn of 1931. The obvious solution is to build more roads.

Robberies of motor-cars or caravans on the new roads in the tribal territories are so far almost unknown, except where there are military

operations in hand. Then they become at once ~~unusually~~ ^{very} serious, because the tribesmen consider military transport as the spoils of war.

During the five years' work on the Rowanduz Road one hundred thousand pounds for the payment of the labour gangs were transported through wild country guarded by only a few policemen or tribesmen. We were never once robbed or interfered with. The road had been deliberately aligned through the territories of the worst tribes who had given most trouble. As the road advanced one chief after another became friendly and sent his men to work upon it. On many occasions I have been held up by mud or by snow on the long journey from Erbil to road-head with the cash chest, but never by tribesmen. Often I had to seek a night's lodging in some village whose headman had a bad reputation. The guest rooms and the best food were always provided for my little party.

As the road went ahead every chief in turn showed his friendship, and when their tribesmen saw the value of the road and were paid for constructing and maintaining it, they all became loyal to the Government, and are so still. This experience was not unique to the Rowanduz Road. Works' parties and Government officials were usually treated courteously if there were no military operations.

The Barzan and Shirwan Roads

In the course of deciding the location of the Rowanduz Road provision was made to allow of two important branch roads being led off easily into the rather inaccessible Barzan territory.

These roads were to pass :

1. From Khalifan through the Barzan valley near Zibar or Billeh to join with the head of the newly constructed Amadia Road.
2. From Balkian through the Shirwan district to the country proposed for Assyrian settlement near Kani Rash.

The Khalifan branch has not yet been commenced. The Balkian branch was begun in 1930, and as it progressed no opposition was raised by Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan, though it was of course quite clear to the Shaikh that the road was being built to open up his land. As was usual, his men came and worked upon the road under the tactful Kurdish supervisor. This was not the first work to be carried out in this territory, for some years previously the building of police posts had been proceeding in his districts without any trouble. One of the usual large "Serais" (or blockhouses) had been built at Billeh quite

near the Shaikh's own village, and another was built at Kani Rash in the north. Both these buildings took two years to complete owing to the immense difficulty of transporting materials 170 miles from rail-head over mountain ranges. Hundreds of mules were employed to carry valuable stores through the Shaikh's territory, and though quite unguarded they were never robbed on any occasion. The tribesmen themselves hired such animals as they could spare to the Department.

It seems a great pity that the construction of both roads was not pushed vigorously ahead by the Government in order that their pacifying effect might be felt in those districts where there was inter-tribal trouble. This unrest was considered sufficient to justify the attempt to capture Shaikh Ahmad in the latter part of 1931. The Public Works staff were most anxious, and repeatedly offered, both to construct the roads and to erect substantial buildings wherever required, and anticipated no more difficulty than in the past years when they had worked under similar conditions in the same district and elsewhere.

The Public Works Department laboured under many difficulties, but they were rarely caused by Shaikhs or tribesmen. For some reason the 'Iraq National Army was brought up to the Balkian branch road before it was completed. This was regarded by the tribesmen as a declaration of war and threw the country into hostility, with disorder, robberies, and loss of life; order was only restored after intensive air action. Rather than seek quarter the Shaikh eventually preferred to give himself up to his old enemies the Turks. He was very offended.

As one who greatly wishes to see 'Iraq a stable and united country, I suggest that it does not seem to be in the best interests of 'Iraq to use the National Army to settle tribal quarrels. It is well known that internal administration is not the duty of a national army and is only a resort of weak nations with inadequate police. Its use in 'Iraq is the more strange because there is already a very fine police force which was doing excellent work in the tribal districts under 'Iraqi officers. They were of great assistance to the Rowanduz Road work.

It seems unwise to stigmatize any tribes as being so disloyal that the National Army must be directed against them. When the army enters their territory the tribesmen consider they are regarded as outlaws by those in authority, and they act accordingly; but police do not create the same impression. Single tribes may be subjugated by an army, specially when air assistance is called in, but conquest by force is not nearly as good as having won the willing co-operation of the tribes *without* force; the use of force only seems to leave bitterness

and makes for future difficulties. How much better, for example, if Shaikh Ahmad had been today in his own land, proud of his place in the 'Iraq nation.

'Iraq can get the goodwill of all the Minorities if she really tries. From experience with them it would seem to be a perfectly easy matter, especially if the many natural resources of the country—hydro-electricity, irrigation, afforestation, wool and cotton growing, dyeing and weaving, refrigeration of mutton and fruit, and the improvement of rail, road, and water communications—are pushed rapidly ahead to provide peaceful occupation for all. Specially should more lands be irrigated for those Assyrians still unsettled. When the goodwill of all the races is obtained, and the word "minority" ceases to have any significance in 'Iraq, then only will the British pledges to the League of Nations become fully justified, and 'Iraq herself will be enormously strengthened.

The secret is goodwill, not coercion.


Tribal Psychology

After a study of the Kurdish tribesmen during the course of this road work, some conclusions are suggested as to how "peaceful penetration" is best conducted.

Roads and public works secure the administration of tribal districts more cheaply and *far more permanently* than any other means.

An army is apt to be a hindrance rather than a help. Its presence causes tension, and tribesmen then move about only in parties and fully armed. A large army consumes much food and usually causes an acute local shortage of flour, such as occurred in the Rowanduz district in April last year. Moreover, the fact of there being a large army near him gives the Shaikh arbitrary tribal powers that he does not normally possess. In its origin this custom is the same as that which confers special powers upon any Western Government in time of war. It is, of course, most undesirable that a Shaikh should be given an opportunity of enforcing any emergency powers, such as the rounding up of his tribesmen and the interruption of their ordinary work.

A few police would seem to be the best adjunct to pioneer work, preferably men of the area. Also some tribesmen supplied by the Shaikh himself are usually a great asset, as he is then absolutely responsible for the lives and property of those he agrees to guard, and the compliment rather flatters his vanity. It is a rigid tribal law that such a trust must not be abused by either party. By using this protection nothing was



ever stolen from the Rowanduz Road work by the tribesmen. The men of the particular Shaikh nearest to the work must always be used, otherwise there may be jealousy and danger.

At the same time, care should be taken to explain to the Shaikh that the Government asks for his co-operation and that he himself is sure to benefit by the opening of his lands. Fair compensation should be allowed to him for damage to crops, gardens, or irrigation channels if interfered with in any way. His tribesmen should be employed in every capacity, but if the season warrants their wishing to return to their own cultivation this should not be disregarded. They should be adequately compensated if injured while engaged upon Government work.

There should be a doctor or surgical dresser for those employed or for any others. Nothing impresses tribesmen more than medical attendance. Wounded men from any tribal faction used to come frequently to be dressed by the Assyrian medical orderly in the Rowanduz Road hospital tent.

By using these peaceful means, and taking a little care not to stir up hostilities, a road system can usually be built which will completely alter the Shaikh's power over his followers and make it impossible for him to collect a force even if he should wish to do so.


As a last resort, the road can be used for military measures which would be impossible without a road, but this is most undesirable unless in extreme emergency, because it shakes the confidence of all the tribesmen in the country as to the *bona fide* objective of roads, and tends to make road construction more difficult, or perhaps impossible, in the future.


It is probable that of the three countries—Turkey, Iraq, and Persia—which partition tribal Kurdistan today, the most successful will be that country which gains the goodwill and co-operation of the Kurds by the application of these simple principles.


The Rowanduz Road may or may not prove to be an important trade route, but it will at least remain as a permanent record, carved in the mountains of Kurdistan, of the goodwill of the mountain people towards orderly and peaceful administration.

Mrs. McGRATH (Rosita Forbes), who had travelled over the Rowanduz route while it was still unfinished, paid a well-merited tribute to

the trade agreement of 1932, signed between the Governor of Sinkiang and the Bolshevik agent at Urumchi, gave Russia most substantial advantages in this direction; in return China received nothing of any value. The Soviet position further to the east is assured, with Outer Mongolia definitely absorbed by the U.S.S.R.







MONGOLIA, KANSU, AND SINKIANG AS SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE HAARDT- CITROËN EXPEDITION*

By W. PETRO

THE subject of this lecture is the crossing of the Gobi desert by the "China Group" of the Citroën-Haardt Expedition and the Muhammadan rebellion in Sinkiang of a year ago. But, to begin with, I shall give you a brief history of the expedition. Georges-Marie Haardt and L. Audouin-Dubreuil, having made two successful exploration trips across Africa, organized a similar expedition across Asia. Mr. Citroën, as he had done for the Central African expeditions, placed at their disposal all technical services of his factories and guaranteed the financial backing of this venture. Mr. Haardt's purpose was to cover as much ground as possible in Asia and to preserve for the future the now rapidly changing face of that continent by means of photography, moving pictures, paintings, and scientific investigations. He invited among others two noted French scientists to make the trip, Father Teilhard du Chardin, a geologist of international repute, and M. Hackin, an archæologist who had carried on important research work in Afghanistan. French and foreign scientific societies alike were patrons of the expedition and valuable collaboration was given by the National Geographic Society of Washington, which sent a representative, Mr. Williams, in the field. Mr. Williams has brought back remarkable photographic documentation of countries through which the expedition passed.

Mr. Haardt, a pioneer of motor transport in regions which previously had only been reached by camel caravans, planned to travel from the Mediterranean to the Pacific by automobile. He made a thorough study of an itinerary across Asia and he thought it would be possible to go by car through Syria, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, Russian Turkistan, Sinkiang, Mongolia, and China. When all preparations for the expedition were complete, the Soviet Government cancelled the previously given permission to enter Russian territory.

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 21, 1932, Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes in the Chair.

The route to Sinkiang through the Afghan corridor and the Wakhiir Pass was also closed on account of a serious rebellion north of the Hindu-Kush. There remained only the possibility of passing from Afghanistan into India by the Khyber Pass and then of reaching Sinkiang either by the Leh or the Gilgit route over the Himalayas. The execution of this project required special permissions of H.B.M.'s Government and of the India Office. To obtain the necessary permits Mr. Haardt asked the aid of his old friend Major-General Sir Ernest Swinton. Thanks to General Swinton and to Colonel Gabriel, a member of this Society, permits were granted and the expedition was made possible. I take this opportunity of stating that when the expedition eventually reached India it received a hearty welcome, generous hospitality, and efficient assistance from all British military and civil authorities. It is regrettable that Mr. Haardt's untimely death prevented him from telling his British friends that this kind reception of a French expedition was greatly appreciated not only by the members of the expedition, but also by the whole French nation.

This itinerary—entering Sinkiang through Northern India—presented new difficulties. The expedition had to cross the highest mountains in the world—the Himalayas and the Pamirs. It was considered impossible to employ motor transport over the narrow and dangerous mountain trails, and for this reason Mr. Haardt divided the expedition into two groups. The first group, called the Pamir group, was to leave Beyrouth under his personal leadership and travel eastward by car as far as Srinagar. The crossing of the mountains was to be made on foot or on horseback. On the other side of the Pamirs, at Kashgar, Mr. Haardt planned to be met by a second group, called the China group, with cars which had to be driven from Tientsin across Mongolia and Sinkiang. The leadership of the China group was entrusted to a young but very brilliant French naval officer, Lieut.-Commander Point.

From now on I shall only deal with the China group, of which I was a member. It was composed of Point, the geologist Father Teilhard du Chardin, the naturalist Mr. Reymond, the engineer Mr. Brull, a doctor, a photographer, seven mechanics, a wireless operator, and myself. We had at our disposal seven Citroën-Kegresse caterpillar tractors with trailers and two Citroën trucks on wheels.

The choice of our itinerary across the Gobi was a difficult problem. We had to reach Kashgar as quickly as possible, and the only controlling point on our way was the city of Suchow in north-western

Kansu, where we thought it most convenient to establish our main supply depot. After a year-long investigation we decided to follow the so-called "New Caravan Trail to Sinkiang" which has been used by caravans since the Outer Mongolian Frontier has been closed by the Mongolian Soviet Republic. This trail had never before been followed by foreigners who, like Sven Hedin and Owen Lattimore, crossed the Gobi by the Shan Te Miao Road which passes through an extensive area of high sand dunes, while the "New Trail" was reported to cross the dunes through a narrow neck.

For the organization of supply depots on the four thousand mile stretch from Peking to Kashgar thirteen camel caravans with petrol, lubricating oil, spare parts, and food supplies had been shipped months in advance, and by April 4, 1931, all these caravans but one had reached their destinations. Our cars could normally carry petrol for a distance of four hundred miles over rough trails. For our return trip from Sinkiang to Peking supply depots were established every 300 to 450 miles. As going out we would not have as many passengers nor as much load as after our junction with Mr. Haardt, we calculated that we could carry enough petrol in the cars for a distance of 1,000 miles.

The most convenient point to send a large stock of petrol on the way from Kalgan to Suchow was Pei Ling Miao, an important lamaserie on the Mongol Plateau situated about 350 miles W.N.W. of Kalgan and about 950 miles from Suchow. Therefore our second controlling point had to be Pei Ling Miao. We left Tientsin on April 6 and in a few days reached Kalgan, where we were delayed until May 15 because of the usual political difficulties that arise in China.

Leaving Kalgan, we climbed on to the Mongol Plateau by the Wan Chuen Pass, which is about 15 miles north-west of Kalgan. The Mongol Plateau has an average altitude of over 4,000 feet. Our itinerary from Kalgan to Edzin Gol followed more or less the 42nd parallel of latitude, quite near the Outer Mongolian border. It passed first through the Grass Land, then through a mountainous, more arid region, and then through desert. The "Grass Land" (Ta Ts'ao Ti in Chinese) extends, roughly speaking, from Kalgan to Pei Ling Miao. It is easy, rolling country, where one can travel everywhere in an automobile at a high rate of speed. In this area, after the melting of the snow, luxuriant grass appears everywhere, and in certain places a carpet of flowers covers the country. The grass dies out within a month, but there is usually sufficient vegetation left to maintain large

flocks of sheep, herds of horses, and wild grvelles throughout the year. Water is found in this area in a number of lakes and rivers which dry out late in the summer. Wells are numerous and are found along the trails about every 12 or 15 miles.

The Chinese have penetrated somewhat into the Grass Land and pushed the Mongols away from the borders of the plateau. The plateau is inhabited by the Chahar Mongols subdivided into several "banners" and ruled by their princes. There are many large lama-series in the Grass Land. The most important are Shara Muren and Pei Ling Miao. The lamas of lower rank may be called the vermin of the country and are extremely repulsive. Their sensual, greasy faces bear signs of depravity and are devoid of any intelligence. On the other hand, the lay Mongols are truthful, honest, and hospitable.

The area which is intermediary between the Grass Land and the desert extends westward from Pei Ling Miao for about 180 miles to Uniussu. The country is quite rough, as it is near the point of flexure of the Ta Ching Shan Mountains. The climate is more arid than in the Grass Land, but there are still several well-watered valleys which offer good grazing for both domestic and wild animals. In the cragged peaks west of Pei Ling Miao some of the finest specimens of Asiatic wild sheep are found. Real desert begins west of Uniussu and extends as far as the Sinkiang borders. It is broken in the middle by the flourishing oasis of Edzin Gol. Between Uniussu and Edzin Gol we found the scenery repeating itself over and over along our itinerary. We passed through wide sandy plains, covered occasionally with scanty scrub or saksauls or tamarisks. We went over the gravel "sai," enormous, completely barren areas covered by gravel. Sometimes in the wide plains stand high masses of clay capped by consolidated gravels. They give the geologist the opportunity to read the history of the plateau. For miles we passed through the so-called Black Gobi, areas of much weathered black shales traversed by a multitude of narrow quartz veins. The shales are faulted and foliated under lateral pressure. Everything is black with white streaks. The topography of the country is peculiar. There are no well-defined valleys, but a series of small enclosed basins. One imagines lunar scenery to be like this. It is sinister but beautiful. There are two belts of sand dunes which cross the Gobi from south to north. The first, called the Kuai Tze Hu, begins in the Ala Shan and ends somewhere in Outer Mongolia. To the best of my knowledge this belt is continuous and has no openings. Its width varies from 5 to 100 miles. We crossed

it at the narrowest point. The second is parallel and quite near the right bank of the Edzin Gol River. It is not continuous and is of lesser importance than the former.

There were hardly any grazing grounds and very few Mongol encampments along our itinerary, but after every few "camel stages" we came upon Sino-Mongol trading posts such as Uniussu, Hoyer Amatu, Painte Tologoi, consisting of one, two, or three yurts occupied by Chinese traders from Kalgan who barter with the Mongols. They exchange cloth, tobacco, and millet for furs, wool, and skins.

In the spring and summer terrific sand storms sweep over Mongolia. We had a peculiar experience with our cars during one of them—the particles of sand striking the bodies of the cars, which are isolated from the ground by rubber tyres, electrified the cars to such an extent that one felt a fairly severe electric shock when one touched the car. In the sandy plains the camel trail often disappears after a sandstorm, but one can always pick it up either by the carcasses of camels or by the obos. Obos are the road signs of the desert. An ancient custom, equally respected by the Chinese and Mongols, requires a traveller to make a pile of stones whenever he stops along a trail, or to add more stones to an existing pile. Large obos are always found near water points and other controlling points such as entrances of valleys and mountain passes. They have also a religious significance and are considered sacred. The wells along the desert trails are also entrusted to the traveller's care. They are usually protected by a wooden board, then by a sheepskin weighed down by large rocks brought in some cases from a great distance. It is the law of the desert that anyone taking water from a well must carefully replace the protective coverings. If he failed to do so, sand would soon fill up the well.

The valley of Edzin Gol, with its luxuriant jungle of wild poplars and tamarisks, is well known through the descriptions in Sir Aurel Stein's and Sven Hedin's works. We followed it up to Suchow, but had to cross and recross the river several times in order to keep on the hard gravel "sai." At the confluence of Pei Ta Ho and Hei Li Tze Ho rivers we left the main road and made a detour in the desert, thus avoiding an area overrun by bandits. We crossed the Great Wall and arrived at Suchow, the first city beyond the desert, three and a half weeks after we had left Kalgan. Our average daily progress, including all stops, was about 60 miles. This is only three times faster than camel caravans travel. Still, we considered it a success.

Suchow we found in political ferment. It was just occupied by General Ma Pu Fang, who had brought his troops across the Richthofen Mountains, from the Kuku-Nor region. He had driven out of Suchow General Ma Chong Yng, who for several months had been military dictator of north-western Kansu. Ma Chong Yng might well be the hero of a Chinese Odyssey.* At the age of seventeen he had asked his uncle, the Governor of Ching Hai Province (Kuku-Nor), to give him command of a regiment so that he could attack Feng Yu Hsian. Feng Yu Hsian, the so-called "Christian General," had occupied Kansu and Shensi Provinces from 1924 to 1929 and had greatly oppressed the Chinese Muhammadans (Dungans). When his uncle refused his request, Ma Chong Yng left home with only a few dollars in his pocket and two followers. Before long he had organized an armed band which was looting travellers on the road and also attacking isolated detachments of Feng Yu Hsian's troops. He proved to be such a capable and fearless leader that his reputation spread far and wide and deserters from Feng's army flocked into his ranks. In 1929, when Feng was at war with the Central Government, Ma Chong Yng had gathered a division under his command. By a series of fast and decisive blows to Feng's rear he cut off Feng's army communication between Sianfu and Lanchow, disorganized his supply service, and in this way was partly responsible for the victory of the Central Government.

After that Ma Chong Yng took his division into an area near the Yellow River, halfway between Paotow and Ningsia, and went personally to Nanking to see Marshal Chiang Kai Shek. He asked in return for services rendered to be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Central Government forces of Kansu and Sinkiang, and he drew the Marshal's attention to the fact that the Province of Sinkiang, although very rich, paid no revenue to the Central Government. Chiang Kai Shek, who probably knew that the only way to become Governor-General of Sinkiang is to murder the existing Governor, is reported to have said: "If you get control of Sinkiang, I shall ratify your appointment." This satisfied Ma Chong Yng. He at once assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief and ordered himself a large official seal. He went back to his troops and started plans for a campaign against Sinkiang. A Muhammadan himself, he hoped to be supported by the entire Muslim population of Sinkiang.

* See also R.C.A.S. JOURNAL, January, 1932, p. 69, "Islam in N.W. China," by Rev. G. Findlay Andrews.

His first problem was of a financial character, but he solved it in a very simple way: he laid siege to the rich city of Ningsia, and lifted it only after having received a ransom consisting of money and equipment for his troops. He then made one of the most astounding marches that has been made in China since Ch'ien Lung's time. With two thousand men he crossed the Alashan Desert (about 400 miles) and suddenly appeared before the city of Kanchow, which he took by surprise. Before long he extended his rule over north-western Kansu as far as the Sinkiang borders, and had under his control three rich cities—Kanchow, Suchow, and Ansi. This freed him from any financial worry and allowed him to reorganize his army, to establish strict discipline, and to prepare thoroughly his expedition to Sinkiang. To aid him in this undertaking he secured the services of an ex-colonel of the Turkish Imperial General Staff, Kemal Bey, an officer of high standing who spoke French, German, and English fluently.

When Ma Chong Yng was almost ready to start on his adventurous raid, the Turkis (Eastern Turks) of the Hami region revolted against the Chinese and asked his help and alliance. Ma Chong Yng accepted at once, as it gave him the assurance of being able to take the strongly fortified city of Hami which barred his way to Sinkiang. To protect his rear before moving his troops out of Kansu, Ma Chong Yng entered into a secret alliance with his cousin, General Ma Pu Fang, commander of troops of the Ching Hai Province (Kuku-Nor). Ma Pu Fang could not enter a neighbouring province with his troops, as even in China such a move requires at least an official pretext. So the two generals staged a "sham" war which made it possible for Ma Pu Fang to ask the Central Government for a mandate to lead a punitive expedition against Ma Chong Yng. Thus it happened that two or three days before our arrival at Suchow, Ma Pu Fang's troops occupied the cities of Kanchow and Suchow, while Ma Chong Yng concentrated his forces at Ansi and Tunhwang.

Under the circumstances Ma Pu Fang did not want to allow a group of foreigners, well informed about the situation at Suchow and equipped with wireless, to leave for Sinkiang. He virtually held us of the Citroën-Haardt Expedition prisoners and prevented us from using our wireless. Thanks only to the friendly but not disinterested help of the local Chief of Staff were we able to obtain permission to proceed to Hami by the desert route, avoiding the "disturbed area" of Ansi and Hsing Hsing Hsia, where we already had established depots of supplies.

We again crossed the Gobi by a caravan trail passing through the Ma Tsung Shan Mountains and entering Sinkiang by the Ming Shui Pass. This trail proved to be easy as it crossed the mountains through large valleys and easy passes. There was excellent shooting by the way, and we secured some specimens of *Gazella Subgutturosa* and of *Ovis Argali* and *Ovis Ammon*. The wild asses and horses which we saw near the Sinkiang borders proved to be too fast runners for our hunters.

Near the Ming Shui Pass, at the spring, we found driven into the ground a stick with an inscription in Chinese. It had been left by some caravan leader as a warning to his colleagues. It said: "Don't go west. There is trouble. Hide your camels in the mountains and wait." Evidently something serious was happening around Hami.

The Ming Shui Pass is very impressive. Here the Mongol Plateau ends abruptly and the first of a series of depressions of southern Turkistan stretches infinitely to the west. From here to Hami the trail was excellent and hard, and we could again step freely on the accelerators. Sixty miles west of Ming Shui we saw ahead of us a large caravan also going west. Great was our joy to find that it was our missing caravan which left Paotow five months previously. The caravan leader told us that he read the "Gazette of the Desert" at Ming Shui, but that he decided to risk the journey westward as the cargo consisted mostly of metal parts and lubricating oil which was of no value to anybody except to ourselves, and that consequently he hoped it would not be looted. We advised the caravan leader to follow, as a matter of precaution, the smuggler's trail which passes far from the main road, and we promised to send him a guide to lead him through the dangerous area around Hami.

Yi Ko Shu, the first village situated on the edge of the oasis of Hami, was in flames when we arrived there, and we heard in the distance rifle and machine gun firing. The village was abandoned except by two excited Turkis who kept repeating to us in broken Chinese:

"They are fighting, they are fighting."

"Who is fighting?"

"Oh, everybody is!"

We followed the main road, and at a turn in the valley came upon a large force of Chinese troops defending themselves against Muhammadan rebels who were occupying the crests on both sides of the valley. When we appeared on the scene the firing suddenly ceased and the rebels retreated. They thought, as we learned afterwards, that

we were Chinese reinforcements in armoured cars, and that our cinema camera, set on a tripod on the top of one of the cars, was a machine gun. The Chinese greeted us politely and the officers told us that they were retreating from the frontier post of Hsing Hsing Hsia, which had been attacked by an overwhelming number of Muhammadans; that passing through this valley they omitted to have flank guards and had been suddenly attacked from both sides which resulted in heavy losses. The road, blocked by overturned carts and corpses of men and animals, bore witness to this statement.

Soon a relief column arrived from Hami and reported the road clear. We proceeded ahead of the troops and camped outside the city walls of Hami on June 28, 1931. At Hami, General Chu, Commander of the Garrison, informed us that the road to Urumchi had been cut for some time by the rebels, but he gave us permission to proceed there at our own risk and peril. We went therefore to seek the help of the Muhammadans. Five hundred yards from the Chinese city of Hami is the Muhammadan city of Kumul, the seat of the local Muslim princes. There we learned that the Prince was held prisoner by the Chinese at Urumchi, but that his son, the young Duke Pei Sir, would grant us an audience.

The Duke told us that he was remaining neutral in the present rebellion and that consequently he had no authority over the rebel Turkis who blocked the road. He said that the only thing he could do was send a messenger to tell the rebel pickets that we were his personal guests, and he hoped this would be enough to assure our safety. The Duke could not do anything to protect our caravan, but advised us to send a messenger to the caravan leader with his card and an official Chinese *laissez-passer*.

Saving the caravan was of the greatest importance. The success of the expedition might be jeopardized if the spare parts which it carried were not available for the return trip from Kashgar to the coast. As I had been in charge of all preparations in China and of the organization of supplies between Peking and Kashgar, I decided to remain in Hami to look after things. I kept with me Kumho, our faithful Mongol friend and interpreter, and the Chinese guide who had come with us from Suchow. The Chinese guide I sent at once to meet the caravan and to lead it by the Chol Tagh desert straight to Turfan. I also kept with me a truck which needed some repairs. The rest of the expedition left Hami on July 1, and I heard that the rebel pickets let them pass unmolested.

The Chinese General in command at Hami assigned me quarters in the house of a Turki who had taken the side of the Chinese in the present struggle and who held the rank of an honorary colonel in the Chinese Army. From him I heard much of the origin of the rebellion. He told me the following history:

For centuries the region of Hami or Kumul had been a semi-independent state, and it had been ruled since A.D. 1699 by members of the same House. The princes of Kumul paid a nominal tribute to the Peking Court and their titles were ratified by the Manchu Emperors. Although the Chinese maintained military garrisons at Hami and at Hsing Hsing Hsia, all local affairs were handled by the princes. It was the prince who collected taxes, administered justice, maintained an armed force, and had the right of life and death over all his subjects.

When the old and wise Prince Shah Mahsud died in 1930, the Governor of Sinkiang decided that the propitious moment had come to do away with the local independence of Hami. With this end in view he invited the heir, Prince Nazar, to come to Urumchi to discuss matters pertaining to affairs of state, and held him prisoner. Then he issued the following proclamation:

"Since China has become a Republic, the entire population, regardless of race and religion, should benefit by being freed from the oppression of petty rulers and be subject to one code of law and to one National Administration. The Governor of Sinkiang, being responsible to the National Government for the welfare of Muslim citizens within his territory, has therefore taken over the functions of the former Princes."

At the same time he announced the reduction of taxes.

At first the Muslim population submitted passively to the new regime, and their experience might well be compared to that of western foreigners living in treaty ports of China proper who had been deprived of their extraterritorial rights. The tax rates were indeed reduced, but the value of land and cattle was assessed at much higher rates, with the result that the burden of taxation was heavier than before. The Muslim population could get no satisfaction from the Chinese courts, to which they were now forced to appeal as proceedings were carried on in Chinese and not sufficient interpreters were provided. Furthermore, the Chinese introduced garrisons in many new places and the people now suffered from the usual exactions of Chinese soldiery.

This was too much. Three months after the Chinese had taken

over control of local affairs, the lowlanders, deciding to resort to arms, abandoned their fields, villages, and gardens and fled to the mountains.

The Chinese, seeing that they had gone too far, sent a new "High Pacification Commissioner," General Chu, to negotiate matters at Hami. Chu pretended to adopt a lenient policy and solemnly promised that the *status quo* would be restored and that the deposed prince would be reinstated. Instead of keeping his word General Chu ordered the forces from Barkul to surround the rebels, who repulsed this treacherous attack and naturally lost all faith in the Chinese. A real state of war began.

It was then that the rebels sought the aid of Ma Chong Yng. Ma Chong Yng agreed, and with four thousand men crossed the 350 miles of desert between Ansi and Hami and joined the Turks on the same day on which we arrived at Hami. His first move was to send a letter to General Chu. This letter was worded as follows:

"By order of National Government of China I have been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all military forces of Kansu and Sinkiang. Having assumed my new post on this date, I allow you to petition for your resignation and I order you to hand over to me the command of the Hami Garrison."

"Urgent order."

General Chu, who had personally received the two messengers who brought the letter, ordered the head of one of them to be cut off in his presence, and as a reply sent it back to Ma Chong Yng by the other.

That night, June 3, Hami was encircled by the rebels and a general assault was launched against the city by joint Dungan and Turki forces. This assault lasted two days and two nights. Wave after wave of rebels rushed towards the high walls under the terrific machine gun and rifle fire of the garrison. The first ranks were composed of Chinese slaves, whose only duty was to place ladders against the city walls. Next came Ma Chong Yng's Dungan soldiers armed with big swords, who tried to climb up the wall. In the third line were the best Turki marksmen, who with their rifle fire covered the advance of the Dungans. The Dungans succeeded in getting over the city wall in three places, but their success was not supported by the reserves, and they were literally torn to pieces by the Chinese.

The Chinese garrison was exceedingly well armed. There was an immense stock of modern rifles and ammunition, four machine guns, hand grenades, two Krupp 65 mm. howitzers, and a number of old brass cannons.

During the assault medieval methods of defence were also used with success. The soldiers hurled down on the rebels huge rocks and burning hay sprinkled with oil (*our* lubricating oil, alas!).

On the morning of the third day the attack ceased. The losses on both sides had been serious. On the ground near the city wall were heaps of corpses, from which the rebels stole their dead for burial, while the Chinese left the bodies of their men to be devoured by packs of hungry dogs.

For two weeks there were no further serious attacks on the city, although every night there was always terrific firing from both sides.

As in the daytime there seemed to be no enemy on the western side of the city, I decided to make an attempt to reach Kumul where I hoped to be able to get some news about our caravan. My host lent me a horse, and with the authorization of the Chinese colonel I left the city. On the way to Kumul I met only one Turki picket. The men smiled and greeted me politely and let me pass when I told them I was going to see the Duke Pei Sir.

When I arrived at Kumul I went to see the Prince's interpreter, Osman Haji, who spoke excellent Chinese. Since our first meeting we had been friends. While I sat chatting with him in the courtyard a group of excited Dungs and Turkis rushed in to seize me. Osman stopped them with imperative gesture: "This gentleman is my guest. You cannot touch him." They retreated, but I was requested to stay where I was until orders were received from the Commander-in-Chief, Ma Chong Yng. Next morning a Dungan officer came and told me that the Commander-in-Chief would be glad to receive me.

The headquarters of the rebels were established in a fortified farm. A huge, very orderly camp was set outside. I was told to wait in a tent. Before long a Turk dressed in Chinese military uniform came and asked me in perfect French: "A quoi ai-je l'honneur de votre visite?" He was the famous Colonel Kemal.

I had a long and most interesting talk with Kemal, who afterwards went to report my arrival to the Commander-in-Chief. Ma Chong Yng, awakened from a sound sleep, said: "What, a foreigner? Send him to the mountains to look after the horses." Kemal, however, was glad to have a foreigner to talk to and asked me to remain in the camp as his personal guest. I spent six days with him. He explained the reason of his collaboration with Ma Chong Yng by saying that he was working for the Pan-Islamic movement. From him I learned of the latest activities of the rebels.

After the first assault on Hami, Ma Chong Yng had given his troops but one day's rest. Leaving only a thousand men around Hami, he led his cavalry over the Karlygh Tagh Mountains and took by surprise the fortified Chinese town of Barkul (Chien Hsi), where he had slain most of the Chinese garrison and taken a large military booty. He left only a hundred men to occupy Barkul and went over little-known mountain trails through the Karlygh Tagh and the Bogdo Ola Mountains to Chi Ku Ching Tze, where the Chinese had concentrated an army of over ten thousand men. The rebels crept up at night to the camp and suddenly opened fire from all sides. Dreadful confusion ensued, which resulted in complete annihilation of the Chinese troops, whose commander committed suicide.

Ma Chong Yng left a small detachment of his men to block the road leading from Turfan and Urumchi to Hami and returned to Hami with his forces. There, after a few days' rest, he ordered a new assault on the city.

This attack, more violent than the first one, took place while I was staying at the rebel headquarters. The next day I heard that a Chinese officer carrying a white flag appeared on the city wall and asked that negotiations for peace be opened.

As I had not been able to obtain the release of our caravan, which was in the hands of the rebels, I jumped at this chance of returning to Hami, where I had left not only my friend Kumbo but also our truck and valuable baggage. I therefore offered my services for the negotiations. Ma Chong Yng sent for me and asked my opinion on the situation. I told him that if honourable conditions were offered to the Chinese they might accept. Ma Chong Yng, a man of rapid decision, at once wrote a letter to General Chu and gave it to me to deliver.

With a white handkerchief in my hand I rode through no-man's-land. Not a shot was fired. At the blockhouse, just outside the city wall, several Chinese soldiers rushed at me, dragged me off my horse, and started beating me. Luckily an officer who knew me appeared on the scene, ordered the men off, and led me to his Colonel.

The Colonel, a good friend of mine, told me frankly that most of the high commanding officers were of the opinion that the only thing to do was to surrender the fortress, as the losses were heavy and the troops completely demoralized. The General, on the contrary, stubbornly refused to open negotiations and insisted on continuing the defence, trusting more to the advice of the local sorcerer than to that of his staff.

The General, informed of my return, sent for me, and I was received in the presence of the entire Defence Council. I expected to be questioned about the rebels, their forces, armament, losses, etc. Great was my surprise when the General asked me only one question: "Is it true that Ma Chong Yng is only twenty years old?" When I replied that Ma was indeed about that age, the old General turned to his council: "I am eighty-one years old," he said, "and my hair has been white for a long time. My great-grandson is older than this suckling. How do you think I can surrender the city to an infant?" The members of the council hung their heads in shame, and it was unanimously decided to continue the defence.

Three and a half months after the first assault the city of Hami was still besieged. Every sortie attempted by the garrison had been repulsed. Losses had been heavy. Of the 6,000 original defenders only 2,500 remained. Twice the rebels had dug tunnels and blown up the city wall. Food became scarce. Camels, horses, and mules were slaughtered and eaten. In the food shops in the bazar only opium could be bought. Wheat flour had been exhausted and the soldiers were reduced to daily rations of $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. of kaolian flour, and in two weeks even that would be finished. At the same time, just outside the city wall, thousands of crows swarmed over the unharvested wheat fields.

The situation in the city was indeed gloomy. Not one of the sixteen messengers who had been sent to Urumchi had returned and no news had been heard about the long expected and anxiously awaited relief column from the capital. In desperation, General Chu agreed to send a delegation to Ma Chong Yng to open negotiations for peace. All the members of this delegation but one, the Mullah, were made prisoners, and the reply came back that only complete and unconditional surrender would be accepted.

Then only I obtained the General's permission to try to escape with my truck, provided I should agree to take a message to the Governor-General of Sinkiang.

At night a breach in the city wall was made, and in the dark I succeeded in passing through the rebel lines and gaining the Piedmont gravels situated between the Karlygh Tagh Mountains and the chain of oases along which the main road passes. Next night I crossed the main road occupied by the rebels and gained the Chol Tagh desert. For eight days Kumbo and I drove our car without guide or map through most desolate country, through a desert full of deep ravines,

sandy depressions, huge Aolian mesas of clay and salt lakes. On the ninth day, having exhausted our water and food supply, we came to Pichang, from where we quickly reached Turfan and Urumchi, much to the astonishment of all Chinese. At Urumchi I found my friend and chief, Lieut.-Commander Point, who had once tried at the risk of his own life to come to my rescue, but who had been turned back by the fire of the rebels who shot through his petrol tank.

The Governor of Sinkiang having finally raised a large army of Chinese, Mongols, and White Russians, defeated the rebels and delivered Hami on October 25. Ma Chong Yng, who had been badly wounded, fled with his Dungans back to Kansu and became Brigade-Commander in the 22nd Division of the Chinese Central Government's Army, a division commanded by his cousin and ally, Ma Pu Fang.

On the same day that the Chinese troops entered Hami, Point and I met Georges-Marie Haardt and the Pamir Group of the Citroën-Haardt Expedition at the Manan Chose Daban, halfway between Turfan and Kashgar.

In thanking the lecturer the Chairman drew attention to the description given of General Ma's Council, the greybeards who refused to give in and by their valour beat off the young bandit General, Ma Chong Yng. He offered M. Petro his congratulations and the Society's thanks for a very amusing lecture, and one which had added so much to our knowledge of what was happening in that shut-off but most important corner of Asia.

FROM EDZIN GOL'S ENCHANTED GROVES THROUGH THE GOBI BATTLEFIELDS*

NOTES FROM A LECTURE BY MISS MILDRED CABLE

IT is now five years since I had the pleasure of speaking to you in this Hall. Since then I, with my two comrades, have been carrying on our pioneer missionary work in Gobi oases and through Inner Mongolia up the banks of the Edzin Gol to its twin lakes.

We spent some time in Tunhwang, and from there we had eventually to escape over Gobi to Turfan, from which district we reached Urumchi and came home from Chuguchak, via the Turk-Sib railway line, to Moscow and Berlin. We covered a great deal of new ground and visited many new places—it is of some of these I am going to speak to you today.

As formerly we made our base in Suchow; it is a town where many roads intersect, and is on the great trade routes connecting China with India and with the southern border of Siberia. Tibetans coming down from the hills to carry on their business, Mongolians, Russians, Chinese, all meet in the Suchow markets and streets.

From Suchow we made excursions to the towns and oases of the Gobi. I have only time to speak of one such expedition this afternoon, that which we made up the Edzin Gol river among the Torgut tribe. The river, called by the Chinese the Heh-ta Ho, Black River, and by the Mongols the Edzin Gol, has its source in the Tibetan hills, passes over the plain, making fertile areas, and into Mongolian territory, watering the "Eye Lash" oasis and rushing between lovely forests. It eventually buries itself in two salt lakes and is heard of no more.

While the nations of Europe were discussing the probable conse-

* Lecture given on February 1, 1933, Sir Denison Ross in the Chair. In opening the lecture the Chairman said: "I have the pleasure of introducing to you Miss Cable, at the same time not forgetting the two Misses French. You will know that these are three of the most intrepid ladies who ever lived, who not only show a total disregard for danger and comfort, but also have benefited us all by their travels far beyond those who just keep a diary. They have travelled in the most remarkable and stirring parts of the world, have taken notes of everything of interest, have made two discoveries of first-rate importance, and have also been able to take some remarkable photographs.

"I have much pleasure in introducing Miss Cable to you."

quency of England's escape from the gold standard, the trade routes of Central Asia were buzzing with reports that the long looked for hour had come for the great Muslim rebellion; at last, it was said, a leader had been found to carry the Hwei-hwei to victory. This leader is known to many of you as Ma Chong Yng; he is a youth of twenty-one, the son of a general guilty of treachery to a friend; at the hour of his son's birth he had a vision of the wronged man coming to speak to him and he swooned with terror; at that hour the birth of the boy was announced.* It is supposed that the spirit of the injured man entered the boy; his army regards him as a mascot and believes him to be safe from the sword. In his early teens he led armies of thirty thousand men. We first encountered his tracks on the Edzin Gol; we had not gone many days' march when we met hundreds of young men, who had been impressed by his orders and were being carried off to his camp to be enrolled as soldiers.

We travelled up the Edzin Gol river until we reached two small lakes and an oasis called the "Oasis of the Heavenly Tints." On the way we made a short detour to visit the grave of Benedict de Goës, the great Jesuit missionary. In 1603 this brave man travelled from India overland to prove that "Cathay" and China were one and the same country. He held his permit from the Emperor of China himself. He was disguised as a Muslim merchant and arrived at the city of Suchow after months of travelling. He was greatly persecuted, and while permission was being secured for him to proceed, he died. The Chinese, with extreme superstition, declared that his body was so heavy it could not be moved. The Muslims said he was not one of them, but worshipped one God, and though an infidel, was not an "infidel of the pig," but of the Book. The officials said that one who held direct communication with the Emperor himself might not be thrown outside the city gate for wolves to devour. Eventually the Muslims undertook the burial and made him a tomb outside the Great Wall of China. One Christmas Day, when celebrating the festival with our Chinese friends, we heard a converted Muslim telling a Chinese official the story of the "venerable foreigner" buried in the Gobi desert. We listened, and by comparing circumstances and dates knew that he referred to Benedict de Goës. He lies outside the Wall in the windswept Gobi.

After travelling for many days in the heat, often with little water

* See "Islam in North-West China Today," by Rev. G. Findlay Andrew, *R.A.C. Journal*, vol. xix., part 1, p. 69. See also the previous lecture.

and no shelter, we came upon a place which we called God's hostel, and there we rested for a few days. We called it the "Gold and Silver Hostel," as the leaves were gold and the sand silver.

We spent a week here, resting after the hard going through the sand-dunes. From here we had to leave our cart and take to camels, for carts can proceed no further owing to the sands. It was good riding, and we soon began to enjoy the steady, silent, rolling tread. These camels are very strange in their temper and they cannot be persuaded to proceed once they are tired. If a camel is really fatigued the caravan goes on without it, leaving it behind to die, for it will never put up a fight to save itself. On the road were caravans from Peking, Turkistan, and from Kashgar, and when we had been some time on the road we learnt to tell where the caravan came from by the sound of its bells. We had an excellent conductor in our cook, who had formerly been servant to a Mongolian living Buddha; he proved himself so efficient a conductor of travels that we gave him the name of "Sir Thomas Cook."

I do not think a more lovely place can exist on earth than the enchanted forest of the Edzin Gol—the beautiful blue river, with a border of Euphrates poplar, by contrast with the sands around, is most beautiful. This "Euphrates poplar" bears willow leaves at the bottom and poplar at the top. It is said that the phoenix will always alight there because of its purity, and that when the first leaf falls autumn is near. The people say that at your mother's funeral you should carry in your hand a stick of this tree because the joints are inside; when your father dies you should carry a bamboo, as the joints are outwards.

From this Euphrates poplar comes an exudation which is greatly valued in China, as it is a reputed cure for all ills to which horses and mules are subject.

We daily visited many tent encampments. The people were simple and hospitable.

The inhabitants of the area into which we now came are a tribe of Mongols whose ancestors, on return from a great migratory move- which took them right over to the banks of the Volga, separated from the main body for the purpose of making pilgrimage. When they wished to get back into Mongolia they were not able to do so, and the Chinese granted them this piece of land and allowed them to settle. The Chinese, wishing to regain their territory, planned to build a city to be called "twin eyes" near the twin lakes, but fortunately, owing to the unsettled state of the country, have not yet been able to

do so. On the way we visited the tent of a Tibetan lama, who had come into the country many years previously and had fallen in love with a Mongolian lady, whom he married. By marrying her he was disgraced and prevented from returning to his own land and has become of importance in the locality. After three weeks we came to the Great Western Lamasery, which looks more like a Russian outpost than a monastic building. It has a high whitewashed façade, and the strings of prayer flags made it look like an official building decorated for a fête. After a short stay we left for the journey to the Eastern Temple, the residence of the Prince of the Edzin Gol tribes.

The rightful ruler, from whom we had received an invitation to visit the tribe, had recently died, and his place has been taken by a usurper. The rightful heir is a downtrodden princeling with no hope of holding his own. We were received in the large audience tent; the Prince was a fine figure sitting in state wearing a green brocade gown with scarlet collar and high leather embroidered boots. His wife was present at the interview, his interpreter knelt before him, and the whole interview reminded us of the day when early Jesuit missionaries were received in the tents of Kublai Khan.

"I suppose your King has sent you here and meets all your expenses?" said the Prince. "Are your husbands with you? What, unmarried?" He was told that we travelled about teaching our religion and that the little deaf and dumb girl was an adopted child. "Deaf and dumb," he said, "and of no use to them, and they have no husbands! Ah, that is how they acquire merit." He then shouted for one of the wandering lamas who was visiting the court; to this man, a wicked-looking creature, who was said to be able to read and came from Soviet territory, he gave a command to look at our books—the Gospels and *Pilgrim's Progress*. "Undoubtedly the same as those they read in Moscow," said the wicked lama; "they treat of the community of goods—no rich, no poor and plenty for everyone." We managed, however, to proclaim our message, with the great soldierly figure on the dais nodding his head at intervals and his wife listening beside him.

We went back to Suchow after that journey to find our friend Ma Chong Yng had taken possession of the town, and had brought with him some ten thousand troops who quickly ate up all the supplies. They helped themselves to our two best mules and a good deal of our money, which some of his men got at the point of the pistol; then he swept on towards Turkistan, passing across the Gobi desert. After he had gone his cousin, leading the regular Chinese troops, marched on

Suchow, putting up posters telling us that Ma Chong Yng was completely defeated, then later that he was going to be Governor of Turkistan, then that he had been killed, and finally his obsequies were celebrated by a general holiday and free theatre.*

Those who knew now advised us that this was the time to visit the City of Sands, Sahchow, in the Tunhwang oasis, which is a fortnight's journey from Suchow. "There you should meet neither soldier nor brigand," they said.

We passed through the gate at the end of the Great Wall of China. Every man and every woman who passes through this gate does so with a heavy heart, for in the olden days Chinese exiles were sent beyond that gate, and on its walls are poems written by broken-hearted people: "When I pass thy gates . . . my tears may never cease to run." Unfortunately, when Ma Chong Yng passed that gate he broke it down for firewood. An ancient custom requires that you take a stone and throw it at the wall. If the stone returns you will return, but if you are not coming back the stone falls to the ground. Our stones all returned to us. The wall is known as "earth's greatest barrier," and one never returns from the Gobi towards China without every person in the caravan giving a cheer or a shout when the first glimpse of it is seen.

We journey on for a fortnight. Alas! for our hopes of peace. We had not been very many days *en route* when we met a caravan leader who asked us if we had heard the news that Ma Chong Yng had been defeated* in Turkistan and was falling back on Tunhwang. Soon the news was round the city; the gates were shut and three thousand men were on the wall to greet the oncomers. Ma Chong Yng's men battered the gates and said that they must be opened or there would not be a man left alive in the city by the evening. His threats were treated with great respect. By the afternoon his men were in full possession and all the ammunition was handed over; the mayor of the town spread a feast to entertain them; and the brigand general carried off the young men of the district to his headquarters.

Not many days after the occupation of the oasis a messenger from the General rode in and dismounted at our door. He carried orders that we were to go up to headquarters, a four days' journey across Gobi. It was mid-winter, bitterly cold, and we refused to go. Then a letter was brought in which gave us no option; the mayor of the town told us we must obey. We preferred to travel in our own carts, and on the following Monday morning left for our destination with three hundred

* See previous lecture.

"pressed" men. Having reached headquarters, we were brought into the young brigand's room and each day of our stay there was an interview with him. After some time he let us go back to the City of Sands, but we were the only members of the large party who returned there. Strict orders had been sent that we were not to leave in any direction, and you will realize that it is as easy to guard an oasis as an island, it being only necessary to appoint men to guard the water stages. This stay gave us the coveted opportunity of evangelizing Sahchow.

The town at this time was full of Turki-speaking people, driven out from Turkistan by the constant warfare and despoiling of towns and homesteads. Our knowledge of Turki had been well laid by my Chairman this evening, Sir Denison Ross, and after we got back to Suchow we had worked hard at it. Our first native teacher was a high-born Central Asian woman who had led a most tragic life, being left homeless and having had to find her living in any harem open to her. Our lessons were largely taken up in hearing her life-history, and she offered to teach us a curse which she said brought certain death to any person within twenty-four hours. She had been trying to dispose of her present husband by its use, but without success.

Our next Turki teacher was a young man whom the mullahs threatened that they would beat if they could catch him teaching us. One afternoon, while we were having our lesson, we saw some of them entering the courtyard; I hastily engaged them in conversation, while my friends made a screen for our teacher, who escaped among the shrubs and trees in the garden. The mullahs found him later, however, and told him they knew perfectly well what we were up to: trying to learn the language so as to take the gospel to their people. He pleaded poverty and we took it as a great compliment that they considered it worth while to bribe him to the extent of two hundred dollars not to teach us any more. But by this time we had a good command of Turki and were able to carry on our work with the refugees. During the frequent visits of soldiers and brigands to the town our house in the City of Sands had been commandeered and, although it was mid-winter and bitterly cold, we took shelter in the Pilgrims' rest-house by the Lake of the Crescent Moon, that most lovely lake which had been a delight to us in our previous journey and is the refreshment of all Gobi travellers. Here, once again, we heard the singing sands. We were awakened one night by what we thought was the roll of drums, but were told it was the sands announcing the

approach of wind. Some hills "sing" and some do not, but we have noticed that the wind in these "singing hills" always blows the sand upwards to their crest. I do not know if this has been noticed in Arabia and elsewhere.

Before Christmas (1932) we were able to return to our house in the City of Sands, which had now been evacuated by the brigands, and a little later on we renewed our journeys to the surrounding oases. In this way we were able to visit the newly uncovered Caves of the Thousand Buddhas, the very knowledge of which had been forgotten.

Halfway between South Lake and Tunhwang the Tang River, which once submerged old Sahchow, takes a sharp turn, cutting right through the chain of sand-dunes and flowing through a deep channel between conglomerate cliffs. The river is invisible from the high Gobi plateau, and a traveller would have no idea that he was near water. One low shack marks the stage where a rough path leads down the precipitous cliff to the water's edge. Two years ago an old priest, overtaken by a storm on the desert road, missed his way. Wandering in the darkness, he despaired of shelter when, he told us, he became aware of a light ahead as of the flicker of a double lantern. Hoping for company he followed, and was led to a cave hollowed in the cliff. He lay down and slept in its shelter, and in the morning light discovered that he was in a cave temple whose walls were decorated with frescoes similar to those of the famous Thousand Buddha Caves two days' journey away. He reported the matter, and on investigation it was found that recent floods had washed away the sand from the façade, and that the openings of many other caves had become visible. Two priests have since made it their work to clear the rubble, and cave after cave has emerged, revealing yet one more of the series of frescoed shrines which mark the whole course of the ancient route which follows the base of the Tibetan Alps. The paintings, sealed so long from the light of the sun, have preserved the purity of their colours and show the skill of the early artists who worked on them.

We also visited again the caves which Sir Aurel Stein has so graphically described in *The Desert Cities of Cathay*, where he found the great store of manuscripts and paintings by means of which so much of the history of Central Asia has been made clear, under the light of his unrivalled scholarship. We talked with a woman who told us most graphically of the visit of a stranger (Sir Aurel) twenty-six years previously. "He was a nice man," she said, "and was looking for something—dragons' bones, we think—to grind into medicine. We liked

him but found he had one great peculiarity." "What was that?" we said. "He *would* have his meals alone," said she. We wished we knew his secret, for a small crowd would always collect to see us eat.

Passing on we came to a little temple, and, as was our custom, we went in to have a talk with the priest and to leave him some Christian literature. While there we noticed a very ancient door, and looking in we saw a stone man, which I was able to photograph. I do not know enough to be able to tell you anything about it, beyond the fact that there was an inscription in Sanskrit and Chinese on the tablet. The figure of this man is not an idol in the ordinary sense of the word; it is carefully preserved and regarded as a sacred possession.

For eight months we stayed on in Sahchow, making our small excursions in the neighbourhood, such as I have described. We were held by the brigand's orders; food was scarce and typhus rampant. We had put by every week a little flour and grain for our beasts, hoping to collect enough for escape. We did not live in luxury, but it has been said that luxury is only a comparison and also that it kills the imagination. At last we were unable to buy any more food, or anything of which to make clothes; my dress bill for last year was 6d. Every time we attempted to move we got another order from Ma Chong Yng telling us we were not to leave in any direction. One day there came to us a conviction which we knew to be the guidance of God. We started off, as if we were but leaving for a day's work, and reached the border of the oasis. There is a little temple which serves as a guard-house. We asked of some peasants working near by, "Where is the guard?" They replied that early that morning the guard had left, why they did not know, for they had been there day and night for eight months, but that day the oasis was unguarded. We heard afterwards they had gone to loot the city.

We were able to get away and started off across the sands, the Black Gobi, towards Hami. It was a road we knew well, but now the desert was no longer fresh with crystal-clear air; armies had fought over it, and it was littered with remains of men and beasts along the way and piled round the wells. We had no guide, and one of our most terrifying experiences was in crossing a dangerous quicksand river.

We came to the border of Turkistan, where the Chinese have most cleverly introduced a system for deceiving their enemies. On the rocks are many black stones standing up to look like men, and have

fixed to the shoulder something which looks like a gun. Had you the sight to detect that they were but stone, you could never see if there were men behind them or not.

We passed on to what they call the South Road and the grape-growing districts. There I was badly kicked on the head by a donkey, and it seemed as though I might never recover. I was nursed back to health under canvas on Gobi at the foot of the Flame Mountains. These are supposed to have been cursed by Allah, and therefore they burn; the heat given out by them is so great that people attempting to cross them at mid-summer lose their lives. The appearance of the sides of the mountains is one of live flames.

At last we found ourselves near the city called by the Turki Dakianus, where are the ruins of a city built by Alexander the Great's armies. We found a great deal of sculpture showing Grecian influence; we have with us this afternoon a brick which was found there which is a perfect example of Grecian craftsmanship.

As we walked among the ruins of ancient and crumbling Dakianus we remembered the successive hordes of ruthless fighters which have swept up and down the great Central Asian track, making it a high-road for conquest and carnage, and at that very moment the rulers of Turkistan were in the grip of fear. That world-wide, satanically inspired spirit of fear—fear of the powerful neighbour in the north, mistrust of the Mongol which has led to treachery and murder, fear of the impulsive and undisciplined Turki, dread of the cold calculating Dungan whose aim, through every revolt, is to add to his own power and wealth. This is a perilous hour for Central Asia, for under the domination of such fear nations everywhere are liable to adopt policies and tie themselves to commitments of which, in more sober moments, they would beware. It is notable that all these people recognize instinctively that this paralyzing, judgment-obscuring fear is incompatible with the fear of the Lord, and many times it has been said to us, "We are terrified; there is nothing to live for; but your hearts are stabilized because you trust in God."

After one or two questions had been asked the Chairman said: Miss Cable has given us a very fine address, and you must remember that on the journey which she has described she and her companions had no better conditions than there were for Marco Polo; in some

respects they were worse off, for in his day the country was at peace under the Great Khan.

There are two facts of first-class historical interest which we have been fortunate to hear this afternoon: the discovery of the grave of the great sixteenth-century missionary, Benedict of Goës, and the new Caves of a Thousand Buddhas, which were found in such a remarkable way. We were fortunate, too, in the wonderful slides which Miss Cable has shown us. We must congratulate Miss Cable and her companions on their safe arrival and thank them for a thrilling and unforgettable lecture.

A VISIT TO CENTRAL ASIA*

Notes from a Lecture

By MISS SYLVIA SAUNDERS

“CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY,

There are three points I would like to make at the outset of this talk. The first is that I can lay no claim to an intimate or long-standing acquaintance with Central Asian affairs. The second is that I spent five months in Russia, of which three weeks were spent in Turkestan, getting there and getting back, and two weeks in the Caucasus. And the third point which follows naturally from this is that my impressions of Turkestan must necessarily be from the angle of the observer who considers one of the many autonomous socialist republics that belong to the Soviet Union. . . .

Of course, I kept a notebook in Russia and wrote it at all odd hours of the day. As I looked it up in preparing this talk, I found the last notes written there, before our train drew into Tashkent, concerned one of our twenty-two fellow-passengers in the sleeping-car. We had been travelling for five days, the train was fourteen hours late, and arrived at three in the morning. The traveller in question was a Tartar from the Volga, a man with the purest of pure revolutionary records; he had joined the party in 1917 when a medical student in Samara, was wounded twice in the Civil War, and is now inspector and organizer of collective cotton plantations on his way to inspect the thirty-seven new cotton farms that have sprung up along the Turksib railway. My notes said that he sang for two hours to an appreciative audience, for he had a fine voice, that last evening on the train, and he sang three kinds of Tartar songs, first the fierce wild songs of the great Tartar days, martial buoyant tunes, then the

* Paper given on December 7, 1932, General Sir Percy Sykes in the Chair. The Chairman, in introducing Miss Saunders to the meeting, observed that they had not heard very much upon Russian Central Asia for some time. Miss Sylvia Saunders had travelled in Russia for six months and had studied the language and the effects of the Soviet Government there, and had been able to spend a few weeks in Russian Turkestan and the Caucasus.

romantic songs of exiled Tartars, and finally some almost tuneless melodies that drifted almost monotonously on one or two notes. These, he said, were the product of the mixed music of the Russian and Tartar races, a mixture which was bound to produce a nameless songstry for the less numerous and less assertive race.

Later, when I heard the songs of the camel riders in Tashkent and Samarkand and the songs of some high-pitched two-or-three-noted tunes, I wondered whether anything of the kind had also happened to the music of these races.

There seems to be plenty of music in Turkestan today. The instruments are home-made, as they always were, two-stringed cedar-wood instruments, which the men pluck and play like a tired mandolin. They sing, or their wives sing to this, and the words of the song almost always tell a legend of nomad days. We listened to it by the hour one evening in the home of a Tajik schoolmaster, while he played and his wife sang, and we listened to it again in the native theatre in Tashkent, where a band of players accompanied the play, which was almost entirely danced and sung.

There is, by the way, a native theatre or, failing this, native nights at the Russian theatre, in every town in Turkestan. The theatre is always crowded, and there is some pretty good acting. It is, of course, unlike any Western dramatic performance, and reminds one more of a ballet.

The play I saw told the life story of a young Uzbek girl, at home, at school (education is compulsory and free now), and, finally, in contact with the Communist Youth League, which many of her friends are joining. Her parents have plaited her hair into as many plaits as she has years—that is, twelve—and her young Communist girl friends have wavy bobbed hair. Her mother won't let her go out alone, and she sees her Komsomol friends, boys and girls, marching off on rambles, pathfinding, learning first-aid, and reading and discussing books she may not have. How the girl finally decides to join the Komsomol, and how her relations, with the exception of a bold bad uncle, are converted, is the subject of the play. These plays are written in the native dialect by natives and frequently have a socialist message, but the story seems to give scope for plenty of scenic effects and plenty of laughter, to judge by the frequent amusement in the audience.

These Uzbeks in Tashkent had painted their scenery themselves, and it was pretty. They danced in and out of the scenes in lovely

steps, and gave fine impressions of gossip by suddenly crowding together and then separating again in consternation.

There is, of course, a big struggle going on between the older and younger generation in Turkestan, between tradition and emancipation, between the veiled and the unveiled. Almost ninety per cent. of the elder women still utterly conceal their features behind thick black horsehair veils, that hang from the head in front like a stiff little curtain. Even their view must be somewhat obscured by this, for they raised them sometimes to peep at us, chiefly, I think, because we had simplified our clothes problem by wearing breeches.

As so often happens with veiled women, a sight of their faces is a disappointment. The women of Tashkent are not beautiful, except perhaps the Tajik women, who, like Tajik men, are the handsomest and most intelligent of these races.

Of printed literature, by which I mean not the saga, song, and traditional literature handed down by word of mouth, it is perhaps natural that the Turkman nomad tribes produce practically none. A shock brigade of writers was sent down to Turkestan last year from various parts of white Russia to study the language and literature of the Central Asian races. They produced a number of stories that made no attempt at fiction, but stuck entirely to what they heard from the natives, much as a journalist might do. The stories make good reading. You can get some of them in English translations, as, indeed, you can get much modern literature of Turkestan from V.O.K.S. in Moscow, a cultural organization which exists for that purpose.

But if Turkmenistan is lacking in native writers, the same does not apply to the other five stans in Russian Central Asia. Bayalin is a writer whose works you see in the bookshops and whose name you hear in Turkestan. He is a Kirgiz and writes verse and prose in his native tongue. Bayalin once headed a flight of Kirgiz into China to flee from Tsarist oppression. He came back with the Revolution and has been writing ever since. Sadreddin Aini, a Tajik, writes short stories, which sell in cheap editions wherever Tajik is spoken. I have read a tale of his, in translation of course, called 'Ordin,' or the 'Adventures of a poor Tajik.' It describes very fully the Tajiks' life under the Emir of Bokhara, the occasional and fierce incursions of the Uzbeks, the system of tax-farming, and describes especially the race itself with its small regular and expressive features and its timid, quiet, but intelligent nature.

There are others whose names and works are get-at-able, such as Djavid from over the Caspian, who is a native of Baku and writes in Turkish, and Djarbali, who has just written a new play called the 'Bride of Fire,' which is acted in the Caucasus, but which I have not seen. I gather it is a play with a religious theme.

It is not all literature this writing, and it is seldom great literature, but considering the negligible size of the Central Asian book market in 1913, it marks the beginning of a modern national literature. Moreover, it supplies the needs of an ever-growing literacy, for today about 240,000 women and nearly 1,000,000 men out of Turkestan's six million inhabitants can read and write. That is to say, about sixteen per cent. of the men and four per cent. of the women are registered as literate. In 1925 the figures of literates were exactly half that number.

Meanwhile, newspapers are now published in Uzbek, Tajik, Turkoman, Kirgiz, Kazak, Karakalpak, and in Jewish dialects, papers which were simply non-existent before the Revolution. The total number of school books, technical books, and fiction printed in the native tongues of Central Asia last year was 260, while there are at present thirty-eight daily and weekly newspapers with a total of 280,000 copies. There was, I believe, no Kirgiz alphabet. It was drawn up in 1924, and since then all the Arabic scripts of Turkestan have been latinized, making it easier for the illiterates to learn spelling, reading, and writing.

Now the two chief things that strike one today in Tashkent (but not in Samarkand) are cotton and food. Collective cotton plantations are at present being formed in Turkestan, because that region is eminently suited for the growth of cotton. It has always grown a certain amount in the Khiva district. It now proposes to irrigate three vast tracts of land for further plantations. One region is between Tashkent and Yizak, covering about a million acres, and to be watered by the Syr Daria; one in Vahsh Valley on the Afghan frontier; and one near Ferghana, where rice and cotton have long been staple industries.

Statistics in a country the size of Russia are difficult to collect, and I give the Soviet figures for raw cotton production in 1930 and 1931 with reservations. They were in 1930, 278,000 tons and in 1931, 2,310,000 tons. I can only say that when I left for Turkestan I was told that ninety per cent. of the planned crop for Central Asia had been fulfilled, and when I got to the big cotton building in Tashkent I

found that under fifty per cent. of the planned crop had been produced, which still does not mean that there was not an enormous increase.

Cotton cannot be grown on small holdings, hence the drive into collective farms, a drive which, from the many conversations on the subject I had in Turkestan, is resisted chiefly by the small landowners. The nomad has a natural and easy understanding for the socialization of life, and the townsmen and women have never had much property, and more important still, they are, on the whole, the heart and soul of the 'Party' in Turkestan. Tashkent, Samarkand, Tchirnkent, Duschambe, all the big towns, made and fought their revolutions between 1918 and 1922, and they know what they fought for.

Meanwhile, once all the land in the stans is collectivized, the grain, vegetables, and meat are to come from the Ukraine and the Caucasus across the Caspian, from the Volga down the Orenburg line, and from Siberia (hence the building of the Turksib railway). But before that scheme works properly, there will have to be an immense improvement in transport. Above all, these three single tracks will have to be doubled if the glut of goods eagerly awaited in the empty shops of Turkestan is to get there. This problem is so obvious that everyone talks about it, not in whispers, but in the press and in the Chaikhanas. You talk food and you talk cotton in Tashkent today, just as you talk education, trade, and archaeology in Samarkand, Manchester, and Oxford.

Food is short. There was very strict rationing in Turkestan last winter and only just enough food to go round. There are an unending variety of sweets—and delicious they are—for sale at the booths in the street, but there is absolutely no such thing in Tashkent as a public restaurant or tea-shop or even a pub. The restaurants are all numbered and have their full quota of registered workers with tickets to cater for at the two daily meals they serve.

We had enough food with us, six tins of milk, sardines, chocolate, sausage, and a cooker for an emergency, but when we tried to buy food at the foreigners' shop there were no eggs, butter, milk, or cheese to be had for love or money. The foreigners' shop exists for the American experts and for the Consuls, of whom there are three in Tashkent—a Chinese, an Afghan, and a Persian. The foreigners' colony was increased the week we arrived by a dozen American negroes from South Carolina, who had come over at the invitation of the Soviet Government to teach the natives how to sow and especially how to pick cotton."

After leaving Tashkent, Miss Saunders and her companion went on to Samarkand. She gave a delightful description of a long conversation with a professor of biology, their travelling companion. She showed some photographs of the Samarkand mosques and minarets. The buildings in the towns presented a well-cared-for appearance. They had been reconstructed during the last four years by experts, who, not attempting to copy the intricate and lovely Persian designs on Tamerlane's tiles, had completed the shape of a dome where time had ravaged it with a sort of light clay that toned in well. Samarkand must have once been the Mecca of Central Asia; it was still a place of pilgrimage, but it was more difficult now for pilgrims to come from a far distance. The natives of Samarkand were amazingly tolerant of every kind of faith. The mosque of Shir Dar is the only one with a Soviet star on it which is lit up at night. Otherwise the mosques stood open for worship, but were mainly visited by the older men. Above all, the city had always been a great trading centre, and it was an entrancing spectacle to watch the camel-drawn caravans unloading their costly burdens of silks and spices in the plain. It was an exceedingly difficult thing to socialize a market, but Nijni Novgorod was a good example of the effect produced. Once there had been a fair there, now it consisted of warehouses and flats. Some shops in the bazaars had turned their businesses into co-operatives, where she herself had bought a really good pair of riding-breeches for two English pounds. Those frontier people knew the value of gold; a gold coin could purchase yards of exquisite materials. The only vice in Samarkand, as far as one could see, was the drug traffic. This entailed mainly light drugs, productive of mild hysterics, but the procedure was not encouraged by the younger generation. On their fifth day there the English visitors were asked to produce their passports for the first time during their stay in Turkestan, and were told that they must leave within twenty-four hours. That time-limit, however, lengthened into several days by the time the foreign department could secure berths for them. The expulsion was only from Turkestan, not from Russia, and those last few days were spent in comfortable apartments—luxurious, even, compared with their housing conditions in Tashkent.

Miss Saunders and her companion were allowed to go on to the Caucasus. In Baku she attended a performance of "Hamlet" in Turkish, the costumes worn being eighteenth-century Turkish ones. The audience consisted mainly of young Turkish men and women,

who, until the last scene, were quite carried away by the performance. At the final tragedy, however, when the queen drank the fatal poison, when Hamlet stabbed the king, and when Laertes and Hamlet both succumbed to their mortal wounds, someone in the audience began to laugh. The laughter spread from one to another until there was a suppressed mirth throughout. "Such is the attitude of the young Turk towards men who die because the problem of living is beyond solution," she observed.

During the discussion one member asked Miss Saunders if she had seen anything of the development of aviation from Russia into Turkestan, or of broadcasting from Moscow. She replied to the effect that she had been there in the winter, but that in the summer one could fly at any rate part of the way from Tashkent to India. There was an air service from Moscow to Tashkent which took about two and a half days, she thought, including night flying. Those were the only two she knew of. With regard to broadcasting, they were rather backward, but wherever new buildings were put up every flat was supplied with a bathroom and a wireless set! In the towns quite a number were to be found, but outside those there was not very much propaganda.


Another member wished to say a few words about the cotton-growing industry. The inhabitants of Turkestan used to grow an appreciable amount of wheat and corn. Then it was discovered that the ground was particularly suitable for cotton, and farmers were compelled to give up their corn and start cotton-growing. Some refused and met with the usual fate. The Government had increased the cotton-growing to a tremendous extent. Was not this responsible for the shortage of food?

The LECTURER: Yes, it was directly responsible. Farmers with small holdings used to grow corn and vegetables, and when the cotton-growing came in many of them went into collective farms for that purpose, and the result was an immediate shortage of food.

Another member wished to know whether there was still a university in Tashkent, and was told that it still existed and that it was called a Communist University. Many of the students were trained to take up collective farming or to enter political organizations.

The CHAIRMAN then thanked Miss Saunders for her most interesting lecture. He had known that part of the world fairly intimately, and he remembered well being asked one day by one of the natives

how many wives he had got. On being told that he had but one, the man observed that he had got four—one to milk the camels, one to milk the sheep, one to do the sewing, and one to do the cooking. "And they all work to make me happy," the man had added. "How can you do with less than four?"



THE PEOPLES ON THE SHORES OF THE BLACK SEA

By V. KOROSTOVETZ

I AM glad to be able to speak to you to-day of my own people, whose social, cultural, and economic development depends so largely on the Black Sea, a sea that in the past opened a way to distant Byzantium and to Western Europe. I am relieved of the responsibility this afternoon of speaking to you on our distant neighbours round the Black Sea. This task has fallen into more expert hands than mine.

Past and present history show us unmistakably that Great Russia has always turned both morally and materially towards Asia, whereas the Ukraine, or South Russia, as it was purposely named by the Imperial Government since the eleventh century, has fixed her eyes, hopes, and interests towards Western Europe.

The period when the Tartar yoke, which lasted for over two centuries, lay on Russia had two very different effects; in Great Russia it merely tended to strengthen the impulse towards Asia, the population accepted the Tartars and lost their consciousness of invasion. Even after the Tartars were expelled, many of them had married into Russian families, had acquired property, and amalgamated with the population. The Ukraine, on the other hand, resisted this invasion, at any rate socially, though not successfully from a material point of view. The invasion for the Ukrainians certainly had the effect of temporarily severing their bonds with Western European culture. But they did not absorb any of the Tartar spirit socially, politically, or economically. There was no intermarriage in the Ukraine, the race remained pure. It may be noted that the Ukrainians to this day are looked upon by modern scientists as having the "brachycephalic" skull, whereas the Great Russians have the "dolchcephalic" skull. After the Tartar yoke had been shaken off in the Ukraine all traces of the Tartar influence disappeared and the Westward outlook became even more marked than in the past; it seemed as if the Ukrainians were trying to make up for lost time.

Here I must be allowed to draw up an analogy of Great Russian

aspirations under Peter the Great. By brute force Peter the Great formed his one indivisible Empire and compelled his unnaturally united peoples to participate in the affairs of Western Europe. He built up an European army and fleet, built his capital St. Petersburg and called it "The Window to Europe." At the fall of the Imperial régime, exactly as might have been expected, the Great Russians, under the guidance of Lenin, transferred the capital to Moscow and once again faced the East. On the other hand, the Ukraine regained her independence in 1918, and once more began to link herself to Europe. The customs, and therefore the character, of the two countries were, and are, essentially different. Expansion, invasion, conquest, despotism, and imperial annexation are the creeds of the Russians and resulted in their acquiring one-sixth of the globe. The Russian Imperialists wanted Constantinople and the Straits, and to occupy them, *manu militari*, even if it were at the cost of an European war. Sasonov said to me many times, long before the war, that the fate of Constantinople must be decided in Berlin and Vienna, and Russia was preparing to wage war in Europe for this end. Russian ambitions did not end there. Russian historians, philosophers, politicians, and economists formed a school of thought and action called "The Slavophiles," wishing all Slavonic nations to recognize Moscow as their centre and accept it as a third Rome. Their ambitions included the conquest of all the Balkan States, the Straits, and finally their tentacles were even to stretch to Palestine on the pretext that in Palestine was the site of the Christian Holy Places, and Russia, the great leader of Christianity, should therefore have control of them. They realized the value of Christianity to be used as *instrumentum regni* by the Russian centre.

The Ukrainians waged wars against the Turks, Mongols, Poles, and Russians, but with a very different object in view. The Ukrainians desired no expansion, they fought to retain their rights. By nature a peace-loving, hard-working and stable agricultural people, they wished merely to protect their religion, land, and culture. They had no wish to conquer Constantinople; what they did wish was to try to form economic and political agreements with the "Sublime Porte" in order to safeguard the easy flow of their imports and exports. The Ukraine has never coveted territory, perhaps because she did not absorb any of the roaming, invading, and conquering instincts of the Mongols. In short, the Ukrainian policy was to agree with her neighbours, while the Russian policy was to agree with its neighbour's neighbour.

When in 1918 the Ukrainian people acquired their independence, as the result of the revolution and the downfall of the Russian Central Government, they immediately followed their traditional policy. It is therefore understandable why the Independent Hetman Government was the first to be recognized as such by Turkey in 1918, and an ambassador was appointed to Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. This also explains why the Hetman, as the head of a reborn Independent Ukraine, being elected by 8,000 delegates of the peasant Ukrainian farmers, immediately proceeded to draw up a treaty of alliance, which was signed in September, 1918, with a Muhammadan Tartar State in the Crimea. As I have emphasized, to the Russian Empire the Black Sea has always been the key for expansion and annexation, while for the Hetman of the Ukraine the Black Sea was a great factor for friendly co-operation of free nations living round her shores. In the summer of 1918 the Hetman convoked a Congress of Nationalities, such as the Don and Kuban Cossacks, Georgians, Tartars, Tchechentzi, and others, at Kiev. This Congress had three aims: firstly the emancipation of these nations and the formation of them into independent States, secondly the freedom and independence of the respective minorities in these States, and thirdly the close co-operation of these States in an economic and political sense. The Caucasus with its naphtha, the Ukraine with its iron, coal, wheat, and sugar, the Crimea with its fruit, the Don and Kuban with their wheat and minerals, were all interconnected and intended to be linked up economically, politically, and geographically round the Black Sea. The Kuban Cossacks played an especially important part in this linking up, as they are the direct descendants of the "Zaporogskaja Siege," the historical stronghold of the Ukrainian Cossacks on the Dnieper river rapids. All these nations had their centre of gravity round the Black Sea, into which flow many navigable rivers. Commerce was easy as they all had a good coastline on the Asov and Black Sea, with such excellent ports as Nicolaieff, Odessa, Marioupol, Theodosia, Novorossisk, Batum, and others which, though smaller, are quite important for export and import trade along the Black Sea coast. This gravitation towards the Black Sea, and towards each other, was dictated not only by political and economic interests, but also by those deep psychological traits which are common to and characteristic of each of these nations and which differ so much from other nationalities which composed the Russian Empire.

Each of these nations have:

- (a) A strong feeling of national independence.
- (b) Religion.
- (c) They acknowledge the sanctity of private property.

Their strong national feeling arose owing to their constant struggle for national independence in their past history. They were all owners of rich soil and seemed easy prey for invasion. It must be noted that in the past this nation fought successfully against all invaders, but on the other hand it gave willing hospitality to all foreign elements which came to the country with peaceful aims and offered co-operation. Thus we see the rich Black Belt soil of the Ukraine, and especially the land bordering on the coast, has attracted for the last 150 years many hundreds of thousands of German colonists, who imported Western European methods of agriculture, sheep and cattle breeding. The German colonists numbered about 600,000 people, a colony over one hundred years old. The sheep-breeders came chiefly from Anhalt in Germany and acquired enormous properties, as many as 1,000,000 sheep on one estate.

Under the Czarist régime the Ukraine was assigned by the Imperial Government as a "pale of habitation" for the Jews, who were not allowed to settle in North Russia, and this Jewish element has played a considerable and favourable rôle in fostering commerce and industry.

It is interesting to note that, having acquired independence under the Hetman régime in 1918 after a period of Bolshevik chaos, the Ukraine, reviving her traditional form of national and independent government, and being an agricultural country, quickly healed all her social and economic wounds and started her normal life, producing raw materials as she had done in her historic past. Notwithstanding the Great War, which played such havoc in Europe, the Ukraine succeeded in exporting for the nine months of the Hetman régime goods to the value of £81,000,000, while her imports rose to the amount of £52,000,000. The exports consisted chiefly of cereals, sugar, alcohol, and tobacco, while the imports were clothes, leather, fish, coffee, naphtha, and manufactured goods, and a considerable amount of agricultural machinery. This was chiefly due to the recognition in the Ukraine by the Hetman Government of sanctity of private property, which in the Ukraine has always been a leading principle of her social and economic life.

According to the traditional Ukrainian policy of linking up with Europe, the first steps of the Hetman Government consisted of the

appointment of a special commission to decide what proportion of the debts of the Russian Empire were to be allocated to the Ukraine after she became independent, and it was decided that 25 per cent. was due for repayment by the Ukraine to the creditors of the former Russian Empire. It was also decided that all foreign private capital which had been invested in the Ukraine to the amount of 67,000,000 gold roubles by the Belgians, 73,000,000 by the French, and 22,000,000 by the British, was to be repaid in full.

The second characteristic trait of all these people on the Black Sea is, and always has been, religion. An oppressed religion never lies dormant, and the religious feeling of these nations, dependent on nature and her bounty, has been always a strong factor in their struggle for national independence.

During the early period of Ukrainian independence all the schools and centres of learning were connected with monasteries and cloisters and the clergy. These latter have always been the backbone of Ukrainian learning. They were elected to office not only by their superiors, but by the whole parish. During the Czarist régime, when the Ukraine lost her independence, all this was swept away. The clergy were nominated by the Imperial Russian Government from non-Ukrainian elements, and the whole of the Ukraine, as well as the Russian Church, was under the orders not of the Patriarch, as that See had been abolished, but of the Holy Synod, the head of which was a layman, an official of the Imperial Government in St. Petersburg.

It must be noted that during the seventeenth century, when the Ukraine was independent, more schools existed than under the Czarist régime of the twentieth century, and the Bolsheviks have cancelled all the remaining Ukrainian universities. Under the Czarist régime the Ukrainian language was prohibited, and the publication of the Holy Scriptures was declared illegal; and not until 1905, after the first Russian revolution, did Count Witte allow the Holy Scriptures to be published in Ukrainian. The Ukrainian population began a hard struggle for independence and for religious freedom. The Hetman Government in 1918 restored the freedom of religion as well as the independence of the Ukraine, but the Bolshevik revolution which followed swept this way, and religion as well as the clergy was persecuted. This led to violent opposition of the Ukrainians, and now, when Atheism is proclaimed to be the chief Bolshevik religion and enforced by the Soviets in the Ukraine, over 2,000 Ukrainian priests carry on their

religious services in forests, caves, and other secret places, being supported and protected by the whole of the Ukrainian peasantry.

Great Russia, as I have already pointed out, has never had the historical institution of private peasant property, only the so-called "Mir," a sort of commune for landed property, and in Great Russia religion was an *instrumentum regni* in the hands of the Imperial Russian Government. The Black Sea Nationals have never fallen under the fascination of ideas of world-wide conquest, whether of pan-Slavism or of Communism, which seem to govern Russia; there have been frequent risings against Russia all through Caucasian history. The peasants have opposed the collectivization policy of Lenin and Stalin, for the sacredness of private property is a traditional principle with them. They have battled against it for sixteen years, and the terrorist policy employed by the Moscow Government has done so little to convert them that Moscow has had to confess its failure. But it has strengthened the determination of the Ukraine to become independent; the slogan now is, "Away from Moscow to an Independent Ukraine." They have never given in willingly to Russification, as is proved by their constant struggles against it, although they were loyal soldiers and citizens of the Czars when this was not forced on them.

I must now say a few words about our neighbours along the Black Sea coast and further east. The first to the east are the Don Cossacks, who link the Ukraine to the Caucasus. Their love of free life and their hatred of subjection kept them in a state of perpetual guerrilla warfare, and they made a home for those who fled from persecution and oppression—Turks, Kalmiks, and even Swedes and Prussians.

They introduced a law in 1690 which condemned to death any of their people who became agricultural labourers. Serfdom among Cossacks did not exist, with rare exceptions, notably prisoners of war. These were often Turks, Kalmiks, and later on even Swedes and Prussians, also peasants who sought refuge, having run away from landowners in Russia, who in those days introduced serfdom over their peasant population. These refugees were never received as Cossacks and had a special denomination—"Strangers." They later formed the class of workmen on Cossack landed property.

The Don Cossack territories finally had a population, according to Soviet statistics in 1930, 55 per cent. Ukrainian and 45 per cent. Russian. The Don Cossack lands were independent from 1549 to 1720, when they were incorporated in the territories of the Russian Empire, and so they stayed until the revolution of 1918, when they

again declared their independence. The Cossacks during their independence always concluded treaties of friendship and military alliance with the Moscow rulers, later recognizing their dependence as vassals from Moscow; autonomy followed, and finally incorporation. But this incorporation was accompanied by numerous revolts on the part of the Don Cossacks when their autonomous rights seemed to them to be assailed by the Russians: such risings as those of 1772, 1792, 1793, till at last by the decree of the Russian Czar of 1835 they were declared to be a sort of military autonomous unit directly under the orders of the Czar.

When the revolution of 1917 gave them their independence, they elected their chief "Ataman" at a sort of military congress, calling themselves an independent State, "The Great Cossack Don," and they made an effort to conclude treaties with other Cossack lands and with the Hetman of the Ukraine. The Bolsheviks then invaded and subjugated their lands. Numerous uprisings led to bloodthirsty extermination of whole townlets and villages, and guerrilla warfare flared up ever and anon, as their traditional freedom is incompatible with Bolshevik subjugation.

Further east lie the lands of the Kuban Cossacks. These are full of historical interest and are a vital part of the Ukrainian problem. As far back as the tenth century the Kiev princes had colonized these lands, and long before that Ptolemy and Pliny mentioned the Cossacks amongst the population of these territories. The Kuban Cossacks occupied lands lying on the great trade routes from Europe to Asia, and that is why the Kiev princes looked on them with a vigilant eye as precious and often waged wars to protect them. A son of a Kiev prince was habitually the head of the Kuban Cossacks. These lands were devastated by the Tartars during the Tartar invasion and the population exterminated, but later, when the Tartar yoke was shaken off, the Ukrainian Cossacks, remembering their old Kuban colonies, reconquered their country and repopulated it with their own peoples again.

Catharine the Great ended by recognizing the Kubans as an independent Tartar State after a series of wars. The defeat of the Ukrainian Cossacks by the Russian armies in 1775 and the occupation by the Russians of the Cossack strongholds on the rapids of the Dnieper, forced many of the Ukrainian Cossacks to go to Turkey and whence they later returned and settled on the Kuban lands. This was welcomed by Catharine the Great, who saw in them good

warriors able to protect the country against foreign invasion, and in order to reinforce them she sent over to Kuban a detachment of Ukrainian Cossacks amounting to 17,000 men. This peculiar manner of colonization was adopted also in 1806 and 1828 by orders of the Russian Czars. In 1808 25,000 Ukrainians with women and children were sent over by the Czar's decree, and during the forty years following over 100,000 Ukrainian Cossacks emigrated to the Kuban lands. Meanwhile the Cossacks were followed in this forcible emigration by Ukrainian women.

The same sequence happened in the Terek lands. The Russian revolution gave them freedom and they organized themselves in the same way as the Don Cossacks had done, also signing treaties with the Independent Ukraine. But the Bolsheviks overran their country also, and although anti-Bolshevik uprisings failed, their spirit lives, and the Kuban and Don Cossacks and the Tereks are only waiting for the moment to come. The Cossacks love their freedom, country, and religion, and Communistic Moscow is a constant menace to them. Further east their neighbours are the Astrakan, Ural, and Orenburg Cossacks, whose hatred towards Bolshevism has many times been demonstrated by guerrilla warfare and constant uprisings. The various branches of the Cossacks number just over 8,000,000, and their future development depends largely on the future of the Ukraine on the one hand and on the other of the Caucasian people.

Now the Russian Empire's ship has sunk in the turmoil of the Russian revolution and Bolshevism we do not want to muddle in the mire of Communism, but we want to join hands with our valiant Black Sea neighbours to build up an "entente" of peaceful-living nations, working for our homes, families, country, and traditions, these latter being essentially conservative. This we hope will be achieved on a basis of progressive collaboration with Europe, as was our way in our independent past. We do not want to associate ourselves with imperialist aims either Red, White, or any other Russia, and if the Ukraine at present participates in the funds of the Third International with over 180,000,000 roubles a year, believe me this is against the will of our nation and is enforced by an unprovoked terror and foreign régime over our country. But should Russia turn away from Bolshevism and become a normal State we should join hands with our Russian neighbours in some sort of federation or confederation. We firmly believe that Communism is not the Alpha and Omega of the Russian revolution, but the freedom of national in

a peaceful and friendly collaboration will be the outcome of this historical process.

The opposition of the Cossacks and Ukrainians to Bolshevism has developed into a mass exile. In December, 1932, and January, 1933, over 2,000 Ukrainian peasants and their families were exiled to distant northern timber camps in Russia, many of whom died on the way. In the same way over 50,000 Kuban people were exiled in the autumn of 1931 and turned into slave labourers in Siberia and North Russia. It is understandable why the hatred of Moscow Communism is so great in these lands and is about to reach boiling point.

SOME NOTES ON JEHOI*

By BRIG.-GENERAL M. E. WILLOUGHBY, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G.

NINE years ago I had the honour of speaking to this Society on the relation of China to its Western Dependency Tibet. This evening it falls to my lot to say something about its relation to Provinces on its North-Eastern march.

At the outset I should like to say that my necessarily sketchy discourse is intended to serve as a peg whereon to hang a subsequent discussion and to elicit some up-to-date information, on certain points, from some of the galaxy of talent and expert knowledge that I see before me, as my personal acquaintance with Jehol dates back to the closing years of the Manchu dynasty (I Anglicize the pronunciation, as we do with other Chinese place-names—e.g., Peking, Amoy, Canton—and will speak of Jehol and not Jehu [*re he*]).

As the time at our disposal is short, I can only touch very lightly and briefly on certain points—geographical, ethnological, historical, and political—concerning a region of which, from time to time of late, we have heard something in the Far-Eastern news, and about which, I doubt not, we are likely to hear much more in the near future.

As to the *geography*, you will observe on the sketch-map that the new Province of Jehol, some 90,000 square miles in area, is bounded on the west and north-west by the new Province of Chahar, on the north-east and east by the Fengtien Province of Manchuria, and on the south in a general way by the "Great Wall" of China. Its west and north-west border runs along the southern continuation of the Great Hsingan Range, which one may describe as the outer escarpment of the Mongolian Upland. Jehol Province constitutes, as it were, a lower, easterly falling shelf of this upland as far as the line of rising ground which borders the maritime plain and the Liao Vale. Along this easterly lower line of heights runs the "Willow Palisade," a barrier existing since Ming times (or perhaps earlier), and which constituted the limit, in a general way, of Chinese penetration and settlement in the fertile maritime plain and Liao Vale, *prior to the Manchu conquest* (the analogy of the "English Pale" in Ireland, in

* Paper given at a Members' Meeting on February 14, 1933, Mr. E. M. Gull in the Chair.

the time of, say, Henry VI. and onwards, springs naturally to the mind). The line of the "Willow Palisade" now marks the border between Jehol and Fengtien for some 180 miles.

The region is watered by the various upper tributaries of the Liao river flowing north, north-east, and east, and the Luan Ho, which rises near Dolonor and flows past Jehol and on south-east through the "Great Wall" and to the Gulf of Pei Chih li between Taku and Shan Hai Kuan. It is navigable for light cargo-boats up to Luan Ping Hsien, the journey, tracking upstream, taking some eight to ten days. In June, 1909, I took four and a half days going down from Jehol to Lanchou (on the railway) in one of these boats. They are about 35 feet long by 8 feet beam and draw about 9 inches, light, and upwards of 20 inches loaded. The upper courses of the Pei Ho and its tributary the Chao Ho (which passes through the "Great Wall" at K'u Pei K'ou) also run through the south-west corner of the Province.

I ask you to note also the railways that encircle the Province on three sides—viz., the Pei Ping-Mukden, the Tahushan-Tungliao-Liao-Yüan, and the Ssuping-kai-Taonan lines. Only one line actually penetrates into the Province—viz., the Chinchou-Peipiao branch, but another short branch from the Peiping-Mukden Railway reaches the border at Ta Ya K'ou.

I have mentioned the "Great Wall." This stupendous work is over twenty-one centuries old, having been commenced by the Ch'in Emperor Shih Huangti in 214 B.C. as a defence against the Barbarians of the North, the Hiung Nu Tartars. It winds its tortuous way over hill and dale for some 1,200 miles, from the sea at Shan Hai Kuan to beyond Suchow in distant Kansu. Miss Cable recently showed us some excellent pictures of its western extremity. Including its various loops and its long southerly branch which skirts the eastern border of Shansi it must be over 1,700 miles long.

The capital of the Province is Jehol (or Cheng te fu) on the little River Je Ho (hot river) whence the town and region take their name. The Je Ho joins the Luan Ho about 5 miles south-east of the town. Jehol is, as you see, a little over 100 miles, as the crow flies, north-east of Peking (or Peiping as it is now called), and slightly further north-west of Shan Hai Kuan.

The Emperors' Road from Peking to Jehol ran through Mi Yun Hsien and K'u Pei K'ou, where it passes through the "Great Wall" and Luan Ping Hsien, a distance of about 140 miles. It was generally

reckoned a week's journey, and that is the time I took in June, 1909, riding and with a Peking cart for my baggage. Nowadays motor-cars and motor-buses run along it, though Sven Hedin describes the road as even worse than those in Dzungaria.


As to the *ethnology* of the region, it is part of Inner Mongolia—Eastern Inner Mongolia—*i.e.*, that part of Inner Mongolia which lies to the east of the great Hsingau Range.

The Chinese reckoned Mongolia as two main divisions—"Wai" (outer) and "Nei" (inner) Mengu—and up to the fall of the Manchu dynasty they were both under the Li fan Yüan (or, as we might say, "Colonial Office"). Such parts of Inner Mongolia as came within the limits of the "eighteen Provinces"—*e.g.*, Jehol and the Chahar and Dolonor regions in the extramural part of Chihli Province—were under the special military administration of frontier Tut'ungs at Jehol and Kalgan.

The Mongol Leagues in Jehol are the Chosotu League (Khara Ch'in and Tumet tribes), in all five "banners," and the Chao Uta League, eleven "banners," this latter being north of the Shara Muren—*i.e.*, outside the limits of the former Chihli Province. Adjoining them on the north-east are the ten "banners" of the Cherim League in the Manchurian Province of Fengtien. These were the first Mongols to join up with the Manchus, and took part with them in the Conquest in 1644. They have now adhered to the new Manchukuo Government. Mongols cling to their feudal system, their religion (Lamaist Buddhism), and their language, and do not readily fuse with the Chinese, whereas the Manchus assimilated much more easily with the Chinese, adopting by degrees their language and customs, so that it is difficult now to distinguish a Manchu from a Chinese (though Manchu women are easily distinguishable by their dress and natural feet). For half a century and more past, however, there has been an increasing immigration and colonization of the Mongol lands by Chinese from within the "Great Wall," resulting in the gradual pushing back of the nomad Mongols or the anchoring of them to the soil as cultivators, an occupation so uncongenial to them that lands allotted to Mongols for cultivation have in many cases been made over by them to Chinese tenants or managers, the Chinese being, as we all know, expert and industrious husbandmen. This expropriation and encroachment on Mongol pasturelands has been a fruitful source of bitterness and friction and has led to a good deal of hostility by dispossessed Mongols.

The Chinese in Jehol now greatly outnumber the Mongols.

A few brief historical notes may be of interest. The early Manchu emperors, as foreigners from K'ou Wai (i.e., outside the Wall), not unnaturally made their summer resort among their kindred folk, the Mongols, outside the "Great Wall." The second Manchu emperor of China, Kanghsi, who came to the throne in 1661, built the first palace in



Jehol in 1703, and during the next eight years continually added to and beautified the summer resort. He it was, I think, who set apart the large hilly tract known as the Wei Ch'ang (or Mulan, in Manchu) north-west of Jehol as an imperial hunting park, just as our early Norman kings reserved the New Forest, or the Persian Monarchs the "paradises" mentioned by Xenophon. Sven Hedin's book *Jehol der Kaiser-Stadt* gives a most graphic description of these imperial hunts, tigers, bears and deer being the quarry. Kanghsi's son and successor

Yung Ching eschewed both field sports and Jehol, but his grandson, the great emperor Chien lung (1735-1795), revived the annual autumn hunts which were conducted with meticulous ceremony and pomp.

These old Manchu emperors made a great point of cultivating friendly relations with the princes of their outer Dependencies, and especially the ecclesiastical magnates of the Buddhist Church. The fifth Dalai Lama, for instance, was invited to Peking by the first Manchu emperor Shun Chih in 1652 and was lodged in the Yellow Temple, which was specially built for his reception. I may mention that the present Dalai Lama during his stay in Peking in 1908 stayed also in that same temple.

During the long reign of Chien lung the third Tashi Lama of Tibet visited the Emperor at Jehol in 1780 and lived for about a month in the splendid Hsin Kung specially built for him on the model of his residence at Tashilumpo in Tibet. He went on to Peking to the Yellow Temple and died of smallpox in the winter 1780-81, and his corpse was carried back all the way to Tibet.

To Jehol also, thirteen years later, in 1793, came the first British envoy to the Court of China, Lord Macartney, whose mission was received with hospitality and ceremony, but treated as the emissaries of a vassal prince of the Outer Barbarians, and the splendid gifts they brought were reckoned as "tribute" denoting allegiance. Chien lung's haughty reply to the letter from King George III. refused everything asked for and ended by warning our king to "tremblingly obey." There was much discussion as to whether Lord Macartney should be obliged to "Ke' to'u," but, in the end, the performance of this obeisance was waived, and it was ruled that he should be permitted to make such obeisance only as he would do to his own Sovereign.

A later British mission, Lord Amherst's in 1816 to the succeeding emperor Chia Ching, was not received owing to refusal to "Ke' to'u." This emperor Chia Ching died at Jehol in 1820 in tragic circumstances. The pavilion in which he was lying desperately ill, and being nursed by a favourite concubine, was struck by a thunderbolt and set on fire; they both perished in the flames. The annual move of the Court to Jehol was thereafter discontinued and was once only resumed, forty years later, when in 1860 the dissolute and craven-hearted emperor Hsien feng fled thither from Peking on the approach of the victorious Anglo-French forces. The young Yehonala, mother of the heir-apparent and afterwards to become the famous Dowager-Francis Tsu hsi, then only a girl of twenty-five, upbraided him for his

courage in leaving the capital at such a juncture and wanted to stay behind, but was persuaded by Prince Kung to follow the Court. Hsien feng died the next summer (1861) in Jehol, and the conspiracy of the grand councillors, Prince Yi, Tuan Hua, and Su Shun, to seize the reins of power was foiled by the indomitable pluck and resource of this resolute young woman, who thereafter practically ruled the empire for close on half a century. It is all most graphically set forth in Bland and Backhouse's classic work *China under the Dowager-Empress*. Since Hsien feng's death Jehol has seen the Imperial Court no more.

The many architectural gems created by Chien lung in Jehol—the Potala, Hsin kung, Ta fo ssu, Ili miao, etc.—are admirably shown in Sven Hedin's book. I regret that my films had given out and that I can show you no slides of them, saving a very indifferent distant view of the Potala (modelled on the famous Potala at Lhasa) and one of the nine-storey pagoda in the Imperial park. It was completed in 1764.

The park is surrounded by a six-mile-long wall. Fir clad hills, ornamental lakes, picturesque pavilions, and rustic bridges, deer in the glades, pheasants and wild fowl in the thickets and on the water combine to make the Imperial park indeed a beauty spot.

There is something sad and mournful about the present derelict condition of this summer resort of former monarchs. An air of decay pervades the whole place—crumbling masonry, rotting woodwork, roof-timbers falling in, mould and mildew. Where the "Son of Heaven" formerly abode in great state the Republican flag now flies, and the Governor, General Tang Yu lin, has his residence in the Imperial palace.

Where hundreds of monks formerly chanted their orisons now a few score lamas only remain, dragging out a sordid existence in abject poverty. "Ichabod" is writ large over the whole scene—"Sic transit gloria mundi."

I cannot close without touching on just one *political* point, though I know it is a controversial subject. Geneva, as we know, has just taken grave decisions which may have far-reaching consequences. The whole question as to the rights and wrongs of the Sino-Japanese quarrel are outside the scope of my lecture this evening, but one point in it *does* touch my subject, and that is the status of the Province of Jehol.

Seeing that Jehol until 1928 was included in the Province of Chihli (now called Hopei), people are apt to look at old maps (and most

people's atlases, I fancy, are of prior date to 1928) and say to themselves, "Whatever Japanese rights in Manchuria may be, invasion of Jehol is going a bit too far, and is a distinct aggression into China Proper." To such I would say that Jehol is no longer a part of the "Eighteen Provinces."

What is the bond that holds the British Empire together? Apart from kinship, common ideals, and economic ties, is it not a fact that the only remaining actual juridical link is the common allegiance of all its peoples to the British Throne?

In like manner, in more feudal Asia, the bond that held the old Chinese Empire together was the allegiance of the Dependencies, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet (and formerly Burma, Annam, and Korea also), to the Ta Ch'ing emperors, who, as Manchus, had brought Manchuria also into the Empire. So (as Lattimore puts it in his book *Manchuria*) "China's immediate title to Manchuria derives historically from the Conquest of China by the Manchus." When, therefore, China in 1912 became a Republic and expelled the last Manchu emperor, logically its title to Manchuria, the ancestral home of the Manchu emperors, would seem to have lapsed; and, in fact, the present secession of Manchuria from China is not the first declaration of its independence since the inauguration of the so-called Republic of China. Chang tso lin, who was practically dictator of Manchuria, on more than one occasion proclaimed Manchurian independence.

Another point worth noting in this connection is the warning declaration of the Mongol Princes to Dr. Wu ting fang, the Foreign Minister designate of the Republic, on the eve of its inauguration in 1912. This is what they said: "Is the Republic for the Eighteen Provinces or for the whole Empire? If for the latter, Mongolia and Tibet, which form a large part of it, are not only still destitute of republican conceptions, but are strongly pro-monarchical. They firmly oppose the adoption of a Republic. They will sever from the Empire when the old Government is gone, and this will mean the dismemberment of China." Well, what has happened? Tibet has now practically thrown off the Chinese yoke. The New Dominion is in a ferment, with Russian influence predominant in the West. Outer Mongolia is to all intents and purposes a Soviet Province, though owning the Hutukhtu at Urga as its head. It is quite divorced from China. Does not the creation in 1928 of the new extra-mural Provinces of Siao, Chabar, and Jehol rather point to the grudging recognition

by Nanking of this hard fact and suggest a kind of hint to Russia that her absorption of Mongolia must go no further? But what of the Inner Mongols themselves and their sentiments? The Lytton Report even acknowledges that the Charim and Barga Leagues joined the independence movement, so why should not their kinsmen of the Chaosuta and Chosotu Leagues (both in Jehol) be expected to do likewise? The Lytton Report says that these two Leagues "are in touch with the Mongol banners in Fengtien which are now ruled by the Committees." The Committee of the North-East Provinces, formed in 1928 under the nominal superintendence of the Central Government, directed and superintended the Governments of the Four Provinces of Liaoning (*i.e.* Fengtien), Kirin, Hei lung Kiang, and Jehol. Furthermore, when Chang hsueh liang declared allegiance to Nanking (against Japanese advice), he was given control of Jehol as well as the three eastern Provinces.

Consequently it seems to me that the Government of Manchukuo, on proclaiming itself an independent republic on March 9, 1932, was justified in claiming Jehol as an integral part of its territory. I do not dispute for a moment that the secession was instigated by Japan for her own ends, but we are faced by hard facts. Japan has recognized the New State and entered into a defensive alliance with it. Japan is the strong man of the Far East, and it is amazing that it should not have been obvious to Geneva that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for her to climb down now and "let down" her protégé. The League of Nations, in fact, seems to have got us into rather an awkward fix. The conclusions and recommendations of their Commission's Report, a document informed by a benevolent but unpractical idealism, implore China and Japan to "kiss and be friends," ignoring the deep-seated and bitter animosity between them, which recent events have so greatly intensified; and ignoring the still more vital consideration that there is no real Central Government in China capable of speaking for the whole Chinese nation which is hopelessly split up into warring sections and parts of which indeed—*e.g.*, Fukien, Kiangsi, Kuangtung, etc.—have definitely cut themselves adrift and become "sovietized" units. This lack of a real Chinese Government is, in truth, the crux of the whole matter, and Japan sees it much more clearly than distant Europe with its other many anxieties and preoccupations. As our Chairman of this afternoon so aptly puts it in his analytical survey of the Lytton Report which appeared in the January number of our Journal, "If Japan may not occupy the

position she now holds pending the constitution of a strong Central Government in China, she is, in fact, being asked to agree to a régime for which the Commission predicates conditions not yet in sight."

It seems rather a pity that we cannot allow the one strong efficient Power on the spot that can possibly evolve order out of chaos in one corner, at any rate, of the distracted Far East to "carry on" with the good work. But our unfortunate and ill-considered commitments at Geneva, alas! seem to bind us to an unpractical course of action. It looks as if, at the behest of our "sabre-rattling" pacifists, we may find ourselves dragged into a risky and costly adventure "pour les beaux yeux de la Chine" and against our former loyal ally. This is a prospect surely that many of our people cannot contemplate with any satisfaction.

There is a certain poetic justice in Mr. Henry P'u, the tenth and last of the Manchu dynasty of China, being back at the helm of his ancestral domains.

One final point. Why does Manchukuo (or, perhaps I should say, her mentor Japan) make such a point of the inclusion of Jehol in her territory? A glance at the map, I think, provides the answer. A hostile neighbour in possession of the Province of Jehol would be in a position at all times to threaten the long, narrow strip of fertile territory in the Province of Fengtien that lies between the "Willow Palisade" and the sea all the way down to the "Great Wall" at Shan hai kuan and the railway which runs through it. Moreover, branch lines from this railway run up to the border of Jehol at Ta ya k'ou and actually into the Province at Pei p'iao, and the possibility of their occupation (even if only temporarily) by an enemy in Jehol would be an ever-present danger. The vulnerability of the Tung liao and Tao nan branch lines (though in a lesser degree) is also obvious. Moreover, Jehol in unfriendly hands, containing as it does the Chosotu and Chaouta Leagues of Mongols, would always be a source of anxiety to Manchukuo in regard to the possibility of tampering with the loyalty of the "banners" of the Cherim League of Mongols which is within her own border. These are just some of the reasons, strategical and political, why the inclusion of Jehol is so necessary to Manchukuo.

Colonel STEWART: "One of the most interesting points in the lecture to me was the reference to the Lytton Report and the status

of Manchuria. I think that the ordinary inhabitant of Manchuria looks upon all Governments—except the Republic—as a scalded dog looks upon cold water, 'once bitten, twice shy.' The opinion is that the natives of the Province do not want the present Government; I am convinced that that is really not the case. They rely upon 15,000 literas, but it is very well known that 96 per cent. of the inhabitants of Manchuria are illiterate.

"I was very interested in the pictures of the 'Great Wall,' and I thought perhaps it might be of interest to the audience to know how the bricks were taken up hill and down dale. At the bottom it is made of stone, and though the mountains were of limestone the highest part of the wall is built of bricks, which are very large. These were carried up on the backs of goats, which were fed on the way up.

"Also, though this wall has succeeded in keeping out oncomers, in 1924, when the enemy tried to come in, one brigade came through a pass, and I saw the machine guns, etc., actually in the watch-towers from where they got an extraordinarily good fire. As we know, he managed to come in as far as Peking by means of one mixed brigade through that pass."

The next speaker said: "Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have listened with great interest to the lecture. May I add a word to something Colonel Stewart said. I met a distinguished official a little while ago, who assured me that the price of the letters delivered to the Lytton Report was three dollars a letter. I have no doubt that the Government could get a good many more at that figure.

"I was extremely interested to hear that General Willoughby considers there is something in the Japanese side of this case. I think that Japan's position generally has been rather condemned in Europe and certainly in America, partly for lack of knowledge. The fact that China really belonged to Manchuria just as long as one can say that Manchuria belonged to China is, I believe, a bit of history which is very much overlooked in the articles one reads in the papers day by day. Some papers take up the cudgels on behalf of China, and some take them up on behalf of Japan. I read an article the other day in a most respected paper, the *Daily Telegraph*, which ended with these words, 'Great Britain has as much interest in the mountains of Manchuria as she has in the mountains of the moon.' It seems absurd that a statement like that should be able to go unchallenged, and prevent people from doing the little trade that we are doing there.

"I agree that we must still keep our friendship with Japan, the

strong power in the East. If we offend China we may be faced with a boycott. We should be treading dangerous ground in taking up the cudgels to quarrel with our old allies, who would be pleased to welcome us back into some sort of alliance to get and keep peace in the Far East, which is so important to everybody, and especially to our own trade."

After some further discussion the Chairman said: "I will bring the meeting to a close by thanking General Willoughby on your behalf for his very interesting lecture. But first of all I should like to say one or two words on this question.

"I feel personally rather doubtful about some of the arguments used about Jehoi. To base on the mere fact that the Manchus have disappeared the plea that previous relationships no longer exist seems to me to be both doubtful and dangerous. For instance, our position in China is based upon agreements made when the Manchu Dynasty was in power, and we have never supposed that its disappearance affected those agreements.

"Moreover, whatever the original relationship of Manchuria, we must remember that there are thirty million Chinese in Manchuria, and that the prosperity of the country is very much due to these thirty millions. A great deal of the culture of the place, as Owen Lattimore showed us, is due to the Chinese. Also I am very doubtful about the statement that China belonged to Manchuria rather than Manchuria to China.

"Those of you who remember the correspondence which took place between our Government and China's at the time of the formation of the New Financial Consortium will remember that at that time Japan made an attempt to establish her rights to special interests and a special position in Eastern Inner Mongolia, and that the British Government absolutely declined to admit any such claim. You have only to turn up the correspondence of 1919 to see that in black and white.

"I ask you to pass a hearty vote of thanks to our lecturer this evening."

ÜBĀR—THE ATLANTIS OF THE SANDS OF RUB' AL KHALI

By BERTRAM THOMAS

LEST the reader be deceived by the allure of a romantic title, it is fair to warn him that no breathlessly told treasure-hunt for a buried city lies in the pages before him, but only hard-going through a labyrinth of authorities ancient and modern concerning the legendary Wabar of South Arabia.

The need for my thesis at all is to be found in the October number of this Journal. The purpose of it is to question (i.) an exact geographical location of Wabar, (ii.) an exclusive word-form Wabar—twin claims (twin heresies, unless I am mistaken) which my friend Mr. Philby asseverated somewhat provocatively in his admirable account of a wholly admirable journey.

Mr. Philby "deprecated" the deplorable fact "that a Society such as ours should so tamely follow the fashions set some years ago by Colonel Lawrence of spelling Arabic (*sic*) words 'just anyhow.'" He was referring to the spelling of the word Wabar. The Society, it seems, had used the form Ubar, taking its cue from an innovation of mine a year earlier. Mr. Philby, after pontificating Ubar to be intolerable and the form Wabar alone permissible—for was it not thus met with in mediæval Arab authorities (an exception, incidentally, will be found in Tabari, who has used Abar)?—adds: "and, after all, who can have a better claim to know how the word is spelt than myself (*i.e.*, Mr. Philby), for I have actually been there?"

Been where? Mr. Philby's Wabar identification was the site of a meteorite crater (I had passed within a few miles of it a year before) which his companions told him was Wabar. But this "bolt from the blue" does not fit at all into the historical landscape. The old Arab writers speak of Wabar equally as an ancient district and an ancient tribe—possibly by the familiar Old Testament token of Ps. xlix. 11, "they call their lands after their own names." As a people the Wabar are almost invariably mentioned with Ad and Thamud and other South Arabian tribes of the earliest period, then, as now, popularly held to be extinct. Some genealogists—Suyuti (born 1445 A.D.), for

instance—hold them to be among the “true original Arabs,” *Al Arab al Ba'ida*: a list of nine such tribes is given, beginning with Ad and Thamud and ending with Wabar.

This group (i.), *Al Arab al Ba'ida*, Suyuti distinguishes from two other groups: (ii.) the Muta'arriba—i.e., the naturalized “Arabicized” Arabs who also include the descendants of Qahtan—and (iii.) the Musta'riba, comprising the descendants of Isma'il (the Ma'add).

It is to one of these two latter groups (ii.) and (iii.) that the modern Arab traces his origin, so that Suyuti, in believing group (i.), to which Wabar, Ad, and Thamud belonged, to be extinct is suggesting for it ethnological variation.


From Qazwini (thirteenth century A.D.) we scent linguistic peculiarities when he says, in writing of the antiquity of these peoples, “Wabar dates back to the confusion of tongues.”

For the geographical location of Wabar we must turn to Yaqut (*circa* 1200 A.D.), for Yaqut has a collection of the earlier authorities—viz., Hisham Bin Al Kalbi (*circa* 800 A.D.), Muhammad bin Ishaq (*circa* 750 A.D.), Ibn Al Kaqih, etc. To them all, Wabar had a South Arabian connotation; it was a particularly fertile land, rich in water and fruit trees and especially in palms. Al Masudi (*circa* 950 A.D.) and Al Nabigha (*circa* 600 A.D.), as well as Yaqut, refer to this land of plenty. For more precise definitions of Wabar's magnitude Tabari (*circa* 900 A.D.) describes the broad land of Wabar as stretching from Shihr to Sana; according to Muhammad bin Ishaq, it lay between Sabub (?) and Hadhramaut. Yaqut himself mentions many other unnamed writers, and sums up their record, “Wabar lay between Sana and Shahar, a broad land 300 *farsakhs* long and 300 *farsakhs* wide.” The Arabic *farsakh*=the Persian *parasang*=the distance a man walks in an hour, wherefore Yaqut tells us that Wabar's dimensions were something like 900 miles by 900 miles—i.e., almost the entire area of South Arabia.

The *Encyclopædia of Islam*, now in process of publication (a good deal of the foregoing will be found in an article written before I had published anything on the subject of South Arabia), states that it can be deduced from the earlier authorities that Wabar was the portion of the South Arabian desert of Rub' al Khali that lay north of the Mahra country. Coming to modern authorities, Landberg is cited as holding Wabar to include a cave area where troglodytes live; Spence as denying the Wabar “myth”; and Moritz (*Arabian*, Hanover, 1925) as stating “that the names of those extinct people of the early days

of Arabia, including the Wabar, are at least historical, and there may be a historical kernel in the stories of the fertility of cultivated areas (a series of fabulous stories associated with ancient South Arabia from Yemen to Oman) which later became desert through natural causes."

So much for the historical references to Wabar. Let us now turn for light upon the South Arabia of antiquity by the approach of modern scientific method unknown to and undreamt of by the mediaeval writers. My researches there provide the data.



A brief summary follows of—

(a) Evidences geographical, geological, and zoological, which show that the South Arabian desert is, geologically speaking, new, and that at no very distant date—probably during and after our last Ice Age—South Arabia enjoyed a Pluvial period.

(b) Evidences anthropological and linguistic, which show that there survive to this day reminders of the ancient pre-Arab peoples inhabiting the mountains of the Central South verging the Great Desert, who speak non-Arabi and pre-Arabic (though Semitic) languages,

paralleled in this country, perhaps, by survivals of Ancient Britain met with in the pre-English tongue spoken in the remoter mountains of Wales.

I. GEOGRAPHICAL.—Beyond the belt of the great coastal mountain escarpment of South Arabia, I found that the now arid intra-montane steppe was scored by a vast system of dried-up river beds. That torrential rains fell where now drought conditions obtain is clear from the deeply carved gorges, the mountain sources of these ancient rivers, which are in places hundreds of feet deep, and whose broad beds are thickly strewn with pebbles.

II. GEOLOGICAL.—(a) Everywhere along the southern bulwark of the sands, at a distance of a hundred miles and more north of this mountain system, the marine fossils, oysters, and the like, I found on the surface, are of a limestone composition; they are of that middle Eocene period to which the coastal mountain range belongs, not of the Sandstone formation of the intervening steppe across which they must therefore have been transported by flowing rivers.

III. GEOLOGICAL.—(b) Sand specimens I collected throughout my journey have on analysis been found—even those from the great heart of the desert—to contain considerable grains of pink and white limestone, an indication that these sands cannot be of great antiquity, for had they moved far such limestone grains must have disappeared from the abrasive action of the harder quartz.

IV. ZOOLOGICAL.—Whole families of zoological and entomological life collected in the Dhufar province scientific examination has shown to have the surprising and, for Arabia, the unique characteristic of belonging predominantly to the Ethiopic and not the Palaearctic zone. e.g., the commonest snake collected was the African puff adder, and my butterflies included *Charaxes*, a purely African creature. Here, then, are relics of the former animal population of South Arabia before desiccation had brought about an invasion of Palaearctic fauna from the north—for this "Ethiopic Enclave" surviving in the central south is evidence that at one time Africa and South Arabia were climatically and faunistically one.

That desiccation has been a gradual process, or at any rate that the climate has undergone a considerable change even within historical times, is suggested by Ptolemy's map, in which towns and villages are shown in regions that today are wholly desert.

These considerations lead irresistibly to the conclusion that South Arabia as a whole enjoyed flourishing conditions in remote times, and

there is no incongruity in the historical evidence that Wabar stood for a very considerable slice of this South Arabian terrain.

What, then, of Mr. Philby's identification of Wabar with the meteorite site as far north as the twenty-first parallel? The answer that his companions told him so, bearing in mind that the location of Wabar was a most cherished objective of the expedition and one much discussed with them, raises a suspicion that they would be predisposed "to deliver the goods." Be that as it may, however, the evidence of hearsay alone, set against the cloud of witness before mentioned and unsupported by any evidence on the spot of a single ruined building or other archaeological remain, imports so flimsy a case, that Mr. Philby's emphasis on the validity of this exclusive cite for Wabar, as shown by a pin-point on a map, is untenable. That the Wabar habitat may well have extended as far north as this point, and that it contained a city whose memory survives by its name, are postulates that are inherently probable. I have already recorded in another connection that on the nomads' lips Hofuf is generally called Hasa and Salalah almost invariably Dhufar, a usage whereby the chief town of a province is known by the name of the province rather than by its own name. So also the tradition Ūbār—a golden city lying beneath the sands—was told me not in answer to my enquiries but as a spontaneous outburst on passing definite archaeological remains of ancient extensive caravan tracks leading straight into the great southern bulwark of the sands. This I was content to record without any pretentious or exclusive claim for it. Yet it is clear that this may be said in favour of a southern site for a buried city, if such exists: the deepest sands are in the south; the sands are shallowing northwards; they are comparatively shallow in the neighbouring latitude of the meteorite site, where, however, not a trace of even a partly exposed building was found. As a discovery of scientific importance and great interest, the meteorite crater is magnificent, and I envy and applaud Mr. Philby's find; but as the site of Wabar! *Allahu al 'Alim!* it is a mirage. We must clearly wait for tangible archaeological proof—at least we cannot jump it—before putting Wabar on the map.

There remains Mr. Philby's strictures on the Society's slipshod spelling (*sic*) of the Arabic word (*sic*) Ubar; for while he asked us to swallow the camel of the Wabar identification, he himself strains at the gnat of the spelling of Ubar. A most cursory reference to my anthropological and linguistic researches in South Arabia will bring the criticism into perspective.

I. I discovered that the entire southern borderlands of the Great Desert stretching between long. $57^{\circ} 45'$ E. and long. $52^{\circ} 00'$ E., and the mountains of the Central South, to be peopled by a "bloc" of ancient pre-Arab remainders, troglodytes for a large part, speaking pre-Arabic languages. Ancient quarries in their mountains, the mountains of Dhufar (also the great frankincense country), are traditionally held to be ancient gold diggings.

II. Besides observing their palpable differences from the familiar Arab—physical, cultural, linguistic—I took callipers and made systematic anthropometric measurements, took voluminous type portraits and sent a skull from a rock tomb to the Royal College of Surgeons. Sir Arthur Keith, one of the greatest living physical anthropologists, who studied these and has contributed an appendix on them to my *Arabia Felix* (Jonathan Cape, 1932), sums up that they represent a residue of the population of South Arabia before the familiar Arab came in.

III. The Shahara, one of this non-Arab bloc and linguistically peculiar (incidentally it practises endogamy and so is racially pure), has traditions going back to Ad. This I have recorded in my last book. Another of this distinct ethnological bloc, the Mahra, Yaqut mentions as those whose camels descend from the camels of Wabar.

IV. The four languages Mahri, Shahari, Harsusi, and Bautahari, vocabularies of each of which I have compiled and a short grammar I am now engaged in writing, will almost certainly prove to be survivals of Himyaritic, Sabæan, and Minæan, the old languages of South Arabia in pre-Arabic—pre-Christian times.

Now Wabar dates from this period, before Arabic had been invented as a script, and it is in the language of these southern borderlands that Wabar is met with only as Ūbār. The evidence for the value of the form Ūbār is that I did not take the word out of a book with me to Arabia, but brought it back from the lips of the inhabitants of the ancient south *in situ*.

It is only fair to Mr. Philby to point out that he never penetrated south of Shanna—i.e., latitude $18^{\circ} 50'$ N.—and therefore did not enter the habitat of this great bloc of early remainders stretching as a continuous belt as large as England and Wales together across the Central South, or encounter their ancient tongues. Had he shared my experiences of three considerable camel journeys in that territory spread over a period of four years, he would not have insisted upon the exclusive validity of a form of word dating from pre-Arabic times, in servile respect for the infallibility of mediæval and non-scientific Arab writers.

And so the Society was not misspelling an Arabic word at all. Wabar is more likely to be a late and Arabicized form of the Society's Ubar. All honour to the Society.

In conclusion, there is one point of interest that strikes me as worth mentioning. In Semitic philology the form Ūbār and the Hebrew Ophir can be fundamentally the same word by an f.b. change*—e.g.:

אָפִיר, Afar (H.); هُبَار, Ghubar (Ar.). בָּרְזֵל, Barzel (H.); فِرْزֵל, Firzil (Ar.). גֹּפְרִית, Gophrith (H.); كَبْرِيت, Kabrit (Ar.). אֹפֶרֶת, Ophereth (H.); {أَبَرَا}, Abara (Sy.) (see Wright's *Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages*).

Now the *Encyclopædia Britannica*† has this to say about the Biblical Ophir, *inter alia*:

"Ophir, a region celebrated in antiquity for its gold. The only indications whereby it can be identified are its connexion in the geographical table (Gen. x. 29) with Sheba and Havilah, the latter also an auriferous country (Gen. ii. 11), and the fact that ships sailing thither started from Ezion-Geber at the head of the Red Sea. It must, therefore, have been somewhere south and east of Suez, and must be known to be a gold-bearing region.

"On the whole, the most satisfactory theory is that Ophir was in some part of Arabia—whether south or west is disputed, and (with the indications at our disposal) probably cannot be settled. Arabia was known as a gold-producing country to the Phœnicians (Ezek. xxvii. 22); Sheba certainly, and Havilah probably, are regions of Arabia, and these are coupled with Ophir in Genesis x.; and the account of the arrival of the navy in 1 Kings x. 11 is strangely interpolated into the story of the visit of the Queen of Sheba, perhaps because there is a closer connexion between the two events than appears at first sight."

These considerations suggest to me an interesting theory, and that is that in Ophir we have the Hebrew survival of the ancient South Arabian Ubar, as in Wabar we have the mediæval Arabic memory of it.

* Hence also Ubar can be equated with Ufar: Afar. Dhufar may in origin not impossibly have been susceptible of the division Dhu Ufar (the medial *al* is not met with in the South Arabian languages).

† See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, xi edition, "Ophir," Professor R. Macalister. See footnote, p. 49, my *Arabia Felix*.

WATER SUPPLIES OF 'IRAQ

A MURDER a day in the arid summer season was the pre-war record of one of the provinces in this part of the old Ottoman Empire. Water, indeed, has always been the nodal point of existence in Mesopotamia, and the employment of it has been a factor towards civilization since the beginning of recorded time. The history of Babylonia was largely one of struggles as to who should control the water supply. The central part of the country, as can be seen admirably from the air, shows a complete network of ancient canals; some parts indeed are almost, as it were, herring-boned with these obsolete irrigation works. It is certain, however, that the numerous dead channels were never in simultaneous operation, and that silt and salt between them forced the ancients periodically to abandon their canals and dig new ones.

No less important than the canals of old were the dykes, protecting the towns and the cultivable lands from the floods of the winter and spring seasons, whose association with 'Iraq has been famous since the earliest days of mankind.

Well has 'Iraq been named the Land of the Two Rivers—i.e., the Tigris and Euphrates—and it is from those twin streams, described in Arabic as Al Rafidain, that she has recently taken the title of her sole order of chivalry.

In Southern 'Iraq, as the rivers approached the Persian Gulf, their courses became uncertain in direction and capacity, much water being spilt on either side in vast marshes. Today it is largely the same. The Tigris at Amarah, 120 miles from its outfall, is one-third the size that it is at Baghdad, 240 miles further upstream, whilst the Euphrates, in its course between Ramadi and Basrah, twice dissipates itself entirely, once in the rice-fields of the Shamiyah and once to the south of Nasiriyah.

The nature of the untamed rivers, coupled with a climate that can range in temperature from 25 degrees Fahrenheit in winter to 130 degrees Fahrenheit in summer, creates a host of trials for the dweller in Mesopotamia, who for centuries past has been exposed to floods, drought, disease, locusts, civil insecurity, and foreign invasion. It is little wonder if in such circumstances he has often developed apathy and lack of patience when undertaking tedious tasks.

The statesmen of 'Iraq today are therefore tackling with their pro-

gratifying of development not only the economic deficiencies of the kingdom, but also the psychological weakness of its people. By giving them a sense of security in their fights against floods, disease, and insect-pests, and in their division of the water supply and the cultivable lands, they are creating in the people a constructive spirit and a love for law, order, and civilization such as have been absent from the realm for centuries.

In the programme of the State the construction of flood reduction and irrigation works occupies naturally a most prominent place, for none of the structures of the ancients remains effective today and nothing fresh of importance was achieved until the present century dawned. Prior to the Great War there was in 'Iraq but one major work, the Hindiyah Barrage, the object of which is to regulate the flow of the Euphrates from Hillah southwards.

Since the British forces occupied Baghdad fifteen years ago an irrigation department has existed in one form or another, undergoing frequent changes in its staff, its budget, and its programme of immediate works. It has been required to spend much of its time and money upon matters that were momentarily of military or political importance, and its achievements have hitherto consisted much more in keeping alive or improving some existing system of canals with a population already settled upon it rather than in making "the desert blossom like the rose." Nevertheless, unobtrusively and sometimes despite discouragement from important quarters, it has managed to pave the way for a more generous future by conducting unceasingly, although of necessity slowly, that survey of the waters and the lands of the country which alone can form the basis of any sound projects; it has made a few model canal systems and taught its staff to operate them, it has trained a corps of minor contractors to construct works in good fashion, and it has demonstrated in canal areas, such as that of the Yusifiyah, that the 'Iraq peasant can, when put to it, quickly learn to use his water with care, to the greater benefit of both crops and land. Under the encouraging influence of a steady water supply the sown area of many an existing canal has expanded gradually, although to an impatient observer it may have done so imperceptibly. To such a person the department's work in the Shattrah district will make more appeal, for prosperity has now been restored to this formerly distressed area, causing its tribesmen to return from their wanderings elsewhere and brigandage to become but a bogey of the past.

Simultaneously the numerous dykes have been strengthened or reconstructed and arrangements made to collect and distribute rapidly news of the rivers' behaviour whenever rain has fallen in the mountains of Kurdistan, Armenia, and Persia, and threatened to cause flooding in the plains. In this connection the Franco-Syrian authorities supply by wireless readings of the Euphrates at Jarablus and Dair-al-Zor, thus giving five days' warning to those in 'Iraq to the south of Ramadi of what is in store for them. Similar arrangements with the Turkish officials at Diyarbekr are in course of organization.

With the disappearance of uncertainty as to 'Iraq's political status and the recent solution of several outstanding problems such as those of the oil concessions, the Government of the country is now able to undertake some of the large works which the irrigation department has had in view for years past. Of these the two first to be dealt with are the Habbaniyah scheme on the Euphrates and the Kut Barrage on the Tigris, each likely to cost very roughly one and a quarter million sterling. However the Government may arrange to pay for them, it will be able to include in its reckoning its revenue from the oilfields which are being kept apart from its ordinary revenue and expenditure.

As regards the Habbaniyah scheme, the tenderers are now busy on the spot getting out their estimates. This scheme provides for an off-take from the Euphrates, near the town of Ramadi. This channel will run into the great Habbaniyah depression and will be used to fill it whenever the river reaches a certain level. Thereafter in any given year one of two things will happen. If the flood proves to be exceptionally big, another channel at the south end of the depression will be opened to let in the surplus water in the river, and after entering Habbaniyah dissipate itself in another and still greater depression, the Bahar al Milh. In a normal year, however, the escape to the south will not be used, but in all years the Euphrates water stored in Habbaniyah itself will be kept there until the summer, when an outlet near Fallujah will be opened to allow the impounded water to run back into the river. This scheme was first propounded to the Turks by the late Sir William Willcocks. Its virtues are that it protects the lands of the lower Euphrates from undue floods in spring and gives the cultivators of Central 'Iraq the assurance of more water for their thirsty crops in the late summer, when supplies are usually exceedingly scanty.

Further to the south on the Euphrates is the Hindiyah Barrage,

built by a British firm before the Great War. This structure regulates the flow of the river for the benefit of the canals watering the lands to the south of Hillah. It has already performed most useful service, but before it can reach its maximum efficiency much minor work is still necessary in its subsidiary canals.

As regards the barrage on the Tigris at Kut, the object of this work is to divert the surplus water of the Tigris into one of its ancient channels, still surviving, as often as not with a dry bed, as the River Hai (or Gharraf), which runs due south towards the Euphrates near Nasiriyah. It seems probable this work will be put up to tender very soon.

ERNEST MAIN.

NEAR EASTERN ART AT THE COURTAULD INSTITUTE

THE importance of all that the Nearer East has contributed to the art of the world since the beginning of the Christian era is coming every day to be more fully realized. Yet facilities for the study of this period and this region have until now never been provided in England. While courses on the art and archæology of ancient Egypt and ancient Mesopotamia are to be followed at most of our universities, while the teaching and study of the archæology of Greece and Rome occupies large bodies of people at all of them, the study of the so-called "dark ages" has, in general, been utterly neglected.

In spite of this, the work of a few individuals has shown that the darkness attributed to the period from about A.D. 300 until the Italian Renaissance in Europe, and to practically all the Nearer East from the beginning of the Christian period until today, was in reality the very opposite. That it could ever have been called "darkness" was to be accounted for by the faulty vision of those who sought to overlook the period in order to satisfy cultural theories of their own. But the individual workers have shown us, too, often in the face of considerable opposition, how superb were the actual products in the spheres of architecture and art, how great an influence they had on our own arts in the West, and how continued a series of cultures of the highest type flourished throughout this age, not only in the one most famous centre, Constantinople, but also in practically every other city of importance in the whole of the Nearer East.

These pioneers have paved the way for further and more elaborate research on the part of other isolated enthusiasts like themselves. They have set the study of Near Eastern art on an established footing, and have shown that it is well worthy of the close consideration of the more general art-loving public as well as of that of specialists. But the time has now come for their studies to bear a more abundant fruit; their learning must be made easily accessible. Where, says the public, are the fruits to be found? Who will lead us over these curious, little-known territories? The books are rare and expensive; the majority of them are in foreign languages; most of them are controversial. Who

will tell us what to read, and who will help us to interpret what we read correctly?

It was with the idea of satisfying to some extent a demand of this nature, and of showing the younger students what fields lay open to them, that a series of lectures dealing with certain aspects of Byzantine and Near Eastern art were included in the general course at the Courtauld Institute during its first year of existence. The lectures awoke a keen interest among the students, and they were apparently sincerely appreciated by those of the general public who attended them—so much so, in fact, that a more comprehensive series is being arranged for the coming session, 1933-1934.

The first series of lectures dealing with the Nearer East ends on March 16 of this year. A second full course, of about twenty lectures, by the author of this note, entitled "Some Aspects of Christian and Moslem Art in the Nearer East," designed to give a complete, though necessarily somewhat sketchy outline of the whole subject, will be delivered during the coming winter. This full course will be supplemented by other shorter courses on special branches of the subject by various authorities. Among them is one this summer on Byzantine mosaics and painting by Professor Charles Diehl; and there will be courses during the winter on Coptic art by M. Georges Duthuit, on Islamic architecture by Captain Creswell, and on Islamic art by Professor Meyer.

In order to assure the continuation of this work, however, the establishment of a permanent lectureship in Byzantine and Near Eastern art at the Institute is one of its most pressing needs. In the creation of such a post it is certain that not only will an important gap be filled in the facilities provided for the more general student; there will also be established a nucleus for future research and study, both at home and in the field. The first essential for such a nucleus is the formation of a complete collection of photographs of Byzantine and Near Eastern art, both Moslem and Christian, and for this the Conway collection of reproductions, so generously presented by Lord Conway of Allington, forms an admirable foundation on which to build. The further elaboration of this collection has already begun, but it is necessarily a slow and expensive business. Should this note come to the eye of any who can further the scheme, who can present photographs or lend negatives for prints to be made, the Institute will, needless to say, be most sincerely grateful for the opportunity of considering them.

In addition to providing facilities for teaching and research, the

Institute hopes to be able to organize from time to time small exhibitions, with the intention of making certain obscure aspects of the art of the Nearer East more generally familiar. The first of these exhibitions, which dealt with Byzantine and Greek panel paintings from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries, was held in January. It was met with considerable welcome in the press, and was attended by a large number of outside visitors.

Such, in brief, are the aims of the Courtauld Institute with regard to Near Eastern art: to fill a vacant and important breach in the fields of teaching and research in this country and to establish in England a centre which will not only be worthy of its object, but which will also, in the future, be as fully accessible and of as much service to students from abroad as their resources have been to us in the past.

D. TALBOT RICE.

REVIEWS

The Cambridge History of India. Vol. VI. The Indian Empire, 1858-1918, with chapters on the Development of Administration, 1818-1858. 9½" x 6½". Pp. xxiv + 660. Cambridge University Press. 30s. net.

§ 1

One hundred years ago, on January 29, 1833, commenced the first session of the Reformed Parliament, soon to be heavily involved in the discussion of "those immense and salutary reforms with which the Whig Cabinet had resolved to accompany the renewal of the India Company's charter." So is it written in the biography of Macaulay, who, as member for Leeds and Secretary to the Board of Control under the Presidency of Charles Grant, bore the burden and heat of defending the India Bill in debate and in Committee.

Macaulay's work, indeed, is typical of British effort in and for India during the first half of the nineteenth century. He is the embodiment of those liberal principles which inspired the great activity and notable reforms accompanying the final development of the Indian administrative system. In two of those "periodical revisions of the imperial system, each in effect a revolution"—the India Bills of 1833 and 1853—he held the stage. Championing competitive examination as the method of recruitment for the Indian Services, he played a part no less historic than his achievements in India as the first law member of the Governor-General's Council. A bare recital of his work in that country would serve as an index to the history of India for a generation. It was Macaulay who, as president of the first Indian Law Commission, produced the first draft of the Indian Penal Code, and laid the foundation on which other legislators were to build. It was his minute which drew from Lord William Bentinck the fateful decision to base the higher education of Indians on Occidental rather than on Oriental literature. His death, in the fitness of things, coincided with the Company's extinction, which, accelerated though it was by the cataclysm of the Mutiny, he had so wisely planned and so carefully anticipated.

This period—from 1818 to 1858, the period of Macaulay—is described in chapters of exceptional interest, which, although they occupy one-third of the volume and receive due mention on the title-page, are ignored altogether on the cover or on the dust-jacket. Of these forty years the first twenty enjoyed profound peace, broken only by the first Burmese war and the Bharatpur incident; the remainder, so far as this volume is concerned, are invested with a somewhat unreal calm by relegating to Volume V. the Afghan tragedy, the conquest of the Punjab, the second Burmese war, and Dalhousie's annexations. This, the sixth volume, is concerned almost entirely with the development of imperial government in England and India, and with district administration in the Presidencies and Provinces. Education and missions, and the Company's armies and marine receive separate treatment; while the internal histories of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and of the North-West Provinces, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces are recounted with knowledge and skill, refreshingly free from technicalities.

§ 2

In the second period—from the Mutiny to the close of the Great War—Professor Dodwell distinguishes three main developments. In the first of these—in the administrative and political sphere—control exercised from London was rapidly tightening. "The Indian States ceased to be the dependent but external allies of 1858, and became integral parts of a new empire of India," which reached a higher degree of union than ever before. A new class of society was created—educated in Western knowledge and possessed of professional qualifications—a class essentially urban and inspired by a new sense of unity created by railways and telegraphs, by an Indian press, and by the use of English as a common vehicle of thought. Side by side with this development went the great economic advance. Irrigation, railways, agricultural improvements, co-operative credit, all these, and more, diffused wealth in ever widening circles, and went far to exorcise the spectre of famine. The third development "consists of a series of efforts to transform into an organic state the inorganic despotism which the Crown inherited from the Company, and the Company from the former Indian Governments." Of this portentous experiment the end is not yet.

In the years after the Mutiny up to the close of the century there is no outstanding figure like Macaulay to sum up in one personality the spirit of the age. There were giants indeed, and their works live after them. But the names of the men who made the India we see are, it is to be feared, in danger of being forgotten.

The general trend of administration in these years is well described by Sir Verney Lovett. After the substitution of the Secretary of State in Council for the Board of Control and the Court of Directors neither Parliament nor the Secretary of State was inclined to interfere with the administration so long as all went well, and Indian affairs hardly touched British politics. "The Government of India became a Cabinet Government, presided over by a Governor-General, business being carried on departmentally, and the Governor-General taking a more active and particular share in it than is taken by a prime minister in a Western country, or than had been taken by any of his predecessors." The system remained unaltered during the whole of this period. In India public policy and legislation were everywhere controlled by the Central Government, which was in its turn dominated by its responsibility to Parliament through the Secretary of State. The general feeling in England was that Indian affairs were safe in the hands of the Indian Government.

After Lord Curzon's departure from India a new era began. Lord Morley found no particular difficulty in getting his own way, and gathered more and more power into his own hands. The Morley-Minto reforms prepared the way for future developments, which were to follow with unexpected rapidity. Not unmindful of Professor Dodwell's Horatian warning we approach the volcanic ground of present-day controversy. With judicial wariness Sir Verney Lovett guides us past the changes announced on December 12, 1911, draws a painful contrast between parliamentary interest in India during the Victorian era and the attitude of the House of Commons towards the Government of India Bill of 1919, and returns to firm ground with an account of the Crown's functions. "The crown worn by Queen Victoria and her successors has been far more than a mere symbol of unity. It has been a strong power and a reconciler in India."

Provincial history from 1858 is in the same competent hands as before, and

there is the same welcome absence of oppressive detail and wearisome statistics. Finance is ably dealt with, and Sir Verney Lovett Griffin holds our interest with his essays on foreign policy and education. His sketch of the district officer in charge of famine relief will awaken many memories. There is also a restrained, but none the less ardent, appreciation of Lord Curzon, "with all his splendid energy, twenty years too late."

Professor Dodwell, in his account of Central Asian policy from 1858 to 1918, traces the tendencies of European cabinets, as communications improved, to exercise an ever-increasing control over local governors. "Even Curzon's vigour and determination had been barely able to restore to the Government of India the phantom of its old authority; and what he could not achieve lesser men could not even attempt." Dr. Davies recounts the history of the North-West Frontier during the same period. It would be difficult to find a Letter guide to Central Asian affairs in the latter part of the nineteenth century than these two monographs.

Chapters on the Services, the Indian Army and India's part in the war, the relations of the Government of India with Indian States, Law Reform and Local Self-government, all of the highest interest and importance, leave little unsaid regarding this century of strenuous achievement.

5 3

So men laboured—Britons and Indians—and others entered into their labours; the multitude with joy and thanksgiving—none the less sincere because inarticulate—the Brahman with envy, hatred, and malice and all uncharitableness. For the influences released by the high-minded devotion of the Company's servants and, after the Mutiny, by the servants of the Crown, were precisely those which threatened most nearly the mental, moral, and social supremacy of the Brahman oligarchy. For hundreds of years the Brahman had striven to rid the land from all save those over whom his domination was assured. The Buddhist, whose tolerant creed admitted to the fold the alien and the foreigner, was forced to yield. The Brahman was left supreme until the Muslim invader forced the barriers and remained to rule. The alien waxed ever stronger, until the empire of the Moghuls showed signs of extending equal sway and equal protection to Hindu and Muslim as well as to other creeds. The Brahman, forced to look for a weapon to compass the downfall of a power which boded ruin to his ascendancy, found one ready to his hand. The robber hordes of Sivaji and his followers, with the craft of the Brahman to aid them, took shape as the Maratha principalities, which undermined and finally destroyed the Moghul Empire. But the hopes of Brahman ascendancy in a Hindu India were destined to lack fulfilment. By 1818 the skill and determination of Wellesley and Hastings had humbled the pride of the Marathas. The momentary hope that the British forces might be caught between the undisciplined armies of the Poonja and Gwalior was extinguished by the battle of Maharajpur, while the result of the Sikh wars was to confirm the position of the British as the controlling power in India.

The Brahman, seeking for his purposes yet another weapon, turned to "the sepoy army, because that was the only organized body through which Brahman sentiment could express itself" . . . "to the Bengal section of the sepoy troops because that alone included numerous Brahmans." Such is Professor Dodwell's view of the Mutiny and its origin, a view with which, though not unchallenged, it is difficult not to agree. "The weapon," says Professor Dodwell, "was broken

by the very use to which it was put. The sepoys lost coherence with the loss of their English officers." The Brahman reactionary had failed once more, and, stunned by the thoroughness with which the Mutiny was suppressed and the efficiency of the subsequent reorganization, found no opportunity to renew the struggle till a quarter of a century had elapsed.

The opportunity, when it came, was worth waiting for. Occidental education, at first productive mainly of ethical and social improvement, led rapidly to political activity. The Congress, which began to hold its annual meetings in 1885, is thus described by Sir Verney Lovett:

"From early days the Congress included two parties of Hindus. There were the Western-educated followers of Gladstonian liberalism, loyal to British rule, but anxious to press on politically, who drew much inspiration from English literature and history, and gathered strength from their power to appeal to English democratic sympathies. There were also reactionary and irreconcilable Hindus, who regarded the memories of Muslim supremacy and the intrusions of British rule and Western culture with rooted aversion."

The history of British Indian politics during the last forty years is the exploitation of the former of these two classes by the latter. The extremists for their own ends—for the removal of alien rule, and the maintenance of their own ascendancy—have fought in the ranks of the constitutional reformers, appropriated their gains, and sullied their reputation. From behind a screen of impeccable liberalism extremist propaganda, no less ingenious than malicious, has been broadcast against the British and all their works. "In our own day," says Sir Verney Lovett, "extremism has gone far to make the successful working of any parliamentary system in Indian for ever impossible. But perhaps this is the object of some of its leaders. . . . No orthodox high caste Hindu can really desire to see democracy established in India." The Brahman's belief in constitutional reform is confined to its power of weakening British rule and the British connection. Has not the weapon been broken, as in the Mutiny, by the very use to which it has been put? Has not the extremist, by exploiting constitutional reforms in which he has no belief, defeated his own ends? Has not clamour for democratic institutions given power to the very classes which the high caste Hindu wishes to see for ever subservient or removed altogether from his path? The answer must be sought in a volume of this history which has yet to be planned.

It may be that those responsible for this volume will suffer "the experience of those countless writers on Indian themes who have successively blunted their pens against the passive indifference of the British public." In these pages interest is there in abundance for those who are interested, and, fortunately, in view of the issues now facing us, their number is increasing. But, whatever befall, the editor and his coadjutors can enjoy the satisfaction of having raised a worthy memorial to an age of devoted endeavour and momentous fulfilment.

A. M. S.

Egypt since Cromer. Vol. I. By Lord Lloyd, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.F., D.S.O., P.C. 9½"×6". Pp. xi+390. Maps. Macmillan. 21s.

We expected a good book from Lord Lloyd, and our expectations have been amply justified, for *Egypt since Cromer* is not merely good—it is masterly. In every line one realizes that here is a writer who not only knows thoroughly his subject, both past and present, but one who has also an almost uncanny grasp

of the peculiar mentality of the people about whom he writes; and there is no doubt whatsoever that no one at the present time understands so completely the Egyptian and his particular outlook on life. The first and foremost impression one gets from the book is that the author has never failed to see both sides of the question, and though advanced Egyptian Nationalists might disagree with Lord Lloyd's views on certain points, they could not possibly accuse him of partiality, for his book is essentially fair and unprejudiced. There is much of Lord Lloyd's personality in the book; for the style is crisp and concise, there is not a redundant word or an involved paragraph, and every sentence means something and helps on the narrative of events.

Lord Lloyd starts his book with the year 1904, when it was hoped that the agreement with France over the Moroccan question would end that country's policy of aggression and hostility towards the British occupation, which had prevented any modification of the existing Capitulations and in every respect had stultified Lord Cromer's administration. Lord Cromer had expected confidently that the agreement would herald a new era in Egypt, but, as Lord Lloyd shows conclusively, this was not the case and, despite the mutual arrangement, France still maintained her hostile attitude.

The chapter on Capitulations is particularly good, as here Lord Lloyd deals in no unsparing manner with the ramifications of these survivals of another age, and shows how they have hampered all Great Britain's attempts at improvement; how galling they are to a sensitive people who are attempting to arrive at a satisfactory and fair system of taxation; not to mention the grave effect on prevention of crime that the abuse of their regulations causes. As Lord Lloyd, quoting Sir Valentine Chirol, says of foreigners who enjoy the freedom of the Capitulations: "Amongst them are to be found some of the most undesirable elements of the Levant, who chiefly use the privileges conferred by the Capitulations to defeat the law of the land."

In the chapter devoted to the last years of Cromer's régime, Lord Lloyd sums up the situation sympathetically, pointing out the foundations that Cromer laid, and in the next chapter he deals with Sir Eldon Gorst and his endeavours to carry out the policy of concession as a cure for unrest, dictated to him by the Liberal Government then in power. It is pointed out that Sir Eldon Gorst's early death prevented him from seeing the result of his policy, but we gather that there was very little hope of fruition for his schemes for a better system of education and the encouragement of the self-governing bodies in the country, and that Gorst himself was aware that his whole policy of concession had failed, though he was loath to admit it. Throughout the book Lord Lloyd points out how public opinion at home has always pinned its faith to democratic institutions, regardless of the fact that in Egypt such a thing as a real democratic feeling does not exist. He speaks of the authorities at home looking forward in a few years' time to an ideal state of affairs, "when a voter's heart should beat beneath every galabieh and a voter's sturdy intelligence fill every Egyptian head," and one gathers that he attributes largely our failure in Egypt to the inability of our home Government to realize that the Oriental differs from the Occidental in any way, and to the efforts to cultivate democracy regardless of the unsuitability of the soil.

After the chapters on Gorst and his disastrous policy, it is refreshing to come to the chapter on the Sudan, where one realizes what can be done in a backward country when the administrative staff are of the right type and do not suffer unduly from "unenlightened instructions coming from uninstructed sentimentalism." In a later chapter Lord Lloyd returns to the Sudan, dealing

with the events from 1908 to 1919, and he has nothing but praise for the enormous advance that a wise administration has made in this country.

Kitchener's régime, we gather, was remarkable only for his feud with the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, in which Kitchener scored all the tricks, and for his great and lasting work to better the conditions under which the small fellah existed. Kitchener had always a weak spot in his heart for the fellah, and, though the Egyptian is not remarkable for his gratitude, the popularity that Kitchener enjoyed in the villages of the Nile Valley has never been equalled by any High Commissioner. One might pause to wonder for a moment whether this would be a true statement if Lord Lloyd himself, during his own term of office, had had the same opportunities of mixing with the fellah in the villages. On the few occasions when Lord Lloyd managed to escape from his office chair and visit the Provinces, it was proved that he possessed to a marked degree the particular personality and charm of manner that the Oriental finds irresistible, and villages that had resolved to treat his arrival—as representative of the British oppressor—with sullen neglect had, against their will, broken out into scenes of enthusiasm and flocked round his car to shake his hand. Kitchener was serving under the same Liberal Government that had dictated the policy of concession to force, which had wrecked Gorst's career, but Kitchener, it would appear, had no enthusiasm for anything beyond his own particular schemes for the general betterment of the country and the small farmer, and he rather naïvely shelved or stultified all other matters.

The war chapters are among the best in the book, for here Lord Lloyd very plainly and sympathetically shows the Egyptian point of view, a side of the question which few people have taken the trouble to consider. As he puts it: "She was neither combatant nor neutral; she was in the heart of the strife and yet not of it." He advances very strong arguments in favour of annexation immediately after Turkey's entry into the war and the automatic severing of the ties that bound Egypt to her sovereign state, and points out that probably the Protectorate was the worst choice of the three possible solutions. The attitude of the troops toward the inhabitants of Egypt is aptly summed up as follows: "If they were glimpsed among the khaki-clad figures in the hotel or restaurant it was probably with the feeling that they weren't doing much in the Great War and must be making a lot of money at the same time—this general attitude of easy-going, rather contemptuous lack of interest must have been intensely wounding to a hyper-sensitive people still suffering from an inferiority complex." This expresses exactly what the better class and more influential Egyptian suffered from 1914 to 1919, and explains to a very great extent the unpromising wave of hostility against us that was shown by the intelligentsia in March, 1919. The hostility of the fellah is accounted for by the recruitment for the Labour Corps, forced purchase of animals and coerced subscriptions to the Red Cross Fund.

The book then deals with the rising of 1919, the unsympathetic treatment accorded to Sir Reginald Wingate, and finally Lord Allenby's concession to the forces of disorder in April, 1919, when Zaghloul and his fellow-deportees were brought back to the country. To quote Lord Lloyd: "The weapon of violence had been adopted and until that weapon had been struck from the hand of Egypt, and conclusively shown to be valueless, there could not safely be any talk of negotiation or concession. Of this view later circumstances have been one long confirmation."

Lord Lloyd has earned our gratitude for providing us with a book that explains with the greatest fairness to both sides and without an unnecessary word

the very much involved Egyptian problem. The only possible fault one can find with it is that he has so schooled himself not to stray from his set purpose of making clear the ramifications and ~~ways~~ of Anglo-Egyptian affairs from Cromer's time till the end of 1919, that he only occasionally gives rein to his natural gift of humour. In describing the early days of Zaghloul and his differences with the then Adviser to the Ministry of Education, Lord Lloyd says: "It is more than likely that during this period he began to learn to prefer opposition to office, realizing from his own experience how much easier and more pleasant it is to soar aloft in the comfortable elevator of destructive criticism than to climb the steep stairs of constructive effort." Also when describing a certain laxity during Mohammed Said Pasha's tour of office, he adds: "He was therefore in a position to give free rein to his native tendencies, and to put into operation the principles of advancement by nepotism and private interest. In Oriental countries this is the principle naturally adopted. It is held to accord equally with the claims of self-interest and with the sacred demands of family affection." This sort of thing makes one desire more, but the book is a serious one on a serious subject, and the temptation to see the humorous side on all occasions had to be avoided.

One puts down *Egypt since Cromer* with a feeling of gratefulness to Lord Lloyd for giving one a thorough understanding of the affairs that led up to the present impasse, and one looks forward with eagerness to Volume II., which will deal with an even more difficult period.

C. S. JARVIS.

Georgia : A History of the Georgian People. By W. E. D. Allen, with an Introduction by Sir E. Denison Ross. 10½" × 6½". Pp. xxiv + 429. Illustrations. Plates. Maps. Kegan Paul. 1932. 31s. 6d.

Only eight years ago the present reviewer wrote to an Indian bookseller for any available literature on Georgia, and received, by return of post, a book on the Southern States of the Union, a monumental work on the South Polar Regions, a disquisition on the Solomon Islands, and a volume of "Georgian" stories, with a polite intimation that no book on North Georgia could be traced. The clerk's unconscious humour was as excusable as his zeal was commendable, for Mr. Allen's book is literally the first original work of importance in the English tongue devoted specifically to the Georgian people and their history.

That a young Ulsterman of such adventurous and varied interests as Mr. Allen should be prepared to devote himself to historical research may appear astonishing to some of his acquaintances; but not to his friends, who will find in these pages a wealth of learning, modestly displayed in an attractive literary garb. The author's choice of subject is to those who know him as natural as the choice of Louis Napoleon to write the *Life of Julius Caesar*. Nationalism, which

Professor Gilbert Murray, regardless of the Statutes of Præmunire, loves to describe as "the modern Moloch" (the word is the high-brow equivalent in current cant to the "Baby-Killer" of a later day), is not the invention of politicians, it is a compromise between the claims of race or religion and the needs of government. The men of Ulster stand out in contemporary history as a people who are less concerned with geography and race than with religion and regional history. The Georgian people have evinced similar tendencies in their long struggle against neighbouring but alien races; like Ulstermen they have but infrequently turned the other cheek when attacked, and a study of the annals of their many wars, as recorded by Mr. Allen, is an admirable commentary on the difficulty now confronting the learned but inexperienced delegates at Geneva in their search for a judicial definition of aggression. Mr. Allen has absorbed a vast amount of history from recondite sources available only to determined students; this solid fare has given a strong framework to his book and lent sinews to his style; he has also drunk deep at the Pierian spring and has browsed in flowery pastures. These pleasant excursions are reflected in passages of real eloquence where, dropping for a moment the heavy but never cumbrous mantle of the historian, he describes some mountain scene or great military exploit.

"In the history of the Caucasus," he says, "is a wide instruction and a mighty pleasure, for it is all instruction, born of illustration, rather than of assumption, argument, and proof. Here are no serried ranks of causes and effect, no steady mark of progress, no smug train of evolution. All the nations of the world have drifted through the Caucasus; all their leavings are to find—but little has been left. Here are the ways of God and men, most horrible and lovely, uncertain and not comprehensible. Such things we may contemplate, learn somewhat, understand a little, and wonder."

That is finely said, and wisely, for the true historian may honestly write over his study, like Linnæus, "*Recte vivite, numen adest.*"

In treating of the Historical Geography of Ancient Georgia, Mr. Allen has little respect for those who labour the theme of "geographical influence." "The theme of history is the woof and web of man's intelligence . . . the history of man is his amazing fight . . . to control all natural life in its manifold and various forms, his own natural self therein." He looks on the professional tributes to economic factors and environmental factors as priestly incantations before the vast power of natural forces not yet comprehended-gods.

whom half-baked materialists, their hearts aching for natural certainty, have vainly created to take the place in man's life of God the All Powerful, the Only Wise.

Of the Georgians (page 72) he says, "they are often, indeed always, heroes and never, or very seldom, martyrs." They retain, he adds, "both individually and as a people, the clear and gentle outlook, the free and inquiring intelligence, and the high amoral and untrammelled mind of primitive man." A type of life which characterizes the Homeric poems enlivens the pages of mediæval Georgian epics and declares the mind of the Georgian of today.

The book is admirably illustrated by photographs and by fine reproductions of early prints in half-tone or in black and white. It is furnished with an ample bibliography, in which full justice is done, chapter by chapter, as in the text, to original Georgian and Russian sources; the index is very full and accurate. There is an important diagram to show the relation of Georgia to the different cultures of the Middle East, and two historical maps which are entirely new and of the highest value.

But the book has other and greater claims on our attention than these. The output of historical works today is unprecedented in volume, and has never been of higher quality. The literary river has several tributaries which, to the discerning eye, scarcely mingle. One stream, and that the most limpid, but chilly, has for its sources the specialized studies of professional historians of varying degrees of eminence and authority, working in cloisters which, except during vacations, are today no more secluded than an oriental market-place.

A second stream, less limpid and more boisterous, cutting its way through the alluvial deposits of previous ages, and changing its course from time to time, includes the contributions of men who write history with imagination (the Abbé Liszt once remarked of his daughter Cosima that "she spoke the truth like a historian"). There is bias in their work, but just as fiction is sometimes insight into fact, so is historical bias, if overt and therefore susceptible of correction by the reader, less likely to mislead than the cool and uninspired periods of the impartial arbiter. Truth is a jealous god, and not a judicious compromise.

A third stream consists of hasty syntheses—"Outlines," "Summaries," and the like—crude productions which seek to secure the assent of all parties by espousing none, or, rather, by professing to expound, with equal "impartiality," the views of the most clamorous on

the basis not of life but of the printed word. A very little of this stream will ruin anyone's digestion; it is especially popular at Broad-casting House.

A fourth stream comprehends works such as Mr. Allen's, written by men who regard history, in his own words, as "a wide instruction and a mighty pleasure," who have not spared themselves time or labour, who approach their chosen task with no preconceived theories, but with close personal knowledge of the people and country, and lay down their pen without being tempted to lengthy disquisitions or specious generalizations. This stream is better to the taste than any of the others, and offers the best fishing; it is more apt to irrigate the thirsty fields of youth and less liable to leave a deposit of sterilizing salts. To this health-giving stream Mr. Allen has made an important contribution, and to him our gratitude is due, in the quaint prefatory verse of the inimitable Thomas Herbert, companion on the scaffold of our Martyred King:

"Since then varieties please God and man,
Thank him whose sweat and cost demonstrates them."

A. T. W.

The French Colonial Venture. By Constance Southworth, Ph.D. London. P. S. King and Son, Orchard House, Westminster. 1931. Price 12s. 6d.

Dr. Southworth's book is a study of the economic value to France of her colonies, and an attempt to estimate whether it is to France's interest, from an economic point of view, to retain and develop herself the colonies she now has.

The author admits the obvious difficulty of separating the economic from all other criteria, such as the value of the spirit of enterprise, the military and strategical advantages secured, the moral and political enrichment of the colonizing country, and what he calls the general colourfulness of achieving an Imperial destiny. Yet he claims that there is a real present demand for the valuation of colonies in terms of purely economic profit. No one will deny that the necessity for such a valuation may be forced upon any of the colony-owning countries within the next fifty years.

If such a necessity arises, Dr. Southworth's work, short as it is (it has only 199 pages of text), should prove an extremely useful preface to the research that will be required. It is direct, admirably compact, well organized in its assemblage of essential considerations and rejection of what is irrelevant. The author keeps steadily in his road and does not allow himself to be diverted into the extremely tempting by-paths of discussion, which are constantly suggested by the facts that he elicits.

He does not state his reason for the selection of France's colonies for his study. But it is clear from his account that, in the first place, the size of the French Empire makes it a conspicuous example, for he strikingly says that the "Empire on which the sun never sets" is a saying as true of the French as of the British.

Empire. Second, the French colonies of the second Imperial venture (the first was practically wiped out by the Napoleonic wars) were acquired in a relatively short space of time, and in a great measure under the same impulse, which was an impulse towards power and prestige rather than an economic expansion from within. Third, the centralized organization of French institutions gives their Empire a compactness which facilitates research and comparative estimation.

In the third chapter the author, keeping strictly within the limits of his enquiry, sets out the "measurable points" that can be taken in making his calculation:

First, the amount, if any, which France has spent on her colonies, in excess of what she might have had to spend if she had had no colonies.

Second, what France has gained by trade with her colonies compared with what she might have done with her capital and resources in other directions, internal and external.

Third, a comparison of actual returns on French capital invested in the colonies with the potential returns of the same capital had it been employed otherwise.

It is evident that the "might have beens" contained in these problems provide considerable field for conjectural hypothesis. Nevertheless, where there are facts, the author has marshalled them with skill, and in such a manner as to carry conviction that his conclusions are reasonable.

His enquiry on these points brings out much that is of interest in a general point of view, the close centralization of French Colonial finance (which is in itself a great assistance to him in providing the facts for his investigation), the enormous military expenditure that France has incurred in respect of her colonies (a constantly increasing figure that amounted to 2,300,000,000 francs in 1931-1932), and the tendency of her military expenditure in this direction to increase rather than diminish. This tendency he shows is due fundamentally to the French obsession with "security" and the consequent desire to ensure a dependable supply of colonial troops, food, and raw materials in the possible event of a war. These and other points that emerge in the course of the enquiry indicate that the instinct of the French in colonizing is to provide backing for their international position rather than an expansion of wealth.

So the conclusion is reached that France has spent money on her colonies greatly in excess of the money she has received from them. And, presumably, does not look for dividends in cash on such expenditure.

The trade enquiry is very nebulous and conjectural. The ordinary reader must be content to follow the author's figures. It would need a more than ordinarily intimate acquaintance with the statistics of international trade to attempt to criticize him. The conclusion is that the possession of colonies has been slightly a benefit to France financially.

The investigation into gains from capital investment in the colonies also appears, at the first glance, one which cannot lead to any very satisfying conclusion. The question which Dr. Southworth propounds is: "If France did not own colonies and her citizens had invested somewhere else the money which they actually have invested in their colonies, how would their returns on that money have compared with what they actually have been?"—a very wide-ranging query to which the author claims to supply a "reasonably satisfactory" answer. The complications provided by the decreased value of the franc, and, further, the difference between the decreased value in French territory and the decreased value in other lands, make the problem very difficult for an inexperienced reader, who must follow his author's conclusions, relying on his manifest industry

and exactitude. He holds that other uses for French capital would probably have yielded higher interest and dividend rates than the Colonial securities.

Finally, the sum is done, the quantitative gains are added up, the quantitative losses are set against them and the result is given that, omitting Morocco, the economic gain to France has been at the maximum forty-one per cent. of her economic loss. The inclusion of Morocco would reduce the percentage considerably, as the greatest gain from Morocco has never been more than five and a half per cent. of the loss.

So we reach the conclusion, which is that "the French colonies, from an economic point of view, have been an unprofitable venture for France, and will probably remain so for many years to come."

In the two final chapters the author first makes the suggestion that France might ultimately benefit herself more than she is doing at present by abandoning the tropical colonies and concentrating on her North African possessions. And in doing so, he claims to reconcile the other factors—political, military, and psychological—with purely economic considerations. In an interesting appendix he summarizes a recent similar study by a Frenchman, Dr. Aug. Vallet, whose conclusion (reached on rather different lines) is that France should retain only (1) the African colonies, temperate and tropical, not including Madagascar, and (2) for purely sentimental reasons, St. Pierre and Miquelon.

He next, in the last chapter, draws the moral of the whole enquiry, which is that it would be wise of colonizing nations to adopt a similar critical attitude of mind towards their own possessions, and to define to themselves realistically and logically what their reasons for holding colonies are, and whether their aims are in fact being realized. Such an intellectual evaluation of the whole process and design of colonization might produce, in the British Empire for instance, far-reaching modifications of economic and strategical policy. We have got past the age when the possession of territory just for the sake of possessing it was looked upon as the normal function of a sovereign state. We should claim for our Empire that a certain idealism has animated our acquisition of lands overseas. It is not too much to say that our claims to idealism have not always been sincere. Better, perhaps, leave the idealism out and try to appraise honestly and without timidity what we are really trying to do, and whether we are really gaining anything of what we are trying for. Dr. Southworth's book might have first seemed to be written from a narrow and circumscribed point of view. But in this underlying suggestion that we should bring a spirit of realism to the service of our ideals, the book has a force and originality which make it an important contribution to political literature.

A. H.

A History of the Maratha People. By C. A. Kincaid, C.V.O., I.C.S., and Rao Bahadur D. B. Parasnis. 84"×54". Pp. x+503. Illustrations. Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1931.

Whether India be a nation is a question the answer to which can hardly be doubtful, but as current political thought drifts more and more to schemes of federal shape for India's future a cognate problem presents itself—i.e., whether any and, if so, which of the larger masses of humanity inhabiting the peninsula can claim to be regarded as nations. Hardly of the Bengalis, Madratis, Hindustanis, or even of the great State of Hyderabad can this be predicated, but the Marathas stand on a different footing. They have a racial, cultural, religious,

and historical unity to be found nowhere else in India, hence their history has a living interest apart from its romance and glory. There is much we need to consider earnestly as bearing on the political questions of the present day.

Mr. Kincaid has made the field his own, superseding even the great works of Elphinstone and Grant Duff. That the mass of military adventures, brilliant in themselves, fuse into a compound that becomes drab as a whole can hardly be made a reproach to a European historian. We have drum and trumpet enough, though the oceans lend our histories the flavour of adventure with which the great land-locked masses of Asia have nothing to compare. The Marathas alone can claim some naval history. They are not the only sea-faring race of India, but they are the only one which has used sea-power as a political instrument. How the Marathas first entered India there is nothing to show. They claim to have been part of the great Aryan immigrations, but their racial characteristics are strongly Tartar or Mongol, and they appear never to have been settled elsewhere than in the west of India. It is probable, therefore, that they must have taken the second road into the interior of India when they first entered—namely, the road due south, entering the country between the western mountains and the sea.

Their history begins with the revival of Hinduism against the Mogul. The exploit for which they themselves profess the greatest admiration and which has attracted so much renown is one which, it cannot be denied, has a flavour of treachery. It is the murder of Afzal Khan by their great leader Shivaji. The history under notice practically consists of the description of the establishment of the Maratha power against the Moguls. It began with a struggle against the subordinate or outlying Mogul States of the Deccan and went on to cope with the Delhi Empire itself. That failed, and the Marathas were beaten back in that terrific battle at Paniput, which is not, though it ought to be, included in our list of the decisive battles of the world. After that the Marathas, like the French Revolutionists and the Russian Bolsheviks, continued at war with all other nations, though without attempting direct conquest. They adopted the system of enforcing tribute from the other powers of India without direct administration. Then came the second category of their history, the contest against the English. It is remarkable that they originally appeared as the allies, not the opponents, of the English State, but once Clive had established England as the dominant power in India the Marathas became its enemies.

Mr. Kincaid's history only touches briefly on the English and Maratha wars. He comes down to the establishment of British supremacy under Elphinstone. It is somewhat curious to find that there were two innovations that Elphinstone especially repudiated—the establishment of English Law Courts and the spread of Christianity. In the former, at least, the Marathas' hostility no longer subsists, for the Marathas have a very fine reputation as judges and legal practitioners in the Courts of the English system.

Mr. Kincaid's work does not reach to the present day, and therefore does not touch on the Great War. He mentions at the close of his book the extremely fine work done by Maratha soldiers in the service of the British Crown, but if he had been able to continue it he would doubtless have referred to the magnificent record which Maratha soldiers established in the recent war; in fact, without perhaps any invidious comparisons, it may be noticed that high British military authorities consider that the Maratha regiments earned the finest reputation of all the Indian races who fought for the British Crown.

This history is the second appearance of a book which originally comprised three volumes. The present issue is condensed into one volume, and, apart

from convenience, it certainly gains in literary merit by some reduction of diffuseness. Mr. Kincaid's colleague, an Indian gentleman of high literary reputation, Mr. Parasnis, has passed away since the book was first issued and his death is a loss to the world of literature.

A. L. S.

Administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon. By K. N. Venkata Subha Sastri, M.A. 8½" x 5½". Pp. 322. Illustrations. Allen and Unwin. 1932. 16s.

A striking feature of Bangalore City, the administrative capital of the Indian State of Mysore, is a line of stately looking buildings with a broad façade looking on to a great stretch of undulating parkland, resplendent in springtime with the glory of the gold-mohur. These buildings are the Government Secretariat. On the façade, in a prominent position fronting the park which bears his name, is an equestrian statue in bronze of Sir Mark Cubbon, greatest, perhaps, of the master-builders of modern Mysore.

Mysore traces its origin to a fief of the Vijayanagar empire, established in the fifteenth century by a Rajput soldier of fortune from the north. In the middle of the eighteenth century a Muslim military adventurer took advantage of the weakness of the administration to oust the Hindu ruler. In the end he built up a strong Muslim empire which, under his son and successor Tipu, embraced most of Southern India from the borders of Hyderabad. The military exploits of Tipu, his immense fortress at Seringapatam, his hatred of the British, and his challenge to their supremacy appealed strongly to the imagination of the British people. The death-blow to the usurper's power in 1799, when Seringapatam was taken by a British army, became almost an epic in our history of India.

The British were now faced with the responsibility of reconstructing the Government of Mysore. There was no historical basis in the country for Muslim rule, and it was accordingly decided to re-establish the Hindu dynasty. As a saving clause in the treaty of rendition the British Government reserved the right to take over the administration in an emergency.

Thirty years later the British had to intervene. The Maharaja, under the influence of worthless favourites, had lost his grip; insurrection followed, only subdued by the use of British troops. Chaos prevailed everywhere; the machinery of the administration had disappeared. British officers now took over the government. Two years later Cubbon, then an officer of the local garrison, was placed in charge of Mysore affairs. He continued to administer the State for twenty-seven years till 1861. He died in the same year on his way to England.

During his long tenure of power Cubbon, with the aid of a small body of picked British officers, evolved an efficient system of government, based as far as possible on indigenous models; order was firmly established; the keynote of the administration was the well-being and happiness of the peasantry.

The fifty years' work of Cubbon and his successors in Mysore is an epic of British administration in India. It was constructive work of permanent value. Not the least of British achievements was the creation of a Civil Service, the personnel of which was Indian (mainly Brahmin). The new service adopted British traditions, and it is not too proud to claim today that it is maintaining British standards. And the claim is not ill-founded.

How order was evolved from chaos under the guiding hand of Cubbon is described in a recent book, "The Administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon," by Mr. K. N. Venkata Subha Sastri, Assistant Professor of History in

the University of Mysore. Mr. Sastri's work is characterized by sympathy and insight. As a work of reference it will be of great value to the student; the mass of technical detail may to some extent deter the general reader. The author pays a generous tribute to the work of Cubbon and the British Commission. One regrets that with his great knowledge of his subject he has not found space to produce a sketch of social and village life in Mysore during the period he surveys. It is well that the British people should sometimes be reminded by Indian writers of the work done by British officers in India, and of the quality of their half-century's work in Mysore.

W. B.

Indian Caste Customs. By L. S. S. O'Malley, C.I.E. 7½" × 5½". Pp. ix + 190. Cambridge University Press. 1932. Price 6s.

The Caste System of Northern India. By E. A. H. Blunt, C.I.E., O.B.E. 8½" × 5½". Pp. vii + 374. Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press. 1931.

The first volume under review is a survey of the Indian caste system from the sociological point of view. In the preface numerous opinions are quoted as to the merits and demerits of the system. It may, therefore, be taken that the volume is put forward as popular fare, with some bearing upon the present situation in Indian politics. It bears all the marks of a compilation, although the work has been done with care. But care and a scholarly knowledge of books do not compound anthropology, which is the study of man as he is, at the time of the investigation, in his proper environment. India is a sub-continent; it is dangerous to generalize about an area of such huge dimensions and varying nature. For instance, it is said here that only members of the Brahman caste can exercise sacerdotal functions; yet all over India there are shrines kept by low caste officiants, and the basic idea of Indian heir-ship, and very often its legal proof, is bound to the performance of the last rites by the acknowledged heir. In the same way, washing clothes is the Dhobi's profession, but other castes do wash their own clothes, and the Dhobi also makes money by hiring out his donkeys. On page 127 it is admitted that potters and barbers may cultivate: so may Brahmans. In fact, there are Brahmans *and* Brahmins. The Pardhi snarer of the Deccan calls his own priests "Brahmins." The Dhers in describing their wedding ceremonies habitually speak of the officiant as "the Brahman," when it is perfectly clear that he is only a senior member of the community, whose only boast probably is that he has been to Pandharpur and can sing to the *Eṭ-tara*. In fact, a Brahman, as defined in the Sanskrit literature, remains an abstract being from the point of view of anthropology. In the villages, where the literary scholar's reverence for his books does not pertain, he must be defined by different standards. It is not a matter of in caste or out of caste, of Brahman or Sudra, but of local communities with local traditions. A Lamani or Kaikadi when asked if he fulfils such and such an observance of orthodoxy will, as likely as not, answer: "No, we do it in this way—that is the Hindu way." Yet both Lamanis and Kaikadis (Korchas) will spurn a forest Chenchu as a being beneath them, worlds apart.

The same type of false generalization, founded on alleged standards of orthodoxy, which actually cannot be generally applied, leads to the statement, on page 92, that marriage is a sacrament. Among the Deccan lower castes it might fairly be defined as an arrangement of bride-price, often by way of exchange of girls,

divorce depending only on the repayment of the price. Among the matrilineal Nayars it was still less. On page 98, in a footnote, it is said that the "price" is a marriage fee and that there is no actual purchase. Such a statement demands endless discussion, if it is to be justified. It is not wholly true as a generalization. Indeed, the difficulties raised by such a simple point bring home to one the dangers of attempting to popularize Indian anthropology in the present state of our knowledge.

On page 4 reference is made rather cryptically to exogamous sects (sects?). On page 12 *san* is translated as flax, which is surely incorrect. Is *devi* (page 27) ever prefixed to the name of Brahman women? *Pan* (page 183) is *piper betle*. The transliteration is in several other places unusual.

In order to discuss Mr. Blunt's learned little book, reference must be made to the history of anthropological research in India. It began with the compilation of the District Gazetteers. These in their way are monuments of scholarship, clear witness to the great tradition of the India Civil Service. Upon the groundwork so provided, district by district, the Census Reports have been built up. It is this mass of material that Mr. Blunt has sifted. The result is excellent as a summary. But is it anthropology? Science is largely a matter of nomenclature. In India two things have obviously happened: firstly, a caste known and inscribed by one name in one district is not necessarily known and inscribed by the same name in the next district; secondly, large scale castes straddling five or six districts or even provinces, though owing to one name may differ completely in their actual being and manner of life. These are the basic problems that must be answered before our caste nomenclature can be put forward as meaning anything. Mr. Blunt has summarized the official traditions, but what are the facts as lived? The truth is that the greater number of these peoples are mere names to us, or at most they are only known to us in our own special districts.

The basic facts, physical and cultural, can only be got at by organized field-research. We must start from the beginning and, applying modern methods, learn not only what these lesser peoples are and look like, but the way they live and the things they make and are concerned with. India is virtually an untouched field for anthropological research, providing a complete panorama of physical and social types. The modern anthropologist is becoming too much of a specialist; he is too closely tied to psychological, sociological, and economic theory. His mind is overloaded with matters African, Australian, and Oceanic. A change of scene would do him good and, perhaps, bring him to earth, face to face with the real problem of his discipline—human life as it is lived in its special environment. Meanwhile, generalizations will not carry us anywhere, either in science or politics.

K. DE B. CODRINGTON.

Behind Mud Walls in India. By C. and W. Wiser. 7½"×5". Pp. x+180. Illustrations. Allen and Unwin. 6s.

The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt. By Darling. With a Foreword by Sir Edward MacLagan. 9½"×5½". Pp. xvii+201. Illustrations and Maps. Milford. 1932. 11s. 6d.

We want more books of this kind, if it is only to remind British politicians that the real India is an India of villages, hardly visited by politicians and certainly not dreamt of in their philosophy. And in dealing with villages it is best to deal not with the theoretical or ideal village, or with groups or conglomerations

of villages, but with an actual village—Karimpur, for example. How will a proposed reform (so-called) hit it? Having investigated one village thoroughly, we can then begin to generalize, making allowance for any regional features. But at any rate we shall have a point of departure based on realities, and shall be saved such absurdities as the statement that Indians have so many wives that unless they are soon converted to Christianity the country will become overpopulated.

Economic enquiries into the condition of a village are made in the Punjab (and I believe in the U.P.), at every Settlement, and the terse village notes made by Settlement Officers in the Abstract Village Notebooks are often brilliantly concise summaries of the rural economics of each village. The Punjab Board of Economic Enquiry has also undertaken a series of Village Surveys of typical villages based on a standard questionnaire. Such a method is more systematic than that of the Wisers and clears up certain points—e.g., the tenancy system—which are only vaguely indicated in *Behind Mud Walls*. It is not clear, for example, what rights, if any, the tenants in Karimpur have as against the landlords. It would be interesting to see the Village Notebook of this village and compare it with some of the statements in the book.

But these are rather pettifogging criticisms of an intensely interesting and admirable book, so interesting that I, as an official (retired), would like to compare it with the dry-as-dust statistics of the Heaven-born revenue system. As a Punjabi I may take pride that in the Punjab the land revenue system will not allow the patwari to make changes in the revenue records without a regular mutation order certified by a higher official in the presence of the parties. This would check some of the antics of the patwari described in this book.

Every page in this book is thought-provoking. There is something rotten in our educational system. We turn good ploughmen into bad babus. Why should not the higher education of the countryman give him a survey of such subjects as agriculture, rural economics, veterinary science, the land revenue system, and history, written with special reference to the growth of the village community, the tribal system, and land tenures? This would be a knowledge that would expand and not kill the practical horse-sense of the villager.

But space forbids me to expatiate further on the ideas which surge into the mind on reading this fascinating book.

But if the Wisers raise the mud walls of Karimpur to Heaven, in the Punjab *Pearls* the Heaven-born descends to earth. While the Wisers are content to state problems, Mr. Darling brings to bear on them the culture of King's College, Cambridge, enriched by vast stores of reading and practical experience. Moreover, in theory at any rate, Mr. Darling confines himself to one problem, that of indebtedness. Actually, however, his investigations lead him to take an extensive view over the whole field of village life, with the result that he has produced a work of intense interest and great value.

One minor criticism might be made. His work is admirably documented. He might have said: "I have gathered a posy of other men's flowers, but the hand that binds them is mine own." That would have been too modest. But the value of the references in the notes would be greater if they were more clearly explained. To me, such hieroglyphs as *Pb. Bkg. Enqy., B. and O., Ld. Rev. Ad. Rusticus Loquitur, U.P. ibid., Calvert, op. cit., etc.*, are more or less intelligible; but I can picture the English politician, or economist, who wished to use this book as a basis for research, getting terribly muddled. Moreover, a book like this will have a permanent value. It will last. Why not, therefore, make the references clear not only to Punjab experts but also to others?

In 1931 "Nationalists," protagonists of the democratic ideal for British India, were ready enough to take up the cudgels for the rights of the Kashmir Durbar. Mr. Rushbrook Williams alludes to two of the main—mutually contradictory—ideas inspiring Nationalism, not only in India but elsewhere: one, based on an inferiority complex, which sees progress only in the replacement of the indigenous by the foreign; the other, based on a superiority complex, which seeks to exalt everything indigenous to the exclusion of everything foreign—well symbolized in the obsolete form of *charḡha* it has adopted as a badge. In matters constitutional both schools have now united in a desire to transplant to Indian soil a foreign form of government, however alien to the Indian genius and Indian conditions. But that operation once performed, there seems to be no reason why the essential conflict between the two ideas should not break forth afresh. Sir Theodore Morison recalls Sir Mahomed Iqbal's remark, that "the problem of India is international, not national"; and it is to be hoped that a desire to create an as yet non-existent Indian nation will not lead to any trampling over nationalities that already do exist, or—what would be worse—to any "Balkanization" of the Indian Continent.

Those discussing Indian politics are perhaps somewhat prone to fall into the belief that their only object must be to satisfy the varying claims of Indian politicians, and to be "oblivious to the fact that we are trustees of over two hundred million Indians who have never heard of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms or of the Simon Commission, but who will be the first to suffer and who stand to suffer most by the breakdown of the constitutional machine." An acute consciousness of this fact is the leading feature of *The India we Saw*, a book deserving to be widely read, because written with knowledge, sincerity, common sense, and a certain amount of that spleen which long years in India are supposed to engender though not to justify.

Whatever the future may have in store, both books make it clear that there will still be need for Englishmen, and that their quality will be as important as their quantity, if not more so. It is sometimes lightly assumed that the only essential is goodwill. That indeed they will need; but they will need many more besides of the qualities of the great men of the past. "Æquam memento . . ." was Warren Hastings' watchword: his successors might well adopt it.

H.

The Quatrains of Hāli. Original Urdu, with a literal English translation by G. E. Ward, M.A., and a rendering into English verse by C. S. Tute. 7½"×5½". Pp. vii+102. Oxford University Press. 1932.

Colonel Tute was the author, some years ago, of a verse translation of a new text of Omar Khayyām. He has now selected for translation Hāli's rubaiyāt, of which a bald prose version in English already existed. The fact that he received help in getting the latter checked from officials of the Nizam's government is a reminder of the widespread public which an Urdu poet may hope to reach. For Hāli belonged to the Punjab. He was a reformer in two spheres. He took part in a reform of Urdu poetry, commencing at Lahore in the seventies or eighties. He and his associates rejected, not indeed the traditional Persian metres nor—with one exception—the Persian vocabulary, but the outworn imagery, the conventional themes, and the endless verbal ingenuities of the later Persian and Urdu tradition, aiming at a greater naturalness and spontaneity. Small officials in British India and Indian States, they had been stirred by the fresh draughts of air from the West. But Hāli was more than a literary reformer. A friend, in

middle age, of Sir Syed Ahmed, he preached to his community in his *Musaddas* a gospel of awakening and self-control. The book has been very widely read among Indian Moslems. It is stated in that excellent work, Ram Babu Saksena's *History of Urdu Literature* (Allahabad, 1927, Rs.5), to be the best-known of all modern Urdu books. Hâli's reputation appears to be based mainly upon his unaffected style, his sincere exhortations to his community, and his concern with the realities of life. The present quatrains, which form apparently a part of his "Diwân," deal indeed with the need for reform, but also touch personal and other notes. They vary a certain amount in key, some being merely worldly wise and others satirical. Probably those which appeal most to English readers will be the addresses to the Deity and the more personal quatrains, in which Hâli is kindled not merely to earnestness but to some measure of warmth and beauty.

Here is one of Colonel Tute's better quatrains:

"Stirs in this empty flagon the ferment of new wine—
Stirs in the heart of Hâli new ecstasy divine—
Yea, your kind praise, O Taslîm! has made me, even me—
Hope that there may be virtue in some poor verse of mine."

"Ecstasy divine" is rather a forcing of the note of Hâli's "*walwala*." But if the quality of the rhythm had been maintained throughout the book at the level of the above quatrain, many trifles could have been forgiven. Unfortunately it sinks too often to the steady beat of "From Greenland's icy mountains," and otherwise betrays the prentice hand. For the rest, Colonel Tute's version shows a good deal of poetical resource, despite occasional bathos, and keeps pretty close to the original. It certainly succeeds in recapturing some qualities which were lost in the prose version. The original, the prose translation, and the verse translation of a quatrain are all visible to the eye at the same time, as was the case in Heron-Allen's edition of Fitzgerald's Omar.

A. F. K.

The Martial Races of India. By Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C., D.S.O. 9"×5½". Pp. xii+368. Map. Illustrations. Samson Low, Marston and Co. 15s.

This is another book from the pen of an officer who has written several interesting books on India, gained from a first-hand knowledge of the country and its people during a long and distinguished career in the Royal Artillery and on the Staff, of which the greater part has been spent in India and part in the Mountain Branch of that Regiment which enlists some of the fighting classes he describes.

The book consists of seventeen chapters, the first twelve forming practically a brief but succinct history of India, and the others describe in more detail the various fighting classes.

In the huge sub-continent of India there are 350 millions of inhabitants, and out of this huge number how many really form the fighting classes? As the author says, on page 3, out of this large number perhaps thirty-five million only of them are manly young men and only then three million males between the military ages of twenty and thirty-five! As he truly says, Astounding! and he adds that at thirty-five in the East a man is even then ageing for work in the ranks. I would put the age even lower, at thirty for real efficiency, as a man ages quickly in the East. The climate is in great part enervating and a man loses his energy and vitality, and after ages of this a race is bound to deteriorate if there

has been no new blood infused. Look at the virile Mogul and Afghan and others that came from the north how they grew slacker and slacker as the years went by, ending up with the puppet Emperor on the throne when the Mutiny broke out. With the European there is constantly new blood coming out to the country which keeps the type up to its pristine energy and worth.

A man in the ranks is at his best up to ten years service. After that he ages rapidly and becomes unfit for a really strenuous campaign as that in France or other theatres of the Great War. This was found so with the Reservists that were sent out as reinforcements. Quite fifty per cent. were quite unfit, being "men of twenty or more years service entirely incapable of undergoing the rigours of a winter campaign in Europe." (I.A.C. in France, page 455.) So they were returned to India for employment on light duty in Cantonments as orderlies, butt markers, and so forth. The system on which the Reserve was then organized was responsible for this and since has been altered for the better.

The story of the Martial Races is an entrancing one as described on page 3. Truly it may be asked where would all these so-called "Intelligentsia" be if these martial races were left without the British officer and British soldier? Why, all eaten up by these martial people of the north, and the noisy sedition-monger and Bengali clamourer for complete independence would receive short shrift. Sir John Simon and his Commission hit the nail right on the head and thoroughly understood and reported the whole situation and in consequence were not popular with these gentry.

The first twelve chapters or historical part is very interesting and well written, and calls for no special comment, so we come to the later ones where each of the martial races is described.

The growth of the Indian Army is well traced right down from the very beginning and the days of the John Company to the present day. There has been unrest from the very beginning in a greater or less degree, when the Army began to be properly organized in the days of John Company and much more of later years when it has received an impetus from the general unrest all over the world, the aftermath of the World War, and from the growth of anarchism organized and fed with funds from that land of "social bliss" Russia! So no matter which particular race it may be, this has to be very carefully watched, for the old principle of "*sæpe cadendo*" is always at work, as the author rightly says. However, as is mentioned in another place, he remarks that the old pensioned officer in the Punjab and elsewhere is a tower of strength to the administration and a great check against bribery or exaction of illegal gratification.

The account of each fighting race is well written and accurate, though here and there are errors which will be pointed out in due course. The accounts of the Gurkha and Sikh make interesting reading as well as that of the Mahratta, as they have, so to speak, been more to the front in the history of India than the other races. The account of the Garhwali is naturally shorter, but more could have been said of them from their connection with Gurkha regiments, in which they used to be enlisted pretty freely formerly and until a complete battalion was raised of them and which has now been increased to four battalions.

In the last chapter the author discusses the Indianization of the Army, and gives his opinions on the experiment that has been commenced. With these I am in general agreement. The Indian does not want to be like the Imperial Service Troops; that is, like the troops of the Native States—*i.e.*, wholly Indian but mixed up with the British officer. The great thing is will the latter appreciate serving under an Indian Commanding Officer? I fancy not; at any rate, not for many years until the code of honour, habits, etc., approximate more to those of

the British officer, and I doubt it even then. Their habits, customs, and outlook on all matters are so widely different and also they have different codes of honour, so that it would appear the two would never get on as they should in a unit get on, if the C.O. were an Indian and over British officers.

Another point is will the Indian ever "stick to it" long enough till he rises to higher ranks, and will he ever have the force of character to fill these higher and more responsible posts? I also doubt it. In civil life it is quite different, as there he has ample leisure to think over what he has to do or say at all times, whereas in periods of stress in the Army and on service a quick decision has to be made and acted upon. The Indian does not love being bucketed about like one is in the Army, especially in these days since the Great War. He prefers a civil life with his family around him. As an executive officer he is quite good when he has received direct orders to do so and so. But when the heavy responsibility rests upon his shoulders and the decision has to be made on the spot—that is the crucial test when he will, I think, fail. However, it yet remains to be seen what the result of this Indian Sandhurst is and what material it will turn out. The selection of those who present themselves as "umedwars" for the Army is rather a difficult problem, as so many have to be rejected as they pass through the sieve of the two or three committees before whom they have to present themselves. Will the education of the sons of Indian officers as Subahdars and Ressaldars, which the author mentions on page 347, solve the problem and be a success? It deserves to be, and would, I think, at any rate furnish much better material for the purpose than the sons of unwarlike Indian gentlemen. But my experience has been, from the few that have been so educated, that they at once lose their former martial spirit immediately you educate up to imitate Western methods and habits.

There are grave problems to be considered whether this Indianization is completed quickly or after a long period. If an Indian parliament were in power and demanded immediate and complete Indianization adequate safeguards must be provided. Will all these jarring factions ever be united into one harmonious whole, such as Gandhi and his satellites, the Indian States still doubtful about the desirability of Federation, the Untouchables, and the India Congress Party, which was not represented on the last Round-Table Conference, to which must be added the smouldering hatred which exists between the two great antagonistic religions of Hinduism and Islam. If left to themselves will the Indian ever be able to rule justly and impartially without the watchful eye of the British "Sirkar" in supreme authority? That this is doubtful, one has only to remember the many cases where the Supreme Power has been obliged to intervene or has been asked by the rulers themselves to come in and rectify matters, as in 1883 in Bikanir and in more recent times in the case of Kashmir and now again in Alwar.

It is strange that the author should have made some grave errors when such could so easily have been avoided. Take the description of the various Gurkha Regiments on pages 195-6, where he has gone astray over their titles. Neither the 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles nor the 9th Gurkha Rifles ever was the Nasiri battalion. This title belongs to the 1st King George's Own Gurkha Rifles (the Malaun Regiment). The 9th Gurkha Rifles originated from the old Fatehgarh Levy, then became the 63rd Bengal N.I., and finally to its present title. Also the 4th Prince of Wales's Own Gurkha Rifles never was the "Kumaon" battalion. The 1st and 4th Gurkha Rifles are located in the Punjab Hills. It was the 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles which was raised as the "Kumaon Battalion" at Almora and located in Kumaon, its second battalion, when raised

in 1887, being located at Lansdowne in Garhwal, the title "Kumaon Battalion" being dropped in 1887.

On page 323, in some unaccountable manner, he has put the date of arrival of the first Armada of the Indian Army Corps at Marseilles as February 26, 1915, whereas the Lahore Division with part of the Indian Cavalry Corps arrived there on September 26, 1914, and both the Lahore and Meerut Divisions were in the trenches before the end of October, 1914.

General MacMunn seems to be in some doubt as to the correct way of spelling the word "Rahtor." He spells it in four different ways in his book. It is spelt as "Rhatore" (page 62), "Rahtore" (page 84), and "Rathor" and "Rathore" (page 279). The correct way, I think, is "Rahtor."

Then, again, the author is also somewhat "at sea" in regard to another Regiment closely allied to Gurkhas—viz., the 2nd Battalion 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles—whose trouble in Peshawar in 1930 he deals with in terms which are misleading.

It is a matter of history that two platoons of this battalion mentioned mutinied, but there can be no comparison between the "mutiny" at Peshawar in 1930 and the fundamentally different "rebellion" against the British "Raj" of 1857. In drawing an analogy between the two the author most regrettably emphasizes words to the same effect which appear in his book *The Indian Mutiny in Perspective*.

The statement on page 287 that the whole "Corps" (defined as four battalions) was disarmed is, of course, incorrect.

There is more to criticize in the author's handling of the Peshawar incident, but to enter into further details would be to take him too seriously. He has tackled a delicate matter in too light-hearted a way and, apparently, without adequate knowledge of the facts of the case.

Incidentally, the number of Military Crosses and Indian Orders of Merit won by the Garhwalis (two battalions) in France, as mentioned on page 288, was as follows: Military Crosses 5 and Indian Orders of Merit 15, and not as therein stated.

In his preface the author describes his collaborator, who illustrated his former book *The Armies of India* so excellently for him, as Major (later Br.-General) "A. C. Lovat," whereas the spelling should be "Lovett."

It is difficult to conceive how so experienced a writer failed to verify his facts by so easy a process as consulting the half-yearly Indian Army List, which records the origins of and changes in the Units of the Indian Army, and by submitting to those most concerned the draft of his remarks on the fighting troops he attempts to describe and at times disparages.

The illustrations in the book are most of them excellent, being taken from his former book *The Armies of India*. The interest of the book would have been enhanced, I consider, if there had been added illustrations of a Gurkha Rifleman, a Garhwali Rifleman, and a Sepoy of the 6th Royal Jat Regiment instead of duplicating unnecessarily those of Sikhs and Dogras. There is, it is true, a picture of Subadar Santabir Gurung of the 2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles, an excellent type of soldier, but the addition of the others would have added to the interest of the book for future aspirants to the Indian Army. These could have been taken from the same source, as I think there was one of a Gurkha Rifleman and certainly there was an excellent one of Garhwalis.

The book, with the amendments noted, is a readable one and should be read by all making their careers in India, civilian or soldier, especially the latter, of the Indian Army.

D.B.

The Indian Police. By J. C. Curry, with a preface by Lord Lloyd. 9" x 5½". Pp. 353. Map. Faber and Faber. 12s. 6d.

This book is not a romance, but, as Lord Lloyd has implied in his preface, a bare history of a service. As such, it should give the reader some idea of what the British have done for law and order in India, and also of the special problems which are to be found policing half a continent in Asia. There has been a certain amount of public eulogy concerning the loyalty and devotion to duty of the Indian police. Mr. Curry stresses a point which is often missed, and that is their impartiality; for, while the police have had to deal with civil disobedience—organized by Mr. Gandhi and his colleagues—as well as criminal work, they have also had occasion to save him from the attentions of his angry friends as well as from those whose political ideas do not agree.

There seem to be few people who know that when an Indian policeman is killed there is no provision made for his widow by Government except under special circumstances. His loyalty is the more striking for this reason, and it is to be hoped that this will be remembered when his conditions of service are reviewed in the making of the new Constitution.

The author gives a brief description of police work in ancient India and of the system of spies used. He also mentions the system used by the Moguls, which the British took over.

His next few chapters deal with the evolution of the Indian police and of the organization as it is today, the type of men recruited, and the work they are expected to do. There is much of interest here to those who would understand the Indian policeman, and especially the way he has stood up to the vilification (and often persecution) which has been his share since the war, for Mr. Curry illustrates his points by stories, in many cases relating actual incidents. Some of them have a dry humour and others a touch of the heroic, but there is no exaggeration.

Naturally a book about a police force deals much with crime, and the difference between Eastern and European conditions is shown. The horrors of an Indian communal riot, like those in Bombay in January-February, 1929, are not like mass demonstrations in Britain and most parts of Europe. The clear account of criminal tribes and their activities, of those which are relics of primitive barbarism, and the descriptions of dacoities emphasize this difference. Mr. Curry also shows that modern civilization has affected crime in India (chiefly in the towns); criminals have not been slow to pick up ideas, whether from films or the detective fiction which is so popular, and the police have had to learn modern ways of dealing with this which has kept them in touch with police work at home. Revolutionary crime is in this class.

Lastly, Mr. Curry deals with the work of the Imperial Service, some of its strain, and some of its compensations, and mentions the work of the better-known and more famous among its members. A service that has given India men like Handyside and Beatty is not to be taken lightly. It has and will fashion more of their kind. The writer has mentioned but two names, but there must be many others who are as well esteemed in their own districts.

This seems to be the first book of its kind, although there is one book which deals solely with the police in Bombay City and a few written about the work and experiences of individual men. It comes at an opportune time, as the fate of the Indian services is to be decided shortly, when the India Bill is to be brought before Parliament. The decisions then taken may mean the negation of all this splendid work or they may advance it. It is to be hoped that as many

people as possible will read this book, for it may help them in their ideas of what ought to be done for India.

Lord Lloyd was quite the most suitable person to write a preface. He knows his East better than most people, and there must be many policemen in India and Egypt who are grateful to him for the support he gave them when there was trouble. He never shirked responsibility, and having made a decision always "backed up" the men who were there to carry it out.

G. C. D. G.

Diversions of an Indian Political. By Lieut.-Col. R. L. Kennion, C.I.E. 8½"×5½". Pp. viii+323. Frontispiece. Blackwood. 1932. 7os. 6d.

It would be well if this book could be put into the hands of any young fellow who in these changing times may be debating whether a career in India is good enough to embark upon. As the writer truly remarks, "happen what may, India will still need the services of Englishmen of the right stamp as in the past, and will surely obtain them." He further emphasizes that whatever may be done in the way of withdrawing British personnel from other Indian services, the Foreign and Political Departments of the Government "must be preserved from the incalculable influences of Indian parties and politics," and hence that "for many years to come they will offer to our sons careers that for variety, interest, and entertainment bear comparison with any in the Empire." An inference that may be drawn from Colonel Kennion's reminiscences is that a most satisfying recompense for service in India is the gratitude and devotion with which the more virile classes in India—as opposed to the politically minded—respond to sympathy and understanding shown to them by British officials.

The chapters are mostly reprints of articles that have appeared from time to time in various journals and publications, and constitute a record of a remarkably varied career by one who knew how to find the best in his surroundings wherever he might be, and to make the most of his opportunities.

The book contains much more than its modest title implies, for besides tales of sport and adventure in Central India, in the high Himalayas, in Persia, Tibet, Nepal, and elsewhere, there are stirring records of war-time service as Consul at Muhammerah and in the highlands of Western Persia with the Russian Expeditionary Force under General Baratoff, and with Bicharakoff's Cossacks.

In the concluding chapters, moreover, written in retirement in England, the Indian Political finds scope for his love of animals and zest for field sports in home surroundings, as well as in memories of the past.

J. K. T.

The Book of the Tiger. By Brigadier-General R. G. Burton. 8½"×5½". Pp. 287. Illustrations. Hutchinson and Co. 12s. 6d.

In the preface to this handsome volume, with its tiger-skin wrapper, the author explains that his object is natural history rather than sport. It is, however, from the viewpoint of the hunter that it is written, and this is just as well, for writers who aim at depicting animal psychology and habits from the viewpoint of the hunted, even when so well done as in *Tarka the Otter*, must rely chiefly on imagination. Here the author's aim is rather to sift truth from the mass of fable that has collected about the big Asiatic cat. Though General Burton's book is encyclopædic, it has none of the dryness associated with books of reference, for it is full of interesting experiences and well-told stories, a book, in short, to be

read from cover to cover before being consigned to a shelf, not too high, whence it can be taken down to silence argument.

As General Burton points out, the tiger is believed to be a comparatively recent arrival in India from the North, but the approximate epoch in history when this migration—doubtless a very gradual one—took place is a matter of speculation, and the enquiry becomes the more involved by linguistic discrepancies. For instance, in India a tiger may—in addition to local names—be called *sher* or *bagh*, while the lion, an ancient inhabitant of India and Persia, is also *sher*, or *babar sher*, or *singh*. In Persia a tiger is *babar*, a lion *sher*. Thus, the "fables of Bedpai" (known also as *Anwar-i-Suhaili*), the oldest of all jungle books, is believed to have been written in India about the time of Alexander the Great. In this, lions are frequently mentioned, but no tigers; and the fifteenth-century Mughal illustrations of the Persian version depict lions only. May the conclusion be drawn that tigers did not exist in India at that time?

About local races of tigers the author has much to say of interest. The most complete summary of information on this subject is to be found in Mr. R. I. Pocock's paper in the Bombay Natural History Society's journal of May 31, 1929, to which General Burton refers; and it may here be said that throughout the book the author makes frequent reference, with acknowledgment, to the beautiful and unique quarterly published by this Society. In this number Mr. Pocock refers the tigers of the Elburz region to a distinct race, a conclusion about which General Burton seems rather doubtful. Your present reviewer, who had something to do with two of the specimens described by Mr. Pocock and has seen others, concurs about the existence of a distinctively coloured race in the Caspian area, but this tiger is somewhat darker than the animal shown in the coloured plate accompanying Mr. Pocock's article. Its general appearance is, in fact, brown rather than yellow.

The Book of the Tiger is a reliable guide on many disputed points of tiger lore. There is, for instance, the common belief that tigers call up sambar by imitating their "bell." The author, in opposition to many, cautiously expresses a contrary view, and quotes the well-known hunter, Mr. Dunbar Brander, to the effect that a tiger may make a noise "like a sambar's 'bell,' but no sambar would mistake it." Even wild beasts' ears, however, may sometimes be deceived. For instance, your reviewer has known of a sportsman calling up a panther by imitating the bark of a dog! Another subject discussed is a tiger's coloration; white tigers, black tigers, the why and wherefore of their zebra-like stripes in surroundings so totally different to those of the zebra. In the daytime stripes are certainly protective or, rather, obliterative. But tigers hunt at night. Is it possible that in their original home in Siberia tigers hunted more by day? Or may it not rather be an instance of Nature's artistry subserving no utilitarian purpose? It may be remarked that a markhor is *not*, as the General thinks, protectively coloured. Among Himalayan precipices his safety depends on his senses of sight and smell. In his dirty white pelage of summer he is peculiarly conspicuous.

Then there are those many other details of tiger lore so full of interest to the shikari fraternity, so meaningless to outsiders; their "extreme admissible length," their weight, their method of hunting and killing, their mating and gestation, their ferocity, strength, and cunning. Their food. What a list! Elephants to grasshoppers, human beings, bears, carrion, their very own offspring. These and many other things may be read about in *The Book of the Tiger*; perhaps most interesting of all a chapter devoted to tiger myths and superstitions. And where points of natural history are in dispute, the author's views are put forward so well and clearly and with such absence of dogmatism that they are generally con-

vincing. Searching for omissions with a reviewer's hunger, nothing seems to have been left out, unless it is how a tiger's age may be ascertained from the number of lobes in his liver!

Of the several ways of hunting tigers the author has a natural preference for the methods he was accustomed to in the provinces he wandered over—that is, driving by beaters up to guns posted in trees or other commanding positions, and in the event of a tiger being wounded, following him up on foot. For other methods, "sitting up," the use of an elephant for following up a wounded beast, or the Nepalese method of ringing or beating with a large number of elephants, he seems to have feelings perhaps verging on contempt. As for sitting up, some find it tedious, others enjoy the suspense, the glimpses they may get of shadowy forms, and the mystery of nights in the jungle. *De gustibus* is as true of tiger shooting as of anything else. There were once two brothers who for many years hunted together in the C.P. It may be said in parenthesis that once bitten—if the expression may be used—by tiger shooting, the devotee is apt to pursue exclusively that one sport. Both brothers were equally keen, but the time came when, like Paul and Barnabas, they parted. The reason was that while one had come to prefer driving, the other liked "sitting up." As to whether a wounded animal should be followed on foot or on an elephant, in the well-known shoots of the Central India Horse an elephant was always used when available. It is really a question of the kind of jungle. In some places the pursuit of a wounded tiger by three good rifles on foot is a comparatively safe and rational amusement. In other places it would be foolhardy. In jungles such as those of the Nepal *terai* elephants *must* be used both for shooting from and for beating.

"I have not," says the General, "found tigers difficult to kill or displaying any remarkable vitality"! He must have held his rifle very straight! It is the opinion of most that the tiger (a cat, remember!) is a tough beast, and that if not killed by the first bullet, he seems to get a fresh lease of life—his domestic relative's "nine lives."

"If I were to go tiger shooting tomorrow," General Burton says, "I would take a black powder .500 rifle in preference to any other." This must be taken as a personal preference, for there can be no question that a modern .465 H.V. rifle or something similar is a more efficient weapon. Efficiency may, of course, be overdone. In his condemnation of modern magazine rifles for sport one may cordially agree. For tigers they are ridiculous, while for other game they have led to young sportsmen taking too long shots and so to unnecessary wounding. And now we hear of the Gerlich bullet with the Halger barrel giving increased velocity and still longer point-blank range! If this goes on, a time will come when big-game shooting will no longer rank as a sport.

Are tigers, outside zoological gardens, a doomed race? In Persia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the absence of game laws must result in their extermination. As for India, *The Book of the Tiger* may be quoted. Referring to the disappearance of tigers in certain localities we read, "nor are they (tigers) likely to be seen again until the withdrawal of British rule once more exposes the country to the anarchy and devastation which formerly oppressed it, leading to the extermination of populations, the reduction of agriculture, and the letting in of the jungle." In another place an Indian gentleman is thus quoted with approval: "Game laws and close seasons are set at naught. . . . The destruction is now being widely carried into Government reserve forests, the last refuge of the large game of British India. With the extension of self-government, this destruction will proceed apace." These two opinions do not clash as might at first appear. No one can doubt that one of the first happenings in "free" India will be the

flooding of the country with firearms. The deer and pig, the tiger's chief mainstay, will soon be shot, while the carnivore, driven to killing cattle, will suffer extermination by poison. By the time the stage pictured by General Burton is reached, the forest may, as he says, have encroached on the cultivation, but the forest fauna will have disappeared. A dismal picture! And posterity, whether British or Indian, will be poorly compensated for the loss of the fauna of the country by having books in which to read about it—even such good ones as that under review. One may regret the intrusion of politics into *The Book of the Tiger*, but unfortunately such thoughts *must* intrude themselves at the present time. Let us hope the General is too pessimistic. There still remain the Princes. They may save the tigers of India and perhaps—who knows?—India herself.

R. L. KENNION.

Jehol, City of Emperors. By Sven Hedin. Translated from the Swedish by E. G. Nash. 10½"×6½". Pp. xiv+278. Illustrations. Kegan Paul. 1932. 18s.

The excellent translation, by E. G. Nash, of Sven Hedin's latest book, *Jehol, City of Emperors*, is opportune, as affording us picturesque glimpses of the capital of a province that is at this moment the scene of long-expected conflict. The book, it is true, treats, not of the region generally, but rather of the city itself and the architectural treasures that the early Manchu emperors, and in particular Chien lung, perhaps the greatest of them all, erected for the embellishment of what the author so aptly calls "the Fontainebleau of China."

We know Sven Hedin, from his previous works, as a great Central Asian traveller. In this, his latest book, we see him in a somewhat different guise—as the compiler of what one might describe as a sort of guide-book, albeit a guide-book instinct with life and adorned by many a patch of vivid word-painting.

The object, in fact, of the author's pilgrimage to Jehol was one of limited scope—namely, to collect materials for replicas of the Golden Pavilion in the Potala to be set up in Stockholm and Chicago, and to acquire for the same, objects ritual and artistic appertaining to the Lamaist religion.

Of the fourteen chapters that make up the book, the first describes the short journey to Jehol and the author's reception there. The fact that the journey was made by motor-car and that mention is made of motor-buses plying on this road (described as worse than the roads in Dzungaria in inmost Asia), is eloquent testimony to the advance of mechanical transport to very remote corners of the world. (The reviewer took a week with ponies and a Peking cart to cover the distance in 1909.) A significant point and one that bears on the present controversy between China and Japan regarding the status of the province of Jehol is the statement, on page 8, that "the province is now included in Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's realm the three eastern provinces, Hei lung kiang, Kirin and Mu-ben." This was written in 1930. If, therefore, in 1930 Jehol was reckoned as included in Manchuria, the new state of Manchukuo would appear to have some just grounds for claiming it to be so still.

In this first chapter and again later in the book the author makes mention of the risk to travellers on the Luan ho from bandits. He mentions also that the pay of the soldiers at Jehol was 1½ taels (about 4 shillings) a month, but that for the previous six months they had received no pay at all. What wonder then if they turn to brigandage? This mention of banditry recalls to the reviewer's mind a little stratagem on the part of his boatmen when going down the Luan

ho in 1909. The boat had been tied up to the bank, ostensibly for the night, while it was yet daylight. As soon as darkness set in the boatmen insisted on quietly dropping downstream a mile or two and tying up silently in a different spot.

Three chapters are taken up with detailed descriptions of the various temples and shrines which were the goal of the author's special quest. To the general reader these meticulous descriptions may, perhaps, be a little wearisome.

A chapter is devoted to the story of the wandering of the Turgot Mongols. Their "trek" *en masse* to Russia and their flight therefrom—this story, though in the nature of a digression, is a masterpiece of graphic descriptive writing. The author likens their odyssey, not inaptly, to the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt and to the retreat of Napoleon's Grand Army from Moscow.

Two chapters tell of the doings of the great emperors Kang hsi and Chien lung, whose long reigns, combined, cover 120 years of the life of Jehol. Excerpts from Imperial edicts, and the writings and poems of these monarchs themselves, shed much light on their mentality and outlook on life, and give an indication of their greatness as rulers and as men. Their statcraft in cultivating the devotion of their Buddhist subjects of the Outer Dependencies by showing special honour to the pontiffs of that religion and by building Lama temples and monasteries for their Mongol lieges is emphasized.

A whole chapter is devoted to Lord Macartney's mission to the Emperor Chien lung in 1793, and deservedly so, seeing that this event was an important episode in the history of Jehol. It was the first British embassy to the Imperial Court of China, and though received with ceremony and hospitality departed empty-handed. The reply, indeed, of the Manchu Emperor to the letter from King George III., indicates that the latter was regarded as a vassal prince humbly sending tribute.

The tragic end of the Emperors Chia ching and Hsien feng at Jehol is related in picturesque detail.

The story of the plot of Prince Yi, Tuan hua, and Su shun to seize the reins of power on the demise of Hsien feng, and how this plot was frustrated by the courage and resourcefulness of the young Yehonala, is graphically described. The author's account, however, differs in some important particulars from the story as given to us by Bland and Backhouse in *China under the Dowager Empress*, which full and documented account of the arrest of the conspirators and their subsequent fate impels us to consider theirs as the more correct version of the affair.

Much else might be said of the many other interesting matters treated of in Sven Hedin's book, did space permit—of the pageantry of the Court; the scenery of the Imperial park; the assemblages of the Mongol vassals; the pomp and circumstance of the autumn hunts in the "Wei Chang"; the visit of the third Tashi Lama and his death at Peking and the subsequent seven months' journey back to Tibet of the funeral procession with his remains; the lives and loves of these old potentates.

There are little telling touches also. To those, for instance, who know North China the mention of the pigeon-whistles will assuredly bring back memories of the clouds of white pigeons soaring high in the blue ether and the unforgettable sound of the sudden change of note as the whole flight wheels this way or that.

Dr. Montell's artistic photographs are a charming feature of the work, and equally so are the clever pencil sketches by the author.

One or two minor inaccuracies should perhaps be mentioned:

Yehonala's father, Hui cheng, held rank as captain only in the "Black and White Banner."

The capture of the Taku forts and subsequent march to Peking of the Anglo-French forces took place, of course, in 1860, not 1861.

The usefulness of the clear little sketch map of Jehol and its immediate surroundings would have been enhanced by the addition of a scale.

Let us hope that the ruthless hand of War will not presently obliterate the already crumbling monuments of a bygone era.

M. E. W.

La vie de Bouddha et les doctrines bouddhiques. By Marie Galaud. Pp. 215. Pls. 24. Paris: Maisonneuve Frères. 1931. Price 25 francs.

The book consists of three chapters from the author's *Ceylan—Bouddhisme* (ed. Pierre Roger) reprinted in a revised and enlarged form. The first chapter deals with the life of Buddha and the Buddhist doctrine; the second sketches the development and decline of Buddhism in India; the third is concerned with some of its sacred writings and doctrines. As a whole, the three chapters stand as a remarkably lucid and relevant exposition of Buddhism, and the book deserves to rank both as one of the best introductions to and as a valuable history of the subject.

The author opens the first chapter with an account of the Buddha's birth and early life, and the sudden revelation which was vouchsafed him when, after having encountered first an old man, then an ill man, then a corpse, and finally a priest, he withdrew from his luxurious surroundings. The author cleverly leads the reader to desire a doctrine and a form of life different from that which regulated the day at Siddhodana's palace, and he is therefore well prepared when the author introduces him to the Buddhist doctrine by means of the sermons, words, and arguments which the Buddha himself used to convert his contemporaries. And although the author seems sympathetic to the doctrine and carefully, perhaps almost too carefully, avoids criticizing it, she does definitely stress the fact that the creed, as preached by Buddha, was not based upon "l'amour quand même" but upon "l'indifférence malgré tout," that it was a religion which extolled neither pity, charity, nor equality, but which praised instead all destruction of birth—that is to say, of life.

In the second chapter the author gives us a rapid sketch of the spread of Buddhism in India, and then hurries on to the third and more informative chapter. Here she enumerates and briefly summarizes several of the more important Buddhist texts and lays stress on the value of texts other than Pali. She then briefly but competently relates the history of the Southern Buddhist Church, which flourished in Burma, Siam, Annam, and Cambodia, and that of the Northern Church, which developed in Nepal, Tibet, the Himalayas, Mongolia, China, Annam, Corea, and Japan, and shows how greatly the doctrines propounded in the latter countries differ from those originally formulated by the Buddha.

The author concludes her work by quoting the opinions held by various eminent Western scholars regarding the meaning of Nirvana—the rock on which Buddhism is built. It appears that no two of them hold a similar interpretation of that term and, therefore, still without stating her personal opinion of the creed or her own interpretation of Nirvana, the author closes her book by stating that "... le Bouddhisme du Bouddha demeure, touchant les points capitaux, la doctrine flottante, fuyante, insaisissable, qui troublait Mâlungyâputta et qui fit, à travers les siècles, des Bouddhistes croyant à la non-réalité de l'Ego ou à son immortalité, au Nirvâna, état d'indifférence temporelle, de béatitude sans fin ou de

néant éternel; qui forma des athées, des panthéistes, des monothéistes et des polythéistes; des partisans du monisme ou du dualisme, du phénoménisme ou du personnalisme, du nihilisme ou du mysticism, du pessimisme outrancier ou de l'ultraquétisme."

The plates are good and pleasing, but bear no particular relation to the text. It is regrettable that there is neither an index nor a bibliography.

D. T. R.

Die Materielle Kultur des Kabulgebietes. By Dr. Bruno Markowski. Large 8vo. Pp. 154. Pls. XXXV. Leipzig: Verlag Asia Major. 1932.

Notes sur L'Afghanistan. By Maurice Fouchet. Œuvre posthume. Préface de J. Hackin, Conservateur du Musée Guimet. Small 8vo. Pp. 225. Paris: Maisonneuve Frères. 1931.

Dr. Markowski's book provides us with a detailed account of the material culture of the Kabul Valley in every aspect. In Part I. (pp. 1-30) he discusses the more abstract subjects at the base of the culture: geography, climate, population, languages, and religion. In part II. (pp. 31-152) he deals with the material side of the culture itself. Building systems, the nature of the houses, the disposition of their rooms, their heating, lighting, and domestic arrangements, are first examined in detail. The national costumes and food are then discussed, and the economy, commerce, trade, and finance systems are described. The book closes with a useful bibliography.

The illustrations are grouped together on thirty-five plates at the end of the volume, several figures being included on each plate. But for some obscure reason the numbers of the figures break off at 20 on Plate X., to begin again at 1 on Plate XI.—a completely unnecessary complication.

The most useful portion of the book, as far as the general reader is concerned, is probably the note on communications under the heading "Geography." The remainder, in the minuteness of its detail, is not very readable, though it constitutes a useful record, and will serve as a basis for future research of a somewhat wider nature.

The second volume under review is of a very different character; it is the posthumous publication of a series of notes and essays on Afghanistan, composed by the late Maurice Fouchet, France's first diplomatic representative in the country. The book is divided into two parts, the one dealing with the country and its inhabitants, the other with its history and political significance. The first forms a charming series of sketches, which seem to give a really excellent idea of what the country is like; the second provides us with a pleasant outline of Afghanistan's history from the earliest times until 1924, when the work was actually written. The revolution and dethronement of Amanullah are thus not included.

In addition to the main theme of the book—Afghanistan—M. Fouchet speaks at certain length of India and of some of the problems which confront Great Britain on the North-West Frontier. His comments are well worth reading, for he writes from the standpoint of the broad-minded Frenchman, who is prepared to say good as well as bad of the British régime in India. He is, however, perhaps unjustly scathing at England's expense in one or two instances.

There is one matter, however, on which he is less broad-minded; he speaks with the most sincere patriotic delight about the thirty years' archaeological concession granted to the French in Afghanistan. Surely the deplorable condition

to which this science had been brought in Persia by a similar concession it would be enough to show that monopolies of this sort are hardly desirable. This seems to be, rather, one of the few fields in which serious international effort could really be exercised to the full.

If this short work does not supply us with very much original information, it does, nevertheless, furnish a very readable narrative, especially as regards the descriptions of the country and its inhabitants. The author is a true Frenchman; he delights in finding that the new city, Dar-ul-Aman, designed by Amanullah in true Eastern fashion to take the place of the old Kabul, is purely French in plan; he takes more than one opportunity of making comparisons between Afghanistan and France; anything that resembles France he at once praises. But to anyone who knows the French this adds to, rather than detracts from, the charm of the book.

D. T. R.

Ceremonies at the Holy Places. By Harry Charles Luke. 7½"×4½". Pp. 74. Illustrations. Faith Press. 1s. 6d.

In this small book the author amplifies vivid sketches of religious ceremonies in the Holy Land with chapters of historical interest. Students will find in it a clear exposition of the complicated history of the Holy Places, while the ordinary reader, who has not had occasion to visit Palestine, will get a vivid impression of the tense atmosphere created by fervent devotees of different faiths, race, and colour congregating within a small area. The struggles of the Christians to keep the small spaces allotted to each sect in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Church of the Nativity make curious reading.

The following quotation shows the diversity of forms of worship at Eastertide: "While the Ethiopians are dancing in their tents on the top of S. Helena's Chapel the Armenians are chanting inside it, the Franciscans are singing their midnight Mass in the Chapel of the Apparition, Coptic and Syriac litanies are swelling this Christian Babel, and high up in the Crusader's dome of the Chorus Dominorum the metal *σημαντρα* (gongs) are shrilly calling the Orthodox to prayer. In and around the Haram al-Sherif the Moslems are resting from the fatigues of their pilgrimage to Nebi Musa, while in the neighbouring Haret al-Yahud the Jews are commemorating their exodus from Egypt. And forty miles to the north the Samaritans are sacrificing their burnt offering on the summit of Mount Gerizim, where the oldest rite in the world is performed by the world's smallest sect."

The accounts of Moslem, Samaritan, and Jewish ceremonies, which complete this excellent book, are packed with picturesque detail, and form an interesting study of comparison with the various Christian rites, whose differences are hardly less surprising than the points of similarity between the Jewish "Great Burnings" at Meiron and the Christian ceremony of the "Holy Fire" in Jerusalem.

The illustrations in colour from paintings by Philipa A. F. Stephenson are worthy of the text.

A. M. SOLTAU-STYMONS.

Palestine As It Is. By M. J. Landa. Foreword by Sir Herbert Samuel, M.P. 7½"×5". Pp. 126. Goldston, Ltd. 3s. 6d.

Mr. Landa has recently toured through Palestine with a party who travelled light in one of the innumerable motor-buses which ply through the length and breadth of the land. The tale of his adventures is told from the Jewish stand-

point, which, in view of the events that are now taking place in that most fascinating land, is of exceptional interest. Though Mr. Landa's sympathies are naturally with the Jews and the Zionist organizations in Palestine, he regards every aspect of the rapid development, which he describes in his pages, from a strictly impartial point of view. He praises the Jewish settlements and the Jewish attitude; but he no less apportions blame and criticism where he considers that they are merited.

The keynote of the book is enthusiasm. Enthusiasm for the progress that is undeniably being achieved through Jewish enterprise, as well as for the development of the country, both its peoples and its natural resources. In his book, which is more in the nature of a series of sketches of his journey than a continuous story, he recounts with faithful accuracy his impressions of his experiences, and he has recorded these impressions in a fluent and easy style which compels attention. It is difficult to put down the book when once it has been commenced.

The party with whom Mr. Landa travelled were possessed of high spirits, and we catch delightful glimpses of their travels on board ship, at Alexandria, at the parties arranged for their honour in Palestine, and in their motor-bus. Mr. Landa has not failed, nor can anyone who travels through the country fail, to observe the extraordinary spirit of change and progress that is making its mark on the Palestine of today, a progress that may be symbolized by the motor-bus and kerosine tin, which latter, as he remarks in one of his inimitable sketches, is used for every purpose under the sun and now practically everywhere replaces the old-fashioned and more picturesque water-pitcher. The motor-omnibuses, too, crowded with humanity of every species, flash along the well-kept motor roads, themselves another sign of modernity.

Together with Mr. Landa and his jovial party we journey through Palestine and gain an insight into the Jewish colonies in the Valley of Jezreel and elsewhere. These colonies with their up-to-date methods strike a wonderful note of contrast compared to the antique methods of the Arabs, though it is interesting to note that the latter are rapidly assimilating the modern ideas of the Jews.

We are told much about the new city of Tel Aviv with its up-to-date buildings, though the presence of slums and lack of adequate sanitation is duly mentioned. Tel Aviv, perhaps more than anything else in Palestine, epitomizes the regeneration of the country and marks the astounding progress that is being made by the Jews.

Mr. Landa's description of Jerusalem is delightful. He is struck with the extraordinary mixture of humanity that crowds its narrow alleys, and he exclaims in disgust at its unspeakable slums and hordes of filthy beggars. His account of the Wailing Wall is at once touching and dignified and must appeal to Jew and Gentile alike. Running through Mr. Landa's optimism there sounds a note of warning with regard to the aspect of some of the more modern Jews. Their lack of religion and neglect of the old ceremonies are disturbing, and hint at a scepticism that can lead to no good. He found no synagogues in the communal colonies, and his enquiries for them evoked good-natured laughter. He raises the question as to whether this slackness in the observance of the old customs presages a drift from Israel, and though in some places he was told that there was no fear of this taking place, he found that in others this confidence was not universally shared. The Jew-Arab question will, it appears, loom largely on the horizon in the near future.

The chapter on the Arabs is enlightening, and gives a striking picture of their present-day attitude. That they are learning much from the Jew is very

where apparent, both in the development of the country and the improvement of their social status. No less apparent is their readiness in assimilating the propaganda as taught by the Jews. Mr. Landa mentions the strike of the Nablus Arabs as a protest against the establishment by the Government of the sealed armouries for the use of the Jews in emergencies, though in marked contradiction he also mentions the fraternization of Jew and Arab in certain districts.

As Mr. Landa remarks, Jews in Palestine have much to learn and they are learning rapidly. The Jewish settlements must inevitably benefit the country if guided along the right lines.

For all those who take an interest in Palestine in general and the Zionist movement in particular, this book of Mr. Landa's is to be strongly recommended.

H. E. CROCKER.

OBITUARY

LORD SYDENHAM OF COMBE, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G.,
G.C.I.E., G.B.E.

1848-1933

By Lord Sydenham's death the Society has lost one of its most brilliant and distinguished members. Few public men of his time had such a deep and wide knowledge of public affairs; few could rival him in the skill and courage with which he presented his views, which, however unpopular or unheeded at the moment, were almost invariably justified in time; no one could compare with him in the constancy and intellectual vigour with which he strove to serve his country, regardless of praise or blame, literally to the day of his death at the age of eighty-five.

His last act was the composition, the day before he died, of an article on India and Lancashire trade, in which the origin and growth of that long and involved question have been explained with a lucidity and thoroughness which prove that his mental powers and his devotion to the interests of the Empire were unimpaired to the end. Few officers even of that great corps, the Royal Engineers, which he joined in 1868, passing first into and first out of Woolwich, have had such a varied career or distinguished themselves in so many different fields.

He soon made his name as an instructor on the Woolwich staff; then had a spell of active service in the Egyptian and Sudan campaigns, where he was able to test in practice the new principles and methods of warfare. Thereafter he was among the most prominent and able exponents and creators of the great schemes of naval and military re-organization and imperial defence, with which his name will always be associated and which, fortunately for the Empire, were brought into operation before the Great War. One indication of his scientific knowledge and penetration may be mentioned. His classical work on Fortifications, published in 1907, foreshadowed with marvellous accuracy the small part that the great fortresses would play in a coming war.

As a civil administrator Lord Sydenham won equal distinction as Governor of Victoria (1901-04) and Governor of Bombay (1907-13). The latter office was the supreme test of his qualities of courage and statesmanship. From 1907-09 the seditious reactionary movement, headed by the Brahman, Tilak, who glorified the bomb as a heaven-

sent means of getting rid of the hated foreigner, was steadily gaining ground. The then Liberal Government at home, with Lord Morley as Secretary of State for India, showed no disposition to grasp the nettle. Tilak's influence steadily grew till it became an issue (the writer was in Southern India at the time) whether Tilak's word or that of the King-Emperor was to be law south of the Nerbudda. Lord Sydenham took up the challenge. Tilak was prosecuted for incitement to sedition and rebellion, convicted by an Indian judge, sentenced to six years' imprisonment, and the anti-British agitation at once collapsed.

This vigorous action was taken by the responsible Governor on the spot contrary to the policy and wishes of the doctrinaire Secretary of State, Lord Morley. A few months later the writer, when on leave, had a conversation on the subject with Lord Morley, who made no secret of his thorough disapproval of Lord Sydenham's action on the ground that it made Tilak a martyr. How little Lord Morley knew of the Oriental mind! Unfortunately Lord Sydenham's courage, though it saved a critical situation, injured his own prospects of succeeding Lord Minto as Viceroy, an office which his great talents and his administrative achievements eminently fitted him to fill. He returned to England the year before the Great War, in the course of which he held many important posts, but none which gave sufficient scope to his outstanding qualities.

After the war he continued his labours in many spheres of public duty, but above all devoted himself to working in the interests of the Princes and peoples of India, which he saw were threatened by the hasty and ill-considered schemes to impose Western democratic institutions on races intensely conservative and brought up for centuries in the traditions of personal rule. In the face of many obstacles and countless disappointments he strove to the end for the welfare of his country and the interests of the hundreds of millions of the Indian masses, who, in his view—and who shall say he was wrong?—were being made the sport of politicians, British and Indian, and the *corpus vili* of a rash political experiment. If those interests are to receive something approaching adequate consideration from those in whose hands the decision now lies, that will be mainly due to Lord Sydenham's labours and will be not the least tribute to the memory of one whose motto might be "Semper et ubique fidelis."

M. F. O'DWYER.


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NOTICES

THE Hon. Secretaries will be at 77, Grosvenor Street on Wednesdays at 12.30 p.m., except during August, when the office will be closed.

Members are asked to notify the office of any change of address.

Contributors and speakers are alone responsible for their statements and spellings in the JOURNAL.

The Annual Dinner will be held on July 6.

The Coat of Arms will be shown in the October JOURNAL.

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
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(Name, with Rank and Appointment or Occupation)

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ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend $\frac{\text{him}}{\text{her}}$ for membership.

Proposed.....

Seconded.....

His connection with Asia is :
Her



SLAVERY IN ARABIA

By ELDON RUTTER



IN several parts of the world various forms of temporary slavery are still in operation. I refer to some of those systems known as "contract labour" and "indentured labour," by which men and women bind themselves for some totally inadequate consideration to serve a master for a term of years. In practice these arrangements often result in lifelong slavery.

Going further, we find definite slavery, bondage which nobody attempts to disguise under a fanciful name and the buying and selling of human beings openly practised. The best example of this is to be found in Arabia.

Arabian slavery does not directly include the sickening horrors of slave-raiding, nor is it even the worst form of slave-owning. The interesting point is that in Arabia slavery persists as a normal institution of life, fully recognized and upheld by the laws of the country. Its existence there is sanctioned implicitly by nearly 300,000,000 of the human race. And, moreover, its existence there is a sanction to those 300,000,000 Muhammadans to own slaves themselves if they desire to do so, and can manage to elude the forces of the opposition. Remember that point! For I shall suggest later on that it is not impossible that the abolition of slavery in Arabia may be hastened by a right use of that point.

Now, we all know something of the Arabian Empire. We know that in the decay of Greece and Rome the dying embers of scientific knowledge were eagerly seized upon by the Arabs, and fanned into a blaze, and so carried to Western Europe. Why is slavery still practised by a race which once did so much for the advancement of mankind?

* Lecture given on March 15, 1933, Lord Lugard, G.C.M.G., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—Sir Percy Sykes and the Council of the Royal Central Asian Society, in collaboration with the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, have arranged this meeting to celebrate the Centenary of the abolition of slavery in all British possessions throughout the world.

We all know that in Arabia slavery is an institution sanctioned by the law and the religion of the State, and we are privileged this afternoon to hear one of the greatest living authorities on present-day conditions in that country, who will tell us what he himself saw of the conditions of slavery there.

Why have the Arabs themselves not yet undergone a change of heart in this important matter?

The reasons are simply these: The Arabs are the most insular of all peoples. Their inhospitable deserts cut them off from free intercourse with the rest of the world more effectually than the ocean which surrounds any island cuts off *its* inhabitants. The outside world cannot easily go in to them. New ideas only reach them as gossip: such ideas are outside the realm of adoption as practical politics. Suggestions of change are not reinforced by any pressure worth mentioning. In consequence, the powerful opposition to change which exists in this conservative community has little to contend with, and remains consistently triumphant.

Again, slavery itself is congenial to the Arabian character. The Arabs are a patriarchal people. A man's wives, children, and servants are all very much under his sway—a benevolent sway, the sway of the patriarch. He likes to have as many dependants about him as possible. He likes to dole out their subsistence to them at his own good pleasure. He likes to hear their invocation of blessings on his benevolent head. He pays no direct wages to his servants. He prefers them to come and sue to him for a new garment, a weapon, a beast of burden, or a dole of money. He likes to see them sitting about his doorway at all hours of the day and night, awaiting his commands. But, of course, it is mostly self-interest that keeps them there on those terms. A dependant who scents a chance of gratifying his self-interest more effectively elsewhere will leave his good patriarch, and go away to improve his prospects. This is natural enough, but it may be very disconcerting to the benevolent patriarch.

That is why patriarchs prefer to buy their servants outright, rather than to hire them. A slave cannot go away at his own will. The most he can do is to beg his master to be so good and kind as to sell him to somebody else.

Besides being of less trouble, slaves are much cheaper than servants in the long run. This is particularly true in another connection—namely, that of wives and slave-concubines. In all Muhammadan marriages a dowry must be paid by the bridegroom. There can be no marriage without this. Now, if a man finds himself dissatisfied with his wife he can divorce her at once, but he cannot regain possession of her dowry. Whereas a slave-woman who proves unsatisfactory can be promptly sold again, and the price realized is just as likely to be more than that originally given as it is likely to be less.

In Arabia both individual taste and public opinion are wholly in favour of the complete dependence of the members of a family on its head. Slavery is a very ancient custom, in the presence of which the Arabs have lived and died for countless centuries.

The fact that the Koran introduced the new idea that it is highly meritorious to set slaves free is regarded as a basis for the inference that slavery is sanctioned, if not directly commanded, by God. After all, you cannot set slaves free unless you first own slaves.

For many centuries now the freeing of slaves has been growing economically more difficult. In the early days of the Islamic Empire, when captives were continually being enslaved in thousands and allotted to the Arab warriors as part of the plunder of warfare, it was a matter of no great self-sacrifice to liberate slaves. But when the tide began to turn against the Arabs, and the supply of slaves was largely cut off, it became less easy. By that time the Arabs had developed their slave-owning habit to an incredible extent. Their houses and tents were filled with slave-girls and boys from every country between the Oxus River in the east and the Atlantic Ocean in the west.

The supply of slaves taken in warfare began to fail, and slaves rose in value. Then it was, doubtless, that slave-raiding in Nubia and Central Africa received its first great impetus. The business became more and more profitable, and the slave-traders acquired great wealth. But few men, surely, since the world began can have laid up for themselves less treasure in heaven.

At last their atrocities towards their wretched merchandise aroused Europe to a sense of indignation so strong that no power that was capable of being coerced could continue to stand in face of it. Arabia, the Holy Land of Islam, was not capable of being coerced—not even by its Turkish overlords, although at one time they made an effort to abolish slavery there. The Turks found that the internal affairs of Arabia were still controlled by the Arabs, as they have been from the beginning of time, so far as history tells us.

The apparent acquiescence of Arabia's various rulers in the efforts of European naval forces to suppress slave-running into the country is the most that has been accomplished. This, of course, leaves the Arabs in undisturbed possession of their existing slaves and of the descendants of those slaves, who are every day being born.

Now, I shall have to show that slavery in Arabia is, in its physical aspect, a slight thing. Regarded in a material way only, the lot of a slave in Arabia is quite as happy as that of thousands of human beings

in the most advanced countries of the world. This is because social conditions in Arabia are still in, not exactly a primitive state, but an old-fashioned state. Such conditions make for contentment simply because the essential difference between the life lived by prominent citizens and that lived by the less fortunate, even by servants and slaves, is not very great.

In the more advanced countries the difference between the life lived by the rich and that lived by the poor has now for several centuries been enormous. But in medieval times it was not so, and the further we look back into history the less we see this difference to have been. A rich man did not live in a pauper-proof mansion. He was accessible to everybody. This is the position in Arabia to-day; and there the levelling influence of Islam has preserved one set of manners for rich and poor alike. Moreover, the many injunctions to release slaves which are contained in the Koran have certainly given rise to a feeling amongst the more pious Muhammadans that they hold their slaves on sufferance. They treat them kindly, and even affectionately.

There is no doubt that slavery of the easy-going Muhammadan kind makes contented slaves. And that is precisely why I regard slavery of the easy-going Muhammadan kind as the worst of all forms of slavery. Let there be no contented slaves. A social system which rears men to be so ignorant and devoid of spirit that they are contented to be bondsmen, and which rears others so insensitive that they are contented to own, to buy and to sell, their fellow-men like cattle, carries its own condemnation—flaunts its self-accusation in the face of an enlightened world, and leaves that world no alternative but to hold out to it a helping hand. For, if a contented slave seems to fall far short of the full stature of a man, the slave-owner is surely a not less unedifying spectacle.

Without desiring to labour the point, I feel it may be necessary to add a reminder that the word "slavery" has acquired a special meaning in our ears. We have read Olmstead's *Journey through the Sea-board Slave States*, or perhaps even more terrible accounts of plantation life in the Southern States of North America, and we shudder at the very word slavery—because of the physical cruelty to which those slaves were subjected. This being so we really need a new word to describe the comparatively mild *riqq* or slavery of Arabia, and another for its subject the *'abd* or slave.

And after having said all that, I repeat that slavery of the easy-going Muhammadan kind is the very worst of all forms of slavery.

So much for the general position.

I will now ask you to accompany me into Arabia. There let us observe the institution of slavery in practice, and form some idea as to the possibility and the great difficulty of any attempts which might be set on foot to secure its abolition.

While we are on our way thither we may study the country with the eye of the imagination. It lies before us—a huge peninsula, nearly one-third the size of Europe. It is a waste of naked yellow plains, composed of limestone steppe, gravel flats, and shifting sands. The horizons of this great wilderness are as unbroken as the horizons of the open sea. Like them, they are occasionally pierced by pinnacles of bare rock. There are a few springs of water and wells dotted about, but in the whole country there is not a single perennial stream which reaches the sea. Wherever a spring occurs, an oasis and perhaps a village are found.

The inhabitants of this desolate country, the Arabs, are divided into two classes—the townsmen with the oasis dwellers and the Badu or desert men. The Badu or Bedouins care little for comfort as we understand it. It is impossible for anyone to make himself comfortable in their terrible deserts. A sufficiency of water and pasturage for his camels, coarse tobacco, black coffee, several young wives, plenty of rice, dates, and an occasional joint of camel flesh, would satisfy the most luxury-loving Bedouin. They are fond of fighting, camel-stealing, watching other people work, and many of the more prosperous among them own a slave or slaves.

Around the coasts of the peninsula we see several small sea-ports. Arabian dhows arrive constantly at these places, bringing supplies of rice, sugar, and other foodstuffs to the merchants. Occasionally a so-called sailor, a member of the African crew of one of these dhows, will be left behind when she puts to sea again. He was no true sailor, but a slave, and was put ashore with the sacks of rice. For it is amongst the crew of a dhow, or as the ostensible servant of a passenger, that new slaves are brought into the country. I myself was told this by the captain of a dhow in which I crossed the Red Sea in 1925, and I frequently heard it said in Mekka.

Amongst the inland deserts we see several towns of some size. The inhabitants of these towns are bigoted Muhammadans, living a life completely unlike anything known in Europe. They are all employed either in some religious capacity, in the government service, or in trade. Their activities are spasmodic and not very methodical, except in the

matter of religion. For the rites of an exacting religious system take up a great part of their time. Their women are never allowed outside their houses unless accompanied by a male member of the family or by a trusted servant or slave. When they do go out the women are so hidden by clothes that no part of their person is visible except the eyes, and in some towns even the eyes are hidden. Every household of any pretensions includes slaves of either or both sexes.

In an almost inaccessible valley, surrounded by precipitous mountains of bare rock, we are astonished to see a city. This is Mekka, the meeting-place of the Muhammadan nations. It is also the principal slave market of Arabia.

We will now pass the forbidden limits of this city, and enter its streets. Unless we are Muhammadans, or very convincingly appear to be Muhammadans, we cannot hope to pass these limits in the flesh. But going by that sure route of the imagination we shall encounter no obstruction.

Seven thin spires show above the flat roofs of the houses. The streets are filled with a great concourse of people from many countries, and from the head of each of the seven spires a muaddin cries out the Call to Prayer. The crowds are streaming into the many gates of a huge walled quadrangle, in the middle of which stands a cubic building muffled in a black covering, except one corner where there is a sacred stone which hundreds of pilgrims are striving to approach and kiss. This muffled building is the House of Allah, towards which the Muhammadans all over the world turn when they pray.

We do not come as pilgrims, however, but as investigators of slavery. We therefore take particular notice of a score or so of tall negroes in immense white turbans who are standing or walking near the House of Allah. These men are called Aghas. They are eunuch slaves, and are employed as police in the Great Mosque. There are about fifty of them altogether, and their duties are not very heavy. They were first established in the Mosque in the eighth century. The reason why eunuchs are employed is that as police they may have to expel from the Mosque not only squabbling men, but women also. No man is supposed to touch a woman who is not his wife or closely related to him, but an eunuch is not classed as a man in the proper sense of the word.

Most of the Aghas have been presented to the Mosque by Muhammadan princes. Nowadays they are chiefly purchased as boys by the Chief Agha. They are not owned by any person, but are the slaves of

Allah. They are, in fact, presumptuously presented to God by their fellow-men—a sort of bloodless human sacrifice. Nevertheless, they are highly venerated by the Mekkans and foreign pilgrims. They also possess considerable property in different parts of the world, which has been bequeathed to them by pious Muhammadans. The last thing they would be likely to desire would be their freedom from this, to them, honourable and prosperous slavery.

Besides these Aghas we see many other negroes and half-castes, some attending their masters, carrying their prayer carpets and spreading them on the ground. These are slaves belonging to the citizens. Some of them, well dressed and carrying silver-hilted daggers, escort their masters as a sort of bodyguard.

On leaving the Mosque, we find many more in the streets. Amongst them there are many water-carriers, staggering along with a large skin full of water. The doorkeepers of many of the houses are also slaves.

We may see, too, a few old slave-women. They are recognizable by the poverty of their clothing and the lack of proper veils. But we see nothing of the several thousands of younger women slaves who are kept close in the shuttered houses of the city.

We make our course through the dusty ways which surround the Mosque, and presently come into a narrow street called the Suk el 'Abid. This is the Slave Market. It is very narrow, and the tall houses on either side allow very little daylight to reach the roadway. Against the houses there are stone benches, resembling the display counters of shops. And so indeed they are, for these houses are the shops of dealers in human beings. The slaves are sitting on the benches—some silent, others talking together, some even joking and laughing. The crowd moves slowly past, coolly scanning the unfortunate slaves and discussing their needs with the benighted slave-dealers.

Few Europeans, I imagine, could walk the length of that street without a feeling of burning embarrassment.

The most desirable of the slave-girls are not exposed to view on the benches. They are kept inside the houses, where prospective buyers are taken in to view them.

In Mekka there are also street auctioneers, called *dallal*. These men are employed by anybody who has anything to sell. They may be seen going about the city carrying carpets, weapons, silk shawls, and other things, which they show to anybody who wishes to buy. Having sold an article to the highest bidder, they deduct their commission from the price realized and hand the balance to the original owner. Amongst

these *dallāl* there are a number who specialize in the sale of slave-girls. They are always in touch with intending buyers and sellers, and they conduct the buyers to the houses where the slaves may be inspected. The best slaves are sold among the citizens by private treaty in this way.

Before we leave Mekka and turn to the consideration of what may be done to secure the abolition of slavery in Arabia, let us go into the Great Mosque again for a moment. As we move along in the cloisters we see two or three very old men and women who look like bleary black skeletons. If we go to the Mosque at sunrise we shall see some of these. If we go at sunset they will be there too. And if we pass by at midnight we shall see them there still, sleeping on the stones in their rags. These are manumitted slaves—free men and women. They have no home but the Mosque, and no food but what they receive as alms. While they retained sufficient strength to be of use they remained slaves. But when they became too old to work any more they were set free and turned out to fend for themselves—or to seek the bounty of Allah, as their masters would say. Those masters would, of course, have sold them if they could have found anybody willing to pay money for such worn-out bondsmen.

It is true that this heartless practice is seldom resorted to unless there is an additional reason for it. But whatever the reason, the fact remains as another evil effect of slavery. One of those whom I questioned had been rendered homeless and free by the impoverishment of his owner, another by the departure of his owner from the country, and a third by the death of his master at the hands of the Wahhabis. The two first had been formally manumitted in the presence of witnesses; the third had found himself ownerless after the massacre at Et Taif.

It is usual for slave-owners to keep superannuated slaves in their houses, and maintain them until they die.

There is yet another repulsive blot on human manners which is rendered possible by Arabian slavery. Mekka is always full of students who settle in the city for years in order to study theology. Some of these marry slave-women belonging to the Arabs. Any child of these so-called marriages is born into slavery; and becomes the property of the woman's owner. The father is usually too poor to buy the mother's freedom. I do not think I have anything more barbarous than that to report out of all I have seen and heard of Arabian slavery.

Let us now consider what immediate hopes there may be of putting an end to slavery in Arabia.

The obstacles to such a reform are great, but the rewards of success

would be enormous. Arabia is a key position. The inhabitants of Mekka call themselves the neighbours of God, and they and their acts are a pattern to devout Muslims all over the world. The care of the Great Mosque, the Holy of Holies, is intrusted largely to slaves, as we have seen, and a considerable proportion of the population of the city are slaves. These two facts are also true of El Medina, and the second of them is equally true of many other towns all over the country. We may feel horrified, but we can hardly be surprised if the Muhammadan tells us that slavery has had the divine approval for thirteen centuries.

As for the slaves themselves, no help is to be expected from them. Beings born into slavery begin life with a maimed boyhood, and pursue it with a maimed manhood. We may continue to hope that they have not entirely lost the spirit of men and the desire for independence, but if we look to them for a united proof of this we shall look in vain. They must be liberated in spite of themselves.

Now, the ruler of the largest and most important of the Arabian States, Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud, King of the Hijaz and Nejd, is a statesman. He is neither a fanatical Muhammadan nor an unfeeling man. On the contrary, he is worthy to be considered great, both as a man and as a statesman.

Ibn Sa'ud has already been approached on the subject of slavery. In one of the treaties between Great Britain and himself there is actually a clause by which the Arabian King undertakes to co-operate with ourselves by every means within his power in suppressing the slave trade. This is Article 7 of the Treaty of Jidda, signed in 1927.

Now, I remarked earlier that whatever goes on in the Hijaz and its holy cities is sanctioned by implication by the 300,000,000 Muhammadans of the world; Ibn Sa'ud recognizes this. He holds the Holy Land of Islam in trust for all the followers of that religion, and has proved himself perfectly willing to consider the suggestions of foreign Muhammadans as to the conduct of affairs in that country.

The majority of those 300,000,000 live in countries where slavery has already been abolished. They are not slave-owners, and I have spoken to many, even to some natives of Arabia itself, who mildly disapprove of slavery. I believe they would be quite prepared to go more deeply into the matter. I remember when I was in Mekka in 1925 discussing it with the Kadi, or Chief Judge, of the Wahhabis, a sufficiently bigoted Muhammadan. He deliberately admitted that slavery could be abolished at any time by the general consent of the Muhammadans. Let England and the League of Nations inspire this

great reform, and I am confident that it is not too much to hope that the chief honours of its accomplishment will fall to the Muhammadans themselves.

There are many able and enlightened rulers of Muhammadan countries, and I am now going to throw out a suggestion to the Anti-Slavery Society, which has already done much in the cause of freedom. Let the Society, perhaps through the League of Nations, invite such progressive Muhammadan rulers as the King of Egypt, the King of 'Iraq, the President of Turkey, the Amir of Afghanistan, the Sultan of Morocco, the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Agha Khan, the Indian Muhammadan rulers, and as many other prominent Muhammadans as they are able to get into touch with, to support an earnest recommendation to Ibn Sa'ud that slavery be completely abolished in the Hijaz. It is not too much to hope that the support of the more advanced Muhammadan princes would be backed by the potent fetwas, the authoritative rulings or opinions, of the religious heads of their people.

This will be the first step. As soon as the fountain-head of Hijaz runs clear the subsidiary streams will clarify themselves almost as a matter of course. All the rulers I have named have already instituted or sanctioned great reforms in their own countries, and it is high time that they were consulted as to their willingness to support the abolition of slavery in the cradle of their religion. They have been moving in that direction for years. Even Afghanistan, one of the less advanced states, has now included in the laws of its constitution a measure which entirely prohibits slavery throughout the country.

The course which I have suggested is the surest way to set about erasing, as far as Arabia is concerned, that blackest of the many blots which still disfigure the manuscript of human life. No religious principle would be outraged. Rather the reverse, for the equality of all the followers of Islam is one of the striking points of that system.

LORD LUGARD: There are two principal ways in which a foreign Power, without interfering with the sovereignty of the various Sultanates in Arabia and bordering on the Persian Gulf, can by means of special treaties bring pressure to bear in the desired direction. The first is by enlisting their co-operation in the suppression of the slave-trade by sea, the second is by exercising the right of asylum—that is, the right of a slave to take refuge in the Legation or Consular premises of the Power which governs or is the Suzerain of the country of origin

of the slave, and the right of the Power to manumit and repatriate a slave who thus takes refuge. An extension of this right consists in the power to manumit any slave who claims asylum whatever his country of origin.

As regards Muscat and Oman, the Trucial Coast and Bahrein in the Persian Gulf, Great Britain has succeeded in making treaties which bind the rulers of those States to abstain from and suppress the slave-trade, and to permit H.M.G. to search their vessels for slaves not only on the high seas, but in Arab and Muscat waters. In these three States there are British Political Agents who have the power to manumit any slave—and this right is well known throughout the Persian Gulf. In the case of Kuweit there is no formal treaty in regard to the slave-trade or the right of asylum, but the control and influence exercised by H.M.G. and by the Indian Government is in practice sufficient to exert an effective check on the traffic in slaves, which for practical purposes may be regarded as non-existent, though a certain number of domestic slaves still remain.

In Bahrein the slave-trade has ceased to exist, and I am informed that the State Courts no longer recognize the status of slavery, so that slavery itself is almost extinct. Of the few remaining slaves twenty-seven were manumitted in 1929 and thirty in 1930.

The Sultan of Muscat and Oman, though well-disposed, is unable effectively to control the warlike and uncivilized tribes in the hinterland and part of the sea-coast, particularly the Batinah area. He is making a road along the coast which it is hoped will assist in controlling such slave traffic as exists, and British war-vessels pay special attention to this area. Domestic slavery still exists, but the British Agent exercises the right of manumission, and in 1929 twenty-eight slaves were freed and twenty in 1930.

The Trucial Sheikhs exercise a precarious control over an uncivilized people, fanatical and intensely suspicious of European interference. The difficulty of eradicating the immemorial practice of slavery is therefore great, but the trade by sea has been put an end to by severe punishment of any slavers who may be captured and threats of serious action should any rulers be found to connive at it or fail to do their best to suppress it. The number of slaves freed by British agents was twenty-seven in 1929 and twelve in 1930.

So far as this group of States in the Persian Gulf is concerned the British Government claims that the sea-borne traffic in slaves has been practically killed, while the number of domestic slaves has been pro-

gressively reduced in spite of the fanatical character of the semi-barbarous population, the traditional existence of slavery, and the absence of any enlightened public opinion.

In the Sultanate of Yemen alone neither the British nor any other foreign Power has succeeded in concluding a treaty or exercising any influence in regard to slavery or the slave-trade. The southern coast of Arabia, from the frontiers of Aden to those of Muscat, has for decades past been under a vague British protection, and thirteen treaties were made by the Indian Government between 1880 and 1896. Slavery exists as an institution, but there is apparently little slave-trade.

Turning to the Sultanate of Hijaz-Nejd, H.M.G. succeeded with much difficulty in embodying in the Treaty of Jidda in 1929 a clause by which the Sultan Ibn Sa'ud pledged himself to co-operate in suppressing the slave-trade, which the French and Italian Governments failed to secure. The latter, however, by an exchange of notes, obtained from the Sultan a declaration of his interest in its suppression, but, like the Imam of Yemen, he has made it clear that he could take no steps towards the abolition of slavery as a recognized institution. The British Legation at Jidda nevertheless exercises the full right of asylum and manumission, and has frequently exerted it in favour of non-British slaves. Since the Convention of 1926 one hundred and fifty-nine slaves have been thus manumitted. The result of this action has been to render property in slaves precarious, and as a natural result they are probably better treated.

In this connection I hold it to be of importance that the Permanent Slavery Committee, when it has been set up, should pay particular attention to these freed slaves—not only as regards their repatriation, but in order to obtain from them full information as to how and when they were enslaved. By this means very valuable data should be obtained for the suppression of the slave-trade and the conviction of those engaged in it.

I have one further observation in regard to slave-dealing in Arabia. One of the methods of obtaining slaves is for slavers to pass off the slaves as pilgrims to Mekka, or as members of the crew of a dhow conveying pilgrims, or for well-to-do pilgrims to sell some of their followers as slaves. To check this practice the Dutch Government has instituted a very effective system of passports for all pilgrims from Java, and has also a Muslim agent at Mekka charged to prevent such practices. The Indian (Muslim) Vice-Consul attached to H.M.'s Legation at Jidda is similarly charged with the interests of British Indian

pilgrims and the Straits Settlements have a pilgrimage officer to look after the Malayan pilgrims. It is desirable that there should also be some person responsible for the protection of pilgrims from Africa. The Nigerian and Sudan Governments are endeavouring to elaborate a passport system for them.

Our subject this evening is Slavery in Arabia, but I may perhaps make a brief reference to Abyssinia, in which country also slavery is still a legal institution, and from which it is believed that such slaves come as are still imported into Arabia. I will therefore merely say that the news I have from that country is reassuring. The Emperor Haille Selassie realizes that sudden emancipation of all slaves would result in chaos in a country where the whole social system for generations or even centuries has been based on the institution of domestic slavery. But he has taken very drastic steps to abolish it gradually. All children born after 1924 are free-born—all slaves are to be freed on the death of their master—transfer and sale of slaves is forbidden. Recently Ras Hailu, perhaps the most powerful of the Kings of Abyssinia, defied the Emperor's edicts. He was defeated, and the whole of his slaves, numbering, I believe, some thousands, were freed. The problem of how to provide them with a living is a difficult one. (I would like to read to you the Edict which was read by Lord Cecil to the Assembly on this subject.) Special judges have been appointed to deal with slave cases, and, most promising of all, a Slavery Department has been set up under an Englishman, Mr. de Halpert, who is now in England and recently spent an evening with me in the country, when we discussed the problems with which he is faced. He has expressed to me his very great regret at being unable to be present this evening. It remains to be seen how far the Emperor will be able to make his Edicts effective in a country larger than France and Italy combined, but his action in regard to Ras Hailu and in setting up the Slavery Department are reassuring.

I should like to have told you of the various stages by which international action regarding slavery has been progressively secured, but I have already taken up too much time. I will refer only very briefly to the action of the League of Nations.

In 1924, at the instance of Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, the League appointed a committee which submitted a report dealing not only with enslaving, but also with slave-dealing, and with practices analogous to slavery—viz., acquisition of girls by purchase, adoption of children, debt-bondage, and forced labour. It made recommendations under

ten heads, not all of which were accepted in the Convention of 1926, in spite of the efforts of the Chairman, Lord Cecil. This led in turn to the appointment of a new Committee of Experts on Forced Labour. Their Report resulted in another Convention, and the Committee is still sitting on other aspects of the Native Labour question; we met last autumn.

Meanwhile, at the urgent instance of the British delegates, a new Slavery Committee had been appointed and met twice last year. This Committee unanimously recommended the appointment, not of a Slavery Bureau such as those set up under the Berlin Act in regard to Slavery and the Liquor Traffic, which had proved ineffective, but a Permanent Committee with a small secretariat attached to it. Its objects are to keep the question continuously before the public, and to seek for and follow up information in co-operation with the Governments concerned. It will consist of seven members of different nationalities chosen for their special knowledge of the subject, and will meet every other year. It is strictly advisory to the Council and has no supervisory powers. It will examine documents submitted by or through Governments, and make research into the nature of the institution and its rôle in the social system of the people. It will advise if so desired as to financial assistance to a State desiring to abolish slavery. It may not hear oral evidence.

The functions of the Committee were somewhat restricted by the very natural fear of the States lest it should interfere in matters of internal administration. Its creation constituted a new departure in the long campaign against slavery in all its forms. For the first time there will be an international body charged with continuing investigation and able, for instance, to prompt research by students of anthropology and primitive sociology into conditions of tribal serfdom which may be considered as normal and incidental to the evolution of a primitive society, and those which are so onerous as to approximate to slavery, and into other similar problems. Or again, as I have already said, it can trace the origin of slaves manumitted by political and Consular agents in Arabia—or the conditions of the Mui Tsai in China. Its success will depend on the prudence and tact of its proceedings no less than on the disinterested efforts of its members, and if it succeeds in gaining the confidence of the Colonial Powers, as I think the C.P.M. has done, it should be able to do a great deal.

LADY SIMON raised two main points. In the first place she said she thought that the task of forcing our Western ideas about slavery

on people who see no wrong in it will be very difficult. She hoped Mr. Rutter's suggestion might be carried out, for if all progressive Muslim rulers decided to co-operate in petitioning King Ibn Sa'ud to close the Mekka Slave Market, she thought it would have a very good effect.

Secondly, Lady Simon asked if the League of Nations had not laid down slave traffic on the high seas to be an act of piracy; why, then, had Mr. Rutter shown a slide of a ship watching over the slave-trade up and down the Red Sea? If we were not able to search ships it would be almost impossible to stop slave-trade, as the slaves, other than slave-born children, were brought from Africa to Arabia across the Red Sea.

The LECTURER: There is one point amongst the remarks made by the last speaker on which I should like to say a few words. The point was that slavery is supported by the Koran. This is scarcely correct. There is no definite support given to slavery by the Koran, neither is slavery definitely condemned by that book. But the freeing of slaves is so frequently enjoined by the Koran as a penance for misdeeds, and it is so insistently laid down therein that one of the objects of almsgiving is for the manumission of captives, that it is true to say that the Koran, when properly obeyed, exercises a deterrent influence on slave-owning. I maintain that if the Islamic religion was rightly and assiduously put into practice all the slaves owned by Muslims would be rapidly freed, and slavery would cease to exist in the Muslim community. The influence of the Koran is therefore definitely an anti-slavery one.

With regard to slave-running into Arabia. We know that the British, French, and Italian naval forces in Arabian waters have instructions to search dhows and liberate any slaves found in them. If the position is that a British warship cannot search a dhow flying the French or Italian flag, and that neither the French nor the Italians may search one flying the British flag, then I think the position is an absurd one, and it is high time a right of general search was agreed upon by the three Powers concerned. What is to prevent the captain of a dhow from carrying three flags, and hoisting an appropriate one whenever he meets a warship?

Sir PERCY COX: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Eldon Rutter, Ladies and Gentlemen, I can only speak of slavery within the sphere of Islam. I spent about twenty years in the Persian Gulf, where I was very much tied up with the problem of the slave traffic; but it is now thirty years

since I first went there and I feel very much behind the times, especially in the presence of Lord Lugard, who has not only just dealt fully with the case of the Persian Gulf, and the position there to-day in the matter of the slave-trade, but who is also the author of the articles, on the slave traffic in general, in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. But I must admit that I do not feel so sanguine as he appears to be that the trade is gradually being knocked out of existence.

In my time in the Persian Gulf, to which I have referred, one of my most important duties as a Consular officer was to see to the manumission of slaves, and no slave taking refuge either on shore under the Union Jack at the Consulate, or on one of H.M.'s ships, could be denied his freedom. It was more than a naval commander's commission was worth to return a slave to his master.

To give you an idea of the extent of the traffic at that time I will read you, if I may, an extract from my Administration Report of 1902-1903, as Political Agent at Muscat.

"If any confirmation were wanted to the reports of this Agency as to the lively survival of the traffic it is furnished by the following items of information which came to hand during the current year.

"(a) In January, 1902, the Portuguese authorities at Mozambique, having been informed that several Arab dhows had entered the small rivers in the Angoche district for the purpose of capturing slaves, the Governor General of Mozambique organized an expedition of one hundred and eighty men, detached from Portuguese men-of-war in those seas and proceeded to a spot where the slave-dealers were reported to have constructed a fortified position for themselves. After a severe conflict two dhows were captured and two burnt and a number of Arabs are believed to have been killed. It is not at present known how many slaves were released.

"(b) Again, in March, 1902, further information of a similar nature having reached the local authorities, the Portuguese cruiser *San Rafael* entered the port of Simoco in the same neighbourhood and there, after a sharp fight, captured a fleet of twelve Arab dhows, liberating seven hundred and twenty-five slaves and making prisoners of about one hundred and fifty of the Arab slave-runners. The Arabs are still in confinement awaiting trial; but meanwhile it is known from the statements of individuals who were present and escaped capture and have since returned to Sur that most, if not all, the Arabs were Oman subjects and hailed from Sur and the vicinity.

"The foregoing incidents seem to constitute sufficiently incontrovertible proof that slave-running flourishes in an organized form and on a large scale and that the port of Sur continues to be, as it has been for many generations, the distributing centre for these waters.

"Of individual fugitive slaves sixty-six have taken refuge at this Consulate, out of which number sixty-four have been given manumission papers with the concurrence of the Local Government."

The following year I reported :

"... Eighty-eight slaves took refuge at the British Consulate. Of these eighty-four were freed with the consent of the Sultan, two were found to be not entitled to freedom, and two left the Consulate while their cases were under enquiry. The gang of Suri slave-runners, whose capture to the number of about one hundred and fifty at Mozambique was mentioned in last year's report, were sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment and deported to Angola in West Africa. This should have a salutary effect on the Suri community."

Those were admittedly the happenings of thirty years ago; but even during the last year about one hundred slaves appear to have taken refuge and been released in the Persian Gulf, and that number is just about the same annual average as prevailed in my time. I cannot believe that treaties alone will stop the trade. The complete suppression of the supply by sea from Africa is the only really practical remedy. In my time we were greatly hampered in this respect by the fact that the French would not concede the "right of search" over dhows flying the French flag, and as it was a simple matter for the captain of a Suri dhow, by taking a wife in a convenient French colony, such as Madagascar or the Comoro Islands, to obtain a French flag and papers for his dhow, our efforts at sea were in a great measure defeated.

The hour is very late and I must not detain you, but that is my personal opinion; the supply will not cease until the traffic by sea can be effectively prevented. Treaties in themselves will never stop it.

The CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen, in reply to Lady Simon's question, the U.S.A. and Great Britain in 1924 agreed to declare the transport of slaves by sea to be an act of piracy, but the treaty was not ratified. The League of Nations' Committee in 1925 again proposed this, but it was not accepted. In reply to her question regarding the right of search. The Brussels Act of 1890 contained

eighty-nine clauses regarding slavery, most of them dealing with the right of search. Prior to the Act, as Sir Percy Cox told us, France had been very reluctant to agree to the right of search, and dhows therefore hoisted the French flag. Great Britain could not, of course, exercise the right of search except in accordance with the terms of the Treaty. No doubt you are aware that in the Convention of 1919, which was signed only by the Allies, the whole of the eighty-nine clauses were replaced by a single clause pledging the signatories to "endeavour to secure the complete suppression of slavery in all forms, and of the slave-trade by land and sea."

Sir Percy said I was over sanguine regarding Arabia. I personally am not, but the information I gave was official. I thoroughly agree that we should endeavour to take some further steps in this matter, but it is difficult to see what can be done in Arabia itself, though Mr. Rutter has made a suggestion.

Since the Brussels Act of 1890 all Africa, except Liberia and Abyssinia, has come under the control of European Powers, and the export of slaves from these territories has been practically put down by internal administration.

Mr. Rutter told us that slaves are often contented with their lot. It is desirable to have a true account of the conditions as they exist to-day. In my experience house-born slaves are often kindly treated as part of the family, but it depends on the master. The history of slavery in every country, however, shows that it involves two great evils:

1. That it has never been maintained as an institution without the necessity of keeping up the supply by kidnapping and by slave-raids accompanied by wholesale murder and cruelty.

2. That it inculcates in the people a slave mentality which not only reduces a man to something less than human, like his owner's cattle, but is equally bad for the master.

THE PROGRESS OF SOCIAL HYGIENE IN THE LEVANT AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN*

By H. E. GARLE

SOcial hygiene, in its fullest sense, is a complex and extended science devoted to the improvement of the quality of the race, and may be considered as a fifth step in social reform if Public Health legislation, the Factory Acts, the provision of popular education, and legislation and the laws devoted to maternity and puericulture are counted as the first, second, third, and fourth. It does not necessarily embrace eugenics, nor does it, as is sometimes imagined, entail the creation of an intolerable bureaucracy to control every action of our lives, but aims at consciously aiding nature in her manifest efforts to embody new ideals of life by educative methods, the inculcation of a sense of individual responsibility in sexual matters, and the promotion of sound legislation directed to those ends.

Social hygiene was confronted at the threshold of its mission by four great killing diseases—tuberculosis, cancer, alcoholism, and syphilis—all affecting mankind in varying degrees, and the last, remarkable not only because of its very heavy incidence and as being highly destructive of human life, besides affecting the offspring of the race in an exceptional degree, but, unlike the others, being capable of almost complete avoidance by the volition of the individual.

Syphilis may be, and indeed is often, acquired by perfectly innocent persons, by doctors, midwives, and nurses in the course of their professional duties, by wives infected by their husbands, or it may be

* Lecture given on Wednesday, March 22, 1933. Sir Francis Fremantle, M.P., in the Chair, said: Mr. Garle is already well known to us. He has had a varied legal experience in the Near and Middle East, extending back to the Daira Sanieh liquidation in 1905, when he represented the Khedivial family in conjunction with Monsieur Poincaré and the late Lord Oxford and Asquith. He has since held judicial positions in the Near East, and after acting for some years as Special Commissioner for Turkish Reparations at Constantinople was until recently the representative of Great Britain and the Dominions upon the Assessment Commission in Paris. He has just returned from the East, where he was asked to make special inquiry into the subjects upon which he speaks.

transmitted by simple kissing, or accidentally from using the common objects and utensils of daily life, but even if we leave these out of account and also the vast army of congenitally syphilitic infants who inherit the disease from father or mother, the fact remains that, in the great majority of cases, the venereal diseases are contracted by a course of conduct which society has generally condemned.

It is this that has imparted religious, moral, and social considerations of the most varied, complex, and controversial order into what would be otherwise purely sanitary administration, and since the venereal diseases are the almost inevitable harvest of irregular secular manifestations, and promiscuity is of the essence of prostitution, it is complicated by questions of public order and public decency which present peculiar problems to the lawgiver and the administrator.

When, moreover, it is reflected that, although moral conceptions and ethical standards tend to spread from one community to another, yet that the reaction of society to immorality varies profoundly according to the institutions, customs, traditions, and even sudden impulses of the community concerned, and that the locus of our inquiry this evening is the point where East and West, Christianity and Islam, are in the closest contact and tend to influence each other most, an examination of the social legislation and administrative problems involved presents peculiar interest.

To begin with, it should be realized that morality, prostitution, and the venereal diseases are separate subjects. Prostitution is immoral, but sexual immorality takes other forms, and although prostitution is a focus for the venereal diseases, yet if prostitution were brought to an end the venereal diseases would remain, although possibly in a modified degree. Nor are the venereal diseases invariably the fruit of sexual irregularity, for, as we have seen, they may be contracted within the marriage tie. They are all three related to each other, but they are in reality separate, and should be kept separate, for each presents separate problems, of ethics, of public order, of public decency, and of public health.

It is only by doing this that it is possible to analyze the influences which have prevailed with the law-giver and extract from the confused mass of legislative endeavour and administrative effort certain principles which admit of classification, and to extend inquiry to the results which have attended their application.

There exists in England a body known as the Advisory Committee on Social Hygiene, a consultative body, formed in England under

Government auspices, to advise the Secretary of State for the Colonies on any questions connected with the Overseas Diseases or public morality of a sexual nature and, when that Committee was asked to report upon certain problems arising in the Straits Settlements, reference was made to the fact that the distinction between East and West had been argued for the continuance in the East of certain systems which had been found unsatisfactory in the West.

After a careful examination, the Committee reported that the failure of those systems in Europe is explained on medical principles which are equally valid in any part of the world, but the subject is not a purely medical one, and has evolutionary, cultural, and social aspects which cannot be ignored.

It is true that prostitution has its roots in the instincts of self-preservation and racial survival, which are biologically fundamental in every living organism, and, since the main-springs of human conduct are the same all over the world, has undergone essentially the same process of evolution, and seeks everywhere the same outlets, but prostitution is the creation of the laws of supply and demand, which are capable of immense natural modification and artificial stimulation by human desires, institutions, and habits, and it is the reactions of different civilizations to this intimate failure of every one of them which we must take as our starting point, of which the first and most important are religious.

Adultery is forbidden in the Decalogue, and in most countries is still a crime; but, although asceticism is universally accepted as the antechamber to superior spiritual excellence, the lingering remnants of the Manichæan heresy which was the natural outcome of the general acceptance by the Christian world of the opinions of St. Bernard and of St. Odo of Cluny, even as tempered by the classic light reflected in the teachings of Clement of Alexandria and St. Augustine's enthusiastic defence of the purity of every created thing, found no place in Moslem thought, for if early Christianity, like Buddhism, contained in it, from the first, a germ that lent itself to ascetic renunciation, the Mohammedans were as emphatic in asserting the sanctity of sex as they were in asserting physical cleanliness.

The Jews reprobated prostitution, and Mohammed severely disapproved of it, as did also the Persians, particularly the adherents of Zoroaster, but the Jews were influenced by racial considerations, and the Moslems by the degradation of the sexual instinct, whereas in the West it was the sexual act which received condemnation, quite as fully

as its asocial accompaniments. This essential difference between the Western and Eastern outlook is of importance, for the first impulse of legislation is naturally directed towards prohibition, yet prohibition in the East has its roots in distaste for the degradation of the sexual act and repulsion for the exposure of women, whilst in the West it is founded upon condemnation of the flesh, with the consequence that in the one the prostitute is viewed with disfavour and contempt, whilst in the other, she is considered as a criminal because she is bound to commit and incite to the commission of what the secular law has followed the Sacred Law in considering a crime.

Shakespeare has historical warrant for the plot of "Measure for Measure" in the legislation directed against irregular sexual manifestations by Theodosius, Justinian, and Charlemagne, whilst in France penalties of the severest kind followed upon the Crusades, the prohibitions and sanctions of the Code of Alaric being incorporated in the ordinances of St. Louis, and although it is true that, in mediæval times, prostitution sometimes played an official part in royal and municipal festivities, and in the Europe of the Renaissance the courtesan perhaps resembled the hetairæ of ancient Greece, the laws remained, although their canonical and civil sanctions were suspended, and the introduction or reintroduction of syphilis at the close of the fifteenth century not only caused their reapplication, but no doubt contributed to a prolongation of the legislative theory upon which they rested.

France took the lead in this revival, and in England, by an Act passed in 1653, adultery was made punishable with death, and three months' imprisonment was inflicted on both parties to any illicit sexual act.

The rigid application of the moral code became, however, insensibly relaxed throughout Europe during the eighteenth century, and the diminishing authority of the Church and religion, coupled with the growing consciousness of the right to individual freedom which grew up towards its close, commenced to favour the view that the fine line between acts which are criminal and those which are merely immoral ought not to be drawn so as to include an act which might quite conceivably entail no injury to the community as a whole.

These broader views received an additional impulse from the French Revolution, but, as the disorders attending upon that event began to subside, it became necessary that laws of some sort should replace the old severe laws touching offences against religion and morality, and a system was introduced, which, whilst continuing to reprobate immorality,

nevertheless accepted it as a phenomenon of social life which could not be disregarded or successfully treated as crime, but which, in the interests of public order, public health, and public decency, ought to be subjected to a certain measure of regulation and control.

This view is reflected in much of the continental legislation introduced during the earlier part of the nineteenth century, and it no longer prohibits illicit sexual intercourse under penal sanctions, but it nevertheless creates a new offence which is applicable to prostitutes alone within the community—that is to say, the crime of carrying on her calling without first making the State a party to it.

In the Levant prostitution had never been subjected to rigorous repression, and since a completely different outlook prevailed regarding sexual matters generally, Moslem legislation was directed rather to safeguarding the family and the position of women than to the social and ethical questions involved, the head of the police, who was charged with the apprehension of thieves and other criminals, having under his jurisdiction the public women, of whom he kept a list and from whom he exacted a tax. He also took cognizance of the conduct of women in general, and when he found a female to have been guilty of a single act of incontinence he added her name to his list and demanded the tax. This tax was sometimes farmed out to third persons, and the extent of prostitution may be measured from the fact that it sometimes amounted to one-tenth of the whole taxation of some communities.

The policy of regulation initiated by France and which became dispersed throughout Europe therefore penetrated into the East without much opposition, and in the Ottoman Empire at least, where the system of capitulations prevailed, the Ottoman authority were powerless to defend themselves against it, even if they had the wish, and the invasion of the private rights and personal liberty of the individual which this system entails was consented to without difficulty and patiently admitted by most countries in which the individual is accustomed to a considerable measure of subservience to the demands of the State. It was nevertheless rejected in other parts of Europe which were vigorously accused of advocating a policy of doing nothing and ignoring vice and disease altogether; this is not altogether true, for whilst both policies unite in considering that an act of immorality, in itself, is not a ground for the intervention of the criminal law, the latter only disagrees with the former in arguing that prostitution ought not to be accepted under any conditions, and certainly not

under conditions to which the State is a party, and that the evil may better be repressed by the formulation of a policy providing against the invariable accompaniments of the phenomenon as a whole.

The controversy between the two schools of thought, to which the terms "regulationist" and "abolitionist" have come to be applied, has not yet been brought to a conclusion, and, at first sight, it might seem that from the sanitary point of view the advantage lies with the former, since the one permits prostitution in a limited degree, subject to certain conditions, some of which have a hygienic aim, whilst the latter, which does not accept it at all, can impose no conditions, whether hygienic or otherwise, as a price of its acceptance, but on a closer examination it will be realized that neither policy excludes the introduction of a curative policy, and that the absence of the preventive element, which forms part of every regulationist system, may to some extent be more favourable to the introduction of a curative policy by excluding the undue reliance which is apt to be placed in regulationist countries upon the preventive side of their policy.

The theories propounded by the abolitionists are tending to prevail, even in those countries which, in the past, have clung the most tenaciously to the regulationist system, and the better understanding of the etiology of the venereal diseases, and the discovery of modern methods of treatment, coupled with a more humane outlook upon moral questions in general and the social side of prostitution in particular, requires that modern legislation should be more and more directed to the sanitary side.

It will be seen, then, that legislative effort may therefore be divided into four classes: (a) Prohibitionist, which makes all illicit sexual intercourse a crime, and makes prostitution criminal because of the sexual irregularity it involves; (b) Regulationist, which removes the penal ban on promiscuity, but retains it against the prostitute, subject to certain exceptions; (c) Abolitionist, which removes the penal ban altogether, and under which the prostitute, if she incurs punishment, does so because she has offended against laws which are as applicable to her as to every other citizen; and (d) State sanitation, which concerns itself exclusively with the sanitary questions involved.

(a) *Prohibition*.—This policy has its roots in the theocratic conception of the unity of the sins of adultery and fornication, and its nature necessitates a very complex web of inquisitorial decrees and regulations, interfering at every point with the private life of the individual, and, by so sharply restricting the natural instincts of man-

kind, requires for its acceptance the full support of public opinion, but this it has never received, although Divine authority is claimed for it by its protagonists.

Wherever it has been put into practice it has raised in its acutest form the eternal antithesis between the claims of the State and the rights of the individual, between discipline and freedom, and between rights and duties, and although promulgated by the greatest autocracies and supported by the severest ecclesiastical and secular sanctions, history has shown that it has invariably resulted in producing contempt for law and fallen into desuetude.

Laws of this character relate, in fact, to matters which are not within the true sphere of legislation at all; and are not only impossible of application, but invariably result in creating far greater evils than those they seek to suppress. They should find no place in any system of jurisprudence, where the best that can be said of them is that they become a dead letter.

(b) *Regulation*.—Under this system irregular sexual manifestations are left to ecclesiastical sanctions, but it is a primary requirement of the system that the laws should prohibit prostitution and punish prostitutes unless they have received State recognition and the permission of the State to exercise their calling, and as a consequence every regulationist policy is immediately confronted with a part at least of the difficulties which confront prohibition, yet under regulation penalties, more in consonance with the humane feelings of modern times, must be relied upon to put down prostitution except so far as it consents to regulation. It is in the attempt to weight the balance in favour of voluntary submission to regulation that the policy finds itself upon the horns of a dilemma, for the penalties must be heavy enough to outweigh distaste for regulation, and yet the restrictions must be severe enough to attain their ends. In order to receive her privilege, the woman must submit herself to much curtailment of her personal liberty, considerable sacrifice of her reputation, and irksome interference in her methods of earning her livelihood, with a consequent diminution in profits, and, in certain circumstances, may even find herself forced to give it up altogether. To ensure public decency, she must be banished from certain streets and certain places. To secure public order, she must live where she is told, her habitation being open to police supervision day or night, whilst to secure public health she must offer herself for periodical medical examination, and, if found diseased, must submit to conditions regarding isolation and treat-

ment, far exceeding in their severity any penalty which she might have incurred by failing to seek State permission in the first instance.

In practice, notwithstanding every effort, the volume of clandestine prostitution has been so great as entirely to defeat any sanitary object, and regulation has had the further effect of introducing such a divorce between the regulative and the legislative authority that more or less arbitrary administrative action develops without the deliberate and express sanction of competent legislative authority. From a juridical standpoint this produces calamitous results, for the law must condemn infidelity in the wife and grant a husband divorce, yet the administration cannot refuse a licence to the wife to commit adultery if she desires to practise prostitution. The State must encourage the sanctity of the home, yet since youth and freshness are part of the prostitute's stock-in-trade young girls must be licensed by the administration; and since regulation can only justify itself by results, it finds itself compelled to accept the argument that the house of prostitution, by segregating prostitution and assisting in the application of the conditions of regulation, should receive toleration.

This is not the place to discuss brothels from the point of view of whether they encourage or discourage immorality or whether they have proved a success or a failure in the domains of public health, public order, and public decency, but brothels require premises, and these must be bought or leased. The management and inmates must be hired, and since no brothel can exist without customers, toleration must extend to toleration of the means by which customers can be secured.

It would carry us too far to discuss the various forms of third-party interests on which the brothel relies for its supplies and to create and intensify demand. The White Slave traffic owes its existence purely and simply to this form of regulation. Moreover, licensed property, by the mere fact of holding a licence, however precarious, commands a higher price, and to avoid the scandal of the undue profits of individuals, municipalities and other public bodies have found themselves obliged to enter into the legal relationship of vendor and purchaser, of landlord and tenant, and master and servant, all under contracts, express or implied, tainted with immorality, and all repugnant to the general policy of the law and tending to place the State in the false position of becoming a party to what it has every interest and intention to suppress. In fact, the State herself becomes a law-

breaker. It must forbid vice in one form, condone it in another, and become a party to it in a third, and by licensing the prostitute eventually finds itself compelled to tolerate the pimp, for the State cannot effectively intervene against third-party interests when it is constrained to make a success of the brothel round the corner if its regulationist policy is not to be seriously handicapped.

Like prohibition, regulation therefore demands that the police must be permitted great latitude to take summary and arbitrary action, and the conflict between the general policy of the law and the exceptions which a policy of toleration imposes ends in creating a body of administrative ordinances enforced not in the ordinary public courts or by the magistrates of the country, but by police judges acting upon a very equivocal legal basis, and possibly applying regulations which they have themselves assisted to frame, and these considerations must be taken into account when surveying legislation based upon regulationist theories, for they aim to secure public decency and order, as well as health and morality, and it must be admitted that if prohibition tends to bring the policy of the law into disrepute and the laws themselves into desuetude, regulation, so far as its policy embraces prohibition, must also pay that price, and that it tends more even perhaps than a complete prohibitionist policy to corrupt the administration of any country which has recourse to it as a policy.

The most advanced countries have succumbed to the strain, and in the Levant, where both prohibition and regulation are foreign to local laws and customs, which are, moreover, often hampered in their application by extraterritorial privilege, the introduction of regulationist principles has simply meant the encouragement of vice in its worst forms, and a competition, unrestrained by authority, in depravity, vileness, and pollution untempered by humanity or any civilizing influence.

(c) *Abolition*.—Strictly speaking, no community can have abolition unless it has previously had regulation, and, like regulation, abolition does not go so far as to label every irregular sexual act as criminal, irrespective of whether the participants have given offence or not, but, unlike the regulationist, whilst reprobating prostitution the abolitionist does not apply the sanction of the law to prostitution itself, or invoke its intervention because the woman has not subjected herself to regulation, and seeks the attainment of public order and public decency, by basing itself upon the theory that prostitution tends to certain forms and expressions, and that it is in so far as these invariable

accompaniments become an infringement of the general law, by making the act something more than an affair involving only the two parties to it, that the law should intervene.

Morality and public order, it is contended, should be left to the care of the general law of the land administered in the ordinary public courts, and all statutory enactments and police regulations, authorizing, recognizing, or licensing the practice of prostitution, should be abolished, and brothels should be forbidden because they are a nuisance and cause annoyance or danger to the neighbourhood, no question of whether they assist regulation, lessen vice, secure morality, or improve public decency and order being admitted.

It has been objected that this is a policy of *laissez faire*, but abolition is not identical with a policy of doing nothing or that prostitution should be ignored, or that there should be no constructive action with regard to it, and has the supreme advantage of placing that constructive effort in the hands of the administration as part of its ordinary functions and of avoiding any conflict between the general policy of the law and those exceptions which a policy of toleration imposes; and indeed abolitionists may retort, that, however realistic and objective the aims of prohibition and regulation may be, they have signally failed to secure them, and that experience has abundantly shown that in neither case is the game worth the candle.

With a reasonably efficient police force, and if legislation is confined within practical limits, there is no reason, in fact, why from the point of view of public order and public decency all irregular manifestations of sex should not be controlled as effectually as any other irregularity in public conduct; and the charge brought against abolition of ignoring venereal diseases may, so far as it is true, be met by the statement that it has opened the door to the introduction of curative principles, and paved the way for the successful introduction of the fourth policy, which in default of a better name has been called "State sanitation" (*étatisme sanitaire*), which relies upon methods partly preventive and partly curative.

The main object of State sanitation is a sanitary one. It leaves moral considerations to moral sanctions or subordinates them to its principal object, and treats the problems of prostitution as merely complementary to the general aim. The policy, in its essence, imposes upon each individual the duty to avoid contracting the venereal diseases, by a course of conduct calculated to secure that end, to seek treatment in case of infection, to continue that treatment until cure, and mean-

while to refrain from communicating the disease to others. It imposes upon the State the corresponding duty to point out the course of conduct by which the diseases may be avoided and to provide facilities for prevention, treatment, and cure, for the policy has a preventive as well as a curative side.

On the preventive the first steps are to secure by educative methods the enlightenment of the individual regarding the nature of the venereal diseases, and to inculcate abstinence from promiscuity as the most efficacious means of avoiding contagion, and to provide ablution centres and indicate prophylactic measures to those who have chosen to risk infection.

The curative side is based on recognition of the fact that the venereal diseases affect the community as a whole, and that confidential treatment must be made available to every sufferer, freely and without hindrance.

The advance of modern medical science has shown that it is a condition precedent to the successful application of any measures of medical prophylaxis that the infected individual should have immediate treatment, and this is, in fact, an essential requirement from an administrative point of view as well, for clearly no curative policy can be put into practice, unless infected persons can as a starting point be induced to present themselves for cure. The sufferer must not merely be persuaded, he must be reassured, and the confidential relationship established between the sanitary authority and the individual must be maintained so long as the latter remains uncured and in an infective state.

In some countries, the sufferer is placed under a penal obligation to seek treatment. In others, the medical attendant is obliged to inform the sanitary authority of those persons who may consult him, and to warn the sufferer of his infective condition with a view to the imposition of penalties in case the disease is transmitted. Sometimes the sufferer's name and address has to be communicated to the superior sanitary authority or held back with a threat of communication if treatment is not followed until cure. Each of these methods has its advocates, but each, it would seem, to some extent has the demerit of prohibition and to be calculated in a greater or less degree to defeat their main object by their liability to deter persons from seeking treatment.

Enough has been said, more perhaps than enough, to indicate the nature of the problems which must confront the legislator in the

field of social hygiene, and it should now be possible to consider them in relation to the Levant and those countries which border on the Mediterranean Sea; bearing in mind that, in so far as some of these countries formed part of the former Ottoman Empire, they have had to meet the further obstacle that neither the legislature nor the administration, whatever their intentions, have possessed the legislative or administrative autonomy necessary to permit the formulation of any policy which would be universally applicable, and that the subject is further complicated in those countries which border upon the sea by the visit to their ports of an alien maritime population possessing extraterritorial rights.

The existence of seaports introduces into every country certain special problems, and in Egypt the position has been rendered particularly difficult by the number of vessels entering and leaving her ports on the way to the East. Port Said and Suez as a result for many years acquired a particularly unsavoury and not altogether undeserved reputation among Eastern ports for the depth and degradation of the vice to be encountered there, and Constantinople, Smyrna, the Black Sea, and other Mediterranean ports did not linger far behind, particularly those in which an attempt was made to introduce a regulatory system with the accompanying toleration of disorderly houses which that policy entails, but, in December, 1924, an agreement was signed in Brussels, between thirteen countries, amongst which are the four principal Mediterranean Powers—Great Britain, Greece, France, and Italy—by which the parties agreed to establish and maintain services for the treatment of the venereal diseases, open to all merchant seamen, without distinction of nationality, in all their principal sea and river ports, to which Egypt adhered immediately after its ratification by Great Britain in 1925, Port Said being chosen as the site of the first clinic in that year.

The credit for this is mainly due to the efforts of the British Social Hygiene Council. The Council undertook intensive work in the Mediterranean in 1922, beginning with Gibraltar and Malta, and the successful results obtained from the introduction of their policy in those ports induced Cyprus, which was regulationist until 1927, tentatively to introduce a policy of abolition and State sanitation in that year. This has since become permanent; Alexandria and Suez followed suit in 1931 and 1932, and a curative system has now been established in all Mediterranean ports with few exceptions. This has happily been followed by the adoption of the recommendations of the

Maritime Conference on the social welfare of seamen whilst in port, as a result of which the social aspects of the problem which are of the first importance are daily receiving care and extension.

The introduction of a curative policy in one direction inevitably invites and facilitates extension, and, consequently, at the same time that the clinic was opened in Port Said, another was opened in Cairo, as well as further clinics in other parts of Egypt, until in 1932 they numbered sixteen, whilst there were in addition one hundred and thirteen venereal disease sections attached to the general hospitals, and the Ministry of the Interior has now submitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers that a committee should be appointed to enquire whether regulation of prostitution should be reformed and maintained, or should be abolished, and in the latter event to make such legislative recommendations as the change of régime necessitated.

The Committee held its first meeting in Cairo in June, 1932, and has now appointed a Sub-Committee to prepare drafts of legislation. It is believed that the resulting laws will be abolitionist in character, and possibly follow the lines which proved so singularly successful in Singapore. If so, the Native Criminal Code, and particularly the Procedure Code, may require strengthening, and, as the Capitulations still remain in force in Egypt, it may be necessary for diplomacy to intervene, which is likely to create difficulties, for there will certainly be a tendency to import extraneous matters of high policy into the question. But whatever the outcome, there is ample room for successful effort, particularly if it is remembered that a policy of State sanitation is successful in an inverse ratio to the amount of legal compulsion which it contains, and that much may be done by administrative effort of a non-coercive character.

Turkey denounced the Capitulations *en bloc* when she entered the Great War, and since 1924 has adopted three new codes, whilst a measure of Public Health Legislation was adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Ankara on April 24, 1930, and promulgated on May 6, 1930.

Article 103 of Chapter 5 introduces a system of State sanitation of a somewhat coercive character, which is so advanced as to include pre-nuptial certificates as to freedom from venereal disease by persons intending to marry, but, as regards prostitution, the legislation retains its regulationist basis. So far there is little evidence to show either how far the policy of State sanitation has been carried into effect from an administrative point of view or the results that have been attained, but

Turkey has now adhered to the Covenant of the League of Nations, which will bring her into touch with modern European thought and medical practice, and, as it seems likely that she will continue to draw her inspiration from Germany, a relaxation of regulationist principles may be anticipated.

Persia so far has no legislation directly touching social hygiene, but the Public Health Authority which met at Teheran on March 29, 1927, stated that regulations would shortly be laid down by which the police would be required to furnish exact statistics regarding prostitutes, and a special hospital is to be set up for their isolation if found diseased.

Iraq has adhered to the Belgian Agreement, and as regards its ports is now in line with the Mediterranean, but the laws remain regulationist, although free treatment is provided for those found suffering from the venereal diseases. The report of the Inspector-General of Health Services for the year 1925-1926 is not very cheering, and it would seem that undue reliance is being placed on purely medical measures of a preventive nature.

On the whole Egypt may claim to lead the Near East in matters of social hygiene, but there exists no easy and immediate solution of its immense and complex problems, and under the best conditions progress can only be attained by enlisting the sympathy and co-operation of the general public.

The complete elimination of prostitution has never yet been attained, and the failure of legislative and administrative effort with regard to it has led to the somewhat unfortunate conclusion that it is both ineradicable and incompressible. So far as it is the outcome of natural physiological impulse there is a measure of truth in this, but prostitution is not merely a matter between man and woman. The instinct is subjected to an immense amount of artificial stimulation, which is deliberately cultivated by third parties for their own profit. An industry has grown out of it, which should be the care of the legislature, but even the demand and supply which can be attributed to human nature should not be viewed as static, or the demand as one which need necessarily be satisfied. If it is capable of being increased and stimulated, it is also capable of being checked and discouraged. That is a matter of time, education, and of gradual improvement in social conditions and the relations between the sexes.

It is an immense step forward that curative policies have been introduced, as their introduction inevitably leads to an examination of the

preventive policies in existence, but French influences still count for much in the Levant, and the question whether regulation is abandoned or not will depend for its answer very largely upon the ultimate policy adopted by France.

At present two parties hold the field in that country: the Government draft laws embodying a system of reformed regulation which was introduced by M. Millerand in 1921, and the draft laws submitted in 1922 by the "*Sous Commission à la Commission de Prophylaxie des Maladies Vénériennes*," which proposes a system of State sanitation of a somewhat coercive complexion under the name of "*Neo-abolitionisme*."

It seems likely that the latter proposals will eventually be adopted, and the influence of France—which will probably lead the way to the other Mediterranean countries—will weigh heavily in the balance.

England abandoned regulation in 1886 and introduced a policy of State sanitation shortly after the war which contains no coercive elements, with the result that the incidence of the venereal diseases has been diminished by over 50 per cent. in less than twelve years.

If, as there now seems reasonable ground for hope, similar non-coercive sanitary measures are adopted in the Near East a sensible diminution in the incidence of the venereal diseases may likewise be expected, but the abolition of regulation will have the supreme result of removing one of the most striking phenomena which has been introduced since the shadow of the West fell upon Western Asia, and with the suppression of toleration those countries may return to the decorum and comparative purity which they enjoyed under their own institutions and traditions.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure we all feel a very deep gratitude to Mr. Garle for the exceptionally interesting and very clear statement of his lecture. We have learnt a great deal from him; it is not an easy subject to handle, but we have been able to get a hold on it by his treatment of it.

One of the main impressions is that the subject strikes down to the very root of the community life. Our marriage laws are based on the instinctive requirements of the continuity of the race, and social diseases strike at that continuity. This has impressed itself, especially since the war, upon those who have been working in Sunshine Homes, where you may see twenty-five little babies, deprived of the gift of

sight because of the disease we have been considering to-day. The community instinctively takes the marriage state as its ideal, and, if it aims at such an ideal, it must insist on the concomitants preserving sexual intercourse for monogamous marriage. Such an ideal is unattainable by a great number of individuals; and that to my mind is the basis of the problem which we are considering to-day.

This age-long struggle for chastity is now complicated by a disease introduced about the time of Christopher Columbus. We have now arrived at an entirely new situation with the discovery only twenty-five years ago of a definite means of treatment and probable cure. Until then people were working in the dark and could only treat this disease socially by isolation; but since the discoveries of Wassermann and Ehrlich we have a new method, and must try to get treatment by this method as complete and perfect as possible, while insisting at the same time on the discouragement of promiscuous intercourse. To secure complete treatment the medical profession have adopted a definite policy of attracting the sufferers to undergo treatment. The policy has been extraordinarily successful. If you use the old repressive measures you drive away; if you provide the treatment as conveniently and secretly as possible the sufferers will flock to be treated.

Attention also must be focussed on preventing infection by distraction of interest, such as the provision of an alternative to the conditions which make for promiscuous intercourse, and promoting the healthy, satisfying outlook of a vigorous, athletic life.

The matter has been actively taken up by the Services; while the British Social Hygiene Council, with various other associations, has pursued a vigorous policy on these lines.

We have been hearing about it to-day in the Levant. It was here that infection was rife and its effect serious, in being spread by visitors on their return home. Our Mercantile Marine are providing institutes, sports, and amusements so that the mariner may have a proper alternative resort in which to enjoy his leisure when he gets into any foreign port.

I feel we are face to face with a grave national and racial menace, the greater, perhaps, because there is no longer the need for prostitution as there was in days gone by; for amateur prostitution has increased, enlarging the field and making it more difficult to deal directly with these diseases, more essential, therefore, to deal with them by methods of attraction rather than repression.

We come back to the fact that it is essential to maintain the ideal of the moral standard.

Mrs. NEVILLE ROLFE (*Secretary-General to the British Social Hygiene Council*): Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure that all who work in this field are extraordinarily grateful to Mr. Garle for having brought his legal mind to bear upon this particular question.

It is important that we in this country should realize the immense responsibility we have, not only in carrying out our own policy effectively, but in communicating the results of our experience to those who are now considering the same problems. We are the only country which has adopted with any completeness the policy of penalizing third-party commercial interests in prostitution and at the same time providing adequate facilities for the free, voluntary, and confidential treatment of venereal diseases supported by widespread popular propaganda. The results that have been gained in this country during the last twelve years have been a powerful factor in encouraging other countries to review the whole situation.

There is a conflict of opinion between the efficacy of the coercive and the voluntary system. The degree of enlightenment of the general public is a governing factor in success. Individuals in the general population must understand the dangers of neglect of treatment and voluntarily present themselves, early after infection, for medical care. The forces of compulsion can only be brought into effect against those persons known to be infected, and they inevitably deter individuals from seeking immediate treatment. The best cook has to catch her hare before she can cook it. However good compulsory treatment facilities may be, if their adoption reduces the numbers of persons voluntarily seeking treatment, they are less effective.

I want to support the point made by the previous speaker that the problem of gonorrhœa, from the public health standpoint, is equally important to that of syphilis. It was suggested that we must primarily stress the fundamental importance of monogamous marriage; we in this country accept it, but we have only just begun to appreciate the scientific value of it. But true as this undoubtedly is you can only use arguments which are acceptable to all races.

One point we do not appreciate—the extent to which International Conventions are actively valuable depends entirely upon how much the principle underlying the convention is really accepted by the individuals of the countries concerned. It is essential that we should press not only for legal conventions, but for a definite level of elementary

scientific knowledge to be disseminated throughout the races. We have got to train our young people in the method of behaviour which will lead to success.

The EARL OF HALSBURY, K.C., and others took part in the discussion which followed.

The Chairman closed the meeting by thanking Mr. Garle for the clear manner in which he had dealt with a subject vital to the race.

FIFTEEN YEARS OF BOLSHEVIK RULE IN TURKISTAN*

By M. A. TCHOKAIEFF.

(Translated from the French.)

FIFTEEN years of Bolshevik dictatorship is long enough to enable us to sum up its policy. For the purpose of this paper we will confine ourselves to one region, Turkistan, whose geographical position makes it of special interest, seeing that Chinese Turkistan, India, Afghanistan, and Persia cannot but be interested in Turkistan, which the Soviet Government describe as an "experimental field" for their revolution for the "liberation of nationalities."

Let us glance at Turkistan as it was before the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to estimate aright the "success" of the Bolshevik dictatorship there.

The Russian revolution took us, in Turkistan, unawares; but we had, none the less, ardently longed for a revolution to establish a democratic régime and obliterate distinctions of class and race, and the attainment of such by normal evolution was out of the question. The "Stolopin Law" of June 3 debarred Turkistanis from voting in the Duma. Turkistan had no local autonomous administration of Zemstvos, no municipal autonomy. As for schools, suffice it to say that, at the start of the revolution in 1917, the number of persons possessing a higher education did not exceed a score in the whole of Turkistan. We had no press, as the Russian administration stifled all initiative from the outset. The only newspaper, the *Turkistanskaja Touzemnaia Gazeta*, edited at Tashkent in the chancery of the Governor-General, wrote on subjects entirely unrelated to contemporary life, save certain items of information on India.

The emigration or colonization policy of the Russian Government was to distribute the best lands to Russian peasants, thus forcing the population of the steppes to revert to a nomad life or else settle on lands unfit for cultivation.

Europe, it seems, knew nothing of all this. It heard of railways being

* Paper given on March 29, Sir Percy Sykes in the Chair.

made in Turkistan, but did *not* know that they did not employ a single Turkistani workman. When the Tashkent railway, linking Russia with Turkistan, via Orenberg, was completed, the number of nomads near the line increased markedly owing to increased Russian immigration and expropriation of the natives' lands, including lands that had been cultivated for decades, as is shown by the report of Count Palen, charged by the Emperor to make an official enquiry.

As regards canals, Prince Massalski, in his book *Turkistanski Krai*, writes: "Almost all the irrigation canals in Turkistan are the work of the natives; the construction of the majority of them goes back to a very distant date." And he professes "a profound admiration for this people, who, with very primitive technical knowledge, under the devouring rays of the sun of Turkistan, and at the cost of unheard-of efforts, furrowed the land with an infinity of arteries of irrigation." He reckons the total length of the Turkistan canals as over 40,000 kilometres, and those whose upkeep devolves on the population of Samarkand Province alone at 4,051 versts,* and of Syr Darya at 21,092 versts. What has Russia done in this connection? Prince Massalski tells us that from 1900 onwards eight irrigation schemes for "State lands" (*i.e.*, lands that the natives have not the right to use) of an area of 209,750 desiatines† were worked out. Of these eight projects, one only, for the irrigation of 45,000 desiatines of the north-west part of the steppes of Faim, was taken up. The construction of this canal 37 versts long was to be completed in five years—*i.e.*, in 1905. Well, in 1913, the date when Prince Massalski's book was published, it was not yet finished. It was eventually constructed, but none but the orthodox might use its water. It may be mentioned that, owing to defective work, the banks soon began to crumble away and the irrigated lands became a marsh. Fevers made their appearance, and many were the Russian colonists who had to abandon the plots that had been granted to them. It was only after the lands irrigated by the Government had become hotbeds of malaria that the natives were allowed to settle in the region. This was done under the Soviet power. There is still one region that owes its irrigation to the Tsarist Government. It is at Bairam Ali, a property of the Tsar's family, now in the Soviet republic of Turkmenistan. All the other canals are the work of the natives of Turkistan, who had also shouldered the charge of their upkeep.

Thus one can understand why, in 1917, Turkistan, deprived of all political rights, without schools or press, and denied even the use of the

* 1 verst = 1,166 yards.

† 1 desiatine = 2.7 acres.

lands watered by the sweat and blood of its children, groaning, moreover, under administrative abuses of every kind, such as the right to arrest natives without reasons given, the unheard-of bribes which gave rise to a popular proverb detrimental to the good name of Russia ("If one gives money to a Russian, one can murder one's father"), wanted the revolution.

There is yet another thing. The Russians, who had done nothing for us politically or culturally in half a century, had yet managed to destroy all our old national structure and customs. The tribal régime was on the eve of complete break-up. Persons of authority had disappeared, with none to replace them, so when the revolution broke out we folk of Turkistani were unable to create anything solid. All the efforts of a few Turkistani intellectuals were directed to the hurried creation of some sort of centre, to bringing together a group of people capable of uniting the popular masses, unaccustomed, until then, to an independent political formation. At the moment when we ought to have been commencing constructive work we were without competent architects, and we wore ourselves out in hunting for simple masons and building materials. Therein lay the tragedy of our position. The longed-for revolution had caught us unawares. I will not dwell on the revolution of February, 1917. I will merely mention that when fighting was going on in the streets of Tashkent between the partisans of the Provisional Government and the revolted soldiery, partisans of the Soviet power, the native population of Turkistan remained completely indifferent to this historic tragedy, so soon to change for us into a national tragedy.

The Bolshevik seizure of power in Turkistan coincided with its installation in Petrograd. I have said enough about the Soviet régime in my article which appeared in your Journal; but I deem it necessary to refer once again to certain moments of this régime. By decree of November 2/15, 1917, the Soviet Government proclaimed the abolition of all national and race-religious privileges, with all limitation of rights. It even went so far as to proclaim "the right of the peoples of Russia to a free autonomy, extending even to separation and to the constitution of an independent State." How were these promises fulfilled?

The abolition of all limitations of rights in matters national or religious was transformed into persecution of everything that was national or religious. Put in force on May 15, 1932, the five-year anti-religious plan promises to extirpate from the Soviet Union by 1937 the last vestiges of every religion. And as for the "right of peoples to dispose of themselves," this right, according to Stalin, is recognized only

for the colonial countries under the rule of England, France, America, and Holland. But within the Soviet Union these rights have never been recognized by the Bolsheviks themselves. Here is an example: Hardly had the Bolsheviks got possession of Turkistan than they declared that "the participation of representatives of the native population in the organs of supreme revolutionary power of the country was inadmissible," adducing as the reason "the absence of a national proletariat" in Turkistan. This shows that the dictatorship of the proletariat in Turkistan came into being, not only without the participation of the Turkistanis themselves, but also against their wish and notwithstanding the "absence of any national proletariat." Hence our attitude towards this kind of power. But we knew our weakness. We had no cadres with military knowledge. The railways, the telegraph, the telephone, all means of communication, were in the hands of the ruling powers and those who supported them, the Russian workmen and soldiers.

Turkistan was at the time in the grip of a terrible famine, so an open struggle could not be embarked on. Consequently, while rejecting in our inmost hearts the mere idea of "proletarian dictatorship," we were obliged to parley with the Soviet authorities, and we reminded them of their declaration on "self-determination."

On December 10, 1917, the Congress of Turkistan, at Kokand, proclaimed its autonomy and demanded its recognition by the Soviet Government and the dissolution of the Russian soldiers' and workers' Soviet which had set itself up in Turkistan against the will of the people. But Stalin, who had signed the "self-determination" decree, replied that the Soviets were "autonomous in their internal affairs," and that it rested with the Turkistanis themselves, if they had the strength to do it, to dissolve the Soviets which had set themselves up contrary to the will of the people. This was simply inviting civil war and launching into it an unarmed and starving population, and also sanctioning and encouraging the activities of the Bolsheviks of Tashkent, who had denied to the Turkistanis any share in the administration of their own country. The Soviet Government of Tashkent thereupon decided, in January, 1918, to forcibly extinguish the autonomous Government of Turkistan. It fell after eight days of bitter fighting, two months after its creation. Its fall was the signal for a general rising, which has become famous under the name of the "Basmatchi rising." The first writers on the October revolution in Turkistan and the "Basmatchi rising," the Bolsheviks Safarov, Skolov, etc., are unanimous in noting the character of this general revolt of the population, a revolt of legiti-

mate reaction against the "colonizing régime of the Soviet power," against "foreign domination." Subsequently the Bolsheviks invented a legend that the rising had been engineered by the English. This line of argument made it easier to hide the national hatred of the Turkistanis for the Soviet régime and the absence of any basis for the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Turkistan. This lack of basis is clearly shown by the concessions wrung from the Soviet authority by the Basmachis movement. Skolov enumerates these concessions in an article published in the *Jisn Natsionalnostei*—viz.: Re-establishment of the "shariat"* tribunals; return of the confiscated "wakf"† properties to the Muhammadan clergy; the summoning of important native citizens to positions of authority; renunciation of the application of the Agrarian Reform.

These concessions, obviously, mean nothing less than the renunciation by the Bolsheviks of the ideology of the October revolution. Nowhere in Soviet Russia, at no time in the civil war, not even when General Judenich was threatening Petrograd and Denikin approaching Moscow, had the Soviet Government granted such concessions. This marks still more distinctly the cleavage which had grown between the October ideology and the demands of Turkistan. We must acknowledge that we were not prepared, technically, to keep in our hands what had been won on the field of battle. The Bolsheviks conquered us in the end. They won, not by the October ideology, but thanks to superior military armament and technique. The "October ideology" did not really begin to penetrate into Turkistan till later, and then by *decree*. Suffice it to note that the agrarian revolution which Lenin and his disciples consider as a basis of the revolution for "the liberation of oriental nationalities" only reached Turkistan in 1925, and under the ægis of a *fatwa*‡ of the Muslim clergy. But the most astonishing thing is that three years after the application of this agrarian reform Uzbekistan, the most advanced of all the Soviet republics of Turkistan, issued a decree forbidding the "revolutionary peasants," under pain of being declared wreckers of the revolution, to restore to the original proprietors the lands they had received, and, on the other hand, forbidding the old proprietors to take back their lands, freely restored to them, under pain of being declared "enemies of the revolution and of the people." After having consolidated themselves in Turkistan by dint of a regular conquest, the Bolsheviks set themselves to applying their "October policy in the matter of nationalities." This policy, according

* Canon law of Islam.

† Religious endowments.

‡ Legal opinion given by a mufti.

to M. Stalin, was to be "*national in its outward form and proletarian in its inner substance.*" The outside world, especially those who are inclined to believe in and sympathize with the Bolsheviks, see only the "outward form," but are unaware of the struggle being waged in the Turkistan republics between the native and the Russian communists.

The Bolsheviks have created many schools whose aim is to form a communist youth. They teach children a hatred for everything that is not communist, hatred for religion, for all that is national. For a long time past they have included Muhammad himself in the category of agents of the nascent class of Arab merchants of the early seventh century! But national sentiment is natural. The Bolsheviks "chase it out by the door, and it comes in again by the window." Many of the thousands of young Turkistanis who have gone through special courses of Soviet propaganda in the Red universities betray the standard of Lenin and Marxism.

Economic questions are attracting special attention and controversy in Turkistan. I will confine myself to one only—namely, the struggle on the "cotton front." Everyone knows that before the revolution Turkistan was the sole cotton-producing region in Russia. From year to year the area sown with cotton grew, so much so that in 1916 the surface sown attained the figure of 650,000 desiatines, and the raw cotton gathered exceeded 18 million poods.* Turkistan was already then drawing from Russia the wheat required for its sustenance, seeing that the cotton sowings were being made to the detriment of cereals, which had been, in large measure, eliminated. The "cotton task" imposed on Turkistan by the Soviet Government was twofold—viz.: (1) The liberation of the Russian textile industry from all dependence on American cotton; (2) competition with Egyptian cotton.

To-day one may say that Turkistan has been transformed into a land that cultivates cotton only. The cotton-growing area in Uzbekistan alone is now a million hectares.† Turkistan is forbidden the very profitable cultivation of rice, simply because it requires much water, which is needed for the cotton fields. "Collectivization" has greatly facilitated the cotton policy. The wheat imported from Russia, from Siberia, and from the Northern Caucasus, as well as manufactured products, are distributed to those, only, who punctually deliver their cotton quota. Thus the compulsory character of the cotton sowing constitutes the main factor of the policy of the Soviet powers that be.

* 1 pood = 36.11 lbs.

† 1 hectare = 2 acres, 1 rood and 35 perches.

None the less, for a long time past the population has waged a bitter struggle against cotton, for this struggle was above all a fight for wheat. The fields sown with cotton were ploughed up afresh and planted with wheat; where cotton was growing they hid it, to change it for wheat. This explains the Bolshevik failure to realize, up to now, their cotton programme. The Soviet official statistics note that, last year, only 82 per cent. of the scheme of deliveries was realized. The Soviet Press of Turkistan reports frequent cases of burning of cotton. In the district of Namangan, in Ferghana, alone eleven such cases occurred in a short space of time. This is how the struggle is being carried on in one of the most important regions of the economic policy of the Soviet power in Turkistan.

Another question of dominant importance for us Turkistanis is that of *Russian colonization*. Nothing is so bad for foreign domination as the seizure of lands. I have already pointed out how, during the Imperial régime, our lands were passing, from year to year, into the hands of Russian peasants, whom their Government, in the interest of its internal policy, was compelling to spread into the border lands such as Turkistan and Siberia. In Turkistan the opening of the Tashkent railway brought a great influx and increased largely the number of Kazak-Kirghiz nomads. We grew alarmed for the future of our people. Troubles broke out, notably in 1916, when the Government decreed recruitment of the natives for military works. At that time we young Turkistanis made a comparison. Why, said we, did the Indians, whom our teachers continually described to us as an oppressed people, hasten, at the call of their King-Emperor, to provide nearly a million men for the front, while we, here in Turkistan, supposed to be enjoying all possible blessings under our White Tsar, responded to his appeal by a general rising? The revolt of 1916 was due, above all, to the Government's colonial policy.

The Bolsheviks are continuing this policy of land confiscation, but their theory is that the influx of Russian colonists into Turkistan has no other aim than to show the solidarity that exists between the Russian and Turkistani workers, and that, moreover, the Turkistani communists, as being internationalists, have no grounds for protesting.

The Soviet Press envisages the project of converting the nomad population into a sedentary one. Are they carrying out this scheme? No. On the contrary, they are requisitioning cattle under a more ideological form of "collectivization," which has brought about a marked diminution of hire livestock. Deprived, thus, of one-third of

their hire animals and robbed of all means of existence, the population is doomed to death by famine. The work of nomad settlement is proceeding at tortoise-like slowness; and, besides, the best lands have been given to the Russian colonists. Here are some figures on this subject. In 1917 the Kazak-Kirghiz population numbered 6,500,000. Now, according to the 1932 data, they are scarcely more than 5,000,000. Our hostility to the Bolshevik dictatorship is therefore understandable. Fifteen years after its inauguration we see an aggravation of relations between nationalities. Turkistan is left out of the picture of autonomy of which we had dreamed well before the October Russian revolution. The characteristic features of Soviet policy—e.g., the cotton policy, depriving our land of its wheat and rendering it completely dependent on its masters; the colonization policy, so repugnant to us, of handing over our best lands to Russian colonists—have resulted in uniting all Turkistan under the watchword of the "fight for independence." Our country is, so to speak, in an isolated corner of Asia; it is shut in, cut off from the outside world, and nothing transpires of what is going on in the interior. We are carrying on the fight against Bolshevism at the point most sensitive to Soviet propaganda, and this struggle is going on without external aid, without it being noticed, even. During the years when the Basmachi movement was at its height we tried asking for external help, but our appeal was not heeded. In February, 1919, I, as President of the Turkistan Committee, addressed an appeal to the countries of the Entente for support against the Bolshevik dictatorship in our land. British forces were then occupying, in Turkmenistan, part of Turkistan. Our cry was not heeded, and yet Europe was still in an atmosphere of war which might well have justified such aid. Since then many changes have taken place. The Soviet Government has been recognized by most States. Nobody, nowadays, wants war, and a good thing, too; but to imagine that the Soviet Government and the Communist International are separate entities would be a great mistake. In Lenin's time, even, the official theory was that "the Soviet Power and the Communist International constituted the bases of one and the same edifice."

I will end my discourse by a word or two on what Turkistan and its struggle are. By Turkistan we understand, now, six Soviet republics: three independent Soviet socialist republics in the orbit of the Soviet Union—namely, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—and three autonomous Soviet socialist republics—to wit, Kazakstan, Kirghizistan, and Karakalpakstan. These six republics contain about 16 million in-

habitants, of whom 13 millions are aboriginal. The only people of non-Turk origin among the natives of Turkistan are the Tajiks—about half a million. The area of Turkistan as above defined is 3,986,729 square kilometres. It abounds in riches of every kind—coal, metals, naphtha, stock-raising products, cotton, silk, fruit, a fertile soil, and a hard-working population possessing high moral qualities. We are carrying on the struggle to free our land from the Bolshevik dictatorship and ideas. We have lost the battle through our insufficient preparedness. Now we are better equipped. The anti-national and super-revolutionary policy of the Bolsheviks has powerfully awakened the national conscience of our people. It used to be said of us, formerly, even by those who, from afar, sympathized with us, that we were lacking in intellectual and technical powers. Nowadays, all that is changed: dozens—nay, hundreds—of Turkistanis have received a higher education in modern Turkey and in Europe. The upper Soviet schools contain tens of thousands of our students. It is they, these young Turkistanis, who, having passed through the Soviet schools, demand posts, suitable posts, in their own country. It is again these same students from the Soviet schools who head the struggle for the liberation of Turkistan from the Bolshevik dictatorship.

We Turkistanis are few in Europe, but we are strong in our ties with our country: we are strong through our unity of views and aspirations. One of the essential items of our work is to give our compatriots in the homeland a true idea of Europe. But this work is very difficult, for it necessitates purging the organism of the Turkistani youth of the poison of Bolshevik propaganda which has been instilled into their minds and giving them more wholesome fare. But in the present conditions in Turkistan this task is not an easy one to accomplish. In spite of these difficulties, material and technical, we, who belong to this new generation, are continuing our work. I would wish to lay stress, yet again, on the exceptional difficulties which our situation presents, the absence, in the past, of traditions and experience in all that pertains to political work of wide scope. We have to be, at one and the same time, the architects and the masons of this healthy national structure in which we would wish to see harmonized our national liberation and our love and admiration for European culture.

THE NEW ASPECT OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION*

By BOSWORTH GOLDMAN

THERE are two subjects to this lecture: the significance of present conditions in Siberia, and the new aspect of the Central Asian Question resulting from the new system of Empire advocated by the Soviet Government. The connection between the two is the newly opened, much over-praised Turk-Sib Railway.

I will deal with Siberia first.

During my journey I was struck by the independent character of the Siberians. This was unexpected after my experiences in European Russia nearly two years earlier. That this independence is inherent in the people I intend to show by a short historical summary. Its importance at the present time has been enhanced by three factors. First, the movement of heavy industries to the Urals has made that neighbourhood the economic centre of the industrialization drive. Secondly, the position of Western Siberia adjacent to these growing industrial giants rendered their growth dependent upon the support of the Western Siberian peasants. Thirdly, the policy pursued by the impractical Moscow theorists has resulted in the virtual if temporary ruin of the "black earth belt in Europe." As a result, not only the new industrial areas, but the dominant bureaucracy and factory workers, are now almost entirely dependent on the product of the Western Siberian peasantry.

Let me now make a short historical summary. Between the time of the first Slav principalities and the Great War the gulf between the rulers and the peasants had been widening. The earliest system of government, by which land was granted to the military leaders on condition that they raised the requisite money and soldiers to prosecute the struggles against the Tartars, had started the separation; later, at the time of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, wars were undertaken in the West for which additional sinews were required. The army and the navy were placed on a regular basis and industries started to support them; the products of these industries were denied the peasants,

* Lecture given on April 26 to the Royal Central Asian Society, Sir Denison Ross in the Chair.

who therefore started their own home industries. These in turn were heavily taxed. Many of the peasants, to escape these exactions, ran away to the south and east. Those who did go were naturally the most independent natured, to whom this suppression was irksome or intolerable.

The Cossacks spread their dominion steadily across Siberia between 1580-1680, for the furs they could exact from the native tribes. The Czar encouraged them, since in 1680 he made one-third of his revenue from his monopoly of the foreign fur trade. In the wake of the Cossacks were the peasants, who supplied the adventurers with agricultural produce. Thus an exchange of defence for food grew up, and with it a feeling of self-sufficiency that these little colonies were largely independent of control by the Central Government. This was, in fact, the case, since the Central Government was glad to be saved the trouble which such distant administration would cause. Local governors were responsible only for the taxes which had to be remitted yearly to the Czar; otherwise they could do as they pleased.

To join these early settlers were sent prisoners from the Western wars—a practice which continued until 1917. Many religious sectarians went voluntarily. Members of the Intelligentsia, too, went voluntarily, and others were sent because they were too outspoken in their opinions. From 1670 onwards exile became a definite sentence for an increasing number of criminal and social offences, and in 1760 landlords were given the power to deport troublesome serfs. Later still, as the population grew in European Russia, sheer economic necessity forced many peasant families to emigrate. Thus it can be seen that the elements of which the Siberian population was made up were of an independent character, who found Russia proper, ruled by a militant Church and an autocratic Czar, too narrow for them.

Perhaps here I may describe Siberia a little to show what kind of a country this was to which all these hardy peasants were going. The popular imagination has taken its picture of Siberia from such Russian writers as gained favour here during the last century. For them Siberia is a dreary snow-bound plain. Across it knout-flayed prisoners are pursued by hungry wolves. If the prisoners escape these savage animals, brutal soldiery shoot them as target practice. In the far north, the Tundra are indeed bleak and desolate. Price, an enterprising journalist attached to the *Illustrated London News*, in 1890 said that the Arctic coast of Siberia reminded him of the less-favoured parts of Scotland. But a little farther south, during the month of August, mosquitoes abound,

things, to move the main centre of industry into the Urals and Western Siberia. This was part of the general swing towards the East in Russian affairs since the Revolution. It was reckoned that Siberia, as it was at that time, could produce sufficient to feed this new industrial giant. European Russia and Eastern Siberia were to be stimulated by "collective" drives, so that foreign machinery and advice could be bought with exports produced in these areas. This last part of the Plan has failed, and consequently the support of the dominant bureaucracy and factory workers of the entire Union has devolved on Western Siberia. The ruin of agriculture in European Russia by Communist methods is a significant warning to even the most fanatical adherent of the Moscow creed that it will be best to leave Siberia in her present ways.

The economic dependence of the Soviet Union on Western Siberia is growing; Siberia's sturdy peasantry are therefore likely to exert an increasing political influence on the general policy of the Union. On account of her geographical position, Siberia is unlikely to secede from the Union; instead she may cause the other states within the Union to follow her example. To hide this example and the partial failure of industrialization the OGPU terror is being intensified everywhere in European Russia. The movement of industry and the formation of independent states on Russia's Baltic coast have removed the necessity for a Baltic outlet. The present policy of export from Russia demands the use of the Black Sea for exports and the railways for imports. These factors all lend weight to Lenin's doctrine that the Communist creed should be propagated in the East. The masses of the West, Lenin maintained, were themselves too much identified with the bourgeoisie to form a revolutionary proletariat. Now this theory is being followed in an attempt to dazzle the Russian proletariat by achievement in Asia. Japan is militant in the Far East and is avowedly anti-Communist. Besides, the neighbourhood of Japan is already becoming overcrowded. Chinese Turkistan, on the other hand, could well absorb, Colonel Schomberg estimates, double its present population without increasing the area under cultivation. Russians are still emigrating to Siberia, which, it is estimated, would be satiated by the end of this year. Thus fresh land is becoming essential to the Siberians in particular and to the Soviet Union in general. If the rigour of the police terror can be maintained, and the proletariat really bewildered by new lands joining, or being joined, to the Soviet Union, the improvement which would result from the general adoption of the Western Siberian example in European Russia may be long postponed.

Having thus explained the key position which Siberia holds in the Soviet Union, I will pass on to some description of the Turk-Sib Railway. The completion of the railway has been hailed by the Soviet Press as an occasion for national rejoicing. To Moscow it was the first symbol of the new spirit which animates the citizens of the Soviet Union; and indeed it is an achievement for the Comintern, the department of the Communist "hot gossellers." Its completion did not pass unnoticed by the Press of the world, since a few remembered it as the survival of a project which had been dropped in 1907, at the time of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement. In view of all this publicity, I was ready to be awed by the grandeur, or at least pretensions, of the railway itself. But I was disappointed; the station-master of Novosibirsk, to whom I applied for my ticket, was wearing a small white hat, like that of an American sailor. At my question he stopped making paper boats, with which his otherwise empty table was covered, and spat out a few shattered sunflower seeds; he then took me graciously to the head of a long queue at the back door of the booking office. These men and women in the queue were the privileged few who were not compelled to wait among the milling crowd outside the front door of the booking office. Six hours later—a record as far as my experience goes—I was seated on a louse-ridden perch in one of the high old coaches of which the Turk-Sib Express was made up.

The Soviet part of the Turk-Sib runs from Semipalatinsk to a junction between Pishpek (Frunze) and the Jaxartes (Syr Daria). Before this section is entered upon the train from Novosibirsk passes through the Irtysh Plain. This line was originally constructed as a feeder to the Trans-Siberian backbone. At several stations along this line were ruined trains of "isothermal cars" which had been used in the pre-war export trade of Siberian butter by the Baltic ports. Now, an engineer told me, the transport was too slow for this trade to be possible or profitable. Many of the sleepers were old and rotten; evidently this section of the line is not capable of handling the increase in traffic which the southern extension of the line has produced. No new colonists are permitted there, the adviser to a series of farms told me. His position was insecure and his power ill-defined; his popularity he explained by saying: "I am useful to them, since I know more of science than they."

Beyond Semipalatinsk the country is more of a desert, and can barely support the few kind of the sparse nomads. Sometimes the sand over which the lines were laid was soft and yielding. This, the engine-driver explained, was why such old engines had to be employed on the

line, as the newer and heavier ones sank deep into the sand. The way-side inhabitants were learning Russian by degrees, and had already mastered sufficient to trade their milk and felt for tea and clothing.

From Sergiopol to Chuguchak a new route goes into Central Turkistan. Near Sergiopol a Russian schoolmaster ran up to me, waving an account in the Kazak language of the first harvest gathered on a Tartar collective farm a little farther to the south. It was the mark of progress, he said, the triumph of the proletariat. To me this excitement seemed a little unthinking, since the expense of producing corn in these barren wastes is out of proportion to the labour required and quantity produced. The sky seemed to lose its lustre and be dimmed by the fine dust which was blown up all round us.

The sharpest gradient on the line is up to the Pass of Toyasesk, between Lake Balkhash and the Ili Valley. Here the jumble of camel tracks, which had been the trade route until supplemented by the railway, came beside ours. From the summit of the meagre climb I saw for the first time the snow-capped beauty of the Tien Shan, the Mountains of Heaven, which are the glamorous barrier between dull Russia and mysterious China. The proud heights float in the burning blue sky, a high rampart of glittering battlements, serene and detached above our struggling progress. Beneath, towards the Ili, our desert way was transformed to a sea crossing, stretching to an indistinct blue mirage, where mountain and haze merged in the foothills some eighty miles away.

The railway crosses the Ili River by a new iron bridge. A traveller on the ceremonial opening told me that the majority of the passengers had preferred to walk across a wooden bridge which had carried the line then. To the east the river wound into brown hills; along its valley lies the future extension of the railway into Chinese Turkistan by Kuldja, the gateway of nations, on the path of Chengiz Khan.

Later on that day we came to Verni (Alma-Ata), at the foot of the Tien Shan. From here a long road is being constructed, and is said to be in use as far as Narinskoye, to Kashgar. From Alma-Ata to Arys, the junction with the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway, the line runs through more fertile country, watered by the melting snows of the mighty Tien Shan.

I have described the line at some length, since I believe I am the first independent foreign traveller to have passed over it. Before passing on to a consideration of its importance, I should like to tell you of my arrival in Tashkent. We had been told to prepare for Tashkent at

midnight. By three o'clock I was sleepy and angry, so I got out at a halt and put my watch under the wheels. My companions were delighted at this display and clapped me on the back good-naturedly. Hardly had I fallen asleep after this incident when we arrived at Tashkent. I gathered my belongings leisurely and descended from the coach. A soldier and a civilian took me quietly but firmly by the arms and marched me into an office, on which were blazoned the sinister letters, OGPU. The platform had emptied quickly and now was deserted beneath the glaring electric lights. All the stories of secret police, torture, and prison flooded back into my mind. Other officials had arrived, and my camera was demanded. I had sinned: I had photographed a Kazak station-mistress near Chimkent. Naturally there was a background of the train itself. This was forbidden. Espionage was hinted at, and the camera and films confiscated. But for the good offices of the British Embassy in Moscow, to whom I am deeply grateful, that camera would probably be in the use of the chief of the Tashkent OGPU. It is an interesting sidelight, not only on the power of the OGPU, if more were needed, but also upon what may be treated as espionage. However, from the camera's return I must conclude that on this occasion at least the OGPU were over-zealous in the "class war." Later the soldier showed me out of the station into a dark street. Blinded by the lights of an approaching Ford, I fell headlong into a deep ditch stretching across the street. Painfully I grovelled in the damp bottom for my scattered provisions; eventually a weary cab-driver rescued me from the trap. I felt that my arrival in the chief city of Russian Central Asia had scarcely been auspicious.

Let me deal now with the motives which dictated the construction of the Turk-Sib, and why its completion received such acclamation from the official Press. The solution of the Soviet Union's cotton problem seemed to the Moscow Government to call for the organization of vast state farms in Turkistan. Once formulated, the visionaries saw the plan as rectifying altogether the shortage of clothing resulting from the civil war and economic chaos of the first years of excited Communist experiment with Russian industry. The whole of Turkistan should produce cotton and the country be fed by a new railway from Western Siberia. The most fervid missionary spirits saw the projected railway as a moral influence among the backward—from a Communist point of view—Khirgiz and Kazaks. In this they were justified, for during my journey I was struck by the mixture of excitement and awe which the train excited, perhaps comparable to the stir an aeroplane might cause in

rural Europe. Far-seeing members of the Third International pictured the advance of the railway into Chinese Turkistan, and even spreading their ideas into adjacent India. The general disappointment that immediate revolutions had not been produced in Europe by the Comintern would be retrieved by the achievement which the railway would imply in Central Asia. Soviet technicians knew of the mineral wealth of Chinese Turkistan, and considered the raw materials it could provide for Soviet industry. Finally, the population problem, which has only become acute again in the last few years (since the population decreased during the war and immediate post-Revolution period) was offered a temporary solution by the advance into Chinese Turkistan that was envisaged as the natural sequence to the Turk-Sib's completion. Thus all the diverse practical and theoretical ideas which actuate the Moscow Government were in accord—that this railway should be constructed before other lines, economically more urgent, were considered.

If I now make a short survey of internal affairs in Russian Turkistan it will make more explicit my observations of how far the practical and commercial objects of the railway have been attained.

The policy of the Czarist Government towards the native inhabitants aimed primarily at peace within the province, so that the army in Central Asia might not be occupied on internal police work. The Moslem religion was encouraged, thus robbing Islam of its power to stir up race hatreds. The Government made every effort to encourage the nomad tribesmen to settle; but, once settled, it made *no* effort to raise the cultural level of the indigenous inhabitants. Only a few of the tribesmen wanted or achieved a Russian education. Before the war this number was increasing slowly, and, like the British-educated Indians do in India to-day, wished to take a greater part in the government of their country. They considered themselves to represent the native tribes, and consequently carried forward the national self-determination cry raised by Lenin. To another element Lenin's sayings also appealed. Petty Russian officials, in contrast to the English in India, settled in Turkistan when they retired. Owing to the policy pursued towards the native inhabitants, many of these Russians were without much land; Lenin, they thought, would give them more. Though permanently settled in Turkistan, these men never forgot their native soil in Russia—a fact shown by their houses, which are built on the Russian model rather than adaptations of local design better suited to the different climate. So after the revolutionary struggle this tie asserted itself, and Turkistan fell once more under the central authority. The strength of the tie

existing between Russians in outlying districts and those in Russia proper may be gauged from the practically similar territorial extent of the old Empire and the new Union, after the most fundamental change of government the world has ever seen. The Revolution, then, in Turkistan was carried out by the Russians and a few educated native inhabitants, while the great majority were either too nervous or too indifferent to take any part.

The reshuffle in ownership of the land after the Revolution displaced the agriculturalists, who understood cotton culture and the proper use of the limited water supply. Many fled to neighbouring countries. The Moscow Government promised comprehensive irrigation, elaborate food supplies, and an increased price for cotton, thus securing their precarious hold on Turkistan. But, once its hold was secured, local needs were forgotten in the mist of world-wide revolutionary propaganda. The cotton crop decreased in comparison with the pre-war figures. At this moment the Five Year Plan, embodying Turk-Sib, state farms, and intensive propaganda among the nomads, was introduced. Unfortunately for the Moscow Government, the corn production in European Russia has fallen right away, as I have said, and all the Siberian grain is in consequence required to feed the bureaucracy and factory workers who control the Government. The condition of the native inhabitants is indeed terrible. Officialdom seeks to hide this by propaganda in the local press and behind building activity in the chief cities. But my trips into the neighbouring country revealed the true state of affairs. The native inhabitants are inherently distrustful of the new-fangled schemes of irrigation and cotton production. And even if they do produce cotton, there is little food to be bought with the roubles thus earned. Russian officials forbid the natives to grow maize, as this would decrease the potential cotton-bearing area. With true Eastern fatalism the natives crouch hopelessly outside their miserable hovels; their emaciated bodies bear silent and terrible witness to the failure of the Five Year Plan to solve the problems of Turkistan by the much-vaunted Turk-Sib Railway. Under the proselytizing influence of which the Turk-Sib is the symbol the nomads are gathered into large settlements. The pasturage is too poor to support the cattle thus gathered. In the towns, too, this may be seen. The winding charm of the native quarters is being razed to the ground to make way for garish blocks of flats in the modern manner, where the dominant Russian officials are to live. Meanwhile the native inhabitants are crowded into the remaining streets, renamed after the heroes of the Revolution in Russia, or are driven out into the foodless

areas about the towns. Only the completeness of the OGPU network, more thorough there than anywhere else in the entire Union, as an official told me, prevents a militant outbreak. The few natives who partook in the Turkistan Revolution have become so Russified in outlook that they feel only the Communist missionary urge disseminated from Moscow, and are indifferent to the sufferings of their fellow-countrymen. The great spirit which raised Samarkand and Bokhara from villages to mighty cities, glorious monuments, and seats of international learning, is indeed lost for ever.

In conclusion, let me deal with Soviet power in Asia beyond the borders of the Union, the aspect of Central Asian affairs which most closely concerns British statesmen and thinkers. In the middle of last century the Central Asian Question was said to be concerned with those countries which lay between the British and Russian Empires. As Russian arms advanced on Turkistan this number was reduced, and the scramble for influence in Persia and Afghanistan ensued. By the rapprochement of 1907 half a century's rivalry ended, and Central Asian affairs practically disappeared from world interest. The Russian advance into Turkistan was considered in Europe to be an advance on India. But Prince Lobanov Rostovsky says that Russian Central Asia is to Russia what the Bay of Biscay is to the Atlantic. This military movement was primarily intended to guard the junction of European Russia and Siberia from the incursion of the fierce nomadic tribes of Inner Asia. When the frontiers of the Empire had been placed upon the great chain of natural obstacles stretching from the Hindu Kush to Gobi, expansion ceased; Russia was a geographic entity, and beyond these obstacles imperialism ran rampant, and was only advocated and executed by military officers anxious to further their personal ambitions. The Czarist Foreign Office, however, found that these efforts could be used to bring pressure to bear in Europe; but that the Indus or Persian Gulf might supply the outlet to world trade which Russia lacked was never seriously considered. This is clearly shown by the policy towards the indigenous inhabitants. The Trans-Caspian Railway, however, did imply a definite strategic menace to India, though its purpose was to facilitate the subjugation of the Turkoman tribes who threatened Russian control in Turkistan. Therefore the international centre of interest moved from Tashkent, where the Russian control had already existed for more than a decade, to Turkmenistan. This implied threat still exists to-day, but two factors lessen its urgency. First, a high official in Tashkent told me that the Comintern was inactive in

Afghanistan, since it was doubtful of the outcome of a struggle between the Central Asian Red army and an efficient European column. This struggle, it was considered, might be produced by an advance of Communist ideology into Afghanistan. During my journey I formed the same doubtful estimate of the Red army's boasted efficiency. The main reason for this is that the army is used as an internal propaganda agent; consequently it suffers from a diversity of political ideas which would affect its efficiency in the field. Secondly, the expansionist policy which has replaced the sporadic imperialism of the Czarist Government is not dependent on military force, but upon the dissemination of revolutionary ideas. This purpose is definitely facilitated by the adjacent position of the Communist and non-Communist territory, and would be hindered by military interference. Chinese Turkistan is therefore more suitable than Afghanistan. The centre of interest, therefore, in Central Asia has moved east, and the menace is given definite urgency by the construction of the Turk-Sib Railway, foreshadowing as it does an advance of the Soviet power into Chinese Turkistan.

From the ideological standpoint the line is a far greater success than as a commercial enterprise. An agricultural expert told me that it avoided the more fertile, and therefore economically more important, regions in order to facilitate the construction of branches into Dzungaria, the northern part of Chinese Turkistan. The Trans-Siberian Railway encouraged trade between outer China and Russia; the Turk-Sib is closer, and its political and commercial importance to Chinese Turkistan can hardly be overstated. Even now, in the present state of the railway, Russia has more than regained the commercial predominance she held before the war. In addition, under the Soviet Government propaganda follows Russian trade. That China is unable to protect her provinces is evident from the ease with which Japan advanced in Manchuria.

Communists in Tashkent consider that revolutionary support would be forthcoming from many elements of the population on the Chinese side of the border. The discontent of the tribes with the Chinese yoke could be mobilized, and it is said that the numerous Russian colonists are anxious to rejoin their fatherland. The unrest that has been smouldering in Chinese Turkistan since the assassination of the competent Governor Yang in 1928 has recently assumed more serious shape. The anarchy which threatens there may make Soviet rule preferable to no rule, even by those opposed to Communist principles.

At the present height of missionary fervour among Communists

there could be no greater magnet than the three hundred millions of India's population. Newspapers in Tashkent retail stories of religious quarrels there, and advocate a common Communist religion as a solution. The depressed classes could be given land at the expense of the landlords, the newspapers aver. And should the Soviet gain power in Chinese Turkistan, the tribes in India's northern border would be in direct contact with the Bolsheviks. The high ranges of Kashmir offer obstacles to the passage of armies, but, before the dissemination of propaganda, they are less of a barrier, and, in fact would hinder those anxious to check such a traffic. The idea of a Communist menace to India may be far-fetched, but even those who ridicule this danger must admit that the Bolshevik "hot gossellers" are notoriously expert at adapting their sermons to suit the immediate needs of any section of the community at odds with authority. In addition, they must admit that the existence of the Soviet principle of government in Chinese Turkistan, fundamentally opposed to that of the British in India, might fan any smouldering discontent among the frontier tribes between the two. Those who have the welfare of India and the British Empire at heart would rightly watch the advance of the Soviet power into Chinese Turkistan with considerable misgiving.

In the discussion, in which Mr. ROSE and others took part, Sir BERNARD PARES said: I was very interested in two points Mr. Goldman made in his excellent lecture. The first is the extraordinary charm of Siberia, and its tremendous natural advantages. It is truly a land flowing with milk and honey. When I went there I realized at once how much healthier it was and how much better the climate was than that of Petersburg. The people who went, many of them political prisoners, many of them adventurous and independent spirits who found Russia intolerable, are as Mr. Goldman has described them. But what I find specially interesting is the fact that the causes which populated Siberia are greater in present-day Russia than they have been for many years past. At the present moment Russia is going through a tremendous crisis, the struggle between compulsion and fluidity. We are apt in England to think of Russian affairs in terms of our own political life and of Parliamentary government, but the predominant factor in Russia is at present "fluidity." In the last six months all Soviet legislation has dealt with "fluidity." The term may seem a vague one, but its

results have been concrete enough. It is "fluidity" that made Siberia Russian; it is "fluidity" that created the Cossacks.

To qualify one thing that Mr. Goldman said, I want to point out that the process which he has described in European Russia extends to the very east of Siberia, as is witnessed by reports recently received by us. The agriculture of Russia is being destroyed; that is to say, the people are quitting agriculture because it no longer feeds them. They are making their way to the nearest factories even in Siberia.

Except in the sense of business, the Siberians have nothing to do with politics. Siberia was made by individuals; it is essentially individualist, not Communist.

I would emphasize what Mr. Goldman said about the effect which Siberia may have on the course of affairs in Russia, in which at the moment there is a very big crisis.

Crops in European Russia are failing. There is now famine in the Ukraine. On the other hand, we find serfdom such as we have never seen before. As a result, Russia is not likely to be able to export grain, and, if she cannot export, the Government cannot keep its trade balance or buy what is necessary to the second Five Year Plan. Under the circumstances, orders were sent round to factories to scrutinize and criticize foreign machinery. This could enable it to find excuses for not paying and to blame it on to the foreigner.

Sir DENISON ROSS: It has been extremely interesting to hear of Siberia from somebody who has just visited the country. It is curious when we look on the flood of invasions from east to west to notice how few of them reached Europe: except for the Huns under Attila, and the Mongols in the thirteenth century, they all turned south on reaching the Oxus. Mr. Bosworth Goldman tells us that the Russians are building flats in Central Asian cities. It is interesting to recall that when the Mongols overran Western Asia they erected tents outside the towns because they could not bear to live in the houses.

It was the capture of Astrakhan in the middle of the sixteenth century that opened up Siberia to the Russians. Until that time Mongol power was strong enough to hold its own against all outside states.

It is difficult to know how to treat the Russian problem of to-day. When I was in India I was accustomed to think on the conventional lines of strategic railways and frontier states. It all seemed quite simple, although there was a constant dispute as to whether the Foreign Office in London or the Foreign Office in India understood these problems better. Now it is like pitting your brains against a fog. Great Britain

is responsible for India, and it seems to me that nothing has changed more than the relations between England and Russia. Conventional diplomacy seems to have given way to silent watchfulness.

I am sure we are all most grateful to Mr. Goldman for coming here to give us the results of his journey.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN SIAM

By W. A. GRAHAM

On May 30 Mr. W. A. Graham lectured to the Royal Central Asian Society, the Rt. Hon. Lord Lloyd in the Chair. In introducing Mr. Graham, the Chairman congratulated the Society on hearing a lecture from one who had spent thirty years in Siam, serving in many capacities, enjoying the friendship of the Siamese, and who was, moreover, the author of the standard work on that country, *Siam*.

ABOUT eleven months ago some little interest was aroused here and elsewhere in Europe by the announcement of a revolutionary outbreak in Siam. The first hint of trouble was contained in a vague telegram sent home by a German flying-woman who had left the Bangkok aerodrome immediately after the outbreak, and it was not until some days later that censored telegrams from *The Times* correspondent in Bangkok, and others, began to come through, gradually making it known that a *coup-d'état* had indeed been effected but that no loss of life had occurred, that the king was still on his throne and that a new government had been peacefully set up.

In due course private letters and local newspapers came to hand, from which it was possible for persons knowing Siam and its people to reconstruct the drama that had been enacted there, and to form an estimate of the probable reactions of the Siamese nation to the new conditions confronting it.

Later in the year this Society very kindly invited me to speak on the situation, and, having by then heard a good deal of detail and, as I thought, got the position fairly sized up, I accepted the invitation. But, foregathering with a number of people connected with Siam at a social function in November, my confidence was shaken by a multiplicity of rumours I heard then: of the tottering weakness of the new government; of the fury of frustrated extremists, and their determination to push on through bloodshed and confiscation to communism; and of the high probability of impending disruption of the State, either by internecine strife or by foreign intervention.

Such forebodings, though emanating chiefly from officials, active or retired, in agony about their salaries and pensions, and from men of business anxious for their trade and investments, could not well be dis-

regarded. Some of the croakers were very recently from Siam, and it seemed possible that these might be repeating echoes from some real inside information veiled by the censor from the outside world. It was borne in upon me that, to make any definite pronouncement regarding the situation while it was possibly still very fluid, would be to risk committing a *faux pas*, as it were, to the possible embarrassment of Siamese interests, of this Society and perhaps also of myself.

I therefore represented the position to the Society, and your Committee very kindly cancelled the lecture and expressed a hope that I might be able to deliver it at a later date when the outlook had become clearer.

Since then six months have passed, during which time the forces making for stability in Siam have gained much ground, and the horrid rumours of November have been falsified. I have recently been in Siam for about a month, and have made a close study of the situation on the spot. I met a great number of Siamese of every shade of opinion, as well as the chief European advisers of the Government. I have, in fact, been well soaked in Siamese politics, and feel that I may now venture to tell the story of the recent movement there, to describe the actual situation, and to hazard a guess at the future, without much fear of embarrassing anybody.

At the risk of trying your patience I must go back a little way along the well-worn path of Siamese modern history, because a glimpse into the past is essential to a proper understanding of the present.

Before 1850, as regards knowledge of the outside world and of what we have been wont to call "Western Enlightenment," there was nothing to choose between Siam and the other countries of Further India. In common with Burma, Anam, Malaya, and the rest, she was a nation of peasant cultivators, ruled by an intensely proud and sensitive autocrat in accordance with the precepts of Oriental despotism of the traditional sort. Like the others, Siam was becoming involved in the meshes of European expansion in the Far East and, like the others, disdainful of the detested white foreigners and of the power behind their persistent penetration, she was floundering with convulsions of outraged pride alternating with evasive wriggings, towards the catastrophe that, sooner or later, robbed all those others of their independence.

But in 1851 chance brought to the throne a prince of mature age who for twenty years had watched the signs of the times from the shelter of a monastery and had realized the permanence of the foreign

incubus and the necessity for teaching the people to bear with its evils and to profit by any advantages that might be extracted from it. Early in his reign he entered into a treaty of friendship and commerce with England and later made similar arrangements with the U.S.A. and the Powers of Europe. And by these and other means he placated the ravening foreigner and set his country on a line that brought it, not without much wavering and stumbling, to ultimate international security and commercial prosperity.

It will be well to remember that in so acting the king went entirely against the sentiments of his people, who, if left to themselves, would most certainly have wrought their own destruction by continuing to kick against the foreign pricks.

King Chulalongkorn, who succeeded in 1868, gave himself with the utmost devotion to the cultivation of good foreign relations and to internal improvements, and, before he died, after a reign of forty-two years, had the satisfaction of knowing that dangerous foreign complications had become practically things of the past, that the condition of the people had improved out of all knowledge, and that the nation fully recognized the good genius of the Royal House and regarded it with unqualified respect and affection.

The eldest son of King Chulalongkorn and his first Queen succeeded in 1910 and reigned fifteen years. He continued the consolidation of foreign affairs, in which he was very successful, but in matters concerning internal welfare he was remiss, allowing the reins of power to fall into the hands of Court favourites to such an extent that the authority of his Ministers was undermined and many of the administrative institutions so carefully nurtured by his father degenerated into mere instruments of corruption and extortion. The favourites found pretexts to increase the already large privy purse, and when these failed to satisfy their rapacity they abused the royal power to override the fiscal laws and raid the State resources. At the same time the pernicious example of those in high places set up extravagant ideas of the standard of living and a period of reckless expenditure set in, which continued until a failure of the rice-crop, of unprecedented magnitude, found the people depleted of reserves and plunged them into indigence and discontent.

To the mind of the unsophisticated Siamese peasant his monarch is not only the sole proprietor of everything in the kingdom, but is also its ordained guardian, whose business it is, as such, to protect it from all trouble, whether due to natural or supernatural causes. Hence he

must be able to conduct it to victory in war, to provide good laws and enforce them, and to secure, by leading a well-ordered life and by the magic of properly conducted ceremonial, the benevolence of the unseen powers that so closely affect human destiny. Consequently the troubles that now overtook Siam, including the enfeebled administration, failure of crops and even a severe epidemic, were attributed by about 97 per cent. of the population to some sort of shortcoming in the occupant of the throne. But they found no fault with the system, merely supposing that the King had by some misfortune mislaid his magic, and that when it should please fate to remove him, they would find happiness again in a successor in full possession of the god-like benevolence and power of their ancient tradition.

But the remaining 3 per cent. of the people, the educated, emancipated, almost wholly official class, while also regarding the King as the cause of the national malaise, were less inclined to submit to circumstance. With these children of modernity the magic of kingship was rather at a discount, and towards the end of the reign they were secretly considering the expediency of some degree of participation by others besides the King in the responsibilities of government. And in 1925, as discontent increased, the discussion of democratic institutions crept into the light, and the newspapers, moving warily at first, opened their columns to articles and correspondence on the application of liberal principles to Siam; and printed some good and sound reasoning and a lot of frothy and ill-considered nonsense.

It had, of course, been recognized from the first that an important factor in emancipation along Western lines must be education by Western methods. Chulalongkorn as a child imbibed the elements of an English education from a governess engaged for him by his father, and, after he came to the throne, he devoted much care to the instruction of his young brothers and half-brothers, and later to that of his sons and nephews. Some of his brothers and nearly all his sons and nephews were sent to school in England, afterwards specializing in the armies and navies and in the law, medical, engineering, and other technical schools of various European countries; and these, on returning home, entered the Government service, where, being numerous, they filled most of the higher-paid posts. At the same time a few specially chosen sons of commoners about the Court were sent to school abroad at the royal expense, and when, about 1890, education was systematized under a Department of State (with the aid of the late Sir Robert Morant), the annual selection of a considerable number of boys to

go abroad became a fixed institution. At first, nearly all these government-subsidized students went to England, but later, when politics seemed to demand a more cosmopolitan attitude, some were sent to Italy, Germany, U.S.A., and ultimately, as relations with the traditional enemy improved, to France. The lads, of a good intelligence and quick in the uptake, naturally compared the institutions with which they came in contact with those of their own country. In Chulalongkorn's time, being few in number, widely scattered and dominated by the princely element, they prudently kept to themselves such conclusions as they drew to the disadvantage of their rulers, and allowed them to wither sooner or later from want of nourishment; but during the next reign the supply of princely students began to run short, while that of commoners grew exceedingly, and societies were formed which drew the youths together, when, in the discussion of every conceivable subject, the condition of home affairs was certainly not forgotten. Things seemed to be going not too well with the fatherland, and intense arguments were held as to what ought to be done about it. Most clung to the time-honoured Despotism, advocating various, and some of them quite wonderful, reforms; but a few there were, and these chiefly students in France, who had convinced themselves with endless talk and a strong, indigestible diet of red literature, that their compatriots, living under a despotism, could not possibly be other than misgoverned, downtrodden, and enslaved; and for these enthusiasts nothing short of a clean sweep of Absolutism and the establishment of a very limited monarchy, or even a republic, would suffice.

These last, though on their return to Siam they dropped into the lesser Government offices for which they had been trained like the rest, kept alive their subversive ideas by secret meetings and propaganda, and awaited a time when some administrative or social crisis might give them a chance to try out those ideas in public. In 1925 things were so unsettled that their opportunity seemed to be approaching, but in the autumn of that year the King died, and the murky political atmosphere was cleared by the accession of his only surviving full brother, His Majesty King Prajapitok, whom God preserve.

Before his accession the new King had considered deeply the problems presented by Absolutism, and had arrived definitely at the conclusion that the magic inspiration of an exclusive omnipotence could not be relied on to surmount the difficulties and unravel the intricacies of government and administration in accordance with modern ideas. In fact, that whatever might have been the case in the simple days of

old, it was no longer advantageous, either for the people or the King, that the sole responsibility for the public welfare should rest on the shoulders of one individual. Ideas of a Constitution had occupied him, only to be set aside as impracticable until such time as the political darkness of the general public could be lightened. Something, however, he *could* do, and very soon after his accession he appointed a Supreme Council of five of his nearest relatives to assist him with their advice, and to share, in a measure, in the responsibilities of government. It has been observed by some, very shrewdly as I think, that this constituted an actual revolution, being, in fact, no less than a tacit abandonment of the principle of Absolutism. The idea of the Supreme Council gave general satisfaction, as all the princes appointed had held office under King Chulalongkorn, and, it was presumed, were imbued with the spirit of his genius.

And so the reign started under good auspices; the efficiency of the State services was speedily restored, a rigid public and private economy was enforced by the King's precept and example, and four excellent harvest years, following the accession, restored the finances, reanimated trade, and swelled the wad of currency-notes in the farmer's betel-box. Peace and contentment prevailed, and the nation rejoiced once more in a sovereign endowed with all the virtues.

But the King continued to ponder a Constitution, and how, with the material available—namely, a confident but inexperienced educated class and an ignorant, gullible peasantry—to construct a democratic system at all likely to assure the public welfare. At the end of five years, though nothing absolutely concrete had been evolved, he had made up his mind as to what he wanted: to grant a franchise and a parliament, with reservations enabling him to guide and control the first steps in democracy, relaxing his hold by degrees as the people gained political experience.

That was the situation when, in 1931, the depression that had been spreading through the world struck Siam with devastating force, and brought the period of well-being to a sudden end. The market for rice, tin, teak, and other exports broke disastrously, ready money vanished, and all sorts of trouble fell upon the people, who once more began to look askance at their rulers, more especially at the princely Supreme Council on whom, when the King's too frequent ill-health necessitated, the task of governing devolved. And soon the Council found itself in a maze of difficult problems, to solve which it explored many avenues, but all unfortunately in wrong directions. Ill-advised

new taxes which produced little money were imposed upon the wrong people to support the failing revenues, and this intensified the discontent. Efforts were made to manipulate commodity prices which failed conspicuously. Then England went off the gold standard, and though Siam had always been linked to sterling, the Supreme Council decided to stay on, and by that error of judgment dislocated foreign trade and compromised the Treasury reserves. In fact, the Supreme Council bungled things, and so lost the public confidence. His Majesty now took a strong line of his own. He remitted as far as possible the extra taxation that had fallen on the poorer classes, provided assistance for farmers, decreed an immediate return to sterling, and increased the burdens of the upper class, hitherto the most lightly taxed part of the community. He also ordered reductions of all official salaries, and, not for the first time, surrendered a large part of his own privy purse. These measures somewhat mitigated, but of course could not altogether banish, the ill-effects of the world depression. They failed to allay the general discontent.

Meanwhile the small confederacy of the revolutionary-minded began again to fish in these troubled waters. Meetings were held and schemes were concocted, and though, of course, the utmost secrecy was sworn to, it got about before long that some sort of an outbreak was impending. Indeed, on at least one occasion of public ceremonial early in 1932, the Bangkok populace went forth in the morning in full and fearful expectation that before nightfall some undefined but dreadful catastrophe would have overtaken the city.

But though no overt action took place, the conspirators were seriously at work. They numbered about thirty all told, two-thirds being junior civil officials and the rest military and naval officers. Their leaders were Luang Pradit Manodarm, a French-educated legal official, and Colonel Phaya Bahol, Assistant Inspector-General of the Army; the first a red communist and the second reddish but not a communist. They decided after long discussion to attempt a *coup-d'état* to establish a sort of a constitutional monarchy; not the kind of thing the King had in mind, but an arrangement by which the monarch should be bereft of all initiative, and all power vested in an Assembly, apparently free but actually packed, under cover of which they themselves would rule on ultra-democratic principles.

They were aware that the King was again at work upon his Constitution, that it had been drafted and only awaited the approval of the Supreme Council and other advisers to be put into effect. They

realized that this might conceivably happen at any moment, and that, if it did, their chance of securing power would be gone. That, in fact, a race was now on between the King and themselves, and that they must win it or go under.

Immediate action was necessary.

More than one of the military conspirators were officers of some standing, and these, moving with the utmost caution, gained the connivance of a few others, those responsible for the machine-gun, armoured-car, and tank sections of the Bangkok garrison, and for one or two war vessels. The cadets of the military college were easily won over to the adventure. With this backing Pradit and party prepared to take the country by surprise, and to forestall the King's constitution by their own much more drastic arrangement.

At the beginning of June the very efficient Chief of Police submitted to the Prince President of the Supreme Council, who was also Minister for the Interior, a complete list of the revolutionary plotters, and warned him that they were about to take action; but the prince gave no orders for interference, perhaps because, seeing that the list contained no more than thirty more or less inconspicuous names, he thought it might be as well to let them fire off their probably harmless squib and so convict themselves of treason beyond the possibility of doubt. The conspirators speedily became aware that their names were known, and that they remained at large only at the pleasure of the prince, and therefore that their personal safety now depended on the immediate execution and success of their coup.

An opportunity soon presented itself.

The King was recruiting his health at Hua-Hin, the popular seaside resort; the chief of the navy was at sea; the head of the army, with his staff, was inspecting the troops in the interior; and the officer commanding the Bangkok garrison was also absent.

On the evening of June 23 the Chief of Police reported to the President of the Council that he had positive information that an outbreak was arranged for the next day and that the first action of the plotters would be to secure the person of the prince himself. His Royal Highness again declined to move.

Very early next morning, acting under orders, apparently from headquarters, the machine-gun, armoured-car, and tank sections moved out and took position round the square outside the Throne Hall and on the roof of that imposing building, to take part, it was said, in the repulse of a sham aerial attack. At the same time the other troops of the garrison marched unarmed into the square and

formed up to witness the operations. When all were in place an individual stepped forward and, in the face of the astonished troops and onlookers, proclaimed the revolution, and added that the least sign of opposition would be the signal for a devastation by the machine-guns, armoured-cars, and tanks, of which the military cadets, now thoroughly enjoying themselves, had taken over control.

In complete silence a manifesto was read, full of slanderous matter against the entire royal family and its adherents; a cruel and rapacious class, it said, habitually battenning on the people, monopolizing the highest offices of the State and demanding from the masses an unqualified submission and obedience, which its effete members had none of them at any time done anything to deserve. The nation was called upon to cast out all princes and have done with the shameful subservience of the past; to unite in a great People's Party, and to entrust the government to that party, when they could count upon justice for all, no taxes, absolute freedom, and perpetual peace and happiness.

While this proclamation was being made, motor lorries containing armed men visited the houses of the most important princes and other high officials, who were surprised in their beds, subjected to considerable rudeness and humiliation, and brought to the Throne Hall, where they were incarcerated as hostages whose lives depended on the complete submission of the city to the revolution.

The coup had succeeded almost beyond hope! The people, paralyzed by the thought of the revered hostages, would make no movement. The country was for the moment at the feet of Pradit and his tiny gang. But no time was to be lost in consolidating the position. Two things were of vital importance. The King's acquiescence in the rôle prescribed for him must be obtained, and the continuity of the administration must be secured; for the revolutionaries knew that should the King fly or resist, or should the administration fall into chaos, their plans would be wrecked either by an infuriated population or by intervention to protect foreign interests, in which latter case the autonomy of the State might be lost. Armed parties were therefore sent without delay to keep all the State departments quiet and at work, and Pradit himself left in a warship to deal with the King at Hua-Hin.

The railways and telegraphs had been seized, but the King had heard of the outbreak from the Chief of the Air Force, who sent him a report, placed an aeroplane at his disposal and asked for orders. His Majesty was therefore prepared for his visitor, and when he arrived received him with absolute calm. Pradit brusquely explained the posi-

tion, presented copies of the manifesto and the provisional constitution, and demanded the King's recognition of the revolution and immediate return to Bangkok under his escort.

One may be permitted to admire the courage, dignity, and decision with which His Majesty met this most trying situation. He had but to send an order to his Air Force for the revolutionaries to receive short shrift, but he knew that such an order meant certain bloodshed and probably the deaths of his relatives and friends now in the Throne Hall, as well as the possible jeopardizing of foreign interests and intervention from outside. After deep reflection he intimated that, in the interests of the peace that must at all costs be preserved, he would accept the revolution as a *fait accompli*. That, having for long been anxious to place the government on a constitutional basis, he would not now refuse a Constitution because the movement for it had come from others than himself—but he added that the Constitution of which he would approve was not the provisional document now before him. His Majesty continued that he would go to Bangkok at his own time and in his usual manner, that he would take action to ensure peaceful conduct of the government in accordance with the provisional Constitution, and would then await the production of a Constitution to which he could conscientiously commit the nation, failing which production in reasonable time, he would reconsider his attitude with regard to the whole position.

With this rather cold comfort Pradit returned to Bangkok, whither the King proceeded later by train. Immediately afterwards, in a series of Decrees, the Supreme Council was abolished, all the ministers were removed from office, and princes were placed beyond politics, though not beyond the holding of official rank below that of minister. At the same time the public were informed that an Assembly of the People's Representatives, provided for in the Provisional Constitution and consisting of the revolutionaries and some new adherents, seventy members in all, would take over the government, while the administration would be conducted by a People's Executive Committee set up in place of the former Cabinet of ministers and responsible to the Assembly.

The peace was not broken, but the situation remained tense. To outward seeming the King was entirely in the hands of the revolutionaries, and the prospect of government by a group of irresponsible young hotheads, full of half-boiled socialist ideas, inspired no sort of confidence in the public or in those in charge of foreign interests.

But now Pradit took an important step. Without any warning he summoned before him three men whose reputations for intelligence and probity were of the highest amongst all classes, Siamese and foreign. A judge of the High Court, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and an ex-Minister of Education. Modest men who had consistently held aloof from the entanglements of politics. And these he persuaded, not without a hint of compulsion, to join him and assume the guidance of the administration in the interests of the public peace. Two were sworn of the People's Executive Committee and appointed Ministers of Finance and Foreign affairs respectively, the former being also made Chairman of the Committee. The third was made President of the Assembly of People's Representatives.

It was thought by some that this step betokened a change in Pradit's politics, but such was not the case, his opinions remaining communist as before. The move was forced upon him by the necessity of the moment, and it is to be supposed that he counted on the devotion of his followers, his powers of persuasion, and the greatness of the cause in which he implicitly believed, to maintain a safe majority in the Assembly for the realization of his objects.

The soothing effect on the public was marked, and soon the peace seemed assured, whereupon the captives in the Throne Hall were liberated on taking oath not to work against the revolution. The less important were released first, and in a few days none were left but the ex-President of the Supreme Council, who presented a special difficulty. This prince, the highest personage in the land after the King, had been roughly used and mortally offended at the moment of the *coup-d'état*, and now refused to make any sort of capitulation. It was manifestly impossible to set him free; it was equally impossible to keep him bound; his removal by death was not to be thought of. After much cogitation it was conveyed to him that if he cared to travel abroad, facilities would be provided for his departure. He expressed himself anxious to go, and left in a few days with his family.

The Assembly now got to work and, further to increase public confidence, four more men of high standing were invited to join the Government and accept positions, as Ministers of Defence, Justice, Agriculture, and the Interior. Also the President of the Assembly of People's Representatives was made Minister of Public Instruction (an immensely popular appointment). These Ministers were not members of the Executive Committee and had no votes in the Assembly. Nor was it, in fact, proposed that they should have a free hand in

their respective ministries, for Soviet committees were set up in the Departments to guard against autocratic tendencies, and the Chiefs soon found that their authority was to be merely nominal. But they were astute men who knew their countrymen. They sat tight, and had not long to wait before personal influence, diplomacy, and what not, secured them enough support in their committees to enable them to get things done more or less in accordance with their wishes, and to resist the rapacious nepotism and the often ridiculous demands of some of the young communist members.

For the next few months, while the Assembly of the People's Representatives was occupied with flatulent orations and Utopian resolutions concerning manufactured wrongs, a sub-committee of the People's Executive was at work on the draft of a National Constitution. And since, to ensure the royal acceptance, the King must be fully cognisant of every detail of the work, and because he could only deal with individuals who were not *persona ingrata*, the sub-committee had to consist chiefly of the newly co-opted statesmen, all of them at heart King's men; wherefore it naturally followed that, when the draft was completed, though according with the main principles of the Provisional Constitution, it resembled in many respects the draft His Majesty had been considering at the moment of the *coup-d'état*.

While the drafting was in progress there had been some heart-searching amongst the members of the Assembly. Age-old instincts of loyalty are not easy to discard, especially when popular opinion is all the other way. The advice, arguments, and warnings of the respected seniors in charge of ministries had had some effect. A few of the young members had begun to doubt their own efficiency, others to fear that they might after all be backing a loser, and most to feel that the indignities they had cast upon the Royal Family constituted, to say the least, an injudicious move. Therefore when, about four months after the *coup-d'état*, the Chairman of the People's Executive, as head of the sub-committee, presented his draft to the Assembly, there were few who cared to offer much opposition to its many points of difference from their Provisional Constitution. After all, their main objects had been secured; the powers of the throne, though wider than they had intended, were distinctly limited; a franchise and an elected Assembly, though safeguarded from the possibility of extremist gerrymandering, was assured; princes were removed from politics and the holding of ministerial office. So why worry about the rest? Moreover, the King, by his patience, tact, and diplomacy, had certainly averted public com-

motion and so helped the plotters out of what might have become a very tight place for them. In a word, the draft was adopted with acclamation and a wave of reviving sentiment for the Throne swept the extremists for the moment out of sight.

A few days later (and this must have cost Pradit something) the conspirators of June 24 appeared in a body before His Majesty, bearing flowers indicative of contrition, and publicly withdrew the remarks in their manifesto against the royal family, admitting their untruth and apologizing for the offence given thereby. The King, after impressing upon them the enormity of their error in pretending for a moment that his Royal House had ever been other than the good genius of Siam, was pleased to accept the apology as removing a formidable obstacle to the frank co-operation of all parties for the good of the State.

On December 10 His Majesty, surrounded by a glittering throng of princes, Foreign Representatives, and high civil and military officials, received the National Constitution from the Chief of the People's Executive Committee, signed it and sealed it while massed bands played the national anthem, and handed it to the President of the Assembly of the People's Representatives, who carried it out on a golden salver and held it up in the sight of a vast and cheering multitude.

The news of the giving of the Constitution was received in the provincial towns with fireworks and patriotic speeches from leading local officials, when the peasantry, though failing to understand exactly what it was all about, accepted it with loud cheers since it bore the royal signature.

It is impossible to discuss here the details of the Constitution. Suffice it to say that it is as simple, well-constructed, straightforward, and comprehensive as such a document can well be, and that it would not discredit the statesmen of any country. It is divided into four main parts, dealing with the King's Majesty, the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary; and clearly sets forth the powers, duties, and privileges of the monarch, the People, and those holding office under the State. The Assembly of the People's Representatives is renamed the National Assembly (a single chamber), while the People's Executive Committee becomes the State Council, remaining, as before, responsible to the Assembly. Freedom of opinion of all persons seeking election to the Assembly is assured. Pending a general election, the individuals who constituted the Assembly of the People's Representatives were

renominated to the National Assembly, and all Ministers became members of the State Council.

After the *coup-d'état* many young men of the official class, not all acting from purely altruistic motives, had rallied round Luang Pradit and his band, and a great People's Association had been started, at the meetings of which much hot air was released on the subjects of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," the "Sacred Rights of Man," and so forth. To many of these the National Constitution came as something of a cold douche, damping them down to distinctly more moderate views, while in the Assembly itself similar effects of the new order became apparent, some members forming themselves into a small moderate party, while others wobbled between left and right. In the State Council the moderates soon had a permanent majority. It may be supposed that Luang Pradit was not too pleased with this turn of affairs, for it seemed that he had risked his life and incurred the odium of disturbing the public peace, only to facilitate the realization of the King's conception of a Constitution. Whether or not he felt his position weakening was known only to himself, but he certainly stuck to his guns, and the country awaited his next move with curiosity and some anxiety. He gave no outward sign until about the middle of February, when, apparently to test the feeling of the Assembly, he let fall a remark during a debate which seemed to indicate that the expropriation of private property to the State was one of the planks in his platform. The remark was at once taken up, was forcefully objected to by a prominent member, and a serious quarrel broke out. The parties rallied round the principals, argument gave place to threats of violence, papers and other missiles flew about, and the sitting broke up in confusion.

The news of the split in the Assembly spread through the capital and was shortly followed by rumours of the wildest sort. It was said that the real revolution was only now beginning and that red communism was at hand with bloodshed and robbery. That the King had fled! That the King had been assassinated! That the northern provinces had broken away and declared independence! That the princes were preparing a counter-revolution! That Luang Pradit had been shot! And, to make matters worse, irresponsible parties of rough-mannered extremists invaded the houses of princes and nobles, demanded information concerning their property and drove their wives and households into a state of abject terror. People flocked to the banks to withdraw their money before it should be confiscated. Machine-guns

patrolled the boulevards by day and the clattering of cavalry squadrons disturbed the nights, and nobody could discover whether these forces were intended to protect or to terrify the public.

Phaya Bahol, the chief military ally of Pradit and hitherto his devoted supporter, had now become Commander-in-Chief of the army and was taking his duties very seriously. He did not sympathize with the more extreme views of his friend, but had always hoped that these would moderate with time and that a compromise might be arrived at between them. Now, however, he realized that this was not to be; that Pradit's mind was fixed, and that if not checked he would shortly be setting the country in a blaze. Bahol consulted with the Minister of Defence and the State Council, and the upshot was an order to all soldiers and sailors of all ranks to resign from the People's Association, and to take no further part in politics, but to stand prepared to guard the King and the State against any disturbance of the peace from whatever source it might threaten. This was a severe blow to Pradit, and it was shortly followed by another in the form of a similar order to all *civil* officials. Thus the People's Association was deprived of practically all its educated members and became for political purposes a thing of naught.

The orders did much to revive public confidence. The ugly rumours died down, the run on the banks stopped, and life returned almost to the normal.

The State Council, with its majority of moderates, was little affected by the trouble in the Assembly, but continued to function steadily, and, except for occasional fretful outbreaks from its extremist minority, conducted the affairs of the State much on the old lines. Pradit, who had never aspired to ministerial or other high official rank, sat in the Council on a back bench, brooding and silent.

But he still dominated the National Assembly, and, finding he could do nothing with the Council, decided that the Assembly should exercise its powers under the Constitution to force his communistic schemes upon the Council and the country. He had prepared a pamphlet setting forth what he called his Economic Plan, which included, amongst other things, proposals for the nationalization of land, labour and industry, collective farming, and the substitution of tickets or ration cards for money wages. He marshalled his supporters and (by threats of violence, it was said) secured the adhesion of some of the wobblers and frightened others away. But he could not coerce the small party of moderates, the more intellectual and clear-headed of his quondam

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associates, and when he presented his pamphlet to the house and demanded the adoption of his Plan, he was stolidly opposed by these last. Colonel Sông Suradet, an officer who had organized the military part of the *coup-d'état*, attacked the Plan with much vigour, saying that only when the State Council accepted it would his opposition cease. The pamphlet was formally sent to the Council for consideration and adoption, and in due course was by that body turned down.

Still convinced that his Plan was the only way to secure the welfare of Siam if only her people would see it, Pradit now submitted his pamphlet to the King, who returned it with a written criticism that remained private, but was understood to intimate that the Plan appeared to be almost pure communism, and that as Siam was entirely unfitted for such methods, there was no probability that anything of the kind would ever be adopted either by the people or their rulers.

Pradit's final resource was to remove the State Councillors (which the Assembly could do under the Constitution), and get others appointed more amenable to his wishes. He decided to propose a vote of no confidence, and, to ensure a successful issue, instructed his supporters to go *armed* to the Assembly. But unfortunately for his career as a statesman, he encountered at the entrance a strong military guard, posted there with orders to search all members before admitting them to the Chamber. Pistols were taken from the pockets of himself and all his friends, and he entered, disgraced and crestfallen, a butt for the humour of his opponents. He brought forward his motion, however, and demanded that, as provided in the Constitution, a vote should be taken upon it at the next sitting of the Assembly. But that sitting has not yet been held; for next morning there appeared a Royal Decree, countersigned by fourteen State Councillors, in which His Majesty declared the existence of a state of emergency, prorogued the Assembly, ordered immediate preparations for a general election, and, departing to this extent from the Constitution, added the control of the Legislature to the duties of the State Council.

On the same day a law was enacted making the advocacy of communism or any communistic doctrine an offence punishable with imprisonment for ten years, or with fine or with both.

From the fact that the machinery broke down so soon after the Constitution started, so to speak, on its trial trip, it must not too readily be inferred either that the King no longer favours a Constitution or that the people are unfitted to have one. For in connection with present developments two things of importance must be remembered:

the first that the Constitution is a compromise and not altogether as the King would have had it if he alone had made it, and the second that the Assembly was not composed of persons elected by the people, but consisted of the revolutionaries and their closest associates, nominated originally by themselves and accepted as part of the compromise, and therefore was not in the true sense a constitutional Assembly at all.

The Royal Decree dissolving the Assembly was dated the first of April—an invidious date, perhaps, for us—but for the Siamese a day of good augury, as being their New Year's Day. The state of emergency continues, and will do so until the new Assembly meets after the general election, which will be held in October.

Meanwhile the accuracy of Luang Pradit's discernment in the selection of ministers is shown by the efficiency of the State Council, which, having carried on in spite of severe handicap all through the unsettled period, is now conducting the government to the general satisfaction. In its temporary capacity of Legislature, the Council has quite recently adopted several measures calculated to ease the burdens of the masses, prominent among which are the successful issue of an internal loan of ten million baht (£900,000), the first ever floated in Siam, and three enactments adjusting taxation to the shoulders of those best able to bear it.

The general election provides the next problem to be faced and speculation is rife concerning it. The electoral law, which did not contemplate an election for a long time to come, restricts the franchise to those who have attained to a given standard of education, and provides that for the first ten years half the Assembly shall be elected and half nominated, by whom is not quite clear; and a standard of education is also prescribed for candidates. But since all princes and all officials are now debarred from politics, it does not readily appear whence either electors or candidates are to come, educated people outside those categories being few. But forces are at work on the problem, and doubtless a satisfactory solution will be found. It *must* be found, and it *must* be satisfactory if the Constitution is to stand, for the Assembly, as the repository of all power, is the keystone of the whole constitutional edifice.

The Assembly having for the moment vanished, it remained to deal with its extremist members. There was a feeling that no good purpose could be served in proceeding against these men, and, in fact, that it was doubtful if any grounds could be found for doing so. The *coup-d'état* had been condoned and the advocacy of communistic principles

was not a criminal offence at the time when members were engaged upon it. After some thought it was decided that the party might be left to its own devices now that it had been bereft of the power to make propaganda, but that, as a precautionary measure, it should be deprived of its leader. It was put to Luang Pradit that in the interests of all concerned it would be well for him to withdraw for a time and, by further study abroad, to endeavour to modify his political creed into something that might make him of practical use to the community in the, perhaps not too distant, future. The Luang considered the suggestion, accepted it, and retired with his family to France, his spiritual home, the Council voting him an income sufficient for his support.

Not many days ago there appeared in one of our comic papers (I think it was *The Times*), a playfully witty article likening Siam's method of ridding herself of political undesirables to Dogberry's advice to the Watch. That method certainly may have its humorous aspect for some of us, but that does not make it, in this instance, any the less a fitting method. For, unlike Dogberry's "vagrom person," Luang Pradit is not even presumably a knave. So far as appears, he is a man of quite average honesty, afflicted unfortunately with a loud-buzzing and insistent bee in his bonnet, and it may be said that he has earned some consideration from his country, though not in the way he intended, by giving it a shaking up that has done it all the good in the world.

Owing directly to his action, the King stands to-day before his people in a light that, but for this trouble, might never have illuminated him. A light that reveals His Majesty brave, strong, liberal-minded, and a finished diplomat: solely devoted to the interests of his country: sacrificing his health, and prepared to give his life to secure the welfare of his subjects: the worthy son of a great father.

Those who have watched and in some degree assisted the evolution of Siam during the last twenty or thirty years (and by your kind invitation there are a few of us gathered here this afternoon) cannot but regret the disappearance from the scene of those stalwart princes of the Royal Family with whom we were associated in the public service, and who did so much for their country's interests: Devawongse, Chakrabongse, Rabi, Chira, and others who died in harness; Narit, Damrong, Boribat, Purachatr, Devawongse II., Dhani, swept from their posts by recent events. The names of these men will long reverberate in Siam, and the fact that it is now possible to supply at call teams of their pupils, "luk sit," or the offspring of their wisdom, as the Siamese say,

capable of continuing their work, under different conditions, perhaps, but to the same end, supplies at once the monument to their labours and a bright hope for the future of their country.

Lord LLOYD, in thanking the Lecturer for his extraordinarily interesting account of one of the most remarkable revolutions in history, pointed out that a monarchy is infinitely the best form of government, provided the King is honestly working for the good of his people, just and tolerant, understanding, strong, and patient.

Lord LAMINGTON closed the lecture with a short reminiscence of Siam and its charms when he visited it thirty years ago.

ANNIVERSARY LECTURE, JUNE 21, 1933

The Right Hon. Lord Lloyd in the Chair.

AIR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By THE RIGHT HON. SIR PHILIP SASSOON, BART.,
G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P.

(Under-Secretary of State for Air.)

IT is said that it is an ill wind that blows no one any good. Loss of voice has deprived Lord Londonderry, the Secretary of State for Air, for the time at any rate, of the opportunity, to which I know that he was greatly looking forward, of addressing this distinguished Society upon a subject to which he is peculiarly fitted to do justice. It has also robbed you of the pleasure and advantage of listening to what I am sure would have been a most interesting and instructive address. But, at the same time, the misfortune of my right hon. friend has conferred on me a great and unexpected honour.

I am very conscious that there must be many among you who possess a far more intimate knowledge of general conditions in the Middle East than I do. It is all the greater privilege to be permitted to address you upon a particular factor there, with which my official duties give me some acquaintance—a factor which in the course of the last decade or so has been exercising an increasing influence in that part of the world and must, for reasons which I shall endeavour to explain, continue to do so.

I have only to add, by way of further preface and apology, that, as I am sure you will realize, I have had none too much time to prepare an address worthy of the occasion and my theme. If, however, what I have to say shows obvious signs of hasty preparation, as I fear it must, I am sure that I can count upon your sympathy and indulgence.

Air power, like sea power, has two aspects, the commercial and the military. If the history of sea power throughout the ages is any guide,

it would appear that these two aspects are complementary, and that neither can exist for long without the other. There is a striking passage in Mahan in which he illustrates the axiom that sea power is dependent upon both commerce and naval strength.

Discussing the position of England and France at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession (1713), he says: "The sea power of England, therefore, was not merely in the great navy, with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; France had had such a navy in 1688, and it shrivelled away like a leaf in fire. Neither was it in a prosperous commerce alone; a few years after the date at which we have arrived the commerce of France took on fair proportions; but the first blast of war swept it off the seas as the navy of Cromwell had once swept that of Holland. *It was in the union of the two*, carefully fostered, that England made the gain of sea power over and beyond all other States."

I appreciate that argument based upon analogy has its dangers. Yet statesmen in all ages have had to rely, in part at any rate, upon historical analogy as a foundation for future policy. That new form of power which has come into being as a result of man's conquest of the air cannot afford to ignore the lessons of past experience in the development and maintenance of sea power. There are too many resemblances between the two.

Any review of air power in the Middle East must concern itself, therefore, both with commercial air routes and with military aviation in that most interesting area of the world's surface. Until the time comes when the police definitely and finally replace the Defence Services in the realm of international affairs, commercial aviation in the Middle East, as elsewhere, cannot be relied upon to prosper permanently unless it is supported by military air forces sufficient to maintain, if challenged, the control of the air. On the other hand, in the absence of a prosperous air-borne commerce, in which expression I include mails, passenger traffic, and goods traffic, military air forces must lack one of their most important functions.

No one travelling to the Middle East and India by air can fail to observe the close connection and close sympathy which exist between civil and military aviation in that part of the world. No one can fail to be impressed by the fact that civil aviation is still in its very earliest stages of development, that a vast future lies before it, and that as it grows its dependence upon some system of military air control must become steadily greater.

I want to show you, if I can, something of what has been accom-

plished so far, and in doing so make some suggestion of what may reasonably be expected to happen in the not distant future. Let us suppose that we are ourselves starting for an air tour of the Middle East and have left Southampton in some great machine, some commercial development of our largest flying boat, on a long sea hop to Gibraltar. That ultimately we shall develop commercial machines capable of flying out to India and Australia by a truly all-red route is, I think, certain.

From Gibraltar it will be another easy step to Malta, which already is the headquarters of the British Air Forces in the Mediterranean.

The Seaplane Station will have developed, without great difficulty, adequate facilities for the flying boats of the commercial line, and a regular and frequent service will enable those passengers who have the time and inclination to stop long enough to make acquaintance with that most interesting town of Valetta, so long the rampart between the West and the East, the Cross and Crescent.

Following this route, our next stopping-place is likely to be Alexandria, or at any rate its close neighbourhood, where connection will be made with the African air route to the Cape.

The headquarters of the Middle East Command of the Royal Air Force are now at Cairo. The military and commercial importance of Egypt as the natural point of juncture of our main trunk air routes to the Eastern and African portions of the Empire, as well as by reason of the Suez Canal, is such that it is difficult to visualize the time when we shall not have to maintain military air forces in this area. They are at the present moment, and are likely to be for many years to come, as necessary for the maintenance of Egyptian independence as for the safeguarding of our communications with South Africa and the Far East. British military aeroplanes are a familiar enough sight there, and, for the reasons given, are likely to remain so. The climate of Northern Egypt is almost ideal for training, and the oldest and latest efforts of man's creative genius are brought into daily contrast.

As we are touring for our own pleasure and instruction, we may be forgiven if we combine a brief inspection of the duties of the British air units in the Sudan with a glimpse from a new aspect at the familiar wonders of Egypt. What one loses in the sense of size and mass is made up for by the clearness with which is brought out the geometrical exactness of design of these ancient monuments. I need not dwell upon the advantage to the mere sightseer of being able to range in the course of a few hours from the Temple of Osiris to Philæ, where one can compare the work of the old engineers of Ancient Egypt with that of our

own engineers of to-day, and from Aswan and Philæ to the Great Rock Temple at Abu Simbel. Going south from Wadi Halfa, and crossing the great eastward bend of the Nile between that stopping-place and Abu Hamed, we get a first taste of desert flying, and have time to realize what operations in such country would be like on foot before we reach the vivid contrast which British energy has created at Khartum.

Khartum is the administrative centre of the Sudan, and the British squadron stationed there assists in the policing of a district four times the size of England. The type of country varies greatly, from open sandy scrub in the more northern areas, the haunt of the giraffe, gazelle, and wildebeeste, to the rivers and vast marshes of the south, where elephants may be found bathing in the pools and movement on foot is sometimes quite impossible for anything but elephants. Other wide areas are covered by dense forests, and have been opened up, to some extent, by quite creditable roads.

We have had in years not long past considerable trouble in this part of the Sudan with the Nuers, a spindle-legged, primitive people clad chiefly in a long spear or a big club, and with a natural addiction to murder. When they indulge in their natural proclivities at the expense of white officials or of peaceful native traders and cultivators, it is the obvious duty of the policing power to punish the murderers. The difficulty is to catch them, and, until the aeroplane was brought in to help, catching them took many months and considerable expenditure of life and money.

Our journey towards the sources of the Nile will have been worth while if it has done no more than bring home to us that the use of our power for police purposes is not confined to the problems of 'Iraq or the North-West Frontier. In many and diverse parts of the Empire there is need for such work.

So far I have emphasized chiefly, but I hope not inexcusably, the sightseeing possibilities of air travel. It is a side of commercial air transport which is bound to have increasing vogue, and Egypt and the Egyptian Air Services are likely to be among the first to reap substantial monetary benefit from it.

Now we will set out from Cairo upon the other branch of the main trunk route. It is true that for various reasons the connection has been worked in recent years in various ways. But, with the greater range of aeroplanes, many of those reasons will disappear, and we may shape the course of our futuristic journey from Cairo to Gaza with confidence that we shall not be straying far from the route which will ultimately be followed when the all-red air route to the East is a reality.

There will, no doubt, be a branch tourist line to

Jerusalem, and we ourselves are justified in viewing from the air something of the new prosperity which has sprung up in Palestine since we took over the mandate and Great Britain gave its sure guarantee that those who planted new orange groves would be allowed themselves to gather their fruit.

Or we may turn to the new enterprises which security from desert raiders has permitted to spring up along the shores of the Dead Sea: the potash works which are turning the Dead Sea into a perennial source of fertility and life, or the Rutenberg Works, where electricity is produced.

It took a Roman legion, more or less, along her borders to secure Palestine in the old days. I do not propose to suggest what force of ground troops, unsupported by aircraft, it would take to-day. But a squadron of aeroplanes and one section of armoured cars centred at Amman suffice to give the necessary backing to the locally raised ground forces who carry out the normal duties of frontier control.

Amman, on the borders of Transjordan, is one of those natural strategic positions which has kept its importance through recorded history. So long as we are responsible for Palestine we are bound to hold Transjordan in adequate force. There is no way in which it can be held so securely, or so cheaply, both in blood and money, as by air power.

We shall get an idea of the type of country east of Amman as we follow the desert track from Amman to Baghdad. When I flew to Baghdad last, 'Iraq was still a country for the defence of which we were wholly responsible. Changing conditions have lessened our direct responsibilities in this respect, but 'Iraq remains an essential link in the air route to India, and provision has had to be made for keeping it open to us. The presence of the Royal Air Force in 'Iraq to-day is directed (in the words of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty, 1930) to "the maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty" and to the discharge of the obligations of mutual assistance which, under that Treaty, exist between the British Government and the Government of 'Iraq. Yet it is not too much to say that 'Iraq might not be to-day a member of the League of Nations were it not for the work done by the Royal Air Force since it took over the defence of 'Iraq from the Army in 1921.

The saving effected by turning over the responsibility for defence from the Army to the Air Force has been enormous. The Army's proposal for the employment of air forces visualized the continued maintenance of a large ground force of all arms with six Air Force squadrons in addition.

This would have cost 10 millions annually to start with, itself a reduction of over 50 per cent. on the actual cost for the previous year, with a prospect of ultimate reduction to between 7 and 8 millions. The Air Staff proposed the utilization of air power as the primary instrument of control. It estimated that eight squadrons with four Imperial battalions in reserve would be sufficient, and that the cost would be 4 millions annually at first, with a hope of reduction later. The Air Ministry scheme was adopted. The last Imperial battalion left 'Iraq in 1928; the number of squadrons in the interior has been reduced from eight to four, and the total annual cost to-day is about 1½ millions. The facts and figures speak for themselves, and I may add that the duties of the Royal Air Force in 'Iraq have not been confined to preserving internal peace. In 1922-23, and again in 1924, they had to deal with Turkish columns invading 'Iraq through the northern passes, when the Royal Air Force had to operate over difficult country, known to many of you.

Again, in 1924 and in the winter of 1927-28 on the southern frontier the Royal Air Force had to deal with a series of continuous incursions on a large scale by tribesmen from Nejd. The frontier affected was several hundred miles long and consisted chiefly of barren deserts alternating with large stretches of soft sand, where even armoured cars could not operate. It was only the possession and the use of aeroplanes which enabled these attacks from outside to be met successfully and at comparatively little cost. The enormous reduction in cost which follows from the adoption of air control in such countries as these is due to two factors. The first is the fact that in the aeroplane we possess weapon superiority. Weapon superiority, which was the cause of our victory at Agincourt and of our successes in the East from the middle of the eighteenth century until the latter part of the nineteenth century, has to-day largely deserted us, apart from the aeroplane. The traffic in modern arms throughout the East has in recent years steadily been equipping active and virile tribesmen with weapons of precision. Before the arrival of the aeroplane the gradual loss of weapon superiority on the North-West Frontier and elsewhere was telling its tale in steadily increasing casualties among British ground forces. The aeroplane has given us back weapon superiority in these regions, if not for all time, at least for many years to come. It may not, even to-day, be impossible for tribesmen to acquire an aeroplane or two. It is impossible for them to maintain machines in fighting condition. The aeroplane has also overcome the second factor which makes ground operation in these

countries so costly—namely, the nature of the terrain. Only the aeroplane can do this.

We can best illustrate this by continuing our temporarily abandoned journey to the country where Sheikh Mahmud defied the 'Iraqi armies a year or more ago. His district was in the neighbourhood of Sulaimaniya, in Southern Kurdistan, near the borders of Persia. The 'Iraqi control system consisted of military posts garrisoned by the 'Iraqi troops. They were scattered through the hilly and inaccessible country. The posts themselves were in some danger.

Sheikh Mahmud and his friends were operating in country which was their home, and every advantage was on their side. They were men used to the mountains and with all the vigour and enterprise of mountaineers. Had it not been for the assistance of the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Mahmud would still be in his mountain home; but the Air Force brought him in.

Then there were the not dissimilar Barzan operations of last year in Northern 'Iraq, to which I had occasion to refer in my Estimates Speech in the House of Commons. Again the local forces tried and failed, and the Royal Air Force was called in.

Operations were conducted from Mosul and Erbil over mountains rising up to 10,000 feet, where roads were either non-existent altogether or were represented by some rough tracks. Imagine the opportunities for ambush and surprise when small columns of ground forces have to thrust their way through this sort of country and convey themselves and their supplies, it may be under fire, across rough wooden bridges. The question of supplies was met by aeroplanes, which carried many tons of food, blankets, and ammunition to the 'Iraqi posts, dropping them by parachute. Proclamations calling on the tribesmen to surrender were broadcast from the air, and the net result of the intervention of air power was that peace was once more restored to a sorely troubled district.

I need not emphasize the importance of 'Iraq as a link in our Imperial air communications, and I need scarcely point out that that link can only be secure if orderly government is maintained there. 'Iraq is, however, something more than a mere stage on an air route. I can foresee the time, and I do not think that I need look far ahead, when the air tourist traffic to Egypt will extend to Mesopotamia and the relics of ancient civilizations that are to be found there. On our visit to Kurdistan we would have passed over Erbil, said to be the oldest inhabited city in the world. As we resume our journey along the main East route we are likely to see the Arch of Ctesiphon and to be able to

compare the crumbled relics of Babylon with the holy city of Nadjaf, set off by its golden mosque glinting in the sun, and to pay our respects from the air to Mr. Leonard Woolley at Ur. From Basrah and its date palms the route to the East now lies along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. The route along the Persian coast, which I followed on my first journey to India, has been abandoned as the result of difficulties with the Persian Government. The change of route takes us over the island of Bahrein, famous for its pearls, and so along the Trucial coast, whence from the tip of the Oman Peninsula a course is set for Gwadar in Baluchistan, and thence to Karachi and India. If we were to take a more southerly course across the Oman Peninsula it would bring us to Muscat, a most interesting town, with solid memories of the efforts of Portuguese traders and conquerors still evident in its striking castle. We should then have to strike across the sea to the still wilder Makran coast, which at length brings us to Karachi and India.

India, of course, lies outside the area of the Middle East Command; but the similarity of conditions on the North-West Frontier of India, and also at Aden, makes it desirable to include a reference to both these areas where air control has been in successful operation, even though to get to Aden we have to hark back for many hundreds of miles to the south-west. The operations conducted by the Royal Air Force at Aden in the spring of 1928 are, indeed, a peculiarly happy example of the use and effectiveness of air power. Ever since 1919 the Imam of Yemen had steadily encroached on the protectorate territory, until he had advanced within fifty miles of Aden itself and captured two sheikhs who were under British protection. His Majesty's Government had been defied. Friendly Arabs whom we were pledged to protect had been maltreated. Plans worked out for a ground punitive expedition showed that practically a whole division would be required with a transport of 7,000 camels over roads of this nature, at a cost of from 6 to 10 millions.

The Royal Air Force undertook the defence of Aden in 1928 with one squadron of twelve machines. After due warning, air operations against the Imam were commenced on February 21 and continued till March 25, when the Imam asked for a truce and surrendered the two captured sheikhs.

One of the conditions on which the truce was granted was that the Imam should evacuate Dhala. He failed to do so.

Again warning was given. It was disregarded. Intensive air action was recommenced. His border garrisons and certain military garrisons in the interior of Yemen were attacked. The action of the Royal Air Force roused the spirit of the tribesmen in the occupied

territory, and in June the long-exiled Imam of Dhala reoccupied his town. By the end of August the operations of these twelve machines were successfully terminated by the clearing of the protectorate. They had cost some £8,500. *There has been no serious trouble since.*

Now to return to India. The history of the North-West Frontier of India during the past ten years teaches the same lesson. Air power is most simply and obviously exercised when it is directed against armed formations, as in the instances I have given. But it can be effectively employed also to deal with villages or tribes who are in open rebellion against the Government. It has the immense advantage that it can be brought into action promptly, thereby in many cases preventing the development of worse trouble. It has been employed in this way on the North-West Frontier, as well as in direct attack, with marked success. Air power has enabled constant observation to be kept by air patrols over country which can be reached in no other way. Only by the construction of roads at enormous expense, under cover of adequate military forces, can country of this type be brought under control otherwise than by the use of air power. Even where roads can be made, they are often not good roads. Moreover, there is a limit to the making of roads of any kind in such country. Further, the making of roads takes time. *The aeroplane is content with the way of the eagle* and can go wherever it is needed, whenever it is wanted.

The aeroplane is the only kind of policeman to which no sort of country is any effective bar; but it cannot perform its police duties effectively unless it is allowed to bomb. There are a number of points about bombing for police purposes which do not appear to be generally understood. In the first place, modern bombing is not indiscriminate. You have already seen that, when circumstances require, a particular house or building can be picked out and hit. *Indirect gun-fire, even with air observation, would find it difficult to equal this precision.* Secondly, except when aeroplanes are employed against armed forces, bombing is not designed to cause casualties, nor does it ordinarily do so. The village is usually deserted long before bombing begins. Ample warning is always given, and the tribesmen have ample time to clear out and take their portable belongings with them; and they do so. There is no slaughter of women and children, and seldom any casualties at all, for the tribesmen who would turn out and fight if ground forces were employed realize that they have no effective answer to the aeroplane and simply withdraw to some place of safety, such as caves, until the bombing is over. Bombing for police purposes gets its effects in two

ways. It causes a certain amount of material loss; not so much as might be expected, for the buildings destroyed are usually of simple construction—and generally very insanitary. It *does* cause a good deal of inconvenience and general annoyance. It prevents the tribesmen from following their usual way of life, and they do not like it. But it goes no further than that. The local residents do not appear to treat the destruction of their homes with undue seriousness. A fine or imprisonment would probably be regarded as a more serious matter. All the evidence shows that bombing does not arouse that specially bitter hatred and resentment which it has sometimes been said to cause. The testimony of the political officers on this point is definite and overwhelming. In the words of one political officer, the use of the aeroplane has done an enormous amount towards increasing the intimate knowledge of the local political officer regarding his tribes, and towards removing the risk of inflicting indiscriminate punishment on the innocent and guilty alike.

The result of the use of air control upon the general outlook of the tribesmen of the North-West Frontier is summed up in the reply by the Government of India to a special inquiry sent from home upon the subject. The reply was as follows: "Of personal rancour over the air operations there has been none. . . . The attitude of the Jirgas was friendly, and for officers of the Royal Air Force the Mahsuds showed a marked respect based on admiration of the work they do." This emphatic expression of opinion has been since confirmed by later inquiries, and it can be asserted with confidence and truth that air action against the tribes is at once humane, effective, and economical.

There is yet another side to the question. I have dwelt a good deal upon the remarkable economy of money effected by the use of air power. The economy of lives is no less marked. Many urge that, in the general interests of world peace, the use of aircraft and air bombing for police air purposes should be abandoned. They should reflect that, if they have their way, *they will in the years to come condemn to certain death many hundreds and thousands of their own countrymen* whose lives would be lost in maintaining the peace of the Empire by the old and costly method of ground expeditions. Air power has been employed now for police purposes on the North-West Frontier and elsewhere for a period long enough for statistical comparison to be made with operations carried out in the old style with ground forces. There were, for example, operations in Aden in 1903 and 1904 involving forty-seven British casualties in the first year and seventy-five in the second. Our

casualties in the air operations of 1928, which I have described, were confined to one officer killed, a flying casualty. There was trouble in the Mohmand country, requiring punitive action of a comparable nature in 1908, and again in 1927. In the former case 16,200 men were employed, exclusive of followers. We lost 52 killed, 205 wounded, and there were heavy casualties from cholera. In 1927 we employed thirty-two aeroplanes and our casualties were nil. I may add, in parenthesis, that the enemy losses in 1908 were some 450 killed, apart from an unknown number of wounded, and the cost of expedition was £143,000. In 1927 the Mohmand losses were some 30 to 40 killed, and the cost to us was £1,703. Again, there were operations in Waziristan in 1917 and 1925. Over 20,000 men were employed by us in the first of these, and our losses were 221 killed, 275 wounded, and 626 missing. In 1925 we employed three squadrons and a flight of aircraft, and the operations were brought to a successful conclusion with only two casualties.

It would be easy to multiply instances from almost any quarter, but perhaps I have said enough to establish my point. I will only add that since 1920 no year has passed without numerous air operations of a police or punitive character, in the majority of which the action of the air forces was the decisive factor. Our total R.A.F. casualties in all operations in those thirteen years are twelve killed and fourteen wounded.

The peace of the Empire's frontiers must be maintained whether general disarmament among the civilized nations is realized or not. We are dealing on the frontiers with peoples who do not understand peace conferences, but do understand firm rule. Further, the air routes of the Empire must be maintained and extended, and the air commerce of the Empire fostered and expanded. The experience of mankind has not yet shown how this can be done unless the military air power of the Empire is established on a footing commensurate with the needs of the Empire's commerce. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN, in thanking the lecturer, made special mention of the beautiful slides, recalling country all of which he knew so well. At the same time he begged leave to question in their entirety the Under-Secretary of State for Air's conclusions, for he did not think any tribal country could be satisfactorily occupied without ground troops. As an example, the very question of Dhala rose to his mind. But this was not

the time to enter into any long discussion; he would only thank Sir Philip for his most interesting, comprehensive, and vivid lecture, which should bring to members the extraordinarily varied country of the Middle East as seen from the air.

With regard to the two points raised by Lord Lloyd in his concluding remarks, Sir Philip Sassoon has written as follows:

"Lord Lloyd, in his concluding remarks, raised the following two points of criticism to which I had no opportunity of replying:

(a) The Imam of the Yemen is still in occupation of certain villages in the Aden Protectorate;

(b) That I had overstated my case with regard to the effectiveness of air action against the Imam's forces in so far as I had not referred to the difficulty of maintaining the results of air action without subsequent occupation for which only ground forces are suitable;

and I suggest that in any record which you may publish my answers to these criticisms should also be recorded.

With regard to (a), it is quite true that the Imam still occupies certain Audhali territory on the Beidha Plateau which we regard as Protectorate territory, but the evacuation of these villages was not included in the terms offered to the Imam, with which he complied in full.

As regards (b), I cannot believe that Lord Lloyd's remarks were intended to convey that he himself would advocate a military occupation of the hinterland in general and these Audhali villages in particular, as a very cursory examination of the cost involved would show it to be prohibitive. As I have stated above, occupation is really quite unnecessary for the purpose of maintaining the favourable situation produced by the correct use of air power. It is true that when a military expedition withdraws the trouble it was sent to cure will often break out afresh, but air power can be so quickly and easily reapplied in case of need that it makes quite possible effective control without any form of occupation."

ANNIVERSARY MEETING

THE Thirty-Second Anniversary Meeting was held on June 22, Sir Harcourt Butler in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN called on Sir Percy Sykes for his report.

The HON. SECRETARY said :

We, the Hon. Secretaries, beg to report that during the past year twenty-six meetings have been held. To commence our survey in the Far East, Professor MacNair dealt with American Far Eastern policy, General Willoughby with Jehol, and Mr. Tsurumi with Manchuria. In Central Asia, Miss Cable, M. Petro, and Miss Sylvia Saunders gave us fresh information, while M. Tchokaieff dealt with Russian Turkistan. Mr. Goldman lectured on the Turk-Sib Railway and the new aspect of Turkistan. Farther south Mr. French described a tour round Afghanistan. In Persia Dr. Upham Pope dealt with recent archæological finds, while Dr. Giuseppi described his quest for plants. We had two lectures on air routes to India by Colonel Burchall and Squadron Leader Bentley, the latter dealing especially with the Persian Gulf. To-day Sir Philip Sassoon will take as his theme for our Anniversary Lecture "Air Power in the Middle East." In Southern Asia, Mr. Graham lectured on the new Constitution in Siam. We also had lectures on the Indian village by Mr. Brayne and on Indian art by Mr. Vakil, while Colonel Gompertz lectured on Ladakh. To continue our survey westwards, Mr. Hamilton described the construction of the Rowanduz road and Captain Mumford lectured on Kurds, Assyrians, and 'Iraq.

To come to Turkey, Mr. Philip Graves lectured on the Straits and Sir Telford Waugh on "Nine Years of Republic in Turkey." To celebrate the centenary of the Anti-Slavery Society, Mr. Eldon Rutter described slavery in Arabia. Mr. Garle spoke on the political aspect of social hygiene in the Eastern Mediterranean. To conclude, Commander Williams dealt with Tunisia and Mr. Hudson with the spice trade of Rome, and I myself lectured on Cyrus the Great, Darius, Xerxes, and their contact with Hellas. Altogether we have every reason to thank our lecturers for a truly remarkable series which has covered so many parts of Africa.

The Dinner Club has also given rise to several most interesting discussions, and constitutes a special feature of the Society. We are much indebted to the energy and tact of Colonel Newcombe and the members of the Dinner Committee.

The Journal during the past year has contained original articles of considerable importance, while the reviews have maintained their high standard. It is of interest to note that a nearly complete set of the Journal recently fetched £45.

The Annual Dinner was one of exceptional interest, as Sir Samuel Hoare, H.M.'s Secretary of State for India, took advantage of it to make an interesting pronouncement as to a change of procedure in connection with the Indian Conference.

The Council regrets the death of eighteen members. The list includes Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, Lord Sydenham, General Sir Webb Gilman, Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith, Captain Bland, Mr. Treacher Collins, Colonel Carroll, General Douglas, Mrs. Cope, Mirza Eissa Khan Fayz, Sir Sassoon Eskell, Mr. W. M. Fraser, Archdeacon Garland, Captain Wilson Haffenden, Captain W. H. C. Jones, Major S. G. C. Murray, Sir Logie Watson.

We have also lost by resignation 54 members. On the other hand, the Society at a period of very deep depression has elected no fewer than 135 new members. We have consequently the pleasure of reporting a net increase of 60, thus making a total of 1,454 members. While on this subject we would remind members who are in arrears with their subscriptions that they would save Miss Kennedy and themselves much trouble by signing bankers' orders for their subscriptions. The Society works on a narrow margin, and prompt payments are essential.

We now come to the question of the crest and coat-of-arms. It seemed only right and proper to the Council that this Society, having been created a Royal Society, should show its appreciation of the honour conferred upon it in a suitable manner. We addressed our members on the subject of raising £80 to pay the fee of the Royal College of Herald, and have much pleasure in announcing that over £60 have already been subscribed. Our grateful thanks are due to Countess Roberts for permission to use the noble *Ovis Poli* that is now the crest of the Society. We are also grateful to Mr. Omar Ramsden, who is preparing the necessary designs and working drawings. He recently informed me that they had been passed by *Rouge Croix* and had been put up to *Garter*.

In conclusion, we especially thank our reviewers for their valuable

services. We equally thank our staff. Miss Kennedy, whose energy, resourcefulness, and enthusiasm excite our admiration, has been ably seconded by Miss Gregson. The Royal Central Asian Society is prospering, and it is for its members to find more and more recruits and thereby to increase its influence and usefulness.

The accounts were read by Sir EDWARD PENTON and passed.

The CHAIRMAN said Lord Lloyd had kindly undertaken the duty of Chairman for the next session, and Sir Edward Penton would stand for re-election as Honorary Treasurer, and then put the following changes in the Council to the meeting: In accordance with Rule 16, Lord Lamington and Sir Michael O'Dwyer (Vice-Presidents) retired and were not eligible for re-election. Their places were filled by Air-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and Sir Nigel Davidson, who retired in order of seniority from the Council. Mr. Rose retired from the Council in accordance with Rule 25, and Sir Henry Dobbs, Mr. Philip Graves, and Mr. G. E. Hubbard were proposed to fill the three vacancies. These names were put to the meeting and passed.

The CHAIRMAN thanked the retiring members for all they had done for the Society and said that the Council had elected Lord Lamington, late President of the Persia Society, now incorporated in the Royal Central Asian Society, as an Honorary Vice-President.

The CHAIRMAN continued: It only remains for me to make a few observations of a general character. I am very sorry that Lord Lloyd could not attend this afternoon and address you—he would have done it so very much more efficiently—but, as you know, he is a very busy man, and I think we are fortunate in having secured him to remain as Chairman of the Council for the ensuing year.

The reports which we have heard from Sir Percy Sykes and Sir Edward Penton are, I think, very satisfactory considering the difficulties of the time in which we are living. Considering all things, I think we may say that the Society is in a reasonably flourishing condition. There certainly never was a time in the world's history when Central Asian questions are so interesting as they are to-day. We have in the Far East the questions of China and Japan, we have developments in Russia and Persia, and tribal risings in Central Asia and Persia, and all over we have interesting developments. I heard in the City to-day that there has been another revolution in Siam. What its character is I do not know, but I do not suppose it is very serious.

There is every reason, therefore, why we should continue to promote the activities of this Society. In doing so we are helped very much by

our Honorary Secretaries, Sir Percy Sykes and Mr. Gull. I think we have already said what we owe to Sir Edward Penton as Honorary Treasurer and to the staff, who are always ready to help everyone who wants help and to promote the interests of this Society and to do all they can for its welfare.

Accounts and Balance Sheet, p. 496.

BROADCASTING IN PALESTINE

PALESTINE is one of the few countries under civilized administration which possess no system of wireless broadcasting. The license for a receiver costs 10s., and there are now nearly 1,000 such listeners, for the most part Jews, who receive the programmes of Central and South-Eastern Europe without serious difficulty, at least in the plains. The Bucharest station is perhaps the most accessible of all. There is, however, no local transmitting station in Palestine, and the plant which was temporarily installed at Tel Aviv during the Exhibition is no longer in operation. The Jewish promoter of that venture has been seeking permission to restore it for scientific and experimental purposes, without a promise of permanence, but it will be almost impossible for any government, whatever the nominal terms of his agreement, to close it down without protests and possible compensation if a broader scheme should ever be approved on a national basis.

Yet the advantages of broadcasting for such a country as Palestine scarcely need to be explained in detail. Illiteracy is still widespread, and there are only slightly over 200 rural schools for 850 Arab villages. The Jewish settlements, now nearly 150 in number, are provided with schools at the cost of the community itself, together with a grant from Government, and illiteracy is not a problem among the Jews. The case of the Arabs is different. Illiteracy is still common in the villages, and Arab rural women are with rare exceptions illiterate. Girls' schools are confined almost entirely to the towns. Village life, moreover, is not merely backward and simple; it is also depressing and dull, and the boredom which prevails in the evenings, when work is over but artificial lighting is inadequate for intelligent amusements at home, is a contributory cause of both criminal and immoral behaviour. (It is not suggested that the Arab race as a whole is criminal or immoral.) Lord Salisbury was entirely right when, in pre-cinema days, he recommended a circus as the remedy for the troubles of the English village. After a day's work few of us demand such evening occupation as calls for strenuous mental effort; yet we prefer even this to nothing at all, and are glad to accept a mixture of the instructive and the amusing. I am confident that an Arabic programme, delivered to the Arab villages, and still more a Hebrew

programme for the Jewish settlements, would be welcomed with delight throughout Palestine if it combined news and instruction, cultural matter and entertainment. Very little is at present done to interest the villager during his leisure, largely because the ground to be covered is wide and no cheap method of approaching him has been discovered. A touring lecturer, working under the Department of Education at the cost of an international body, has for two years now been actively employed on rural "uplift," but a single individual, even in a country of pocket-handkerchief size, can effect comparatively little, whereas if it were practicable to talk to *all* the villages *every* evening the results would be greater and much more lasting.

Questions of dialect do not arise, both the Arabic and the Hebrew of Palestine being uniform. English would not be needed, since the Empire programme will meet this demand. The rural Germans are too few to be considered, and can similarly supply themselves from overseas.

Private Arab or Jewish transmitting stations will create a very real danger, since no precautions taken by Government will prevent the constant misuse or misinterpretation of a programme or statement issued on behalf of a single community. The only safe and efficient system is that of a Palestine Broadcasting Company containing an adequate official element, with a joint Board of Managers or Advisory Committee, which will do its best—it will not be easy—to distribute impartial news and a fairly balanced programme alternatively in the two languages. It would be tempting to install a high-powered transmitter on the Judæan Hills which would address all the Arabic-speaking lands; but political objections might be raised, and in any case the transmitter alone would cost upward of £50,000. A smaller plant of moderate power for Palestine alone is more feasible, though there is nothing to prevent the nomad Bedouin of Transjordan or even further east from using a portable receiving set and listening in a desert camp. The Egyptian Government has recently given a monopoly contract to a Marconi Company, which is to be directed by a Board including official representatives, and will be required to produce two-thirds of its programme in Arabic. No attempt is, however, being made to cater specially for the rural listener, and the Egyptian fellah is being so rapidly urbanized that urban matter may appeal more readily to him than to his Palestine brother. The cost of the proposed installation in Egypt is about £25,000, and an annual sum of £2,500 is estimated to cover the office and maintenance

charges, though not the programme. The Company does not guarantee reception in Palestine, and is indeed expecting to need relaying arrangements even in Alexandria.

The bulk of the Arab peasants in Palestine will not afford the expense of buying a private receiver, though the annual licence at 10s. might not be beyond their means. The obvious method of approaching them is therefore that of Soviet Russia, where a communal receiver is set up in each school, factory, or village meeting house, and wired extensions may be carried from it to private houses for a small charge. There are 1,000 villages and colonies in Palestine. If 500 of these could be induced to pay a fee of (say) £5 per annum, a receiver could be installed in the school or meeting house—not in a headman's house, since faction is a prevalent evil, and a minority might be excluded from attendance—and since the schools have two or more rooms with a connecting door, the men could listen in one room and the women in the second. The women will thus be enabled to attend without undue publicity. Many women will no doubt soon clamour for a wired extension to the home and men too would appreciate so cheap a luxury. The communal receiver should be in charge of the school-master or a responsible villager and should be so constructed that the switch will be covered by a small door, of which this guardian will retain the key. The set should be fixed to receive on one wave-length only (that of the Palestine transmitter) in order to obviate the danger of meddling by unskilled enthusiasts. In return for the £5 fee, which should be levied on the whole village by means of a local council (where such exists) or elsewhere through a co-operative society, the community should be entitled to the free maintenance of its receiver and the free replacement of batteries by a touring staff of mechanics. It might be necessary to allow a free period also of six months after first installation, in order to let the people become familiar with the luxury of radio. I do not think many of them would surrender it when the period came to an end. The cost of each receiver might be £20, and if half of the annual fee were applied to payment of the touring staff and to the cost of batteries, etc.— $£500 \times £2 \text{ 10s.} = £1,250$, which should suffice for these purposes—the remainder of the fee would pay off the capital cost of the receiving set in eight or nine years. No surplus from this source would pass to the Broadcasting Company until the receiver had been paid for. There would, on the other hand, be fees at 10s. for wired extensions, and it would be advisable and possible to provide a separate programme for the school children by day;

a slightly larger fee, perhaps £1, might be paid by the Education Department. Income under these two heads, including Jewish schools and Jewish rural subscribers to a wired extension, might well amount to £500. If this will pay for the rural programme, the total cost to Government will be that of the transmitter—i.e., as in Egypt, £25,000 initial and £2,500 running costs. This does not seem to be an excessive expenditure for the benefits received.

The cost of the rural programme should in reality be trifling. There will be a daily news bulletin, prepared by the existing Press Bureau in Arabic and Hebrew. Announcements will also be made by the Government on matters of importance, allaying excitement or issuing directions as to action to be taken for the public health (epidemic diseases, etc.), welfare (locusts, import duties, special trains to festivals) or safety (riots, raids). It is obvious that such a means of communicating with the public would have been invaluable in 1929. The officers of those departments which deal principally with rural affairs will have much to say, and will say it with far greater success than by touring round the country to every village. Agriculture, education, co-operation, health will all be discussed at regular hours on each day or in each week, and when dealing with a village audience speakers need not be shy of repeating themselves. Each address will be brief in order to avoid the exhaustion of the peasant mind, and there may be very many cases in which a wise lecturer, after an interval devoted to song or entertainment (not provided by the lecturer, who is refreshing himself otherwise), will proceed to give exactly the same address a second time. The peasant will welcome it, and will clear his head of doubts as to what the lecturer really did say the first time. Entertainment may possibly be secured from Cairo when the Cairo transmitter is in good order. Egypt has a larger supply of artists than Palestine, and a financial agreement with Cairo could no doubt be made. Hebrew programmes must be found in Jerusalem, but there are a number of organizations anxious to edify the Jewish community, and Jewish music in Jerusalem is of good quality. The gramophone will also be used, and the Blattnerphone for matter once recorded which will stand repetition. With the exception of entertainment, the rural programme will cost very little, and £500 should cover it until receipts increase. I have not discussed urban broadcasting or an urban programme because it is the villages of Palestine which first need attention, and the danger which I foresee is that when once an urban demand has been created the rural programme will be relegated to

the second place. This ought not to occur; if it does, it will indicate a grave error of judgment. Rural broadcasting is the only effective means of teaching illiterates without great expense, and the only means whatever of reaching Arab women. I do not claim that my figures as here given are exact, but they tend to show that for a capital outlay of perhaps £25,000 and a small annual sum, perhaps £2,500, the Palestine Government could perform a big task of adult education, and could at the same time avoid the danger of partisan transmitters which will do far more harm than good.

C. F. STRICKLAND.

SARACENIC HERALDRY*

IN *Saracenic Heraldry* Dr. L. A. Mayer, the well-known librarian and keeper of records, Department of Antiquities, Government of Palestine, and Lecturer in Muslim Art and Archæology in the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, has made a very valuable contribution to the literature of heraldry in general, and has provided what will no doubt become the standard work on the heraldry of the East.

The object of the author, as set out in the Preface, is to provide "a fully documented armorial roll of Saracenic sultans, princes, and knights, designed to meet the frequently expressed wish of students of Muslim Archæology for a work of that description. If the list of holders of Ayyubid and Mamluk blazons given in the relevant chapters comes any nearer to being complete than any hitherto published, and if the inscriptions are correctly read, and the knights, so far as identified, properly identified, then," the author says, "the book will have served its purpose. Since the owners and custodians of Muslim objects with blazons, as well as European heraldists who are interested in Saracenic heraldry, by far outnumber the small group of Muslim archæologists, the following pages have been written for their guidance. It is for their convenience, too, that translations and explanations have been added which would be superfluous in a work intended for Arabists."

Thus, in a few words, Dr. Mayer sets out the object of his labours, and those who are fortunate enough to become possessors of (or are able to borrow) his book will agree that he has succeeded in that object. The greater part of the volume (224 out of 302 pp.) is, necessarily, taken up by the Armorial Roll, which contains some 250 names together with short accounts of the lives of their bearers, their heraldic blazons, and a list of buildings or articles upon which their arms are found, with the inscriptions in the original, and translations for the benefit of readers who are not, as the author says, Arabists. In this connection it is of interest to note that a representative of one of those mentioned in the Armorial Roll is now Mayor of Jerusalem. His ancestor, Amir Muhammad en-Nashashibi al-Khazindar, was Governor of Jerusalem in the days of Laythay.

* *Saracenic Heraldry*. By Dr. L. A. Mayer. Clarendon Press. 84s.

On page 3 of the Introduction the author raises an interesting question as to whether original grants of arms, which were apparently made in every case, as one would naturally expect, by the Sultan as the fount of honour (though, under the Circassians, amirs were allowed a free choice), were made to individuals as a special distinction, or to noblemen as a class. He makes another interesting point, in referring to the relatively minor importance attached to armorial bearings in the East, when he draws attention to the absence of any necessity for warriors to wear distinguishing marks, as in Europe, where their faces were hidden by visors, since helmets with visors were not worn in the East—hence also, of course, the entire absence of crests.

Also he points out that armorial bearings were not necessarily hereditary, as they apparently descended only through those of the family who adopted a military career, an example of the more than probable inheritance of arms being given in connection with Mūsā B. Aragtāy. Interesting examples are also given in order to prove that, though blazons emblematical of their office were granted to officials who became amirs, they retained their original blazons when promoted to other offices. Examples of such emblems as the Cup, the Pen Box, the Sword, the Bow, and Polo Sticks (borne by Almalik, Aydamur Az-Zardkāsh, with polo balls, and others) are interesting; as are also thirteenth-century examples of the use of the Fesse. The inclusion of the "Trousers of Nobility" among the charges is of interest; but perhaps, to a European herald, the most interesting charge is the Fleur-de-lis, which appears as early as 1186-1216 A.D. The four illustrations on Plate XIX. are very interesting examples of quite perfect fleurs-de-lis, No. 1 being particularly beautiful, though included by the author with a great deal of hesitation as being unaccompanied by any inscription. This shield was that of Nūr-ad-dīn Mahmūd b. Zanki, the atābak, over the mihrāb of his madrasah in Damascus, built between 1154 and 1173 A.D. Though Fox Davies states that this charge owes its origin to the lily of France, other authorities question that statement, some maintaining that it represents a lance or partisan head. M. de Menestrier says that it is undoubtedly an iris ("Le véritable Art de Blason"), and this seems the most probable. Dr. Mayer is of the opinion that the true heraldic form of the fleur-de-lis (with three separated leaves) is of Saracenic origin, being found as a form of decoration long before the days of armoury in Europe or in Asia. He does not, however, mention that it is found also in the

ancient hieroglyphics of Upper Egypt, where, in the Zodiac Room of the temple of Denderah, were to be seen three floral sceptres, the third of which had, at the top, two steps, from the smaller of which sprang an exact fleur-de-lis of the strictest Bourbon type (Guy Cadogan Rothery, in the *Ancestor*, Vol. 2). But the controversy regarding the fleur-de-lis has already filled many pages, not to say volumes.

On pp. 29 *et seq.* an important note is to be found on Composite Blazons. Apparently, as time went on and the number of office bearers increased, the simple charges of the early centuries became exhausted, while the small range of colours used in Muslim heraldry was not sufficient to afford differentiation, and religion discouraged pictorial representation, so that recourse was had to the combination of the simple emblems used—as many as five or six devices being used on the same blazon.

Another important question is raised on pp. 34 *et seq.* with regard to the Inscribed Shield, or shield merely bearing script. While no doubt of very great interest, the author himself introduces them “with the greatest reserve” and without calling them blazons. It would be interesting to know whether any of those who used these inscribed shields made use of any other heraldic device; for it appears that, if they did not, these inscribed shields are entitled to a place in Saracenic heraldry, but not otherwise. The author’s reference to the use of letters or words in European heraldry seems hardly pertinent, as such cases are of extreme rarity and have no regular system such as Dr. Mayer traces with regard to the Saracenic shields.

It is greatly to be wished that the author may find time in the future to follow up the line of research which he has slightly indicated in a note to the Introduction—namely, the tracing of historical information on the subject of Eastern heraldry in the legends about the Oriental origin of certain European coats of arms. While such a quest might possibly add considerably to the knowledge already possessed with regard to Saracenic heraldry, it could not fail to be of the greatest interest to all European heralds who trace the rise and regulation of heraldry to the time of the Crusades and to the influence of Saracenic example. The subject has been already dealt with by Max Prinnet “de l’origine orientale des armoires européennes,” but is by no means exhausted.

A. MEAD.

THE TWENTY-SIX COMMISSARS

In September, 1918, a tragic event of great political importance occurred in far-away Trans-Caspia. This was the murder of Stepan Shaumian and his companions. Shaumian had been appointed by Lenin to supreme charge of Russian Central Asia. He and all the officials who accompanied him were shot near Krasnovodsk by Trans-Caspian Mensheviks. The deed, which caused the greatest indignation throughout Russia, and was ascribed to British perfidy, passed almost unnoticed in England, where it was overshadowed by the tremendous events nearer home during those closing months of the war.

A timely article, under the above heading, by Major-General Sir W. Malleeson, in the *Fortnightly Review* for March, tells the true facts of an episode which has been so much misrepresented in support of anti-British propaganda.

General Malleeson's story is briefly as follows:

It was only when the British Trades Union delegation visited Baku in 1924, and saw the monument to the Twenty-Six Commissars, that the matter was brought before the British public in the delegation's report. The members of the delegation state that they were profoundly shocked to learn that the massacre of these twenty-six unarmed prisoners was attributed to instructions given by British officers, that on returning to England the delegation made careful enquiries and found that the evidence entirely exonerated the British forces and their officers. They further express the opinion that the matter ought to be definitely cleared up by a joint enquiry.

General Malleeson goes on to say that no such enquiry has ever been held, nor can it well be held now, for the Bolsheviks have themselves destroyed practically everyone connected with the case. He then proceeds to relate the facts as known to him. He begins by explaining how it came about that a handful of British and Indian troops were fighting in remote Trans-Caspia in 1918-1919.

Germany, in 1918, was nearly at the end of her resources, and urgently needed petroleum and cotton for explosives. With the double purpose of replenishing her supplies and of striking at the

British through India, their most vulnerable point, Germany planned an eastward movement in co-operation with the Turks. A Turkish army under General Nuri was sent into the Caucasus with a view to the capture of Baku and its oilfields and a subsequent descent upon Trans-Caspia to obtain access to the great accumulation of cotton in Russian Central Asia. Behind Nuri Pasha's army was a German force under General Kress von Kressenstein. The way was prepared by intensive propaganda in Central Asia, Persia, Afghanistan, and Northern India. Early in 1918 counter-measures were taken by the British and Indian Governments. From Mesopotamia a small mixed force was sent under General Dunsterville to Northern Persia to endeavour to occupy and hold Baku; the results are well known. In case this plan should fail, a second move was decided upon. This was to send a British Military Mission to Russian Central Asia, the objects being (1) to organize local resistance to a Turco-German advance; (2) to secure the Central Asian Railway so as to deny its use to the enemy; (3) to get control of all shipping on the Caspian Sea; (4) to intercept enemy agents; and (5) to counter enemy propaganda.

In June, 1918, after delays which imperilled the success of this Mission, General Malleon was put in charge. His parting instructions were to the effect that the situation in Afghanistan was extremely critical, and that the appearance of a Turco-German force east of the Caspian would certainly precipitate a "holy war" against the British by the Afghans and frontier tribes, and that the Central Asian Railway and the shipping in the Caspian must be secured at all costs. Traveling via Baluchistan and East Persia, General Malleon arrived at Meshed in July, 1918. He was quite alone, with neither staff nor troops.

The situation in Central Asia was a peculiar one. The revolution of 1917 had spread throughout the vast area, and Bolsheviks were supreme from the Caspian to the Pamirs and northward beyond Tashkent. They were, however, isolated from European Russia, for the North Caucasus was at this time the rallying ground of Tsarist generals, and communications across the Caspian were very insecure. The country between Tashkent and Orenburg, together with a large portion of Semirichia, was in the hands of anti-Bolshevik Cossacks, while further north on the Siberian Railway Admiral Kolchak with Russo-Czechoslovakian forces was advancing towards the Urals.

The Bolshevik leaders in Central Asia treated the population with such brutality that there were many risings. These were put down

with ruthless ferocity. Chief among the leaders was one Kolesov. His troops consisted mainly of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, who had the option of fighting for the Bolsheviks or starving. In June, 1918, Kolesov attempted a mobilization of Russians in Trans-Caspia for operations against the Orenburg Cossacks. He met with determined resistance, and not having sufficient force to deal with it returned to Tashkent. From that centre he despatched one Frolov, an even more bloodthirsty person than himself, with orders to "liquidate" the situation in and around Askabad. His method seems to have been indiscriminate massacre.

About the time of General Malleon's arrival in Meshed, Frolov, rendered confident by the ease with which he had worked his will upon Askabad, went with a small escort to do the same at Kizil Arvat further along the line towards Krasnovodsk. Kizil Arvat had a considerable Russian population, as it is the place of the workshops of the Central Asian Railway. The railway workmen, however, rendered desperate, shot Frolov and all his party. Then, realizing that they had burnt their boats, the railwaymen decided to dare everything in the hope of suppressing the Bolshevik tyranny throughout Central Asia. After cutting the telegraph wires they went eastward in trains, and, continually adding to their numbers, proceeded to wipe out every Bolshevik official between the Caspian and the Oxus. They even crossed that river, but were then held up by superior numbers, and, ill-armed and undisciplined, had to retreat. It was when they had been driven back to the Merv district that the provisional Government of Trans-Caspia appealed to General Malleon for help. The Government was a body composed almost entirely of the rank and file of railway workers. The President was an engine driver named Fountikov, the other members guards, firemen, and signalmen. Almost the only non-railwayman was the Foreign Secretary, Zimen, a school-master, chosen for the post "because he could not only read and write, but possessed a frock coat and tall hat"! This Government, if it could maintain itself with British assistance, should be able to afford some of the facilities which it was the object of the Mission to obtain. The Mission had no troops at its disposal, but there were in Meshed some Indian cavalry and infantry belonging to the East Persia Cordon which could be made available if necessary. There were, however, other very grave considerations. Lending armed assistance to the Trans-Caspian Provisional Government meant not only committing Great Britain to hostilities with the Bolsheviks in Central Asia, but

also compromising the neutrality of Persia by using Meshed as a base of operations. General Malleon therefore put the whole matter to Simla by urgent telegram. Serious though it was to embark on hostilities with the Bolsheviks in Central Asia with a mere handful of troops which would be operating nearly 2,000 miles from the nearest base at Quetta, the risk could hardly be avoided seeing that the Bolsheviks, who in Europe had ceased to offer any resistance to the Germans, could not be expected to oppose a Turco-German advance via Baku and Krasnovodsk into Central Asia. General Malleon was therefore authorized to support the Provisional Government, and was told that, being on the spot, he must act as he thought best. The only immediate help that could be given was to send a machine gun detachment to aid the Trans-Caspian forces in their resistance to the Bolshevik advance beyond Merv. The detachment did splendid service in delaying the enemy, but were compelled by superior force to retire with the rest. A very gallant regiment of Indian infantry, the 19th Punjab, next held up the Bolshevik advance at some distance further back in the direction of Askabad, and when reinforced by part of the 28th Indian Cavalry they decisively defeated the Bolsheviks, driving them back in full flight almost to the Oxus.

Meanwhile the Trans-Caspian Government sent envoys to negotiate with General Malleon at Meshed, and in August, 1918, a formal treaty was concluded by which the latter undertook to assist the Trans-Caspian Government with troops and munitions provided that they did their part to their utmost ability. Financial aid was also to be given on certain conditions. In return they promised, when required, to withdraw all locomotives and rolling stock from Krasnovodsk, to allow the harbour there to be mined, water and fuel stations along the railway to be destroyed, bridges rendered impassable, and rails removed. A British engineer surveyed the line with a view to denying its use to an enemy.

General Dunsterville had been compelled to evacuate Baku, and the Turks were in occupation with a German force in support. However, an additional safeguard was provided by detachments of the Royal Navy, who, for the first time in history, were afloat on the Caspian Sea.

"This brings us to the question of the Twenty-Six Commissars, some of them men of the first importance, who had been sent from Moscow to 'liquidate' the situation in the Caucasus and then in Central Asia. Caught in the Turkish advance, and being unable to

escape through the Northern Caucasus owing to the presence of Denikin and his white troops, they took ship to Krasnovodsk. Their arrival was announced by wireless one morning in September. This news was obviously of the first importance. Here was a parcel of the biggest agitators in Russia suddenly decanted on our shores. With a fickle and unstable population it was quite possible that they would soon turn the country Bolshevik once more, and then what would happen to all our plans for stopping an enemy advance? What, too, would be the fate of our troops fighting on the Merv front, tied to a railway line traversing a desert, with no other means of transport or supply, with a Bolshevik enemy in front and another one behind? It was clear that the arrival of such a party in Askabad must be prevented at all costs, since it would certainly precipitate a crisis of some sort. Either they would swing the populace to their side and exterminate our friends the railwaymen, or the latter, to save their ~~own lives~~, would slaughter the Twenty-Six Commissars. . . .

"The British Mission did not desire that these Commissars should enter or remain in Trans-Caspia. But (though probably their previous excesses qualified them for such a fate) we had no desire to see them murdered. In fact they were much more valuable to us alive. Apart from getting them out of Trans-Caspia as speedily as possible we needed them badly as hostages. There were British and Allied subjects in Samarkand and Tashkent about whose fate we were anxious. . . . It was decided, therefore, to insist that the twenty-six should be handed over to us forthwith and that we should send them to India, where they would be in safe custody."

General Malleon's only means of communication with the Trans-Caspian Government, other than through the envoy, Dokov, was by telegraphing to his liaison officer in Askabad. The use of the telegraph at Meshed was divided between Russians, British, and Persians for stated hours. The British from noon to 2 p.m., the Russians earlier. When, therefore, Dokov and his colleague, Count Dorer, came to see General Malleon at the usual hour, 11 a.m., they had already heard from Askabad all about the Twenty-Six Commissars. They agreed about the undesirability of their presence in Trans-Caspia, but when General Malleon asked that they should be handed over to the British alive they demurred. Finally General Malleon had to insist, threatening the withdrawal of British assistance if they did not consent. They replied that they would urge their Government to accede, but that probably it was too late, as the twenty-

six was not likely to be alive. "It is a question," they said, "of their lives or ours. If they get to Askabad they will raise a revolution against us, and then all of us, not a mere twenty-six, but many hundreds, will be slaughtered; still, if you insist, we will endeavour to get them handed over." At noon one of the Mission staff went to the telegraph office to communicate with the liaison officer in Askabad. After relating what Dokov and Dorer had said, he added that General Malleon particularly desired that the Commissars should be handed over to him, and that he would send an escort to Askabad for them. He was told that "if not too late" he was to insist upon this. The liaison officer, a keen, hard-working officer and fluent Russian speaker, instead of being content to communicate his instructions verbally, furnished an exact copy of them, and the words "if not too late," natural enough after all the envoys had said, remained on record and constitute the basis of the charge that the British Mission instigated the murder of the Commissars.

As a matter of fact it was too late, and nothing the Mission could have done would have been in time to save them. Krasnovodsk, where at that time there was no British representative, was ruled by a Russian named Kuhn, strong and ruthless, on whose life attempts had been made by Bolsheviks more than once. It is not known whether he received instructions from the Askabad Government about the Commissars, but it is quite likely that he would have made away with them without any such instructions. As it was he put them on a train, ostensibly for Askabad, but a few miles out from Krasnovodsk the victims were made to alight. They were all shot and buried in the desert alongside the railway track. The whole matter was reported to Simla, and General Malleon was told to express to the authorities in Askabad the horror and detestation with which the Government of India viewed this cold-blooded crime. Political murders by Bolsheviks were so common in Russia at this time that there is little reason for surprise that the Askabad Government did not take the same view. The incident might even have passed almost unnoticed but for two factors: the importance of some of the victims, and the opportunity it afforded the Bolsheviks of exciting anti-British feeling.

General Malleon then quotes from *A History of the Russian Revolution*, by a man named Chaikin. The book was published after all the people principally concerned were dead. Chaikin arrived in Askabad from Tashkent in February, 1919, four months after the

murders. He posed to General Malleon as a Social Revolutionary fleeing from the Bolsheviks. Fountikov, detected in embezzlement on a large scale, had been deposed and imprisoned. He is alleged to have said: "On September 20, 1918, it became known to me that to prevent the escape of the Baku Commissars who had arrived in Krasnovodsk measures had been taken by Drushkin (Chief of Police), in agreement with T. J. (the British liaison officer), that these twenty-six men should be taken from Krasnovodsk to India through Meshed. Drushkin, T. J., and Kourilev all spoke to me about this matter. Drushkin, explaining the move, told me that the British Mission considered that it was absolutely necessary that they should take over the twenty-six. As a matter of fact they were not sent to Meshed, but on their way were shot by their guard of Russians and Turkomans, by agreement between Drushkin, T. J., and Kourilev. I also, before the fact, was informed of this, but found it impossible to prevent the action in view of the extraordinary situation and the prior conduct of Frolov towards our workmen. The representative of the British Mission in Askabad spoke to me personally before the shooting about the necessity of its taking place, and after the affair expressed his satisfaction that the execution had been carried out in accordance with the wishes of the British Mission."

A similar admission was said to have been obtained from Zimen. Chaikin further wrote: "Drushkin was the faithful hound, bought by British gold, in all this system of intrigue, deceit, and bloody crimes; his dearest colleague was the representative of the British Mission in Askabad, T. J., but the highest responsible official, receiving his instructions direct from London, was General Malleon. This person, even before the war, was the organizer of the British Secret Service on the Indian frontier and in Afghanistan and had an immense influence on the policy of England in relation to Turkistan and Persia. He was a master in his particular line of work."

As regards the importance of the victims, Chaikin writes:

"The Twenty-Six Commissars were, according to both their friends and enemies, the flower of eastern Bolshevism, its true ideal and intellectual centre. Their disappearance was a matter of supreme political importance for the whole of Central Asia. The blow was struck according to a true but merciless plan by able analysts of the Eastern problem, determined to demoralize and destroy the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, Persia, and Turkistan."

And again:

"Of a truth I do not risk being guilty of exaggeration when I state that the destruction of the whole of the Moscow Soviet of National Commissars, with Lenin, Trotsky, Lunacharsky, and Chicherin at the head, could not have caused greater consternation to the proletariat of Leningrad and Moscow than the carrying away to British India—as was at first believed—of Shaumian, Djeparidze, Fioletov, and the others did to the Baku and Trans-Caspian workers."

The weak point about all Chaikin's statements is that they only appeared after almost all the principal actors were dead. Moreover, General Malleon was in Askabad during the whole of Chaikin's visit there. He gave him one interview, and was quite ready to give him more. He never mentioned the subject of the Commissars. General Malleon would willingly have held an enquiry then, when most of those mentioned were still available. As it is, very few remain. Dokov disappeared into the North Caucasus. Kuhn escaped in disguise from Krasnovodsk in the spring of 1919. Fountikov, Dorer, and Zimen were all shot by the Bolsheviks during 1920 in Askabad on the strength, presumably, of Chaikin's "revelations." Drushkin died at Batum in 1919. T. J. left the Service after the war and cannot be traced. In 1921 the Bolsheviks, not satisfied that sufficient punishment had been meted out, tried forty-two other persons in Krasnovodsk, of whom forty-one were shot. The Commissars may thus be said to have been amply avenged.

The question of the responsibility for the murders remains unsolved. It is impossible to say whether Kuhn acted on his own initiative or was complying with instructions from Askabad. One thing is clear, and that is that the British Mission tried to save the Commissars. The silence of the British Government may be partly due to their knowledge that all over Russia similar cases were of daily occurrence. While all must join with the Trades Union delegation in condemnation of these cold-blooded murders, there is this much to be said for the trade-unionists of Trans-Caspia: they had been through a whole series of revolutions and counter-revolutions, all of a sanguinary character. They also had seen their relatives and friends murdered in cold blood, their women ravished, their property looted. At last they became temporarily in the ascendant shortly before Shaumian and his colleagues appeared on the scene. It is true that the Commissars were unarmed, in the sense that they had been deprived of firearms. But they possessed more terrifying weapons in the powers of the skilled agitator whereby mobs are swayed and fresh

Bolshevik risings brought about. Believing as they did that the only safe Bolsheviks are dead ones, the railwaymen killed them. They were swayed by none of the ordinary motives for murder—greed, lust, or revenge. Their motive was overwhelming fear, for which they had good grounds.

'IRAQ: A NOTE

By E. B. MAIN

(Former Editor of *The Times* of Mesopotamia and the *Baghdad Times*)

THE visit (in June) of King Faisal of 'Iraq to London as the guest of King George is an event of some considerable importance, for Baghdad is swiftly coming back to its old importance as the junction of the great roads to the East. Indeed, Britain's interest in 'Iraq is largely, almost entirely, dictated by the necessity of keeping her Indian communications open. Now that flying has become a normal means of communication (and even of troop movements), now that motor transport has brought the journey across the Syrian Desert within a day's compass, the Suez route has lost a certain amount of its value to Britain. At the same time, and by the same token, the ancient land routes between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, *via* Baghdad, are recovering their ancient importance, which they enjoyed before the opening up of the Cape route to India.

Until the British troops in the war captured Palestine and Mesopotamia, while Faisal and Lawrence were liberating the Arabs, the whole of the area from the Levant to the Persian frontier and from the highlands of Anatolia to the Arabian Sea was (more or less) Turkish. It is true that the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula were under other influences (chiefly British), and it is also true that Arab Nationalist movements had been making considerable headway (until the calling up of the Arab officers of the Ottoman reserve in 1914 broke up the "home rule" parties and societies). But in general the Middle East, as far as the Persian Gulf, was "Turkey in Asia." All that the Ottoman wanted was his quota of troops and (more important) his 10 per cent. tax on produce and on foreign trade. These assured, the Government in Constantinople had little further interest in the more distant and backward parts of its Asiatic dominions. Its *valis*, or governors, had one, and one only, further interest—namely, to increase their personal fortunes at the expense of the inhabitants.

The growing force of Nationalism in the Arab countries had probably escaped notice in Washington. The United States, on the other hand, had long displayed a strong sentimental interest in the Armenians

—the unheroic Christian community that could never resist stabbing its Ottoman overlords in the back whenever their hands were full. Whatever the impelling motive, the future of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine (with Transjordan) early exercised the thoughts of Woodrow Wilson, who not only insisted on their ultimate freedom, but invented the "mandate" as a device to ensure their tutelage in statecraft until they were ready for liberty. In Syria, French influence (a relic from the times of the Crusades) was dominant, although there it was British troops and Lawrence's Arabs that won through to Damascus in October, 1918. In Palestine there were numerous foreign interests, mainly of religious origin. British interest in the Holy Land had steadily grown during the war, due to the vital necessity of keeping open the road to the East by the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. In Mesopotamia British influence was strong in Baghdad and in Basrah, which dominated the head of the Persian Gulf and therefore covered the British-controlled Anglo-Persian oilfields, and safeguarded, through the century-old operations of the British Navy in the Gulf, the flanks of the sea route to India.

Long before Wilson's Fourteen Points were heard of, Britain and France had been taking counsel together. Before Turkey entered the war, Kitchener, the British War Minister, had ascertained that the Arabs would be prepared to rise against the Turks, Britain guaranteeing that no international intervention would take place in Arabia. Old Hussain, the Sherif of Mecca (and father of King Faisal of 'Iraq), later demanded the recognition of an Arab kingdom, to include Syria. Britain demurred and excluded from the old man's visionary scheme a stretch of territory as being partly non-Arab, and stipulating for the continuance of British influence in the provinces of Baghdad and Basrah. The fact that Hussain's Arabs, under Faisal and Lawrence, continued to prosecute their "war" with vigour has been taken as proving that Hussain was satisfied with and accepted the British modifications of his scheme; perhaps it denoted the sherifian satisfaction with the golden sovereigns which Lawrence poured into Arabia.

By 1916 France and Britain had negotiated the agreement known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, by which the two Powers agreed in principle on the setting up of an independent Arab state, or confederation, in Syria and Mesopotamia (except the areas—Syria with Mosul, and Baghdad and Basrah—which Hussain had been told would be excluded and which were clearly earmarked for the two Powers concerned). The chaotic state of the views that prevailed in those days was then reflected

in General Maude's proclamation on entering Baghdad in March, 1917, less than a year later. Although by the Sykes-Picot agreement Baghdad and Basrah were to come definitely within the British sphere, Maude's proclamation said that Baghdad was to be Arab, Basrah alone falling to Britain. It was not until January, 1918, that Wilson laid down his Fourteen Points. The President's ideas then developed, until after the war the Allied and Associated Powers decided that the territories in question should become mandated territories in accordance with Article XXII. of the League Covenant, which said that

"certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."

The idea of the "mandate" did not appeal to the European Powers concerned in the same idealistic way in which Wilson regarded it; "protectorate" was how public opinion in the Old World tended to interpret it. But the settlement finally provided for "mandates"—to be exercised in Syria and the Lebanon by France, and in Palestine (with Transjordan) and in Mesopotamia, soon to be called 'Iraq, by Britain. The principle, as laid down by Wilson, provided for the exercise of a mandate—under the League of Nations, which set up for the purpose a Permanent Mandates Commission—by the Power which by reason of its experience and its geographical interests was best able to exercise it. Thus Wilson's ideals and Anglo-French *realpolitik* were made to coincide; thus Britain in 1920 took over the control of the two springers of the great arch leading to India.

In the case of Palestine and Transjordan, the political situation remains essentially unchanged. There is constant friction, to a greater or less degree, between Jew and Arab. Each of the two sides maintains a press which is frankly propagandist; Britain is in effective control as between the two. Year by year the British High Commissioner, or his counsellor, visits Geneva to sponsor the annual reports which the British Colonial Office presents to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League, and on which the British representatives may be examined and cross-examined by the members of the Commission, many of whom, on behalf of their Governments, have axes to grind. Meanwhile Palestine remains prosperous, one of the few bright spots in a world of depression. Such progress as she is making is due almost entirely to the Western methods introduced by the Zionists; before many years have passed the

harbour developments at Haifa and the establishment of oil-refineries there will mean the growth of a purchasing power, at present non-existent, similar to that which has populated with steady-going artisans the Anglo-Persian oil area in South-West Persia.

In the case of 'Iraq the mandate ended in October, 1932, when 'Iraq became independent and entered the League of Nations as a constituent member, in full and friendly alliance with Great Britain by virtue of a treaty, negotiated in 1930, which came into force on the expiration of the mandate. Except that the Arabs are now in full executive control in 'Iraq, the passing of the mandate has so far made little essential difference. The country still depends on Britain for its defence; some have said that King Faisal still depends on Britain for his throne. Within the past year or two, two insurgent Kurdish chiefs were reduced with the help of the British Air Force, and could not have been reduced without it. If the Persians, for instance, wished to seize Basrah; if the Wahhabis under Ibn Sa'ud (who is greatly impoverished through the failure of the Hajj in recent years) wished to repeat their century-old Puritanic exploit of looting the enormous wealth of the Shiah Holy Cities in 'Iraq; if the Turks were minded to recover Mosul and the oilfields—the 'Iraqis, as in their quieter conversations they will frankly admit, would be unable at present to defend themselves. 'Iraq has no defensible frontiers except in the northern mountains—and the Arab soldier, generally speaking, is no mountaineer. Moreover, the 'Iraqi Air Force is still in swaddling clothes.

By letting 'Iraq go, Britain has to some extent sacrificed British trade interests there, but she has removed any danger that might have arisen from hostile nationalism. There is a tendency in 'Iraq to impose heavy taxation upon those goods and services which, in practice, the native 'Iraqi does not use; in other words, the foreigners are being taxed more heavily than the 'Iraqi, in spite of the fact that the average foreigner in the country spends more money and is a bigger employer of labour than the average 'Iraqi. Nor is it by any means certain that the British Embassy in Baghdad is so fully alive to this tendency as it might be. So far as hostile nationalism is concerned, the danger to a British protectorate might have disappeared had Britain in 1920 made up her mind and declared resolutely in that sense. But the adoption of the mandate policy not merely encouraged the honest and sincere Nationalists, but stimulated all the place-hunters in the country, so that by 1923 or 1924 it would have been impossible to go back.

In any event, however, Britain has still safeguarded her communica-

tions with India, provided 'Iraq remains strong. Under the 1930 treaty the British Royal Air Force will remain in 'Iraq, but before 1937 all the depôts and stations must be moved west of the Euphrates. The present headquarters of the R.A.F. 'Iraq Command are at Hinaidi, a few miles south of Baghdad, and there is a bombing squadron based on Mosul—both east of the Tigris. The new headquarters are to be at Dhibban, near Lake Habbaniyah, about fifty miles west of Baghdad, on the right bank of the Euphrates. At Basrah the present flying-boat and bomber bases will remain as a link with the Arabian coast and with the British naval division operating in the Persian Gulf. The present disposition of the Royal Air Force from the Mediterranean eastwards is as follows :

Mediterranean Command.—Malta.

Middle East Command.—(a) Egypt—Aboukir, Alexandria, Heliopolis, Helwan, Ismailia, Khartum; (b) Transjordan and Palestine—Amman, Ramleh, Sarafand.

'Iraq Command.—Hinaidi, Basrah, Mosul.

India Command.—Karachi, Lahore, Ambala, Peshawar, Kohat, Risalpur, Quetta.

Aden Command.—Aden, Khormaksar.

Far East Command.—Singapore, Kai Tak.

The R.A.F. "bridge" is thus strongly constructed, particularly as the desert is now not only fully surveyed, but is also studded with dumps and landing-grounds. Until recently the trans-desert motor communications were concentrated upon the Baghdad-Damascus route. Within the past year or so the British Government has been trying to develop the Baghdad-Amman-Jerusalem route, thus ensuring that the western end is under British control in Palestine instead of under French control in Syria. For there seems no early possibility that the Palestine mandate will come to an end. Palestine thus is the western springer of the British arch from the Mediterranean to India. Whether from Egypt or from Cyprus, the new air and land route to the East starts from Palestine. The other springer of the arch is the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf.

Down that side of the Gulf British influence is now consolidated. The sloops of the Persian Gulf Division of the East Indies Squadron continue the century-old work of keeping order on the pearling banks, dispensing justice to slaves and pirates alike, and generally showing the flag in those inhospitable waters. It is no easy task. Not so long since one of the sloops was detailed to report on Elphinstone Inlet as a proposed permanent anchorage for naval ships. The visit of inspection was

paid in August, with the humidity such that the visibility was only about a hundred yards. Not a soul was to be seen on shore; even the native Arabs cannot live there in the summer and retire to their hot-weather villages in the hills behind. Four-fifths of the engine-room staff went down with heat-exhaustion, and the "survivors" brought the ship out at half speed.

Such is the summer climate at the southern end of the Persian Gulf, where the British sloops for generations and the R.A.F. for four years have done magnificent service to British Imperial interests. For many years now the shaikhs of the key principalities of Kuwait, Bahrain and Muscat have been under British protection; but it is only within the last year or two that the shaikhs of the Trucial coast (Northern Oman) have been coaxed into the fold, with the result that British air communications between Basrah and India are now flanked by friendly Arab potentates, until the sea-jump from Sharjah to Gwadar in Beluchistan sees the fliers once again in British territory. The early extension of this air route to Malaya and Australia will but increase the Imperial importance of the Palestine-Basrah-Oman bridge.

Over all hangs the smell of oil. The Anglo-Persian Company has settled its dispute with the Shah, but a keen fight is going on for the oil which is known to exist on the Arabian side of the coast. The British Government is naturally anxious that this oil should be British controlled. But at Bahrain the concession—providing for royalties at the rate of just over five shillings per ton produced—has gone to a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company. At Kuwait the struggle is still going on, and the Shaikh is bargaining over the rate of royalty. On the Hasa coast the Standard Oil Company is busy. In 'Iraq, moreover, one small company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian, is now producing, while two much bigger concerns have yet to make a start. The Anglo-Persian Company, in which the British Government is a major shareholder, has a 23 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. holding (with Standard, Royal Dutch, and French interests equally represented, the balance of 5 per cent. being held by the original concessionaire), and appears to be in complete control of the administration on the spot. By 1935 the pipe-line from Northern 'Iraq to the Mediterranean will be completed, with one terminus, as insisted on by the French, on the Syrian and another on the Palestine coast. This terminus is to be at Haifa, which within ten years is bound to become one of the great ports of the Mediterranean, and in all probability an important British naval base.

There has been, for some considerable time, talk of a Haifa-Baghdad

railway. Such a railway would, in my opinion, greatly help in the consolidation of British influence in the Middle East—so much so, indeed, that it is not surprising to find obstacles put in the way by other interested parties! A Haifa-Baghdad-Basrah railway would cut out the Suez route almost entirely; it would open up the 'Iraqi and Persian markets to the West (assuming, of course, that by then Persia will have repealed her various trade monopoly laws); it would become the new passenger route to India—once the Baghdad-Basrah railway was relaid on standard gauge. The projected railway would follow the line of the pipe-line—Haifa-Tiberias-Haditha, thence turning south-east to Baghdad. Already a great trans-desert telephone is being constructed under British auspices, and the telephone engineers are working across with the pipe-line engineers. Another project would provide for the building of a metalled road along the pipe-line route. At present the rains turn whole sections of the desert into sticky mud, in which cars and lorries are frequently bogged. Even in dry weather a metalled road would ensure great economies in tyres, springs, and petrol.

France, from her position in Syria, is showing a good deal of jealousy of these developments of British policy, some of which she did not foresee during the war-time negotiations. It is true that the French appeared to triumph when they drove Faisal from Damascus in 1920, but he is now firmly established in Baghdad, and in so far as he owes the maintenance of his position to Britain, to that extent he is bound to carry 'Iraq in the wake of British policy. Of that policy a strong 'Iraq is a vital part—as a buffer between British Imperial communications and any possibility of pressure from Turkey or Persia—and in the nature of things no one will derive more benefit from a strong 'Iraq than the 'Iraqis themselves. 'Iraq's steady progress towards independence and strength added to the French difficulties in Syria. The Syrians rightly consider themselves a more advanced people than the 'Iraqis, and they did not understand why they should not be regarded as equally ready for independence. It may be that before long France will be willing to give up the Syrian mandate on condition that she retains full control of the coast. Already French jealousy is apparent in the efforts she has made to attract 'Iraqi and Persian transit trade to Beyrouth, where the French have promised both these Governments free port facilities—the implication being that the French fear the rise of Haifa.

There remains one aspect for consideration—the views and aspirations of the Arabs. The overland British route to the East is straddled by the Arab peoples. They claim to be the rightful inheritors of Pales-

tine, they control 'Iraq, they rule the coast from Basrah to Muscat, as well as the whole of Central Arabia. There is much talk of "Arab union" or "Arab confederation." The Arab is a great talker. Whether sitting in a coffee shop or in an editor's chair, there is nothing he likes so much, nothing at which he is such an adept, as political speculation. Now the idea of a great Arab confederation has fired the imagination of the politicians in all the Arab countries, and this idea is one that must be carefully watched by Britain. It must always be borne in mind that the forcing-house of the war brought Arab nationalism to fruition long before it could otherwise have reached this stage. Some of the Arabs themselves feel that they may be moving ahead rather fast; it is certain that the great mass of them, illiterate as they are and devoid of political consciousness, have no interest in anything except being allowed to carry on their lives in their own way and by their own ancient methods.

A further point to be noted is that the very nature of the Arab himself will militate against any form of union or even of federation. The Arab's nature is to be independent and distrustful—frequently even of his relatives. The desert life is a hard life, and through countless generations it has not left many of the finer characters except family affection and hospitality. Suspicion it breeds in large measure. Who knows what enemies may lie behind the next sand dune or in ambush in the next *wadi*? Four hundred years of Ottoman rule merely intensified this secrecy and suspicion in which the Arabs had lived and worked. Frankly, it is almost impossible to imagine any gathering of Arab representatives who will not give individual promises or take individual action in diametrical opposition to what they have unanimously and solemnly decided in council half an hour earlier.

Some 'Iraqis have argued for a joint Syro-'Iraqi kingdom under King Faisal. This project would have the support of influential elements in Syria anxious to see the French getting out. But many 'Iraqis, perhaps seeing more clearly, argue that union with Syria would be a mistake. 'Iraq is no doubt potentially richer than Syria, but the Syrians are more advanced than the 'Iraqis, and union would mean that the Syrians would simply move across to Baghdad and pick up the best jobs, returning in due time to their own pleasanter country. Such a prospect naturally does not commend itself to the 'Iraqis, who are looking for advancement themselves. So far as the Arabs in Palestine are concerned, they are too much occupied with their Jewish question to be really interested in any schemes for union. Transjordan scarcely counts. Abdullah, its ruler, is an elder brother of Faisal, and of late there has

been no love lost between him and Ibn Sa'ud, who ejected his family from Mecca. Ibn Sa'ud counts for a great deal in any speculation on Arabia's future, but his country is terribly backward—it is only within the last few months that acute economic distress and financial stringency has induced him and his advisers to abandon their age-old objection to foreign industrial concessions. In any case, the freer Arabs of Syria and Iraq are by no means certain that domination from Mecca would be good for a united Arab "nation." The Gulf shaikhs realize fully that their influence is stronger as it is to-day than it would be as minor members of an "Arab League."

There is thus no immediate likelihood of Arab union. The Baghdad and Damascus newspapers have been full of the idea, and no doubt certain leaders and others, on both sides of the desert, are supporting it, with their eye on the main chance. But it is not yet within the sphere of practical politics.

British relations are cordial with all the Arab rulers on the Mediterranean-Oman route. The diplomatic service, the navy, the army, and the air force have all contributed to this result. France, Germany, and the United States are all watching closely the consolidation of the new British bridge to the East.

Of the countries constituting this bridge, Palestine is to-day the most prosperous and the one with the brightest future. She has agriculture and industries and manufactures; in the Dead Sea are valuable chemical resources; the coast has two good ports, one of which will soon become a first-class port. In addition, Palestine's invisible exports, the money spent by tourists, have been considerable even in these years of slump. When the world depression comes to an end, and Haifa with its harbour and oil-refineries attains its full development, Palestine will be prosperous indeed. One of the secrets of Palestine's success, apart from British administration, is the fact that the returning Jews have put things on a European or American basis. Other Middle East countries have progressed in their own way; Palestine has gone ahead on Western lines, and the native Arab has had no share in this. Arab nationalism in Palestine is very real and very conscious of itself, but its mainspring is its hostility to Zionism; it is not constructive, and even in its destructive criticism it often wanders far from realities. Both in natural resources and in industrial and commercial development Palestine is the "promising" land.

Syria is peopled by a clever race, who since the Crusades have been closely connected with the West, particularly with France. In

Damascus she possesses the flower of the Arabian world—that lovely city which the Prophet himself would not enter lest he spoil his delight later in Paradise. Syria's trade is considerable, and when the pipe-line begins work the port of Tripoli will handle the French share of the total production. But industrially and commercially Syria can compare neither with Palestine nor 'Iraq. She is relatively poor, and it is becoming more and more evident that France's chief interest is in controlling the coast and the mountains immediately behind it.

'Iraq is the only portion of the former Ottoman territory that has achieved independence. The British community in 'Iraq are apt to say that the efficiency of the administration will diminish. The Arab reply to that would be that if their administration remains at a standard which satisfies them, that is all that is necessary. Agriculture will always be 'Iraq's chief "industry," and the money derived therefrom will always be mainly spent in the country. It is not so certain that this will be the case with the oil revenues—the royalties to be paid by the 'Iraq Petroleum Company on the left bank and by the British Oil Development Company on the right bank of the Tigris. It is possible, as many have suggested, that a certain proportion of this money will find its way into private pockets; it seems certain that, with 'Iraq's increasing expenditure abroad, a very considerable percentage of it will be spent outside 'Iraq altogether. The original idea was that the oil royalties should be used for capital works only: every payment hitherto has been used to meet current expenditure.

'Iraq's chief troubles will lie in two directions—with the minorities, chiefly the Kurds and the Assyrians, and with the Euphrates tribes, who will object to pay taxes. If Baghdad is fair as well as being firm, there need be no trouble. The treaty with Britain provides for military aid against external enemies. What will happen if Baghdad is unable to cope with internal trouble and as a result British communications are threatened? It does not seem at all likely that Britain will allow her communications with the East to be jeopardized!

REVIEWS

On Ancient Central Asian Tracks. A Brief Narrative of Three Expeditions in Innermost Asia and North-Western China. 9½"×6½". Pp. xxiv+342. Illustrations. Colour plates. Panoramas. Map. London: MacMillan. 1933. 3rs. 6d.

The journeys and archaeological discoveries of Stein in Central Asia constitute an epoch. Consequently we welcome an epitome of them in the volume under review. Stein was first drawn to this area by seeing some relics of a lost civilization which had reached Calcutta from distant Khotan. He was quick to realize their importance and soon started off on the first of many fruitful journeys.

Stein had already studied, so far as was then possible, the valleys of the Indo-Afghan border, where Græco-Buddhist art first endeavoured to use classical forms for the figures of this Indian religion, and Chinese Turkistan with its borderlands, although a desert country for the most part, with the absolute desert of the Takla-Makan joining the still greater Gobi, yet served as the channel for the interchange of the early civilizations of India, China, and the Hellenized west of Asia. Its aridity, which is saved from utter lifelessness by the great rivers that, pouring down from some of the mightiest ranges in the world, sustain oases of remarkable fertility, has yet preserved in the most complete manner the relics of these lost civilizations. Indeed, the finds have been almost overwhelming in their magnitude.

In his first journey, which might be termed a reconnaissance, the explorer, starting in 1900, crossed the Himalayas to the Sarikol Valley and made for Khotan. There he set to work to explore Yotkan, its ancient capital, and Dandanoilik, "the ancient city Taklamakan," and other sites. He was amply rewarded. Among his chief discoveries, a stupa with colossal statues of the Buddha was perhaps the most striking. But of even greater interest were wall paintings and painted panels. One of these latter (p. 62) represented the "King of the Rats," who is mentioned by the celebrated traveller Hsüan-tsang as having saved Khotan by his rats gnawing the bowstrings and harness of an invading army. When the Moslems conquered Khotan they transformed the "Shrine of the Sacred Rats" into *Kaftar Mazzar*, or "The Shrine of the Pigeons." According to the guardian whom I questioned, these pigeons were descendants of two doves which flew from the heart of a dead martyr of the faith! He also informed me that these sacred pigeons were never attacked by hawks! It is of quite exceptional interest to note that Herodotus tells an identical story of an Egyptian army being saved by mice.

A principal object which Stein invariably kept before him was the connection of this wonderful art with other countries. His discovery of a painted panel representing a Persian *Bodhisattva* proved to be the great champion Rustam. At the end of his last great journey in far distant Sistan, Stein discovered Persian frescoes on the Kuh-i-Khwaja, including one of Rustam holding his famous mace. This linking up of frescoes in Sistan with those discovered in the Takla Makan desert surely constitutes a great achievement.

The second expedition was of a more ambitious nature. Stein had secured permission to cross Wakhan, which very narrow district—it can be easily ridden

across in a day's march—constitutes the buffer between the British and Russian Empires. He crossed the Oxus for the first time and was much moved at seeing the great river of Central Asia:

"In his high mountain-cradle of Pamere," as Matthew Arnold wrote.

Revisiting Khotan, Stein travelled eastwards to Lop Nor, where he discovered documents sealed with clay seals representing Greek deities, thus linking up Central Asia with the classical period. The explorer then crossed the Gobi, one of the most extensive deserts in Asia, which was the scene of Hsüan-tang's adventures in the seventh century A.D. Stein refers to the celebrated Master of the Law as his "Chinese Patron-Saint," and with pious care traced the route followed by that great explorer. Moreover, he discovered and explored a fortified wall with its watch-towers which was constructed some 2,000 years ago for a distance of 200 miles, and reaped a rich harvest, more especially in early Chinese documents, as described on page 180. The illustrations are also of especial interest.

Reaching Hun-huang, an oasis situated on the eastern side of Gobi, Stein examined the wonderful "Caves of the Thousand Buddhas." Here we see the great archæologist at his best, and we marvel at our good fortune not only in his vivid descriptions, but also in the beautiful illustrations, that of a temple cella (p. 196) being among the most remarkable. But Stein did much more than merely examine the caves. He had heard of the existence of a great hoard of manuscripts, and, winning the confidence of the guardian-priest by his references to Hsüan-tsang, he was permitted to examine some of the precious rolls. These *mirabile dictu* proved to have been brought from India by the great Chinese explorer, and aided by this fact, which was regarded as a portent, Stein was able to secure for civilization not only manuscripts, but also paintings and embroideries. The paintings belonged to the T'ang dynasty, when Chinese art was at its best, and the illustrations in the book constitute a revelation of beauty.

Before quitting the "Cave Shrines of the Thousand Buddhas" I would mention that Miss Mildred Cable, as reported in the April number of the Journal, discovered more of these caves which a flood had opened up. She found that their pristine beauty had been preserved and took photographs of considerable value. After despatching his treasures to India, Stein again became the explorer, and surveyed the snowy Nan-Shan range in the summer of 1907. In the following summer he surveyed in the mighty Kun-lun range, where he was badly frost-bitten.

In his third expedition, Stein penetrated as far as Kara-Khoto, where he secured a rich harvest of manuscripts. He then visited Zungaria and Turfan, and, in 1915, my sister and I had the pleasure of meeting him in the Pamirs. He was then bound for Roshan and Shugnan, and his journeys in ancient Central Asian tracks appropriately ended at Samarcand.

It is difficult to express adequately the value of the work of this great archæologist-explorer. Stein will remain for all time the greatest figure in the exploration of Central Asia, and of him it may justly be said *nihil tetigit quod non ornavit*.

P. M. SYKES.

The Empty Quarter. Being a description of the Great South Desert of Arabia known as Rub'al Khali. By H. J. B. Philby, C.I.E. Pp. xxiv + 433. Illustrations and maps. 21s.

The world, said the Muslim geographers, is in shape like a ball, and it floats in the circumambient ocean like an egg in water—half in and half out. Of the

exposed portion, one half constitutes the "Inhabited Quarter" of the globe, while the remaining half is the "Empty Quarter," the Rub'al Khali, placed in the barren wastes of Arabia.

This "Empty Quarter" Mr. Philby had set his mind on exploring fourteen long years before. It was his great ambition, as it had been the ambition of Wellsted, Burton, and the rest of us. "For seven years I had laboured in vain as Jacob of old for Rachel," writes Mr. Philby of the period which ended in the collapse of his first plans, but, nothing daunted, our author was prepared "to toil other seven years for the bride of my constant desire."

There could be no better commentary on the almost insurmountable obstacles to European penetration of Arabia. Here is Mr. Philby, convert to the religion of Muhammad, resident of Mecca, enjoying the friendship and patronage of Bin Sa'ud, Cæsar, all but omnipotent in the Peninsula, and whose influence is unparalleled since the Prophet (our author holds), and yet the door to the great Southern Desert is barred and bolted to him, the prize within as remote as Rachel.

But at last the day dawned—a day in 1932. Ibn Sa'ud sponsored and financed the Englishman he admired. Mr. Philby was sent across the Peninsula, advance guard of Cæsar himself, with instructions to Bin Jiluwi, Bin Sa'ud's great viceroy in the Hasa, to organize the expedition. The reviewer recalls with amusement his own shudders when entering the habitat of Bin Jiluwi's Wahhabi tribes the year before when he travelled under no ægis but his own and was making his dash across the desert on the "blind side of the scrum" of Authority, so to speak—the nightmare Bin Jiluwi, a God-favoured Judge Jeffries, more influential, more intimidating than Cæsar himself to the bold denizens of these desert marches. The moment Bin Jiluwi took Mr. Philby under his wing, our author need have small apprehension for his plans. Nineteen stalwart men, thirty-two chosen camels are off before Cæsar arrives at Hasa: before them the desert empties.

"We seem to have a prodigious amount of stores," wrote Mr. Philby at the outset of his journey, and the reviewer reads with envy as he remembers his own start from Dhufar practically without any European stores at all, for they had all been eaten as a result of a hold-up in the Qara Mountains for two months, a delayed start. But the tables are soon turned and envy gives way to admiration. If Mr. Philby was profiting from a Muslim profession of faith, we must not overlook the ordeal of his observance of the Ramadhan Fast which it was now to involve. It is doubtful whether anyone who has spent long days in the camel saddle can realize the magnitude of his feat of total abstinence from food and drink between sunrise and sunset for thirty days on end. The pangs of hunger and thirst would be almost unendurable for the normal person under ideal conditions, but for a European approaching the age of fifty, coming fresh to the saddle after years of comparative riding inactivity, this self-denial during long arduous camel marches under the blazing Arabian sun is unparalleled, so far as the reviewer remembers, in the annals of exploration. The author's making light of it in his book reflects great credit, but it is an aspect of his journey which the reviewer can perhaps better appreciate than others, and one he feels privileged to focus attention upon. Assuredly Mr. Philby richly deserved his tent by night—a tent was an amenity not enjoyed by the reviewer, for Arabs dislike heavy loads, and to show consideration for camels is a sure way to a Badu's heart.

Part I. of the book—the narrative is divided into three parts—is devoted to the exploration of Jafurah and of the Jabrin oasis which Major Cheesman had reached a decade before. The author's collection of sea shells, fossils, and other geological specimens (they form the subject of learned appendices by experts of the British Museum) and his theories based thereon of ancient river estuaries,

uplifted beaches, and an intruding arm of the sea in ancient times form a very notable scientific contribution.

When Mr. Philby says that he disagrees with Major Cheesman over the question of the language of the Murra tribe who roam about these northern borderlands of the desert, he is right—the Murra, of course, speak a good and readily understandable Badawin dialect—but when our author goes on to criticize some of the earlier travellers' locations of places, he is not nearly on such strong ground. The explanation of the whole matter is this, that the Arab's dominant characteristic is suspicion: he is suspicious particularly of the stranger's questionings; his first impulse is to lie. That, after all, is reasonable in a half savage pastoral man whose precarious existence makes his water-holes and pastures not less precious to him than are, for instance, business secrets to a European industrialist. Hence it is that the lightning visit paid by a European to a part of Arabia new to him whose denizens he has had no opportunity of meeting before, his recording innocently and trustingly the names given him by Arabs, followed by his departure with no opportunities of checking what he has recorded by reference to other local natives—this from a cartographical point of view is anything but ideally satisfactory. Yet that is how most of the map of Arabia has been made. It explains, the reviewer thinks, why Mr. Philby has impugned the veracity of Palgrave's descriptions. Mr. Philby and Palgrave each recorded what he was told, and not improbably each was told by their respective parties with their tongues in their cheeks the same name for two different places. Now Khin as described by Major Cheesman and Khin as described by Mr. Philby would appear to be another clear case. It may or may not be a disputable point which Khin, if either, is accurate, but it is a fault in our author to suppose that it must be all fish that comes to his net. And when he goes on in the course of the narrative to tell us of his strained relations with his companions, of how they quarrelled with him and crossed him, the information acquired under such circumstances, while not necessarily dubious, can be presented for acceptance with no very strong presumptive ground for its authenticity.

Jabrin left behind, the party struck out on the second and middle phase of the journey through the great central wastes, their route converging on, often parallel with, and at times at no great distance from the reviewer's route of the year before, but Mr. Philby was wise in keeping to the westwards where the water-holes are deeper and sweeter and there were one or two fresh names to record.

It is, however, the intimate details of the daily round—the narrative reads as though it were a faithful extension of the diary—that conjured up visions and joyous memories in the reviewer's mind: the tiny touches of desert colour that bring back the very atmosphere of the place; the conversations of the march; the halts for prayer; the camp-fire by night and the huddled figures sitting round and conversing about camels and pastures and women and Jinns; the cool zephyrs; the blue canopy of heaven rarely disturbed by a speck or two—a vulture, perhaps, or a raven or lark; the billowing vistas of the sands themselves a never-to-be-forgotten picture of rose-red loveliness; the blazing Arabian sun and the valley of the shadow; the horseshoe dunes and the joy of green pastures upon their slopes; the singing sands; the foot tracks of oryx, fox, or hare; an old flint instrument or some fragments of ostrich eggs to recall the past; the incongruous "to do" in dismounting to pursue some wretched mantid or other microscopic specimen for the museum.

And it recalls too the health-giving nature of the life; notwithstanding the fact that the reviewer lost twenty-one pounds' weight on his journey the year before, he remained fit throughout, as did Mr. Philby. "There is something in

the "contaminated atmosphere of the desert," says the author, "that makes one actively moribund of health. Perhaps it is the ozone of which the German traveller Gerhard Rohlfs wrote in the seventies: 'In the open desert in January and February there was an average ozone content of 7.3, while in the oases about the same time only 4.9 was observed as the highest average.' " Perhaps it is this that accounts for the "lure of the desert" which cannot be cured in him that has once tasted of it.

Mr. Philby's intimate touches are unerring. It is only when he or his Arab companions are tempted to dogmatize about a part of Arabia with which they are unfamiliar that exception can be taken. Thus Salih tells our author: "The folk of Al Bu Shamis are not of the Muslimin, but of the Ibadiya sect, and they pray in a strange fashion," which is equivalent to a bigoted sectarian saying, "The people of Wales are not Christians: they belong to the Baptist sect"; and our author himself lets himself go in talking of Ibn Sa'ud's exaction of tribute from Northern Oman: "These tax-collecting expeditions scarcely perhaps do more than pay the expenses involved in equipping and sending them out, but they do tend to spread the Gospel of Wahhabi peace and Arabian unity." The truth is that when we are talking of desert Badawin, the term "Arab unity" has no reality, it is a myth; that when tribute is paid to a Wahhabi oligarchy by an independent Omani of another religious sect, it is paid out of fear, not a love of peace; that the majority of Dhahirah tribes regard Mr. Philby's hot gospelling tax collector in much the same way as our old American colonists regarded the agents of the Boston Tea Ships.

In this Part II. of the book an object of lively interest, perhaps indeed the most dramatic discovery of the whole journey, was Mr. Philby's meteorite craters of the central wastes. The meteorite, which must have been one of the largest in the world after the Siberian and Peruvian meteorites, forms the subject of one of the scientific appendices, and its romantic setting in the narrative is revealed to us very picturesquely. The author at first mistook it for an extinct volcano and not unnaturally equated an archaic eruption with a desert story he had heard of the destruction by fire of a great city, Wabar, whose inhabitants lived notoriously evil lives.

The reviewer cannot help thinking that the normal name for this meteorite site in the mouths of Badawin is other than Wabar, but that, whatever it is, it clearly never had a fair chance in life when the author somewhat naively tells us:

(i.) That he had noted down on the map fourteen years before this very spot as the site of Wabar "almost to the inch."

(ii.) "A visit to Wabar had at my request been specifically included by Ibn Jiluwi in the programme of our operations."

It is quite clear to the reviewer that this site is known to the natives of South Arabia, not as Wabar, for which they had another traditional site, but as Umm al Hadid,* or alternatively Al Hadida.

Still, it is the reality of the meteorite that matters rather than the name, and Mr. Philby's bringing it to light must be regarded as a discovery of major interest and importance.

* Umm al Hadid means Mother of Iron—i.e., place of iron. Mr. Philby was shown at no great distance a water-hole which his companions alleged bore that name where he saw no trace of iron. How comes the name then? Mr. Philby's "Wabar" is clearly the place described from the lips of the reviewer's South Arabian companions and Murra guide in *Arabia Felix*, page 246, thus: "Umm al Hadid, a water-hole, is also said to have a tradition of two large blocks of so-called ironstone, whence its name. These may have been meteorites."

Shanna was the most southerly point Mr. Philby recorded, but it is of interest to note that his description of the water-hole does not resemble the Shanna where the reviewer camped the year before, though it cannot be far distant, for the positions approximately tally—viz., 19° N. 51° E. Our author's immediate objective was to press on southwards across the desert steps to the mountains of the Hadhramaut, but this caused alarm and despondency to his party. They refused. They feared too much the danger of the raiding steppe tribes, and indeed with their tired camels they would have made an easy prey. To the reviewer, who knows the politics of this southern steppe—the anarchic conditions and blood lust are poles distant from the comparative tranquillity of Sa'udi Arabia—their refusal is intelligible. They would be no longer within the protecting folds of Ibn Sa'ud's influence. Hence it was they preferred to turn north-westwards and attempt the crossing of the waterless stretch from Shanna to Sulaiyal. That was a bold undertaking. Still, by their actions they showed that they thought it less risky than the Hadhramaut venture.

Stage III. of the book is the thrilling story of attempt, failure, retreat, and then successful accomplishment, and the narrative is full of incidents exciting, eventful, and daring. The breakdown occurred when the party were 140 miles out from Shanna on the first attempt. Camels collapsed in the heat, and the men rebelled against the author. There had been constant murmurings, and now they struck; they refused to go on. "Little did I fathom the dark scheming of their treacherous minds as they marched with me into the unknown," wrote Mr. Philby, who now if he was to succeed must depend upon his own resolution to overcome them. But he held a few good trumps in his hand. Had they forgotten that instead of reward they would receive punishment from King Ibn Sa'ud? Was it worth their while after such faithful service that it should all go for nothing at the eleventh hour? Had they forgotten the very words of Ibn Jiluwi's exhortation at the outset—"Look you, this man is dear to the King, and dear to us all, have a care for him . . . he speaks of Wabar, you will take him thither . . . see that you avoid danger . . . your return is across the desert, even the Empty Quarter . . . for his life you answer with yours"?

One of the escort was physically chastized. This surely is unprecedented, where a European has been travelling, in the annals of Arabian exploration, where the traveller—the reviewer speaks feelingly—has moved on sufferance; it is the European who has normally come in for the beating, if not worse. Huber and Seetzen and Palmer were murdered. Von Wrede, Doughty, Palgrave, Leachman, and others were beaten by their companions, while the reviewer was ambushed on three several occasions in his journey through the southern borderlands in 1927-28.

But to return to the hold-up in the desert. A less combative man than our author may well have lost heart at the thought of being robbed of victory at its very threshold. The party fell back to the water-hole of Naifa. And then a providential thing happened. Rain fell. The situation was changed in a flash. The desert would now blossom and support life. The worst men and camels were weeded out to wend back slowly by known pastures. The others, re-organized, rested and recuperated for the final dash. On March 6 they set out across the great 360-mile waste. Eight days later, on March 13, Sulaiyal was reached. Rachel had been won.

There is one serious criticism which Mr. Philby rather wantonly invites, and that is his juggling on pages 130-132 with the term Rub'al Khali and the obvious difficulties he has landed himself in in his sketch-map at the back of the book.

Mr. Philby's opportunities for guiding the book reviewers as to what is

what is not the Badawin connotation of Rub'al Khali are slight, for this reason, that he has made only one lightning visit of ninety days to this South Arabian desert, and his companions and informants were not natives of the south at all, but Badawin of the northern borderlands.

But let us consider what they told him. He mystifies us by giving three quite different and irreconcilable definitions.

Definition I.—“I would state the result of my researches that the whole of the great Southern Desert is Rub'al Khali.”

Definition II.—The sketch-map at the back of the book shows the Rub' al Khali to comprise the whole breadth of the southern sands from Salaiyil to Ghanim south of about lat. 21° .

Definition III.—“The distinction of Rub'al Khali is one of water; thus the waterless areas Qa'amiyat, Hawaya, Shuwaikila are Rub'al Khali *par excellence*” or simply the south-west area west of long. 51° .

Let us consider them.

The term Rub'al Khali is a geographical term. Badawin are not conspicuously geography-minded. The southern Badawin do not use the term in a geographical sense,* and the reviewer cannot believe that any other Badawin do either unless they are *talking at* a foreigner who uses the term to them. The merchants of the southern towns and the Sultan of Muscat do, of course, like Ibn Jiluwi, Mr. Philby, and the reviewer, use the classical term and for the same reason. It is perfectly good geography, and Definition I. is justified by long usage. Thus is shown Great Empty Space of D'Anville's map 1755; thus Ritter's map of 1852, thus Palgrave's map 1862, and every official map published throughout the world since; thus it was known to Doughty, to Burton, and every subsequent explorer without exception; thus to the British and Indian Governments according to their official publications. Sir Percy Cox believed he had looked down upon the Rub' al Khali from the summit of Jabal Akhdhar; Wellsted thought he had gazed out into it from the desert port of Adam in Oman. The Bents shared the same feelings from the Qara Mountains of the Central South; and that very eminent pro-Consul-explorer-author Colonel S. B. Miles, who spent thirty years of his life talking to the natives between Aden and Muscat, wrote at the end of his days: “The Rub'al Khali is a great sandy desert which covers half of the entire Arabian Peninsula.”

Definition II. is the definition of the sketch-map—that is, it excludes the northern half of Definition I. north of about latitude 21° N. Why? How can Mr. Philby reconcile this Rub'al Khali of his sketch-map with the words in the text—“The wells (sands) are known as Rimal; where there are no wells Rub'al Khali”—when he knows that there are wells in these latitudes east of long. 51° E.?

Definition III. Mr. Philby was misled by his companions if he supposes that in winter the Hawaya, Shuwaikila, and Qa'amiyat areas are any more literally Empty Quarter than any other part of the sands. They *are* inhabited after rains. Indeed, the party with which the reviewer crossed the central wastes he recruited from this very Qa'amiyat. The crucial point is that water is not the main consideration in a desert at all, but pastures, and rains are as likely to fall in well-less areas as where there are wells, and often fall there exclusively. This, curiously

* *Bar khali* = empty land, is often met with on the lips of Badawin, of course. It stands for any part of the desert that will not support camels; an area withered or without pastures; but it is not a geographical term, for pastures are nowhere perennial.

enough, is where our author met rains. Camels can be and are driven off, and for two months on end no one dreams of taking them back to a water-hole. To clinch the matter, how could the reviewer have mapped this area—Hawaya, Shuwaikila, and Qa'amiyat, that lie between Shanna and Sulaiyal, Mr. Philby's "Ruba al Khali" *par excellence*—if his Arabs had not been there and knew the marches? But these same Arabs do not use the term exclusively or indeed at all for this waterless area, as our author would like us to believe. Parallels exist in other deserts. The Sahara consists of regions with and regions without water-holes, but it is all desert, it is all Sahara, and so it is the same with the great Southern Desert the Rub'al Khali. The idea of whittling a geographical term down arbitrarily at a stroke of the pen would be a complete travesty of geography. Badawin, who at need can score a boundary over Wabar, would not be stumped out by a little thing like changing the orientation of the Rub'al Khali. Badawin, even when in quarrelsome mood, are not averse from pleasing if there is profit in it. The Badu, to use a cricket figure again, has three balls in his over: his first ball is the impulse to deceive; his second ball is the desire to profit by "delivering the goods"; his third ball is to combine the impulse and the desire, for which his native cunning well fits him. When Mr. Philby's companions, after deflecting him from his original objective of marching south from Shanna to Hadhramaut, told him that the waterless stretch they would take him across instead was known to Badawin as the true and exclusive Rub'al Khali (Definition III., in short), they were clearly performing the hat-trick. The reviewer is entitled to consider his views have preponderating weight on this issue because for upwards of five years he has been intimately connected with South Arabia; he has made three considerable journeys into the Rub'al Khali, each time with natives of the south—Kathir, Rashid, Awamir tribesmen—and has met elements of most of the very southern tribes who use these south-western waterless sands: Manahil, Sa'ar, Nahad, and Karab; his map took five years to build up, check and recheck *in situ*, so to speak, and is clearly better evidence than a lightning visit to South Arabia and local names taken down from the lips not of natives of these southern marches at all, but strangers from the northern borderlands. The author tells us, indeed, he never met a single native southerner throughout his journey.

Nothing can be clearer than that the area properly called Rub'al Khali—and there is no scintilla of evidence to justify modifying it—stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean and from the mountains of Oman to the mountains of Aflaj and Nagran, as it has done from time immemorial—Definition I., in short. It is naughty of Mr. Philby to attach by implication this name to one restricted southern portion with which he was immediately concerned, and thus, by mischievous confusion, to mislead persons less well informed into extravagant and absurd opinions.*

It would, however, be a pity if the reviewer allowed it to be supposed that that last waterless stretch of Mr. Philby's journey that took him eight days, from Shanna to Sulaiyal, was anything but a magnificent feat. It was: witness, for example, the one day when he was for eighteen out of twenty-one hours in the saddle and covered seventy miles. That is splendid marching with worn-out camels and rebellious escort at the end of a long desert journey.

Here, then, we have another of Mr. Philby's remarkable performances: an epic journey—a classic book.

BERTRAM THOMAS.

* See reviews of "The Empty Quarter" in *The Times* of June 2, 1933; *Times Literary Supplement*, May 25, 1933; and *Manchester Guardian*, May 25, 1933.

Hadramaut: Some of its mysteries unveiled. By D. Van der Meulen and Dr. H. von Wissmann. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ "x6 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". Pp. xxv+248. Illustrations. Map. Leyden: E. J. Brill, Ltd. 1932.

Speaking generally, it is, of course, only natural that the attention of the Western explorer and seeker after scientific knowledge should be focussed mainly upon those ever-shrinking spaces on the earth's surface which have either remained completely inviolate or which, at any rate, still offer some prospect of valuable scientific return for pioneering effort; but it is surprising that after so many decades of practical eclipse the limelight of discovery should have played almost simultaneously from several directions, as it has, upon Burton's "huge white blot" on the face of Arabia, and upon the fringes of the Great Desert. It seems only yesterday that we saw Bertram Thomas and StJohn Philby lifting between them the time-worn veil from the features of the Rub'al Khali, and now we have a Dutch diplomat from Jedda and our own airmen from the Aden garrison not only giving us vivid pictures through the written word and the "movie" camera of daily life and scenery in the Hadramaut, but also adding considerably to our geographical knowledge of the region by industrious survey work alike on the ground and from the air. Incidentally I cannot read, and reread, their published records without bethinking me with what keen interest and enthusiasm that distinguished scholar and student of Arabian geography (and member of this Society), the late David Hogarth, had he been spared, would have welcomed this long-delayed resumption of the "penetration of Arabia." And it has come none too soon, for the genie of mechanical transport is gradually stretching forth his tentacles even to the sands of the desert and the beetling highlands on its borders, and so bringing their unsophisticated inhabitants into touch with the seductive amenities of a higher civilization.

The present volume forms the record of a six-weeks' tour in the Hadramaut proper undertaken by the Netherlands Consul at Jedda in the performance of a diplomatic "mission" on behalf of his Government. Holding such an appointment in the Hedjaz, he necessarily possessed a competent knowledge of Arabic, but he also spoke Malay fluently, and this accomplishment made him especially welcome among the many Hadramautis met with in the course of his expedition who had had successful mercantile careers in Java or the Malay States and had returned to their ancestral homes to pass their latter days. But those who have had the experience know well enough that one who travels in remote regions in an official capacity is severely handicapped in the matter of obtaining secular or scientific information, from the fact that any activity on his part in such directions quickly arouses the suspicion that his visit has some ulterior motive. To discount this disability the author wisely invited a German friend, Dr. H. von Wissmann, a geographer of repute who had travelled extensively in Yemen and the Hedjaz, to accompany him, and he is indebted to the latter for the compilation of the up-to-date map which accompanies the volume and for such scientific information as the narrative contains.

As to the nature of the duty on which the author was engaged, it will be best, I think, if I quote a paragraph from the very valuable introduction written for the volume by that distinguished Dutch orientalist Professor Snouck Hurgronje, among whose alumni the author is so fortunate as to count himself. The Professor writes:

"Mr. Van der Meulen had, during the five years when he was first consul and later chargé d'affaires at Djedda, become convinced that the time was ripe for extending the activities of the Netherlands Legation over

other sections of the Arabian Peninsula than the dual-monarchy of Ibn Sa'ud, and that it would be desirable for Holland to enter into friendly relations with the Imam Yahya of the Yemen, and, if possible, to ensure a suitable reception for the representative of Holland in the Hadramaut, the country of origin of so many Arabs who seek and find their fortunes in Netherlands India. He received then a commission from the Netherlands Government in this sense, naturally with a recommendation to caution in regard to the Hadramaut."

Such was the author's "mission," and at the beginning of his narrative he frankly recognizes that it could not have been undertaken at all except under the auspices and with the friendly co-operation of the Aden Government. Later on, however, in the course of his association with the inhabitants on his route, carried away no doubt by a natural zeal to promote the interests and influence of his own Government, he is inclined to abandon the caution enjoined upon him and to listen or give expression to sentiments hardly conducive to the interests of ours. For example, on one occasion when recording what passed at an interview with some notables, he writes:

"It comes out clearly how positively our listeners count upon a victorious recovery of Germany, who will avenge herself for defeat in a new world-war which will put an end for good to the dominating position of the whole west. They are all aflame for war from so-called pure sympathy for Germany or antipathy for Albion."

We shall know where to look when the time comes! But it will be remembered that the author's companion was a German, and we will hope that the above was only for his "beaux yeux."

On another occasion of the same kind the author's hosts of the moment were discoursing to him of their internal feuds and factions and the apparent failure of the Aden authorities to provide acceptable solutions. In this connection he writes:

"I was obliged to explain why it was impossible for me to assume the right to act as arbitrator. So long as the Dutch could only enter the doors of the Hadramaut with Britain's permission, so long would direct contact between our Government and the authorities of that land remain difficult."

And there are other odd passages in similar vein; but one need not take them too seriously, for it is difficult to imagine the Dutch Government being at all anxious, interested in the region though it be, to concern itself with the thorny internal politics of the Southern Arabian hinterland. Moreover, in recording the sentiments displayed in the passage just quoted, the author seems to take insufficient account of the nature and past history of the British connection with that region. To have a right understanding of it one must look back to our occupation of Aden in 1839—an event which was not unnaturally regarded by some of the inhabitants of the coast and hinterland with no little suspicion and resentment. To them it portended the severe limitation of the slave-traffic from the African coast which had thrived along their littoral from time immemorial; and the infliction of swift reprisals for acts of piracy and rapine perpetrated from time to time upon ocean-going steamers wrecked or driven ashore on that inhospitable coast during the burst of the south-west monsoon. Two or three of such cases are within my own memory.

To these gentry our occupation of Aden meant the establishment of a sort of maritime "Scotland Yard" with headquarters at Aden, while the ubiquitous

British gunboat on patrol duty in search of slavers or pirates appeared to them in much the same light as the policeman on his beat does to the residents in a criminal locality. But the British authorities had no mind or motive then to become needlessly embroiled in the stormy politics and tribal blood-feuds of the hinterland, and they confined their civilizing efforts to the maintenance of Pax Britannica by sea and a certain measure of protection and support to the influential chiefs of the littoral. But times and conditions are quickly changing, and since the Great War the advent of the motor-car and aeroplane and the increased facilities for movement which they provide have had their effect even in the secluded recesses of the Hadramaut. British aeroplanes now soar at will over its hills and valleys, surveying or photographing from the air or marking out landing grounds below, while the Resident at Aden, with their co-operation and that of the motor-car, can make periodical tours in the interior and thus keep closer touch than of yore with the important elements of the population, by whom they seem everywhere to be made welcome, if one may judge by the interesting reports and wonderful pictures of daily life in that region to which we have lately been treated in the hall of the Royal Geographical Society.

Let me now turn to the geographical aspects of Mr. Van der Meulen's expedition. As already explained, he was travelling on an official mission, and it was consequently not possible for him to deviate very far from the accustomed lines of communication or to direct his activities too obviously in the direction of scientific research; nevertheless the travellers were able to vary their route slightly here and there, and Dr. von Wissmann was tireless in his efforts to gather valuable material. Moreover, the happy relations which they established with the communities with whom they came in contact gained them access to interesting localities which had not been actually visited by Europeans before: such, for instance, as Hureda, where they were hospitably entertained and where they noted the remarkable position enjoyed (as indeed throughout the Hadramaut proper) by the wealthy "seyyid" element, to which all worldly authority seems to be subordinate; and again at Henin, the town on the threshold of the Hadramaut proper, where they were no less fortunate and where they first came in touch with a contingent of the Sa'ar tribe who roam the southern portion of the Great Desert and of whom we have lately read a good deal in the narratives of Philby and Bertram Thomas.

As far as Shibam the travellers were for the most part in well-travelled country, and it is interesting to compare their pleasant experiences in their intercourse with the inhabitants with those of Theodore and Mrs. Bent, who fared so very differently thirty years ago, partly no doubt because they were not really qualified for travel in such a country.

At Sewun and Terim our travellers were on less familiar ground, though both places had been visited recently by Colonel Boscawen; there again they were very well received, and that in a locality from which Leo Hirsch, in 1894, had to decamp hurriedly owing to the hostile attitude displayed by the "seyyids," to whom I have alluded above. Terim is apparently the most imposing and important town of the Hadramaut proper, and from the photographs obtained of it seems to abound in Arab sky-scrapers and the ubiquitous motor-car—imported in pieces on camel-back. From here the travellers had had visions of being able to strike north to Marib and thence on to San'a—a very important piece of geographical work had they then been able to accomplish it—but the auguries were unfavourable and the scheme had to be abandoned. They were, however, able to make interesting excursions, with the occasional help of the motor-car, to certain famous spots in the neighbourhood, in particular to Bir Barhut and Qabr Hud.

For the enlightenment of the uninitiated I may mention that "Bir Barhut," literally "the Spring of Barhut," was supposed to be a crater full of seething sulphur on the edge of a Wadi of the same name connecting with the Wadi Hadramaut, and many legends have been associated with it from very ancient times. The Greeks, for instance, apparently identified it with the Styx. But after an exhaustive and exhausting examination of the ground Mr. Van der Meulen and his companion have established that the "Bir" is nothing more than a typical limestone cavern with nothing whatever volcanic about it. Moreover, our airmen report that there is nought that could be taken for a volcano within fifty miles of it. Another popular myth exploded!

In the case of Qabi Hud, on the other hand, the existence and form of the shrine were not in doubt, for it had recently been photographed by one of our airmen, but it had never before been entered by any European traveller. The prophet Hud, who is locally supposed to be at rest under the dome of the shrine, though several places also lay claim to him, was a pagan reformer of pre-Islam days who, like the originator of the Wahabi cult in later times, rose up in protest against the iniquity of the world around him. He has been credited by some of the old writers with being the primary ancestor of the Hebrew race—Eber of the Bible. According to local tradition in the Hadramaut, God clove the rock and received him into sanctuary, thus saving him from the tender mercies of his unrepentant countrymen. On the coming of Islam "Nabi Hud" was included among its saints elect, and his shrine is now the most important place of pilgrimage in the whole of Southern Arabia.

After making these excursions the authors endeavoured to plan another itinerary which would take them direct to Aden on the return journey, but here again they were doomed to disappointment. After keeping to the west as far as they could, they passed through the Wadi 'Amd, where they touched the alleged route of Von Wrede, whose veracity they too find reason to question, and reached a group of villages named Ye'beth, on a Wadi of the same name. Here they found the attitude of the natives distinctly unfriendly—so much so that, being unable to risk the waste of time involved in perhaps fruitless negotiations for a safe passage, they felt obliged to give up the idea of proceeding direct to Aden, and took the shortest route back to Makalla, where their expedition came to an end.

Their account of it as rendered in the volume under review makes very interesting reading, in spite of the inevitable defects from which it suffers as a translation. We are fortunate, indeed, in having it in English at all. An excellent series of photographs adorns the letterpress, some of them taken from the air by our own Air Force, while the map to which I have referred before, embodying all information available to date and accompanied by a full list of authorities upon which tribute has been levied in its compilation, is a great advance. In fact, the authors may be congratulated on having accomplished a most valuable piece of work.

P. Z. C.

The Census of Palestine, 1931. Vols. I. and II. By E. Mills. 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. viii + 345; vi + 595. Map and diagrams. Alexandria: Whitehead Morris, Ltd. 1933. 10s.

The third census of Palestine (1931) is recorded in two considerable volumes by Mr. Mills, now acting as Chief Secretary in the Palestine Administration. The scope of the second census (Mr. Barron in 1922) was less ambitious, while of the

first (King David in 1017 B.C.) only the bare total of the enumeration has survived. The fighting men were found by King David's military staff to be 1,300,000 (Samuel xxi.) or 1,570,000 (1 Chronicles xxiv.), including a possible population of 6 to 7 millions; but though the area of his territory included Transjordan, modern critics are unwilling to accept the figures. A total of 170,000* fighting men has been suggested, with a population of perhaps 800,000, and since the census lasted for nearly ten months it is obvious that inexact methods were followed. The estimation of the nomad tribes by Mr. Barron in the second census, on the basis of families rather than individuals, is held by Mr. Mills to be likewise inaccurate. No reference to the first census is made in the present report.

The increase in Palestine between 1922 and 1931 has been astonishing. An addition of 36.8 per cent. is rarely found in modern times, yet this is the actual result of nine years of peace and development. The Jews have naturally, thanks to immigration, made the greatest advance per cent. (108 per cent.) from 84,000 to 175,000; the advance of the Arabs from 591,000 to 760,000 is absolutely larger, and represents 28.6 per cent.; the Christian movement is slightly less, and the total population has risen from 757,000 to 1,036,000. There are some thoughtful observations (page 46) by the census officers on the limits of human subsistence and the possible Malthusian checks on growth, which may modify this unusual rate of increase; at the present rate the population will double itself in twenty years. Births in 1931 were nearly 48 per 1,000 (*cf.* Egypt 44, Italy 26, England 16.3), and those of Moslems alone were 53; the Jews too at 32 per 1,000 are well above the scale of Western Europe. Deaths of Moslems are also high (26 per 100), but Jews as low as 9.4 (England 10.5). There is thus every prospect of a continued expansion which will lay a heavy burden on the capacity of so small a country, and it should be noted that the expansion is not due, for the most part, to the entry of new settlers, but to the philoprogenitiveness and fertility of those who are already resident in Palestine.

Existence will only be possible, it would appear, if the soil is intensively cultivated and urban industries are created in abundance. Out of a total area of 3,320,000† acres of land only 2,000,000 are utilized, leaving a large idle balance; but details of the latter are not given, and much of it will be rocky and unproductive. The average holding of a family is in the neighbourhood of 18 acres—sufficient for a reasonable peasant's life if the land is good and the method of cultivation progressive, but inadequate in the less favoured regions. It is not surprising, then, that the influx from the villages to the towns is appreciable; the urban population is now 46 per cent. (Jews 85 per cent., Moslems 36 per cent.), and the index of occupations illustrates the ingenuity of an active and determined people. Amongst them may be mentioned the following: Aide-de-camp, astrologer, artificial eye, leg, and teeth manufacturers, bankrupt, bomb seller, buffoon, Chief Justice, devil driver. . . . But the list is stimulating and long. Nor are all the occupations so remote from useful productivity as some of those selected above; 50,000 Jews and 68,000 Moslems are engaged in industry, 38,000 Jews and 91,000 Moslems in commerce. Trade in foodstuffs and in clothing holds a prominent place, the building industry and road transport are equally important. These are valuable activities in a newly settled country in which the towns have yet to be supplied with many of the requirements of modern life.

* The number of fighting men at the time of the Exodus was, however, declared to be 600,000.

† The Beersheba subdistrict, which is either uncultivable or lightly cultivated by nomads, is not included.

They inspire, however, a doubt whether the type of industry which is now flourishing, while immigration is rapid and capital from abroad is pouring in, will be equally desirable at a later stage. Jewish resource may then bring about the required adaptations, and the Arabs* may be ready to join with them in the economic exploitation of Palestine; but an uncomfortable period of readjustment is likely to ensue whenever the supply of foreign money is reduced. The agricultural population of Jews does not exceed 27,000, or 15 per cent. of their total; its achievements are known to all who have visited the Jewish settlements, but unless the Arabs are persuaded to sell a considerable part of their holdings in the plains, the urban element in the Jewish community will more and more outweigh the rural. Mr. Mills points out that the entry of the Jews from various parts of the world into a new home will afford an instructive opportunity at each census of reviewing the changes in their character and conduct. The stability or instability of the Jewish farmer will, in the opinion of the present writer, be the most interesting question of all to examine.

It is impossible to follow Mr. Mills into the intricacies of each chapter; though he cannot always avoid technicality—a census is a highly technical operation—he is ordinarily intelligible to the layman,† and the reflections which he allows himself from time to time on the causes of blindness and insanity, on female mortality, on the consequences of national exclusiveness, and a number of similar matters, prove that he is not a mere recorder, but is capable of a deeper analysis than a census report is permitted to express. These two volumes cannot be recommended to the frivolous reader. They contain nevertheless a great store of information, very carefully collected and very carefully tabulated. The preparation of so exact and illuminating a record is a task incumbent on a civilized administration. It is particularly difficult when (through no fault of the census officer of 1922) a full and scientific method is being employed for the first time, and Mr. Mills is entitled to feel thoroughly proud of the success which has attended his efforts.

C. F. S.

A Wanderer in the Promised Land. By Norman Bentwich. Pp. xii + 263. The Soncino Press. 1932. 7s. 6d. net.

The author's name in itself would suggest that this book is just another polemic treatise about the political controversy on the destiny of the Promised Land, but this happily is not the case. Indeed, those who are as yet not acquainted with this remarkable book have a great pleasure in store for them. The book is full of information invaluable to the student of ancient history and civilization and an excellent guide to the intelligent traveller.

The author possesses encyclopædic knowledge of the history and culture of these ancient places where "history is piled up like storeys in an American skyscraper." He is likewise familiar, in view of his long contact with the land, with the latest remarkable archæological discoveries in this region and with his knowledge of the people who inhabit these places. His descriptions are most interesting and enlightening.

* Comparisons have for the most part been drawn between Jews and Moslems; the Christian Arabs are similar in many ways to the Moslems, though somewhat less conservative.

† Mathematics are not laymen, and they alone will penetrate with Mr. Mills the forest of coefficients and functions which compose his formulae. The discussion of the quincunx is particularly attractive.

It is remarkable that side by side with the rebuilding of the New Palestine the ancient civilization of this country should be discovered. Thus the need for stone in the construction of the Haifa Harbour led to the discovery around the village of Athlit, an epitome of Palestine civilization, of a number of human burials, which are among the earliest known to archaeologists, and a vast treasure of Palæolithic industries, ranging from the Mustertian to the Bronze Age. In the caves which were supposed to supply the stone for this modern enterprise were found implements and skeletons of adults of the so-called Neanderthal man, "but with differences so definite that the anthropologists have had to christen a fresh species, *Palæanthropus Palestinus*; and the scientists are already building up a case for putting further back the evolution of man." Thus if this theory will be generally accepted, Palestine will justly become not only the cradle of the world's civilization, but also the home of the earliest habitation of man. Among the many objects that these caves yielded were also agricultural implements, demonstrating that cultivation of the soil was known in Palestine in that remote age about 6,000 years before the common era.

It is very interesting that in this same neighbourhood were found the earliest specimens of the wild wheat. In discussing these excavations and others, the author proves that he possesses a great knowledge of historical data which he makes use of most successfully.

The chapters on the oldest city of Jerusalem and the Western (Wailing) Wall of the Temple include a great deal of new information and throw a new light on these historic places, not so well known to the traveller as the many reputed places of pilgrimage.

The "wanderings" of the author are not at all like those of a wanderer; they are planned and very well conducted. He does not skip a place which is of any importance, and there is hardly such a place which is not pregnant with historical events and rich with archaeological discoveries. He does not confine himself only to Palestine, but "wanders" through the historic places of Akaba and Petra in Transjordan and journeys across Sinai, the "pagan sanctuary of Phœnicia." And the towns and cites of Syria, "every one of which is a labyrinth of historical events," are also not spared.

Here the author reveals to the reader not only the past but also the living present. The different sects of Phœnicia (the Druses, Mutwallis, Ismailis, Maronites, Melkites, Nestorians, and Jacobites), their origin, beliefs, and habits, are described with the accuracy of an artist and the insight of a jurist.

I. CHIZIK.

Tell Halaf: A New Culture in Oldest Mesopotamia. By Baron Max von Oppenheim. Translated by Gerald Wheeler. Pp. 337. 3 plates in colour, 64 in half-tone. 23 figures in text. Putnam's. 1933. Price 21s.

The career of an archaeologist is one of the most interesting and romantic that it is possible to choose in these law-abiding days of easy travel. Yet it is seldom that an archaeologist is found who is able at the same time both to produce his results in a scientific and reliable manner and to convey to the general reader the delight and excitement of his work. This is not the case with Baron von Oppenheim. His book, *Tell Halaf*, is enthralling from beginning to end. It is admirably balanced; the various chapters deal in the most interesting manner possible with what their titles say that they deal—a fact which is by no means universal in books of this nature—and they tell us of discoveries which must

prove of considerable importance in the history of the Near East. The book is at the same time a thrilling tale of adventure.

Baron von Oppenheim not only controlled the work of excavation himself: he also arranged a special museum in Berlin for the housing of casts and of such of the actual objects as could be brought to Europe; and he has founded in addition an institute to carry on his work, both of excavation and of exploration, after his death. His book testifies the excellent quality of what has been done so far. Would that there were more scholars, gentlemen and enthusiasts of the same type, capable of supporting and directing expeditions of a similar character.

In the first chapter we are told something about Northern Mesopotamia from the geographical point of view. It is an area which had been traversed time and again by the author, and on one of his numerous journeys he heard that some statues had been found by grave-diggers in a little-known mound on the upper Kabur. Von Oppenheim verified this in 1899, and obtained an excavator's concession from the Turkish Government. But he was a diplomat, and that year he was transferred to America. Ten years later a turning point came in his life, for "the Turks declared that they were being pressed by other nations, and could no longer keep Tell Halaf for me. I then took off my diplomatic uniform and turned to digging." This sentence is typical of the author. It conveys his charm, his devotion to the subject, his dogged determination, which served to carry him through many a difficult situation, and finally enabled him to bring the excavations to a successful head—one cannot say conclusion, for much remains to be done, and there seems every probability that it will not be very long before an expedition is again in the field.

Chapter II. deals with the history of Northern Mesopotamia, the ancient Subartuland, home, according to von Oppenheim, of an homogeneous culture in early times, with its own particular racial type and its own particular art. This culture von Oppenheim calls the Subaraic; to its art are to be assigned the works which we know as Hittite and which have hitherto been dated too late, since they have been attributed to the culture established in Asia Minor by conquering Indo-European tribes early in the second millennium. The author suggests that these works must be assigned to the old Subaraic civilization which was closely allied to the cultures of Sumer, Akkad, and Elam, and was established in the north-western part of Mesopotamia. The "Hittite" remains—Karkemish, Senjirli, etc.—have, thinks von Oppenheim, little to do with the purely Hittite culture, which was intrusive above them (p. 56).

The Hittite picture writing he also regards as much older than is generally supposed. It must have been older than cuneiform; have been more or less forgotten, and then revived, perhaps somewhat fictitiously, at a comparatively late date. This suggestion seems perhaps somewhat too elaborate.

The Hittites as we know them—von Oppenheim calls them Nasians—he regards as of Nordic race, who were linguistically members of the Kentum group. But here we are on very insecure ground, and the hypothesis of a large Nordic element in Western Asia, though upheld by certain German anthropologists (especially Günther), is not one which can be generally accepted. The Mitanni, of whom we hear so much in the history of Egypt's foreign relations, von Oppenheim also regards as Indo-Europeans, but they were members of the Satem group, and had little to do with the Hittites. About 1700 B.C. all Northern Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine were under their control. They are probably to be identified with the Hyksos, "who conquered Egypt and occupied it for some 100 years" (p. 61). Here again we stand on ground where learned opinion

is of the most diverse, and it does not seem possible to accept von Oppenheim's conclusions without considerable reserve.

This summary of the problems leads on to a description of the old town at Tell Halaf (Chapter III.), and to a discussion of the objects found, which must, from the artistic, even more than from the archaeological point of view, be classed among the most important that have ever been discovered in the Nearer East. The stone sculpture is divided into two groups, the larger statues (Chapter IV.) and the smaller slabs (Chapter V.). Both groups come from the palace of Kapara (twelfth century B.C.), but archaeological evidence suggests that they were all reused from an earlier period, which is dated by painted pottery akin to that from Kish, Susa, etc. According to the Langdon-Fotheringham dating system, which is followed in the book, this would be before 3000 B.C. The early dating of the statues is supported to some extent by stylistic and comparative evidence, yet the theory of reuse can hardly be accepted without a considerable amount of question.

The larger statues are awesome and impressive; the smaller slabs, which are to be regarded as the earliest monuments found in the excavations, are in many cases of the very first artistic merit, and the motives which appear on them are amazingly diverse. We see here for the first time many forms which were later universal in "Hittite" art, as well as those which were so popular in Achaemenid, Sassanian, and Islamic times, such as the lion-and-bull fight, the winged gryphon, the harpie, and the hippogryph.

Chapter VI. deals with other stone carvings, among them a remarkably fine, Epstein-like, seated goddess of the early period, truly the very epitome of primitive art. In Chapter VII. the minor finds—pottery, bronze, ivory, etc.—are briefly reviewed. Up to now only a very few graves of importance have been explored, but their richness bodes well for the future.

Chapter VIII. is devoted to a neighbouring tell, Jebel el Beda, an open site of worship, which was apparently never really inhabited. Excavations here were beset with numerous difficulties, again overcome by von Oppenheim's splendid determination. Finds consisted principally of free standing sculptures, showing both Sumerian and Hittite affinities. But von Oppenheim maintains that they are to be assigned to the Subaraic culture, not to the Sumerian, and that they belong to the fourth millennium B.C. Historically these statues are no less important than those at Tell Halaf; artistically they are by no means as fine.

Chapter IX. concludes von Oppenheim's portion of the book with a brief summary. In addition to Egypt and Babylonia, he says, we must admit the existence of a third great civilization, the Subaraic, in the fourth millennium B.C. The art which belongs to it has hitherto been called Hittite. Yet the Hittites did not arrive till after 2000 B.C. We must thus revise our canons and our dating completely.

Many of the conclusions in the book will no doubt be met with considerable opposition by more conservative archaeologists. They must be weighed in the scales of time and mature judgment before they can be generally accepted. Yet they cannot but affect our opinions most deeply, and the history of "Hittite" art will certainly have to be rewritten. Certain of the results are obvious at once, and not least of these is the immense importance of Tell Halaf from the point of view of the art-historian. Motives which have ever been familiar to us in Greece and Rome must now be definitely attributed to the East. Some years ago Strykowski wrote a book entitled *Orient oder Rom*; he dealt with a later age, but a similar work dealing with an earlier period will soon be essential, and one wonders how much of what has hitherto been assigned to Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean

will have to be attributed to Western Asia as far as the question of origins is concerned.*

In the first appendix Professor Herzfeld—whose name has recently come before the public as the excavator of Persepolis—points out that had Tell Halaf been discovered before Senjirli and Karkemish, the thought that the sculptures from these sites might belong to the second millennium *b.c.* would never have arisen. In a scholarly analysis he divides the Tell Halaf sculptures into three groups: T.H. I., about 3400-3000; T.H. II., 2900-2800; T.H. III., 2600-2550. Jebelet el Beda must be dated to 3100-3300. The actual figures are open to revision, owing to the uncertainty of opinion in respect of early Mesopotamian chronology, though the relative periods Herzfeld regards as certain. The early dating of these sculptures is certain to meet with considerable opposition in the archaeological world.

In the second appendix Felix Langenegger gives some technical notes on the excavation of the citadel hill; in the third Karl Müller describes the work in the town area; in the fourth Hubert Schmidt deals with the minor finds. Some remarks on the cuneiform texts by Bruno Meissner, and on Aramaic inscriptions by Peter Jensen, bring the book to a close. It is very well produced; has excellent and numerous illustrations and a full index. The translation is fluent and thoroughly readable, though rather curious phrases crop up here and there. The publishers are to be congratulated on producing a really good book at a reasonable price.

D. T. R.

The Independent Arab. By Major Sir Hubert Young, C.M.G., D.S.O. 9" x 5½". Pp. xi + 344. Maps. John Murray. 1933. 15s.

Sir Hubert Young's account of his experiences with the Arabs covers what was the most interesting period of Arab regeneration (1913 to 1921), and he himself was such a thorough and sympathetic participator in this regeneration that his book has both authority and real intimate charm. Above all, he has avoided too detailed and profuse reference to State Papers, and his book is always a story and never a case.

He met the Arabs just before the war, when, after a most meritorious surrender of his leaves to the study of Arabic, he made his first journey through Syria and down the Euphrates to Baghdad. On his road he met Lawrence at Carchemish and opened a friendship which played a very large part in his life during the next nine years. And we read that already in 1913 Lawrence was "capable of wandering about in native dress and passing unobserved among the swarthy and bearded inhabitants, and was apparently accepted without question wherever he went as a youth from Jerablus."

Then came India and a spell on the North-West frontier with his regiment; and then in 1915 he was back again among the Arabs at Basrah, attached to the M.E.F. as an Assistant Political Officer. Political officers in Mesopotamia, as elsewhere, did everything and anything; and early in 1916 Young was the Pooh-Bah in charge of the building of the Shaiba Bund. His account of his mission fully explains why he was chosen for such a task and why he succeeded.

From Basrah he moved up the river to Nasiriyah and had his first exasperating experience of the erratic type of co-operation resulting from joint Arab and British military action—a very entertaining chapter; and then things began to

* Early pottery recently unearthed by Dr. Speiser near Mosul shows distinctly Cretan affinities. Or does the Cretan show Mesopotamian influence?

improve in Mesopotamia: there was a general advance; Baghdad was captured, and after the capture the British army had somehow to be fed. So Young was sent to suspicious Hillah and had his first experience of "Q" work, collecting resources somehow from bargain-making, speculating, and always rapacious and often lying Arab merchants. Young—sometimes from a horse-drawn buggy—evolved a very high technique in the fulfilment of his duties, and eventually Baghdad got all the grain it wanted.

In 1917 he was transferred to Arabia as "Q" officer on that most versatile of all versatile staffs: "Hedgehog" (Hejaz operations); and once again he met Lawrence. The story of the advance of the nondescript Allied and Arab army from Aqaba to Azraq and from there to Deraa and Damascus has been written by many pens; but if there is one outstanding quality in Young's own narrative, it is that throughout he always emerges as the soldier. The operations were essentially a soldier's job, impeded rather than helped by political currents, and Young's story brings this out strongly. There is Joyce, who keeps the Emir Feisal and his staff up to a time table; Young himself, who somehow created aerodromes, the absence of which would have meant possible disaster; Peake, who is here, there, and everywhere; and the French Captain Pisani with his Algerian gunners—a tiny unit and a most efficient one. And the agonies of suspense they all endured amid those Arab boastings, Arab promises, and Arab failures; and always the importance of conciliation and the necessity for keeping a stiff upper lip even when disappointment was positively crushing. I have heard it said that Lawrence's greatest feat was that he miraculously succeeded in getting an Arab army to its objective on the very date when it was due to co-operate on the spot with a British army marching on parallel lines 300 miles away. Joyce and Young and Peake and Pisani were the soldiers on the spot, and they were all in with Lawrence when Deraa went up in flames.

But Young's connection with the Arabs ended at Deraa, and it was with the British Cavalry that he entered Damascus; and, once there, he again became "Q." Nor were his duties light.

"CAPTAIN YOUNG,

"With effect from tomorrow you will provide from local resources rations and forage for the following:

22,000 men.
28,000 horses.
5,000 Turkish sick and wounded.
15,000 Turkish prisoners.

"Acknowledge.

E. F. T."

To be given such an order in a country where supplies were notoriously short and where currency was positively chaotic was, perhaps, the highest compliment Young ever earned; and, of course, he did the job, and the army was able to advance to Aleppo, and so the Palestine campaign ended.

In a sense the last seventy pages of the book are a tantalizing anticlimax. From being a dyke-builder, a railway-dynamiter, and a commissariat purveyor, Young abruptly becomes a prosaic black-coated Civil Servant, seconded from the Army. In 1919 he joined the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, and played a part in all the post-war adjustments in Palestine and Syria and Iraq. But inevitably his narrative has lost the snap of desert life and the intriguing charm of personal contact with the Arabs; and I closed his book with a feeling of disappointment. His narrative ended too soon. Young eventually went out to Baghdad as Counsellor on the High Commissioner's staff and saw the establish-

ment of the Independent Arab Kingdom of Iraq. In *The Independent Arab* he has told us the story of the regeneration of the Arab spirit; he must now write a second and equally interesting book to tell us how it has all worked out in the end.

O. M. T.

In the Margin of History. By Sir Harry Luke. 7½"×5¼". Pp. xiv+270. 40 illustrations. 12 maps. Lovat Dickson, Ltd. 1933. 12s. 6d.

Sir Harry Luke's book, *In the Margin of History*, is a scholarly and eminently readable ramble in the bye-ways and footpaths of history, and he has chosen as the subject-matter for the ten chapters a variety of episodes of which the ordinary man has only the vaguest recollection. How many people, for instance, know the number and geographical position of the several quaint little independent states that are hidden away in odd corners of Europe? If it is desired to learn something of them a full description, complete with their chequered histories, will be found in Sir Harry's book. Another interesting chapter is that devoted to the various swashbucklers who in more recent times have attempted to form kingdoms and carve out dynasties for themselves in the out-of-the-way places of the earth.

Amongst other things, he deals with certain visitors from the East, who in Plantagenet and Lancastrian days came to England in state with the same object in view—i.e., to seek the aid of the English king against the Saracen infidel, and, having been regaled with full banquets and empty promises, returned after many years to their own countries.

The most interesting chapter from the point of view of the Society is that devoted to Aqaba—the tiny port on the gulf of that name where four countries meet. He describes how Turkish aversion to anything in the nature of hard-and-fast frontiers nearly gained for them the greater part of Sinai, and but for British intervention in 1906 there is no doubt that they would have occupied the Peninsula to the vicinity of Suez. Now that Great Britain controls the head of the Gulf, the episode that caused so much excitement twenty-seven years ago has shrunk in importance. Sir Harry sees in this deep-water anchorage and deserted port a key position that some day may hold great possibilities, and though it is difficult just at the present to look sufficiently far into the future to foretell exactly what part Aqaba will play, there is little doubt that he is right in his views.

In the Margin of History touches lightly on many forgotten points, and Sir Harry is eminently qualified to write it, as, in the course of his diplomatic and administrative career, he has spent much of his time in those remote spots that figure in the margins of history.

C. S. J.

Japan: A Short Cultural History. By G. B. Sansom. 10"×6¼". Pp. xvi+537. 19 plates. 39 illustrations. The Cresset Press. 1931. 30s.

In China's script, which the Japanese use too, and employed exclusively until the ninth century, the word for nature, in the sense of human nature or disposition, is composed of two symbols or characters, one meaning to beget, the other meaning both heart and mind. They are written side by side, the governing symbol—the one, that is to say, which indicates the sense of the combination—being the character with the latter meanings. In Professor Giles' dictionary of over 13,000 characters this symbol is also the governing one in some 430 other combinations, a total exceeded in his dictionary only by two other radicals (as they

are called) employed in symbols relating to man's constitution. In how many of the combinations the character implies mind rather than heart it would need a very careful analysis to say—an analysis which would be inconclusive for two reasons: one, that very few scholars would be agreed upon the result; the other, and more important, that in a large number of qualities and mental states the distinction between heart and mind is, in the Chinese view, indeterminable, except in the comparatively narrow sense of brain, for which they use a combination of symbols more material in connotation. The governing one has the meaning of flesh, just as the symbol with which it is often paired—a character meaning marrow (*sui*)—has for its governing component part the symbol for bone.

Amongst ourselves there is probably considerable difference of opinion as to whether the connotations of the term culture are predominantly intellectual or sentimental, matters of mind or matters of feeling. One would give one's own vote for the view that they are predominantly matters of mind. In doing so, however, one would really acknowledge that taste, an indispensable element in culture, is as often as not, probably more often than not, found in its most reliable form amongst people better equipped sentimentally than intellectually. A comparison between the homes of bachelors and married men (one may, perhaps, interject) would furnish striking illustrations. Indeed, in the Anglo-Saxon world taste is regarded more as a feminine than as a masculine quality, with the result that in male circles the term culture is to some extent suspect, and not infrequently irritating. It falls, moreover, under the shadow of the adopted Americanism "high-brow," and because in "high-brow" coteries it is so often used in conjunction with that other Americanism "contacts," not a few people are becoming rather tired of it.

Yet for anyone who takes an interest in Far Eastern affairs, and is trying to make an accurate guess as to what is likely to happen in China and Japan during the next decade or so, Mr. Sansom's cultural history of the Japanese is indispensable. That statement naturally prompts the question, What is the connexion between Japan's cultural past and her political present? One answer is furnished by the fact that, whereas most Western observers are disposed to think that the Japanese are making it impossible to live on good terms with their much more numerous neighbours, and are therefore creating obstacles to the development of an essential market, the Japanese themselves are confident that they are doing exactly the opposite. This confidence arises from what they believe to be a juster estimate both of the Chinese character and of Chinese domestic politics than ours, a claim which rests to a considerable extent, if not entirely, upon the facts surveyed in this book. If, then, we are to judge the value of the claim, we must, obviously, familiarize ourselves with the facts involved, which hitherto have been, not indeed obscure, but much less clearly recorded than, as a result of Mr. Sansom's work, they are now.

The chief fact has already been alluded to—namely, that the Japanese mind developed under the tuition and influence of the Chinese mind, conveyed through the Chinese script, which up to the ninth century was the only one Japan had. Not for some time after that was a syllabary, composed of abbreviated Chinese symbols selected to represent one Japanese sound each, employed freely in combination with the Chinese script, and even then the change, though it resulted in a written language which has to be learnt separately from Chinese, left the original medium of literary expression basically the same, readily intelligible to all Japanese who can read and write, and (for many centuries) the sole channel of thought and knowledge.

The latter, of course, as Mr. Sansom shows, were upon arrival in Japan modified by native genius, itself a compound of elements to a large extent indefinable. There is, accordingly, a distinctively Japanese culture, and it includes a recognizably Japanese taste or sense of aesthetic rightness, just as there is an English culture, and a sense of aesthetic rightness, distinct from those of the European Continent. But much more than our culture is Greek and Roman is Japanese culture Chinese, and much more have Japan's mind and spirit commingled with China's than ours with those of Athens and Rome. For apart from the fact that Japan's written language is still largely Chinese, most of her religion came from, or at all events through, China, whereas Greek and Latin, though they have left many marks upon our language, were never to the same extent national mediums of expression; nor was Christianity an expression of the Greek or Roman mind, though it came to us tinged with Hellenistic ideas. Zen Buddhism, on the other hand, the religion which influenced Japan's artistic development most, though in origin Indian, was, in the form in which she received it, Chinese. On this point Mr. Sansom says:

"The word *Zen* is derived, through Chinese, from the Sanscrit *dhyana*, meaning meditation, and the Zen school differs from other sects in holding enlightenment can come only by direct intuitive perception. It does not rely upon the efficacy of a sacred formula or the power of a merciful saviour, but upon the effort of the individual to grasp the meaning of the universe. Logically Zen Buddhism can be traced back to India, but the historical line of transmission is not clear. It probably owes a great deal to early Buddhist thought, in so far as its central idea is the spiritual experience known as Enlightenment (*sambodhi*); but even its reputed history begins only with the arrival in China in A.D. 520 of an Indian monk named Bodhidharma, and is a record of the development of an Indian doctrine under the influence of Chinese thought. It is clearly a manifestation of that habit of the Chinese mind which found another and not very different expression in the mysticism of Lao-tzu; and whatever its origins it ought to be regarded as a peculiarly Far Eastern product."

Not less important to note is the following description which Mr. Sansom gives of the part Confucianism came to play in Japan after the development there (early in the thirteenth century) of Zen Buddhism.

"The official philosophy in Japan in the early Tokugawa period was that of Chu Hi (1130-1200), a leading figure of the important philosophical renaissance which took place in China under the Sung Dynasty. The canon of this school was Chu Hi's commentary on the works of the Chinese sages, entitled in Japanese *Shisho Shinchu*, or A New Commentary on the Four Classics. . . . Under the Tokugawa régime the Chu Hi philosophy was virtually adopted as the official school of thought, and Hayashi Razan, its chief exponent, was appointed adviser to the government. From this time, it is said, Confucian scholars let their hair grow long. This curious item of history is highly significant. Hitherto learning had been associated with the Church, and scholars had shaved their heads like priests; but now Confucian studies were no longer the recreation of learned monks. The Confucian philosophy had no official status, and it may almost be regarded as having achieved the position of an established religion. Confucianism in one form or another displaced Buddhism in the esteem of the educated classes, and Buddhism seems to have succumbed without a struggle. Buddhist observances were not generally abandoned, but the strictest Confucianists were as bitterly opposed to Buddhism as to Christianity, and they followed

a strict Confucian ritual which included canonical reverence to the memory of the Chinese sages and obeisance at a shrine of Confucius. Such shrines were erected at official expense and even visited officially for worship by the Shoguns themselves. In other ways the administration was at great pains to promote Confucian studies. An academy had been founded in 1633, and this became in 1690 the college named Shohei-ko (after the birthplace of Confucius, which is called in Japanese Sho-bei), the University of Yedo. The office of Rector of this college was always held by a member of the Hayashi family, who thus became, so to speak, hereditary philosophers to the Shogunate, and were official advisers on ethics and education. They were all uncompromising adherents of the Chu Hsi system. We shall see that other systems were studied in Japan, but it was the Chu Hsi philosophy which enjoyed the widest acceptance and the monopoly of official patronage. It was the orthodox school, and despite extremely strong counter-currents it remained the most influential throughout the eighteenth and even the nineteenth century. There is good ground for thinking that no single body of doctrine has had such a powerful effect in Japan upon thought and behaviour among the educated class. Buddhism, of course, was an important vehicle of culture for a thousand years, and has left a deep mark on popular sentiment, but when one considers how venerable was its tradition and how widespread its beliefs, it is surprising to find how few traces of its direct influence are visible in the culture of the Yedo period. As for Christianity, despite its one time prosperity, it vanished from the scene, and among the ruling classes survived only as the bitter memory of a pernicious faith."

Interesting as these facts are from an academic point of view, they are hardly less so from the practical one. For, as I have recently said elsewhere,* they suggest the question, Are the Japanese coming home? Is their recent acquisition of political control over Manchuria and Jehol, in other words, the consequence not merely of urgent economic needs—the only cause which has so far received general consideration—but also the renewed expression of the cultural forces which attracted the Manchus to China and before them other invaders?

The question needs to be considered in connexion with what Mr. Sansom says regarding the racial composition of the Japanese. He writes:

"The Stone Age in Japan is thought by some scholars to have persisted until not later than about 1000 a.c., but others believe it to have continued until much nearer the Christian era. Following (after an interval which cannot be closely estimated) upon the age of the shell mounds, which are the chief repositories of neolithic remains, comes the age of the sepulchral mounds. These are found principally in Western and Central Japan. They consist of great earth heaps over a dolmen of stones and contain, in the tomb itself, vases almost identical in form and decoration with the Yayoi vases, but technically superior, harder, and nearly always moulded on the wheel, jewels, mirrors, weapons, and other objects of bronze and iron. Outside the mounds, but evidently associated with them, are found clay figures (known as *haniwa*). The clay figures of the neolithic age were misshapen and grimacing objects probably intended to ward off evil spirits. Those of the later sepulchral mounds represent sometimes animals (in particular horses), but usually men and women with oval faces and regular features, wearing sleeved robes and ornaments such as necklaces and earrings, and having the hair somewhat elaborately dressed, or covered with a coil or other headgear. The faces were coloured, in definite places, usually red. The *haniwa* are as a rule in the form of cylinders surmounted by a bust, so that the complete costume is not often represented; but the general impression they give is of

* See the May issue (1933) of *The Nineteenth Century and After*.

the dress of northern Asiatics, and not of peoples from tropical regions. The weapons are for the most part of a continental type, Mongolian or Chinese, and though certain knives are thought to resemble the Malay kris they can equally well be related to weapons found in North-East Asia. The arrow known as the *narikaburaya*, or humming-bulb, is a characteristic weapon of the period of the sepulchral mounds, and is definitely of Asiatic origin. The armour, helmets, and horse-trappings, of iron and bronze, indubitably show a debt either to China or to Mongolia, and not to any southern culture."

A little further on Mr. Sansom says:

"We may conclude with some certainty that the country was inhabited at the end of the neolithic age by peoples of the stock known to ethnologists, or rather to philologists, as Ural-Altaic, a stock including Finns, Samoyedes, Huns, Tungusic tribes and Mongols; that successive immigrations from North-East Asia took place, probably through Korea; and that, as time progressed, among the immigrants were an increasing number who had, in their land of origin or during their migration, come under the influence of a bronze or iron culture. That the influence in question was predominantly Chinese can hardly be doubted, and that it was increasingly Chinese from the zenith of the Han dynasty is certain."

And on page 26 the author remarks:

"Most recent European writers assume that the clans which set forth from Kyushu to conquer Central Japan were of Malay stock; but there is a good deal to be said for the hypothesis that the leaders of the expedition were, like the Idzumo people, of Mongolian origin, and had crossed over from Korea by the straits of Tsushima. . . . It is, however, almost certain that there were in Kyushu at the same time large numbers of people of southern origin. Some scholars describe them vaguely as Malays; others bring to bear strong arguments to prove that they were of tribes akin to the Miao and other aboriginals of South China, whence they arrived direct or by way of Formosa and the Luchu Islands. It is quite likely that some of the fighting forces which took part in the expedition to Yamato were warlike people of this type who had allied themselves with the Kyushu leaders. All these questions are still in dispute, and we had better content ourselves with assuming that, in varying proportions, elements from almost all parts of the eastern coasts of Asia were present in the population of Japan at the opening of the Christian epoch."

Thus the question, Are the Japanese coming home? fanciful as to many it may seem at first sight, rests upon two sets of facts. In so far, indeed, as the Japanese have assumed control over Manchuria (and have now acquired control of Vladivostok and the Chinese Eastern Railway), they have in actuality arrived home. The question, however, embraces more than that undeniable fact. It includes the further questions: (a) Can they make themselves comfortable? and (b) Are they going to co-operate with China and make Far Eastern affairs a family matter, or will the bitter hostility which exists between the two countries at the moment prove stronger than their intellectual, moral, and sentimental affinities? The Japanese themselves appear to have little doubt either of their ability to make themselves comfortable or their capacity, when the present hostile phase is over, to co-operate with the Chinese. If they are right, the rising generation of English-speaking peoples, or at all events the next one, is likely to see big changes in political and economic conditions in that part of the world.

Accordingly a study of Mr. Sanson's admirable book is well worth while. It will be found to include a great deal of valuable information of a sociological and economic character, deftly combined with strictly cultural history; and if its arrangement by periods rather than movements is apt occasionally to seem tedious (like too frequent halts for map reading in country that calls for a swinging, unchecked walk), it results, in the end, in a satisfactory feeling of thoroughness and grasp.

E. M. GULL.

Natural History of Central Asia. Vol. I: The New Conquest of Central Asia. A Narrative of the Explorations of the Central Asiatic Expeditions in Mongolia and China, 1921-1930. By Roy Chapman Andrews, A.M., Sc.D. With chapters by Walter Granger, Sc.D., Chief Palaeontologist; Clifford H. Pope, B.S., Herpetologist; Nels C. Nelson, M.L., Archaeologist. With 128 plates and 12 illustrations in the text and 3 maps at end. Published by the American Museum of Natural History, Henry Fairfield Osborn, President. New York, 1932.

As there are so very few of us who can visit the Gobi Desert, Dr. Andrews has done his best to bring it to us. By means of illuminating letterpress and a splendid set of illustrations which include panoramic views, a very good idea can be gained of the whole terrain involved. Book-making could hardly reach a higher pitch of excellence than in this lordly tome. The series of expeditions which have done so much to explore the scientifically unknown fields of Mongolia and parts of China owe their inception to two men—Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews and Professor H. F. Osborn.

Dr. Andrews, who had been engaged in the study of Cetaceans principally along the coasts of Asia, decided to abandon that work for the broader field of land exploration. He was one of a band of young men who had as their chief Professor Osborn, President of the American Museum of Natural History, by whom they were guided and stimulated in the field work which has brought America into the forefront of geographical research. *En passant* we might mention that another leading disciple of the same chief is Stefansson, the famous Arctic explorer. Over twenty years ago Professor Osborn had predicted that Asia would prove to have been a great dispersal centre for northern terrestrial mammalian life, and when Dr. Andrews unfolded his plan for expeditions, to bring to the American Natural History Museum in New York extensive zoological collections from Asia, he was assured of the Professor's enthusiastic support. It was in these circumstances that he undertook the first Asiatic Expedition in 1916-1917 to Yunnan in South-West China and the borders of Tibet and Burma.

This Expedition not only brought back large zoological collections, but served to crystallize in Dr. Andrews' mind plans for work on a much broader scale. His journey along the edge of the great Central Asian plateau fired his imagination and enthusiasm to launch an attack upon that land of mystery: to discover whether or not it was the mother of northern mammalian life. And several trips across Mongolia convinced him that it was the place in which to start an intensive scientific attack upon Central Asia.

It was on these lines that he made his basic plans for the Expedition. The main problem was to be a study of the geologic history of Central Asia: to find whether it had been the nursery of many of the dominant groups of animals, including the human race, and to reconstruct its past climate, vegetation, and general physical conditions, particularly in relation to the evolution of man.

This could only be done by bringing to bear on the problem every branch of

science which could possibly assist in its solution, by the aid of men of high technical ability who would work in the field together, for correlated work was to be the basis of the whole organization. This method resulted in practice even better than it gave promise of doing in theory. "As we sat in the mess tent at night discussing the day's work, it was most interesting to see how puzzling situations in geology would be clarified by the palaeontologist, how the topographer brought out important features which gave the key to physiographic difficulties, and how the palaeontologist would be assisted by the palaeobotanist or geologist in solving stratigraphic problems."

The book shows how admirably Dr. Andrews succeeded in his plans. He was no theoretical leader. Gifted with indefatigable energy, splendid power of organization, and a personality which inspired loyalty, he led successive expeditions to the scene of their labours and brought them safely back, often through bandit-ridden regions. In the intervals he undertook extensive lecture tours, which were the chief source of the funds required to make them practicable.

Up to the time of the first journey the fossil history of Central Asia was completely unknown except for some British discoveries of interest in India and the finding of a single "rhinoceros" tooth in Mongolia in 1894 by the Russian explorer Obruchev.

This Volume I. is written to give the layman a comprehensive view of the Central Asiatic Expeditions, and it leaves the details of the discoveries to the series of volumes which will follow. A study of the collections and data is continuing energetically, and new facts are being elucidated almost every month.

Dr. Andrews tells how the work was done and describes the country traversed, the daily life in camp and on the trail, the transport by camels and motor-cars, and the principal discoveries in the branches of science represented.

A good selection from the "many thousand still photographs" illustrates various aspects of the Expeditions' activities, as well as almost every phase of Mongolian life, so that we are given a permanent record of a rapidly vanishing culture which is of great value.

The following is a brief synopsis of the work which was carried out:

In 1921 there were preliminary trips of China proper.

During 1922 a journey was made from the sea coast straight across Mongolia to the forests of the northern edge, a thousand miles across the plateau northward to the Arctic Divide, during which it was found that the Gobi is essentially a rock desert with sand-dune belts only in restricted areas. Geologically there was found an exceedingly complex series of ancient rocks carrying the story back to the very dawn of geologic history.

Palaeontologically some of the richest fossil fields on the earth were discovered. These revealed several new families and a great many new genera and species, which indicated three categories of the Mongolian fossil fauna: First, animals that originated in Asia and never strayed outside its limits; second, animals that originated in Asia and migrated to America or Europe; third, animals that originated in America and migrated to Asia.

Zoologically several thousand mammals were collected, which gave an unrivalled collection from North and Central Mongolia.

Three additional expert fossil collectors joined the 1923 Expedition. The chief feature this time was the finding of Mongolian tinctorines, an extinct family of peculiar hoofed animals, which showed the most striking resemblances to the forms of those of corresponding horizons in North America, thus demonstrating clearly that there must have been a land connection between Asia and America which acted as a migration route.

This discovery was a personal triumph for Professor Osborn, who had said to Dr. Andrews in New York: "Make a careful search for titanotheres. I am convinced you will find early types in Central Asia."

The 1923 Expedition had headed for the Iren Dabasu Basin, 260 miles north of Kalgan, and this place proved to be a mine of palaeontological wealth. Baluchtherium remains were found not far from the Basin, and in a cretaceous ridge there were the bones of both flesh-eating and herbivorous dinosaurs, reptiles of the bipedal, duck-bill iguanodont type. The complete hind limb of a large carnivorous dinosaur was found. These all flourished in large numbers during the cretaceous period in Asia, the Age of Reptiles, "approximately one hundred million years ago."

But the chief thrill came with the discovery in July, 1923, of dinosaur eggs, which were found in such abundance along with the remains of so many hundred dinosaurs that it was evident this region was a concentration point for the reptiles, at least during the breeding season.

A superb skull of a gigantic beast was found, which was named *Andrewsarchus Mongoliensis* by Professor Osborn, who declared it to be the largest terrestrial carnivore which had thus far been discovered in any part of the world.

A special feature of the 1925 Expedition was the topographical work. It was decided to make a more accurate survey than any other that had been previously attempted on the Central Asian plateau, as the Russian map on which all the existing maps of Mongolia are based had proved very unreliable. Further fossil discoveries were made, including the exciting find of archaic mammal skulls of animals which were a distinct link in the evolution of mammals that followed the extinction of the large terrestrial and aquatic reptiles.

One of the most dramatic moments in the life-history of the world was the destruction of the reptilian dynasties, which occurred with apparent suddenness at the close of the cretaceous period, the very last chapter in the Age of Reptiles.

There were also found fossilized remains of a peculiar beast known as the chalicotheres, a veritable paradox. It was a "clawed-hoofed animal." The head and neck were like those of a horse, the teeth like those of a rhinoceros, and the feet like nothing else on earth. Instead of hoofs the creature was armed with claws.

Much palaeobotanical and botanical work was done in this Expedition, nearly five hundred species being collected.

Civil war prevented the 1926 and 1927 Expeditions, and it was not till 1928 that Dr. Andrews and his staff could resume their labours. In April of that year they set out to make a further exploration to the west, to discover a new route which would lead to Chinese Turkestan without going into Outer Mongolia by what is known as the Great Mongolian Road. This western trip brought them to a very desolate and miserable country, and as no important results were being obtained it was decided to make for Eastern Mongolia, where success at last was obtained. The fossil bones of a new giant baluchtherium were discovered; it must have been a colossal animal, as the humerus was as thick as a man's body and three and a half feet in length. The radius was five feet long. Later the lower jaw of a shovel-tusked mastodon, *platybelodon*, was found. Observations were made on the Dune Dwellers, a race which has entirely disappeared with not even any discoverable human remains; only residence sites are left, and in sufficient number to show that 20,000 years ago Mongolia was much more densely populated by these Stone Age people than it is to-day by Mongols.

The chief feature of the 1930 Expedition was the discovery of the skulls of

big bull mastodons and the skulls and parts of the skeletons of a big mother shovel-tusked mastodon and her baby. Twenty-five ivory tusks were taken out.

At the close of the 1930 season the Central Asian Expeditions had to say good-bye to Mongolia. Chinese opposition blocked the road to further investigation by foreigners in a way that Dr. Andrews with all his diligent persuasiveness could not overcome. This was a scientific tragedy, for the splendid results had made him more than ever convinced that Central Asia is a paleontological Garden of Eden.

Space forbids more than the mention of other explorations throughout China, during which large collections of flora and fauna and fossil bones were made. Neolithic sites were found which yielded many specimens, and much important work of prime importance for archaeological science was done.

The volume ends with a summary of what the Expeditions did in which all the salient points are discussed, and there is added a symposium by various authors on the unsolved problems in Central Asia.

The chief difficulty of this review has lain in the art of compression. There is so much in the volume of absorbing interest and importance for all those of us whose knowledge of Central Asia is as yet comparatively rudimentary: we have not been able to reach back to its foundations. Dr. R. C. Andrews, his able lieutenant Dr. Walter Granger, the Chief Paleontologist, and the members of his scientific and technical staff have laid us under a distinct debt, and it is pleasant to feel that British recognition of their labours has been given in no ungrudging manner, and that we admit our indebtedness to them. The only word of criticism lies in the size and weight of the volume, which preclude its use except on a library table: it weighs seven pounds. Perhaps if a popular edition is demanded, as it well might be, the paper could be of lighter texture, and the appendices, which consist of the bibliography, publications, and list of contributors, could be eliminated.

If there be any among us with a longing for fresh fields to conquer, a study of the unsolved problems at the end of the book will give food for thought and supply a stimulus for further exploration of Central Asia. At present China blocks the way, but perhaps the new political rearrangements, the buffer North China State, and the new Manchukuo may remove the obstructions which proved too much for Dr. Andrews and his Central Asiatic Expeditions.

G. D. G.

Russia and Asia. By Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Assistant Professor of History in the University of California at Los Angeles. 9" x 6". Pp. 334. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1933. 14s.

The expansion of Russia across Asia is a political phenomenon of the first magnitude, comparable only with that of the United States across the Continent of North America and of England overseas. Manifestly its story cannot be told in any detail in a book of 313 pages. Nor indeed has our author essayed to do this. His aim is different. It might have, and to some extent has, been achieved within the compass to which he has confined himself. His book is about the same size as that with which Seeley startled the world fifty years ago, and, like it, is based upon a course of lectures. These were given in 1931. It seeks first "to stimulate interest in a field of historical research which has not received the attention it deserves," and it claims to have viewed the problem as one continuous historical process. "In history," said Seeley, "writing depends upon turning narrative into problems." In neither respect, to be frank, has Prince Lobanov's book the same power as either Seeley's *Expansion of England* or *The Epic of*

America, by James Truslow Adams. It is at once less dynamic and less penetrating than either. Now and again it is true, as becomes one who bears the name of a former Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Lobanov speaks with authority as an exponent of Russian policy, and his narrative throughout seems to aim at candour and sincerity. But he seldom gets to the root of things. For example, he names (p. 37) as the four driving forces which impelled Russia eastwards:

- (1) The desire for security against Tartar aggression;
- (2) A growing consciousness of an imperial destiny inherited from Byzantium;
- (3) The Cossack quest of adventure;
- (4) Commercial enterprise.

But who can doubt that the really dominant factor was the deep unconscious urge of the Russian peoples towards the vacant spaces beyond the eastern horizon, just such an impulse as kept the American frontier moving steadily westward until it came out on the shores of the Pacific and set the ships of England on all the seven seas and her traders and adventurers in the uttermost parts of the earth? The wiser rulers of Russia knew how to harness and use this impulse, but when it brought them to the Far East, where the spaces were no longer vacant, the urge ceased and the drive ended—disastrously for Russia. In the best chapter of the book (Chapter X., "Far Eastern Affairs and the Russo-Japanese War") he does give a glimpse of this, just as he does handle with some insight the Russian conquest of Central Asia. But a couple of sentences, taken from the *Cambridge Modern History*, are really more revealing, as regards Central Asian affairs, than Prince Lobanov's whole story. They run: "She (Russia) was urged irresistibly onward in spite of her oft-repeated protests, genuine enough at the time when they were uttered, that her chief desire was to know where to stop. But Sher Ali (the then Amir of Afghanistan) could not be expected to realize what only the coolest heads in England were capable of understanding."

This lack of understanding has by no means been confined to English heads, and it is in keeping that, while the author has some very just observations (pp. 161 and 180) on the absurdity of some British apprehensions and misapprehensions excited by "the Russian bogey," as he calls it, he himself in many passages discloses precisely the same attitude of mind, attributing to the British the possession of malice, energy, activity, strength, and intelligence (in both senses of the word) in a measure which would have been truly superhuman.

The book closes with a search for conclusions, but the final chapter is, somewhat disappointingly, devoted mainly to the exposure of two prevalent opinions, which the author describes as fallacious. The first is that the Soviet Revolution has resulted in the return of Russia to Asia, and the second that "the Russians are not a nation, but a medley of races with a powerful ingredient of purely Asiatic elements." No one not willingly blind could deny the existence of a Russian nation with a very distinctive culture of its own, but it is perhaps rash to be too positive about the other point. Our author himself says (p. 313): "In order to survive, Russians will have to bleed and fertilize their cultural soil with both European and Asiatic ingredients. Thus this new culture will powerfully influence Asia as well; and since the rôle that Asia is playing in world affairs is rapidly growing in importance, it will possibly be through her influence in Asia that Russia will affect world destinies."

The transmutation of Arabic names adopted in the book is wholly unsystematic. How can Jelal u Sin (p. 19), Nasr Ed Din (p. 197), Muzzfar u Din (p. 251), and Nazir ul Mulk (p. 251) be simultaneously justified?

E. H.

The Tinder Box of Asia. By George E. Sokolsky. 8½" x 5½". Pp. ix+376. Maps. Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

Mr. George Sokolsky, an American citizen, has written a most informative and original book in *The Tinder Box of Asia*, published by Messrs. George Allen and Unwin. Mr. Sokolsky is described as the *New York Times* expert on the Far East, but he was also for some years on the staff of the *North China Daily News*, a British daily published in Shanghai. Mr. Sokolsky has succeeded, where many have failed, in presenting a fair and unbiassed statement about the differences existing between the Chinese and the Japanese.

Mr. Sokolsky writes a preface to the English edition in which he acknowledges the important part Great Britain has played in the development of trade in the Far East, and the civilizing effect of that trade development. Perhaps he rather exaggerates the importance of the American stake in China, but generally overstatement is conspicuous by its absence. He is at his best in his chapter on Manchuria, though he cannot be looked upon as such an authority on this province (or country?) as Owen Lattimore (*cf. Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*).

I should say few individuals have had such intimate personal contacts as Mr. Sokolsky with all shades of opinion, from Japanese, white, pink, and red Chinese, to scarlet Russian. The author points out, as the writer of this review has often done, the peaceful penetration of Russia into Mongolia and Chinese Turkistan while the world looks on unmoved—and no one less moved than the Chinese themselves—the reason for lack of objection being given that Russia is not a member of the League. This seems rather like arguing that "if my friend hits me over the head I shall object, but if an enemy, 'well, what can I do?'" There is a Chinese proverb which says: "We cannot prevent the birds of sadness from flying over our heads, but we can prevent them from nesting in our hair." China seems determined to look on the Russian penetration as one of the birds of sadness which is flying over their heads.

Mr. Sokolsky's last chapter on Communism in China strikes a melancholy last note. He says: "The future of a China divided between Communists in the South and feudal lords in the North, with foreign troops at Shanghai and in Manchuria, is not a pleasing spectacle. It means years of civil warfare." Who shall say that he is wrong? I commend *The Tinder Box of Asia* to all students of the Far Eastern situation, and to all those who would arrive at an appreciation of Pacific problems.

H. StC. S.

Manchuria Year Book 1932-33.

The *Manchuria Year Book*, 1932-33, published by the East Asiatic Economic Investigation Bureau, is a "monumental tome" stuffed full of information. It is an example of Japanese thoroughness and deals exhaustively with Industry, Agriculture, Fisheries, Mining, Currencies, Foreign Investments, Education, Sanitation, and Social Welfare Institutions.

There is an interesting chronology (Appendix II.) covering the period January, 1931, to October, 1932.

In connection with railways, one learns that the South Manchurian Railway Company's works at Shabokuo manufactured during the year 157 rolling stock units and repaired nearly 4,000. These repairs were undertaken not only for the South Manchurian but for other railways. These important railway shops and other factories at Mukden and Antung mark the beginning of Manchuria's industrial era.

The information about labour is useful and surprising; the book is, in short, a valuable contribution to the reference books of the Far East, and should be on the shelves of any institution or individual with Far Eastern interests.

H. StC. S.

Japan, Mistress of the Pacific? By Col. P. T. Etherton and H. Hessel Tiltman. 9½" x 6". Pp. 302. Illustrations and maps. Jarrolds. 1933. 16s.

Japan, Mistress of the Pacific? is an imposing-looking volume, and some of the illustrations are good. The book may be of some assistance to the uninformed, but of the matter one feels, after a careful reading, that it has not added much to the sum total of one's knowledge of the complex Pacific problem. There does not appear to be much original thought in the book. Its size is helped by liberal excerpts from *The Times* and other authorities.

The chapter entitled "The Menace of Numbers" has been far better dealt with in *The Japanese Population Problem*, by W. R. Crocker. At the beginning of this chapter our late Allies are described in the words "the figure of a little yellow man"—a sentence which borders on the offensive.

The chapter on "How Rich is Japan?" has some interesting figures, and the tax burden of £1 1s. 5d. per head compares favourably with most nations: from the £15 15s. 10d. of Great Britain to the £4 13s. 4d. of the U.S.A., though, of course, such comparison leaves out of account the purchasing power of money in the different countries. Income tax in Japan varies from 0·8 per cent. on incomes of 1,200 yen to 36 per cent. on incomes of 5,000,000 yen. A fair comparison may be made on this percentage basis with Great Britain's standard rate of 25 per cent. to the maximum of 41·2 per cent. (including surtax).

Glimpses of the obvious abound, such as: "One day Japan may be all-powerful; a further increase in the size of her armed forces (especially in the air) is almost certain to take place, failing world disarmament."

A very sharp and efficient instrument has been employed by Col. Etherton or Mr. Tiltman, or both, for splitting quite inoffensive infinitives.

To sum up, the book has a few oases of fact in a desert of conjecture, and has been produced at a time when there is perhaps a demand for such literature.

H. StC. S.

The Hazards of Asia's Highlands and Deserts. By Walter Bosshard. 8½" x 5½". Pp. 139. Illustrations. London: Figurehead Press, 18, Adam Street. 5s.

This little book of 139 pages would appear to be the fifth volume of "The Pioneer Series"—the previous volumes being issued at 2s. and the present at 5s. net, and we are informed that with this volume the series "enters on a new life." It is illustrated by fifteen plates, with which no fault can be found, and two small-scale maps showing river courses and heights of passes and places in fact. It cannot be said that the reader is likely to get thrills of any kind by the perusal of this modest account of one side of the Trinkler Asian Expedition's experiences. Walter Bosshard was the non-scientific member of the party, the other two being Dr. E. Trinkler, its scientific leader, and Dr. H. de Terra, the geologist. The author tells us that "it is his aim to relate his own experiences in simple words and not to present his observations to a critically inclined public, but solely that he might be able to communicate his impressions and experiences fresh to a

restricted circle of friends." Bearing this in mind, the narrative is readable, though the impression left is often one of confusion owing to the absence of a consecutive thread. The story seems disjointed and hardly bears out the somewhat ambitious title. There is one criticism your reviewer cannot omit, and that is that neither author, publisher, nor printer has given an A.D. date. The author occasionally gives us the day of the month, and that is the sum total of guidance the reader is allowed to have. But there surely is no excuse for the absence of any reference to the date of publishing or printing. It ought to be a penal offence for any book to be published without a date on the title-page, and in a case such as the one under review the reader should surely be informed in what year or years the journeys described took place. With the author's troubles with the suspicious Chinese one can well sympathize. Most travellers in Chinese territory have the same tale to tell, and the methods of the celestial officers do not seem to vary much through the years. A footnote on the peculiarities of Kirghiz cemeteries would have been useful. On page 35 we read: "A sweetish smell in Kengshawar, which Dr. de Terra followed up, finally led him to a big Kirghiz cemetery." Those of us who are unacquainted with Kirghiz cemeteries would, I feel sure, be grateful for enlightenment. Perhaps the last chapter is the best, if only because it gives a really consecutive story, and the author shows us a glimpse of his powers of descriptive narrative. We almost feel as relieved as he evidently was when he finally left the inhospitable Chinese for the Soviets' land, even if his landlady at one halt had "pedantic features."

J. T. W. P.

The Tragedy of Amanullah. By Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah. 10" x 6½". Pp. xiv + 274. Illustrations. Alexander-Ouseley, Ltd. 1933. 18s.

It is now four years since the ill-fated King Amanullah was ignominiously driven from his kingdom by the general revolt of his outraged subjects; the interval has seen the short-lived Reign of Terror under the bandit usurper Bacc'ha Sakha and the restoration of the Durani ruling family in the person of the wise and patriotic present King, Muhammad Nadir Shah. In *The Tragedy of Amanullah* Sirdar Ikbāl Ali Shah, whose books on the Middle East are familiar to members of this Society, describes with inner knowledge and wide outlook the course of events from Amanullah's seizure of the throne on the murder of his father, Habib-Ullah, in February, 1919, till the "curtain rings down upon the greatest tragedy that has ever been visited upon the God-gifted Kingdom of Kabul."

The narrative is the more interesting because it is written from the standpoint of a patriotic Afghan who, while proud of his country and its independence, is not blind to its shortcomings—suspicion, faction, family jealousies, tribal feuds, occasional fanaticism—and from long residence in India, England, and in Islamic countries, is in a position to view the problem of Afghanistan in its proper perspective.

The summary of Afghan history from the second Afghan War (1880-81) is admirably lucid and impartial. The career and policy of the great Amir Abdur Rahman, the real founder of a unified Afghanistan, are vividly described, and the Sirdar has done well in letting that great master of statecraft speak for himself. His "advice to my successors" sums up the difficulties of an Oriental ruler and the methods of coping with them in a manner recalling Machiavelli's "Il Principe."

Abdur Rahman succeeded because of his virile personality, unflagging energy, and intuitive recognition of how far he could go with a stiff-necked people and an ignorant, suspicious priesthood in breaking up the feudal and tribal system and

making himself like our Henry VIII.—with whom he had much in common—supreme in Church and State. His son and grandson failed because they lacked these qualities. Abdur Rahman's views on constitutional government are of value in these days when democracy is assumed to be the sole means of salvation in Oriental countries. He refers to his three estates of the Realm: the Sirdars, or hereditary aristocracy; the Khawasin Mulki, or Commons; and the Mullahs, or clergy. But he makes it clear that their functions are purely consultative, and that "so far they have not attained the ability or education to qualify them for being entrusted with authority of any importance"; he urges on his successors "never to become the puppets of these representatives," and that all constitutional, legislative, and social changes should be adopted gradually and only as the people become accustomed to modern ideas. What a valuable witness Abdur Rahman would be before the Joint Committee now dealing with the Indian Reforms Scheme! It is interesting to find that he looked forward to Afghanistan one day becoming "a greater attraction than even Switzerland to travellers," adding that "to encourage travellers is one way to bring happiness and prosperity to my people"; also that he cherished the idea of one day securing a footing on the ocean, somewhere on the Baluchistan coast, by negotiation with the British, on lease or by exchange of territory.

The chapter on Amir Habib-Ullah is also vivid and full of interest. That rather easy-going and genial ruler was in advance of Afghan sentiment in his desire to cultivate close and friendly relations with the British Government; for the Afghan people had some historical reasons to be suspicious of their powerful Russian and British neighbours. The refusal to accept an Afghan Minister in London helped to strengthen this feeling; and the settlement of the Durand line by the Dane Mission in 1904, as a result of which the Amir subsidy was raised from 12 to 18 lakhs, was regarded rather as a solatium to the Amir personally than a concession to growing national feeling. The friendly visit of the Amir to India, where his charm of manner made a most favourable impression on all who came in contact with him—including the writer of this review—and his initiation there as a Freemason gave further offence to the reactionary elements in Afghanistan; while the employment of many foreign experts to train his own people in the arts of progress increased the suspicion that he was over-inclined to the ways of the West.

The author is doubtless correct in holding that "the first indication of pleasure-loving is usually the first death knell of an Afghan King," and even before the Great War Habib-Ullah's fondness for show, sport, and the amenities of the West had made him unpopular with many sections, while his tolerance and leniency were regarded as weakness.

One of Abdur Rahman's injunctions to his successors was to "maintain good faith at all costs." Habib-Ullah's good faith was put to the severest test in the Great War, especially when the Turco-German Mission appeared at Kabul in October, 1915, and every inducement was offered to him to join the Central Powers against England and her allies—among them Tsarist Russia. According to the Sirdar, the entire Afghan Court favoured such an anti-British alliance; "the Amir was in a majority (minority?) of one, but carried the day." He was able to keep his word and maintain his neutrality by insisting on terms which he knew the Central Powers could not fulfil. These included the payment of £20,000,000 sterling, "50,000 pieces of artillery" (obviously a mistake for 500), 100,000 rifles, with ammunition and military stores in proportion. Rumour at the time added that he also demanded that a Turco-German army of 100,000 should join in the attack on India, knowing that this was an impossible condition. At the

same time he undoubtedly sent a secret message to the Viceroy through the British envoy at Kabul to this effect: "Tell your Government that I am their loyal friend, and if in any of my actions or utterances they see anything that seems contrary to this, tell them that is being done on purpose. My position is very difficult." Anyhow, he kept his word, even though later it was to cost him his life, and his neutrality was of immense service to the allied cause. How far he stipulated for a *quid pro quo* is not publicly known. The author refers to a "secret agreement" with England and Russia by which the Amir was to receive back the three districts of Roshan, Darwaz, and Shignan from Russia, while England was to renounce control over his foreign relations and pay a large sum of money. He suggests that it was the delay in carrying out this agreement, owing to the collapse of Russia and other reasons, that aroused the national sentiment and led to the attempt on the Amir's life at the birthday celebration of October, 1918, and to his murder at Jalalabad a few months later. But his name will always be held in honour as a ruler who maintained good faith at all costs.

The causes which led to Habib-Ullah's murder and the circumstances under which his third son, Amanullah, seized the throne over the heads of his elder brothers were determining factors in the ultra-nationalist and anti-British policy which he displayed from the start. He won over the army and the Mullahs by promises of increased pay and allowances, and captured nationalist feeling by his first proclamation announcing complete external and internal independence. This was emphasized in his letter of March 3, 1919, to the Viceroy announcing his succession and suggesting "such agreements and treaties as may be useful and serviceable in the way of *commercial gains and advantages* to our Government and yours." The author comments adversely on the fact that the Viceroy did not reply to this letter till April 15. But surely that delay was not excessive, in view, firstly, of the doubt at that stage whether Amanullah's title was securely established; and, secondly, of the importance of the issue raised by the fact (known at once to the British authorities) that early in April he had ordered a general mobilization, which could have only one object; while on April 7 he himself and his foreign minister and evil genius, Mahmud Tarzi, addressed two separate letters to Lenin, President of the Bolshevik Republic, couched in the most friendly and even subservient terms. Amanullah in his letter says: "Hitherto Afghanistan has stood apart from all other nations, but now that Russia has raised the standard of Bolshevism, he hastens to declare he has earned the gratitude of the whole world—he expresses hope that the honoured President of the Russian Republic will not refuse the friendly greeting of Your friend, Amanullah." Clearly Amanullah, violating all the engagements of his father and grandfather, had determined on war with England, partly to gain popularity at home and divert attention from the weakness of his title, and partly because he thought the widespread disturbances in India in April, 1919, following on Gandhi's anti-British agitation, would make the peoples of India regard him as a heaven-sent deliverer. The Sirdar has not referred to his intrigues with the revolutionary sections in India, the efforts of his agents there to corrupt the Indian press, to arm and subsidize the revolutionaries, and to the campaign of lying propaganda pursued under his directions. After April 10 there was a state of armed rebellion in parts of the Central Punjab and martial law was proclaimed on the 13th at the writer's instance. It was all-important to smash the local rising before the Afghan invasion, intended to synchronize with it, could materialize, and, in fact, that was accomplished by April 25, a week before the Afghan armies crossed the frontier. But it was a near thing. An impressive summary of all these machinations is given in the Proclamation of the Viceroy (Lord Chelmsford) on May 20 announc-

ing to the peoples of India the outbreak of war owing to Afghan aggression at three vital points on the frontier and invoking their assistance in repelling invasion. The response was prompt; instead of an oppressed country welcoming him as a liberator, Amanullah found an army of 200,000 barring the way. His treacherous stab in the back failed; his armies were soon put to flight everywhere but on the Kurram front, where General Nadir Khan, the present King, showed signal military capacity and initiative in pushing on from Khost and beleaguering a British garrison at Thall. Thall was relieved on June 1 by that gallant soldier the late General Dyer. The treacherous invasion had failed all along the line; Jalalabad was threatened by our victorious troops; Kabul was bombed by our aeroplanes; the guilty author of all this bloodshed was driven to sue for an armistice. It is not here necessary to criticize the leniency of the terms laid down by the victor, or the policy of the subsequent peace-treaty by which Amanullah lost nothing but the subsidy, gained his main objective, the removal of British control of foreign relations, and was consequently able to proclaim throughout Asia that he had won the war! A "column of victory" was erected at Kabul depicting the overthrow of the British soldier by the Afghan. The vanquished had triumphed, and Amanullah at once sent his envoys over Europe and Asia to announce the fact.

His popularity in Afghanistan was now at its zenith; his opportunity was greater than an Afghan ruler had ever enjoyed; but the man himself had little brains, no judgment of men, no stability of character. Success turned his head, encouraged his over-weening vanity and self-confidence, and led him to pursue that programme of ill-considered reform and ill-judged innovations which steadily alienated one section after another of his people and finally led to his inglorious downfall. The successive stages are clearly described by the author. Long before his journey to Europe in 1927-28, Amanullah had evidently resolved to model his policy on that so successfully pursued by Mustapha Kemal in Turkey; but he lacked the great military prestige and the indomitable force of character of the Ghazi, and in attempting to become the complete autocrat he outraged the national sentiment in every direction. Corrupt administration by his ill-chosen favourites, oppressive taxation to pay for his new capital and his European tour, abuses and bribery in the recruiting methods, estranged the aristocracy, the army, and the tribesmen; while his open attacks on the Mullahs for resisting anti-Islamic innovations, such as the abolition of the Purdah, the adoption of Western dress, and the change of the day of rest from Friday to Thursday, gave them reasons for denouncing him as the enemy of religion. Thus from the Mangal rising of 1924 his throne became insecure; and from the date of his return from Europe at the end of 1928 it was clearly tottering.

He came back more determined than ever to pursue his fatal policy of speedy Westernization. Kipling has well written the epitaph of those who try "to hustle the East." Within a year the tribal risings all over the country and the advance of the bandit chief from Kohistan had driven Amanullah to abdicate at Kabul in favour of his elder brother, Inayat-Ullah, and flee to Kandahar. Thence he made another half-hearted attempt to advance on Kabul through Ghazni; but he had none of the qualities of a leader; his troops had little faith in him; he made a hurried retreat from Ghazni, escaped into British territory, and even at the end showed his colossal ignorance by expressing wonder that the Afghans had got rid of such a King! Habib-Ullah lost his life rather than break faith: Amanullah broke his faith and lost his throne. He saved his life, but one must agree with the Sirdar that he would have done better to die fighting in Kabul instead of flying before the usurper. It was left to a man of another calibre, a

capable general and a wise statesman, Muhammad Nadir Shah, to rescue the unhappy country from the oppressive and bloodthirsty usurper, Baccn Sakha, and to evolve what promises to be a stable and orderly government from the chaos that Amanullah created and left behind him. The early stages in that movement have been told by the author, and we may accept his final verdict, attributed to the Baccn before his execution, "The best man has won," and the Sirdar's own comment that "he has come to stay."

The book has some errors of type and a few of its statements might be questioned, but on the whole it is an admirably vivid and instructive account of recent Afghan history, and Afghan history is never dull.

M. F. O'DWYER.

Up from Poverty in Rural India. By D. Spencer Hatch, B.Sc., M.Sc. in Agr., Ph.D., Directing Rural Demonstration, Travancore and Cochin District. Oxford University Press.

Dr. D. Spencer Hatch has written a very remarkable book, and there is no one who has ever been engaged in rural work in India but will agree that he has laid down the principles and explained the practice of rural reconstruction not merely for Martandam or Travancore, but for the whole of India, if not for a still wider field.

The book is divided into four parts. The third part, containing the bulk of the book, describes the Martandam demonstration; the first two parts discuss the problem and the proper way of handling it; while in the fourth and last part he tackles the all-important matter of rural leadership, what it consists of, and how leaders, paid and honorary, should be trained.

From the frontispiece, the foreword—by no less an authority than His Excellency Lord Willingdon—and some of the earlier pages the reader might be led to think that the book was the story of the rescue of "untouchables." This is far from being the case. Great though such work is, this book deals with a far greater subject, the whole problem of rural reconstruction and its practical solution.

"The work at Martandam—at its centre and in its extension area—is comprehensive, helping to benefit all members of rural families, male and female, young and old, of different castes and religions, in all phases of their life—physical, mental, spiritual, social, and economic."

The problem Dr. Hatch describes very moderately in a few extremely well-written sentences which apply more or less to the whole of India, and give the reader food for very serious thought.

The remedy is self-help; but self-help alone will not do—not yet at least. Things have gone too far for that. "Self-help with intimate expert counsel is the way up and out. Through that combination of effort the poverty, backwardness, depression and misery of India must give way to a permanent and growing happier state."

The rest of the book describes not only how this should be done, but how Dr. Hatch has actually done it. There is no vague and frothy philanthropy about Dr. Hatch. In the year 1916 he set to work in perhaps one of the most unpromising places in the world, and in 1932, after sixteen years of incessant toil—one can guess with what heart-breaking disappointments at some times and what unlooked-for and inspiring successes at others—he has put down on paper exactly what he did, why he did it, and with what result.

Dr. Hatch insists on a comprehensive programme, as "the Indian villager is

not much benefited unless he is helped simultaneously in every phase of his life and in regard to every relationship he bears to others."

The oneness of village life has, however, been far too little recognized.

"In India there has not been a comprehensive survey or handling of the rural problem as a whole. We need to get away from the lamentable fragmentation of effort which has resulted in a regrettably small result from the expenditure of public funds, depriving the development movement of its effectiveness. The number of minor officials who now deal piecemeal with his problems the villager cannot understand and often does not trust. They are more likely to exasperate than to awaken him from his present attitude of indifference to progress. Representing different departments, with little co-operation between them and no connected plan of work, one visitor collects revenue, one advocates co-operative credit, another improved seed and new implements, another comes to inoculate cattle and another to vaccinate children, another deals with sanitation, and another inspects the village school."

Village work requires an organization, and this Dr. Hatch has built up—a highly developed centre with extension services in the villages for many miles round. Some of his workers were, of course, salaried, but he succeeded in capturing the enthusiasm of the educated youth of the neighbourhood and trained them to work as honorary helpers. In this way he has trained and educated leaders in every village. His methods, demonstrative and co-operative, are most carefully explained, and he devotes a whole chapter to his methods of teaching rural vocations. The villager is terribly poor, and a sure way to bring him help and to win his confidence is to teach him how to make profitable use of his spare time, and in teaching this Dr. Hatch teaches him a great deal more besides.

The value of the drama as a means of teaching and of bringing new life to the village is fully realized and taken full advantage of, and Dr. Hatch had the good fortune to have in his partner one whose chosen profession had been this art. He has given us a most delightful chapter upon this branch of rural work.

"Interest rose to the point of absolute forgetfulness of self and all their poverty when—could they ever believe it?—across the front of the stage walked a cow—yes, a real one, and then another! One was a well-cared-for cow of the improved breed which we are now making available and the other cow was a small, thin ordinary one of the locality. The cows were accompanied by their owners, who talked about cows; and the cows, through their interpreters, also conversed. The farmers in the audience excitedly nudged their neighbours and began to talk about these unusual utterances of this unusual show, which was dealing in most usual everyday things—cows. Everybody talked at once. Poking each other in the ribs, they repeated what the actors were saying—then listened! The actors could wish for more of silence, but never for a better 'capture' of their audience. The play was an unqualified success—and the audience were learning things so vividly that they never could forget them.

"The curtain went down on this one act play, 'Moo-cow-moo.' Would the inevitable buffoon, the fool, appear in the interim? Here he came right down into the circle in front of the stage. Not one, but two! And one buffoon was a rearing, bucking, splendid, snow-white Surti he-goat, and the other his tall, lanky caretaker. They put on as good a fool show as could be wished, bringing forth that throat-ching laughter so rare in the villages."

Another chapter is devoted to the rural exhibition where the results and wonderful results they are too—of his labours were displayed for all to see, and were used as a powerful means of spreading the good work.

Not only has Dr. Hatch organized a rural reconstruction unit with its branches

extending for miles all round and its influence extending for a hundred miles, but he has organized "schools" and courses, for shorter and longer periods, both for his own workers and for all who care to come from other parts of India or other countries. His classes are crowded, and his courses severely practical and, as we might guess from Dr. Hatch's own methods, extremely systematic and most carefully and thoroughly worked out to give the student the very best training possible in the time available.

All training starts with a survey. It is no use plunging vaguely into rural work; the first thing is to study the terrain and discover what is wrong and how it can be put right. This Dr. Hatch did for himself and makes his pupils do as well.

It is impossible in a review to do justice to Dr. Hatch and his work. His principles are self-help with sympathetic and skilled assistance, a comprehensive programme, highly trained leaders, honorary and salaried, and an organization spreading out from a demonstration centre into every village, and supported in these villages by voluntary educated helpers and the continual visits of the paid secretaries. Rural vocations are taught; there are exhibitions, dramas and libraries, and every other kind of aid is used to socialize and educate and uplift the people. The village community is organized into co-operative societies of all kinds, Y.M.C.A.'s, or whatever other kind of club or association suits their peculiar needs and circumstances.

"The strength of these associations lies in their 'Who's who'; most of them are without buildings and equipment. Their committee-men and members are young men and boys imbued with the spirit of service, above the mean of the village in education and enlightenment, trained in service (by their service in the associations). Young school teachers, lawyers, farmers, high school boys and others are the leaders. They work in their spare time without material reward, and one cannot but marvel at the devotion and amount of time and energy some of them put into this labour of love."

For those who are engaged in rural work, Dr. Hatch's book has the peculiar advantage that Dr. Hatch is blessed with an orderly mind, and he not only can plan and carry out work, but he can describe it clearly and give the reasons for what he does and the principles on which he acts.

The secret of Dr. Hatch's success is undoubtedly his ideal of service, his enthusiasm, and the spiritual appeal of his work, which he has been able to pass on in such measure to his helpers. But to all this Dr. Hatch has added order, method and organization, the "sanctified common-sense" which leaves nothing to chance, and makes the best use of all its resources.

F. L. B.

England's Quest of Eastern Trade. By Sir William Foster, C.I.E. 9" x 5 1/2". Pp. xiv + 354. Maps. A. and C. Black. 1933. 15s.

International questions have never loomed so large as at the present time, and intelligent men and women are perforce led to study their origins more earnestly than ever before. Consequently we welcome the appearance of this work by an author who is better equipped than any other writer to deal with such an important theme.

England at first merely produced raw material in the shape of wool, and, when she began to manufacture broadcloth, it was difficult to find markets owing to the long-established industries of Flanders.

At this period the eastern and western routes by the Cape of Good Hope and

the Straits of Magellan were dominated by the Portuguese and the Spaniards respectively. But if a northern route to Cathay and the Spice Islands could be discovered, it would avoid the risk of death, perhaps as an *auto-da-fé* at Seville, while, so far as Cathay was concerned, the route would be more direct.

In the first instance search was made for a north-east passage to Cathay. Its leaders were Sir Hugh Willoughby and Richard Chancellor, who sailed from England in 1553. Willoughby and his crew perished, but Chancellor penetrated to the White Sea and proceeded to Moscow, where he was welcomed by Ivan the Terrible. Not only was a profitable trade opened up with Russia, but, using that country as a base, Anthony Jenkinson travelled to distant Bokhara in the heart of Asia, where he realized that trade with China by a land route was out of the question. Later he visited North Persia, where, in spite of an unfriendly reception by the fanatical Shah, he was able to initiate a profitable trade, which, however, pirates and storms ultimately forced him to abandon.

Meanwhile the attempts that were being made to reach Cathay by sea ended in failure, since the heroic navigators were unable to traverse more than perhaps one-quarter of the distance from North Cape to Bering Strait.

Nor were English explorers successful in their attempts to discover a north-west passage. Frobisher rediscovered Greenland, where the Norse colonies had died out; Davis reached 72° of north latitude; Hudson discovered Hudson's Bay; and Baffin sailed still farther north, but yet could not discover the north-west passage. Yet these explorers showed the way to their successors, discovered valuable fisheries, and trained themselves and their crews in seamanship and in hardihood.

The monopoly of Spain and Portugal was broken by Drake, who, sailing from Plymouth in 1577, passed through the Straits of Magellan and sailed the Pacific Ocean. Reduced to a single vessel, he sacked Valparaiso and captured a rich treasure-ship. Crossing the Pacific, in November 1579 he anchored off Ternate in the Moluccas, where he was accorded a most friendly reception by the King. Finally, with a rich cargo of spices, Drake sailed home by the Cape of Good Hope and reached England after circumnavigating the world. To quote Foster: "The voyage was an astounding feat of seamanship, far transcending anything that had yet been accomplished by an English vessel, and Drake became at once the national hero."

At this period the Levant Company was beginning to open up trade with Turkey. But the Levant was only a stepping-stone to India. In 1580 John Newbery travelled to Aleppo, where an English consul was established. He then travelled to the Euphrates, and, reaching the Persian Gulf, sailed down it to Hormuz. After studying the commercial situation at the celebrated Portuguese emporium, he crossed to Gombroon (Bandar Abbas) and thence made his way across Persia, visiting Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tabriz, and finally reaching England in 1582.

In the following year Newbery led a commercial mission to Hormuz with India as its main objective. The Portuguese Governor of Hormuz arrested the Englishmen and sent them to Goa as prisoners. However, they managed to escape, and reached the Court of Akbar at Pattehpur Sikri, near Agra. Newbery decided to return home and died on the way, but much credit is due to this great English pioneer in the East.

Ralph Fitch, who continued his task farther east, travelled across Bengal to Pegu and reached Malacca, where the extent of the trade was a revelation to him. On his return journey, Fitch visited Celon and Quilon. He, too, saw and well of his country.

After the defeat of the Armada the English determined to sail to the Spice

Islands by the Cape of Good Hope. Pioneer voyages were not successful, and the Dutch were the first in the field, driving out the Portuguese and gradually establishing themselves in the Spice Islands. The English, watching their rivals, who raised prices as they gained control, finally obtained a charter from Queen Elizabeth on December 31, 1600. Thus was founded the famous East India Company.

In 1601 James Lancaster sailed to the Moluccas, and we read of the difficulties he had to overcome from storms, scurvy, and the Portuguese, with whom we were still at war. He secured a rich cargo, but on his return to England the London market could not absorb the huge quantity of spices so suddenly thrown upon it.

To turn to the first Indian voyage in 1607, William Hawkins sailed to Surat and proceeded to the Court of Jahangir. He was well received by the great Moghul, but Portuguese influence was so strong that he was obliged to leave. However, he gained much valuable information; and Sir Thomas Roe, the first English Ambassador, changed the situation, and by 1619 factories had been established at Surat, Agra, and at other centres.

The English could not sell their broadcloth in India, and on the advice of Steel, who reported that in Persia they might feel sure "of the vent of much cloth, in regard their country is cold, and that men, women and children are clothed therewith some five months in the year," they decided to secure the necessary *farman* from the Shah and to open up commercial relations with that country.

The Portuguese, based on Hormuz, attacked the English squadron off Jask, but were beaten off with heavy losses. Two years later the English, in alliance with Persia, captured the great fort at Hormuz. This was the first great feat of arms of our fighting ancestors in eastern waters, and it sounded the knell of the power of Portugal.

The first chapter of this truly valuable work deals with the unsuccessful attempt to reach China across the Arctic, and in the last we are given an account of the inception of trade with that vast country in the face of great difficulties, mainly due to her arrogant conservatism. The author concludes with a eulogy to the splendid English seamen: "They were pioneers in the best sense of the world, working for the benefit of posterity as well as for their immediate livelihood; and, in closing this imperfect chronicle of their achievements, we salute their memory with respect and gratitude."

P. M. STEES.

Incomparable India: Tradition, Superstition and Truth. By Colonel Robert J. Blackham. 9" x 5½". Pp. xviii + 302. Illustrations. Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd. 12s. 6d.

One of the difficulties which educated Europeans experience in India is the absence of the great lending libraries which in England are an integral part of their life. In the last twenty years high-quality bookshops have become more common with the growth of the Indian reading public, but the expense and inconvenience of forming a private library by purchase is a definite handicap to the more migratory European. The management of the station club library may be in the hands of anyone, suitable or unsuitable, and standard works concerning the country are seldom bought, while the General Staff libraries at Brigade Area Headquarters seem to vary as widely in interest as in quality. The flood of books

about India and the East is heavy, and the absence of any direction which the ordered and logical provision of the lending libraries at home offers makes study of the country even more difficult.

Young officers of the British Service are charged with no longer seeming to take an interest in the language and ethnology of the country. Colonel Blackham's book is a step towards a corrective of this state of affairs where it exists. In two hundred and ninety-two pages he seeks to cover most aspects of Indian life. Inevitably such a survey is superficial, and often his generalizations are so condensed as to challenge contradiction rather than discussion. Here is the story of the intellectual hobbies of a well-read man devoted to India and seeking to hand on his interest and affection to the next generation rather than the considered production of the scholar for the enlightenment of the student. It is clear that Colonel Blackham himself suffered from that same lack of direction in his time which his successors lack to-day, and the bibliography is but a haphazard collection of volumes compiled without plan or sequence.

There are plenty of young men with dominant tastes such as Colonel Blackham has possessed for whom their first year in India is in this respect a critical year and to whose awakening this book will be a real help. The material is there to rouse enquiry and interest; and among the multitude of intellectual subjects of which Colonel Blackham treats there must surely be one which will attract each reader in some measure.

Colonel Blackham, however, has failed to appreciate the rapidly changing conditions in India and his intimate touch ceases with the close of the Great War. He has not realized how the Indianization of the Services, and of regimental life in particular, is breaking down the purdah system with increasing rapidity; and the frequency with which Indian ladies may be met in social life by those who seek them is already a noticeable feature of the spread of female education in the past twenty-five years.

His chapter on church affairs, which provides no mention of the significant movement towards union in Southern India, must constitute an omission which atrophies the value of the whole essay.

His chapter headed "Swords in the Jungle," a précis of "European Military Adventures of Hindustan," would have had a further value to the reader if to this précis had been added some account of those later adventurers, such as Ventura, who made the Sikh army the fine instrument of war which it became, and by the foundations which they laid, contributed so much towards the success of the Frontier Force Regiments which were formed from their disbanded battalions.

His final chapter is inconclusive and leads us nowhere. A bibliography which omits Cunningham as an authority is necessarily incomplete; and while the list of books is interesting it contains many which are inaccessible to the general reader, which have been out of print for a century, and for whom a later authority might well have been substituted.

Colonel Blackham will have done a real service to his successors if this book is the forerunner of another in which perhaps the acknowledged masters of the subjects of which he now treats will each contribute a chapter, at the head of which will be found a carefully selected and ordered bibliography suitable for the general reader and designed to lead him on to a closer and more intimate study of the subject of the essay. Sir Denison Ross or the Master of Peto House might well sponsor such a volume. Placed in the hands of the young officer on his arrival in India, it would go far to remedy the absence of lending libraries and would enable him to buy wisely and to read intelligently.

Until such a book is published Colonel Blackham's volume will find a place in

every mess in India, where possibly it may awaken the interest of another Tod, another Malletson, another Lee Warner, or another MacMunn.

The map is worthless.

C. T. B.

The Great Wall of India. By Ian Hay. 7½"×8½". Pp. 96. Hodder and Stoughton. 2s. 6d.

In the Author's Note to this book Ian Hay confesses to but slight knowledge of India prior to his recent visit to that country. This can be said to have favoured his plan of recording the impressions he formed during his tour. For the less one has read of a country before visiting it, the more certain one may be that one's impressions are truly one's own. Unfortunately the author has not adhered strictly to his plan, and has occasionally been led to attempt the mingling of fact with fantasy. As a result an otherwise charming book is marred by some ugly blunders. One can picture, for instance, the dismay of Mr. Kipling, from whose writings it is understood Ian Hay mainly derived his knowledge of India, if he should read that "... Sikhs with red-dyed beards . . . each with a home-made hubble-bubble pipe . . ." had been seen in Amritsar. Tradition in the East, says the author, needs no printed page. None the less, it is rash to accept Eastern tradition as historical fact. Disregarding this maxim, Ian Hay, relying on the authority of a Pathan havildar, credits Alexander with having pierced the Khyber Pass. As a fact, that invader entered India by the line of the Kabul River. The geographical description of the country surrounding Peshawar is in general somewhat confusing, and certain statements in this connection are definitely erroneous. A glance at the map would have corrected the author's belief that to the north of Peshawar the "mountainous Mohmand country leads to Malakand," and reference to the Jowaki Salient as the "Tirah Salient, home of the Adam Khel," gives a false idea of the location of the Tirah and of the numerous Afridi tribes that inhabit it. Such errors cannot be passed over, even by one who has derived great pleasure from reading the book that includes them. For, when committed by an author of such high repute, they are likely to be accepted as facts by the uninstructed reader.

But once Ian Hay comes to his true objective—*impressions* formed on the North-West Frontier—he will be read with pure delight, alike by those who have been to India and by those who have not, the two categories in which he classifies his friends. Scouts and khassadars; the British officers who command the former and share the exploits of the latter; the young British political officer giving the judgments of Solomon to a people at once simple-minded and astute; the Pathan medical officer working miracles on man and beast—all stand out vividly to convey to the reader a true sense of the inspiration and romance of life on the Frontier. Perhaps, above all, this is a book to charm the English school-boy, whom one can picture eagerly devouring its pages, with a growing determination to find his way to the country and life described. For such a reader, moreover, a slip or two in history or geography will be matters for sympathy rather than for condemnation.

On his arrival off Bombay, Ian Hay conceived that should he ever again wake up in Bombay Harbour he would find the glamour departed. Since such an idea may deter him from returning to give us a sequel to *The Great Wall of India*, we would have him believe that it is a false conception. If he will but return he will find that, when again he looks out at break of day across that harbour

to Bombay, he will experience a thrill to which the eager curiosity and mild surprise of the newcomer to India bear but a poor comparison.

H. R. S.

India Marches Past. By R. J. Minney. Pp. 292. Map and 12 illustrations. Jarrolds. 16s.

A unique book, indeed, as the publisher claims; one that has never been attempted before: and a writer who lives up to his dust-cover reputation of writing history in such a way that "it reads like fiction." A young author, the publisher says; but that does not deter him from brushing aside in a few lines the considered opinion of older historians, like Vincent Smith, on a controversial point (p. 108). "Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) then set out against Tipoo, (and) shot him through the head in battle" (p. 81). That is history with a punch. Indeed, India marches past so rapidly that the reader is led to understand that the massacres which took place in the period of the first Afghan war were contemporaneous with Majuba and the death of Gordon (p. 130); and when the historian does get the date right (in his chronological table on page 278), he shifts the scene of the massacres from the Khurd Kabul to the Khyber.

"Kaleidoscope" (as the author so aptly calls his historical section) attains the high level set by another recent classic, 1066 *And All That*—only stuffy pedants could want better. But it is when he gets to Part II.—"And Now All This"—his "complete picture of the real India" of to-day, that the author really writes with "pep" ("Fetters," "Ye Gods," and so forth). The author wisely refrains from burdening his text with footnotes, giving the authority for his more fruity or more sweeping assertions. At the same time so modestly does he abstain from intruding his own experience that the reader is at a loss to discover how much of the book is due to Miss Mayo and the like, and how much (if any) is the fruit of the author's personal observations, or indeed whether the writer has any personal knowledge of India at all. But the publisher assures us (that useful dust-cover once more) that the writer is a first-hand authority on India. Oh, for the seeing eye! alas, the wasted years! that in more than a decade spent in India I have not discovered one of those "Hindu divorces" of which the author speaks (p. 215). "In Tibet almost the entire population is monastic" (p. 192). During more than a year spent in Tibet I observed a lot of lamas, but not quite so many as that; and even Sir Charles Bell, writing in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, places the proportion of monks at something between one-seventh and one-quarter of the male population. My recent memories of serried rows of parents holding out their brats for vaccination do not tally with the author's picture of universal Indian opposition to vaccination (p. 245). The author leads us to believe that Indian villagers shun European medicine, and have no use for anything but "spells and incantations" (p. 240). Yet during my village tours I remember being bombarded with howls for more hospitals, more doctors, and wherever there have been sympathetic doctors I have found existing hospitals thronged in Hindu and in Muslim areas alike. Even Rajahs are just as bad—at least, that seems to be the point of the picturesque tale on page 242 of the Rajah (name and date not mentioned) who placidly resigned himself to a quite unnecessary death for astrological reasons. The chiefs I know are less romantic—witness their doctors' bills.

But such cavilling can only come from sun-dried bureaucrats, from those whose eyes have been so darkened by long residence in India that they cannot see the wood for the trees. What the public wants is a "book with red blood

in it" (as they say in the States), and that the public gets. But I do wish that our "brilliant young author" had revealed where he discovered that "the name 'Moslem' means 'traitor.'" I once had an Italian guest in the U.P. who insisted on connecting the cognate word "*-pleym*" with the Italian for "sausage," but I have never heard this one before.

The title-page boasts twelve illustrations and a map. Some of the former are pleasantly familiar, and maintain the usual high standard one expects from the productions of the Indian Railways Bureau which has supplied them. The map of India—3½ inches square—is the soul of modesty, and does not confuse the student with petty detail, such as the names of provinces and major states and their capitals.

The precise object of this volume is concealed with equal modesty. But those who spend a lifetime in grappling with India's problems will not grudge 16s. for a "complete picture of the real India." Did not Lord Curzon say that you should read every book that appears about a country in which you are interested—not only the good ones, but the indifferent and even the bad ones as well?

H.

Kamni. By Sir Jogendra Singh. Lahore: Uttar Chand Kapur and Sons.

The author of this interesting novel is a Sikh, and has for several years been Minister for Agriculture in the Punjab; he is a large landowner both there and in Oudh, and the book is dedicated to his tenants.

Kamni is the pretty sixteen-year-old daughter of a village barber in Oudh. Owing to famine the mother dies, and father and daughter are forced to leave their village and enter the service of a wealthy but weak and dissolute (titular) Raja, where Kamni becomes the confidential maid of the Rani, but has the misfortune to excite the lust of the Raja, who is abetted by his "spiritual" adviser. She escapes, and after falling into the clutches of the police, from whom, thanks to the accidental visit of the English Superintendent, she also escapes, is helped by a kindly villager, and finally adopted by a very broad-minded missionary lady, who teaches her English and arranges for a Brahman college student on vacation to teach her Hindi. She and the student fall in love and contemplate marriage, the student in genuine forgetfulness that at the age of seven he had been "married" to a girl of his own caste, whom he had never seen since. He returns to college, and his mother then visits Kamni and informs her that she and her husband will commit suicide if caste restrictions are disregarded and she does not give up their son. This brings on brain fever and she dies, and the student after a year's wandering devotes himself to the education of women.

But though the story is itself excellent, the chief interest of the book lies in the character-drawing and pictures of various phases of Indian life, and the views of the author on education, caste, and religion put into the mouths of his characters.

The horrible dissipation of the young Raja, who commits suicide when he has ruined his estate, and the devilish advice of his "spiritual" guide; the behaviour towards Kamni of the police, are only too correctly drawn. The sketch of famine relief and the at first hasty and then compassionate behaviour of the District Officer towards Kamni's father, the demonstration of the enormous difficulty for a poor man to secure justice against a wealthy one, thanks to our system of law with its *pleaders*, are all very true to life, as also is the Rani's con-

version and behaviour (my wife knew intimately a Rani in just such a position as the one depicted here, and can vouch for this from personal knowledge).

The broad-minded views on religion of the author—the essential oneness of the good in different religions—put into the mouth of the missionary lady are most interesting. Kamni does not in name become a Christian, but is obviously very near one in fact.

As a picture of Indian life and mentality I prefer the book to any of the novels of Tagore, Chatterjee, Mrs. Ghosal, or Venkataramani that I have read, and I would strongly recommend it to anyone desirous of improving his knowledge of such mentality at this time of transition. The author is essentially a man of moderate views.

C. A. SILBERRAD, I.C.S. (retd.).

Les Héritiers de la Toison d'Or. By Louis Coquet, Colonel breveté d'Etat—Major en retraite. Pp. 256. Paris: Maisonneuve Frères. 1931.

When the author concludes his introduction—"Puissons-nous inspirer à nos lecteurs le même intérêt passionné, enthousiasmé même, que nous avons éprouvé à construire cette étude"—he almost disarms criticism. But this little book about Georgia is so good in parts that it would be a disservice both to the reader and to the author to ignore the numerous and easily remediable errors which occur, particularly in the historical sections (pp. 19-103).

Such statements as that on page 60 to the effect that Irakli II. was born in 1744 (he was born in 1716) and took part at the age of sixteen in Nadir Shah's invasion of India in 1660 (Nadir started his invasion in the autumn of 1736, and he was assassinated in 1747) are really unpardonable, even if we assume that 1660 is a misprint for 1760.

We also find the following extraordinary insinuation made in the form of two rhetorical questions, on page 75, in reference to the German occupation of Georgia in the spring of 1918:

"Le France, momentanément épuisée, pouvait-elle intervenir au fond de la Mer Noire? Sa jalouse alliée, l'Angleterre, qui se réservait la zone d'influence orientale, l'eût-elle laissée faire?" Considering that at that moment of crisis all direct access to Georgia by the Black Sea was barred, and that the desperate adventure of the "Dunsterforce" had been undertaken in an attempt to ward off the enemy (in the common Allied interest) from access to new supplies of petroleum, it is difficult to draw anything at all from the gallant Colonel's observation. His suggestion on the following page that the British occupation of Batum and Baku was inspired by "La Dutch-Shell et Marcus Samuel" is equally obtuse.

"British Imperialists" have often "looked a gift-horse in the mouth," but never more emphatically than in Transcaucasia in the year following the Armistice. Every solution of the Caucasian problem was entertained—independent Republics, an independent Confederation, a Russian "White" régime, an Italian mandate, an American mandate in Armenia—but never the idea of a British protectorate.

Colonel Coquet makes numerous mistakes in the numbering of the Georgian kings—George II. for George III., David II. for David VI., George XIII. for George XII., etc. These errors could easily have been checked by reference to Brosset's *Genealogical Trees*. The author appears, from internal evidence, to have availed himself of Tamarati's "L'Eglise Géorgienne" as his principal

authority, and he uses the valuable materials published by that authority without any attempt to weigh his somewhat ingenuous conclusions. Even here Colonel Coquet does not take advantage of Tamarati's correction of the date of the correspondence between Constantine III. and Isabella of Castille, but accepts the date 1465, which Brosset himself doubted (p. 43). Colonel Coquet repeats the hackneyed reference to the "fanaticism" of Shah Abbas (p. 46) when, in fact, there is plenty of evidence that the Shah's ruthless policy in Georgia was inspired by a calculated determination to baulk the advance of the Russians in the Caucasus; and he was successful in checking the southerly progress of Russia for nearly two hundred years. The saintly and courageous Queen Kétévan, a lady in middle age, can hardly be accurately described as of a "merveilleuse beauté" (p. 47). It is again quite incorrect to state that "the Greeks" (presumably here the Georgian as opposed to the Roman Catholic Church) "favorisaient le commerce des esclaves de Mingrèlie avec Stamboul" (p. 53). There are many documents extant which prove that the Georgian Catholicoses attempted to impose severe penalties on those who took part in this iniquitous traffic.

It would have been better if Colonel Coquet had confined himself to the modern period of Georgian history, and had, indeed, elaborated his useful chapters on Georgia under the Soviet régime. He has published for the first time the sparse military details of the Soviet invasion of Georgia and a moving account of the ill-fated insurrection of 1924. His chapter on "La Diplomatie européenne et la Géorgie" (pp. 162-232) is by far the longest and the most important in the book. He deals interestingly with the relations of the four last Louis and of the two Napoleons with Georgia. The Bourbon relations with the Kartlian Kings have been well documented by Tamarati, but there remains scope for some new research on both the English and French policies in Georgia during the periods of the Napoleonic and Crimean wars. Colonel Coquet's very full documentation of the Georgian Question in the European Press and the British and French Parliaments for the period 1921-1926 should prove of value to the student of this most discreditable incident in the whole history of post-war diplomacy.

W. E. D. A.

Hunter's Moon. By Major Leonard Handley, M.C., F.R.G.S. 8½"×5½". Pp. xiv+267. Illustrations. Macmillan and Co. Price 15s.

This book records the shooting experiences of an army officer, in India and Tenasserim, extending over a period of twenty-two years. It is written in an inflated style with a wealth of adjectives, appropriate and the reverse. Running through it as a central *motif* is the author's love for jungle solitudes and his contempt for people ("norms") who are more socially inclined. For instance: "The night scents of the untamable forest rose all around and smothered me in a pharisaical ecstasy that I was alone, and not sharing this perfect night with a thousand or ten thousand norms who would translate this solitude into terms of boredom, and scream for all the norms' constant satellites of noise, radio, cinema, and jazz, for all the many hideous equivalents which have turned the bulk of the human race into sheep-like morons," and so on. But it is not only his compatriots that annoy Major Handley. His Gond trackers, for whom one might have expected to find a measure of appreciation, also come under his displeasure. They are contemptuously referred to as "semi-Simian morons." Again: There is an oleaginous substance called *ghi* appreciated in Indian cookery, but repellent to most English palates. Major Handley happens to like *ghi*, but this surely does

not justify a petulant outburst against people who do not. There is too much of this kind of thing.

The author aims at "conventionality in his choice of words and in his references to matters not usually talked about. It would have been better too if at least two of the photographs had been omitted. Besides these, your reviewer is old-fashioned enough to take a dislike to the photo of Abdul Majid, the author's orderly, who accompanies him throughout his expeditions. He is shown minus his *safa*, a smirk on his handsome face and a pipe in the corner of his mouth. Some periods of leave spent in Abdul Majid's village are described where Major Handley hobnobbed with the inhabitants, joined in some doubtful festivities, and eventually made the place too hot to hold him. "In fact," he observes, "when looking back on these days with present-day sanity, I scarcely understand them myself!" It may, perhaps, be accounted to him for righteousness that he confesses to things that most people would have preferred to keep quiet about.

Little effort is made in this book to impart information about the districts visited or their inhabitants, and when an attempt is made, as in the chapter about Hindu devotees, the author seems to prefer sensationalism to accuracy. It is indeed a pity that Major Handley did not get some sober friend to edit his book before publication, for, in spite of what has been said, there is in it much that is good. There are many vivid descriptions of jungle scenes and well told stories of adventures and encounters. The book is of interest also—to use a hackneyed phrase—as a "human document." One may picture the writer as a sportsman, with the cocksureness, the enthusiasms, the prejudices of youth, but one also who hears the call of the wild and responds to it in a happy spirit of adventure.

R. L. KENNION.

Assyrians in 'Iraq

Those interested in the Assyrian question should not fail to read Dr. Petros' letter published in the *World Dominion* of October, 1932, and the reply thereto by Mr. Cumberland on the same paper of April, 1933,* as they give the main points for both sides of the controversy.

Dr. Petros has six complaints, the most important being (a) that the Assyrian Levies now being disbanded, the discharged soldiers have nowhere to go except to the malarial and generally unhealthy zones already occupied by their compatriots; (b) that owing to naturalization grievances the Assyrians are debarred from work in government offices and the 'Iraq Petroleum Company; and (c) that the lands given to the Assyrian "refugees" are malarial and in other ways unsuited for a mountain dwelling race, insinuating that as a result their health is such as to make their extermination in the future no unlikely event. Mr. Cumberland, who has worked amongst these people for a number of years, appears to be of the opinion that the plight of the Assyrians is not as bad as is sometimes claimed, and further that many of their disabilities are the result of their own folly. The first of his replies to Dr. Petros' points are: (a) That, notwithstanding certain action of the Assyrian officers last year by which they forfeited a good deal of the former dependance placed upon the reliability of the Assyrians, the Levies are not being entirely disbanded, but made into a new force into which the Assyrians are being given the option to enlist. (b) He states that more Assyrians might be working in the 'Iraq Petroleum Company if properly qualified and that 'Iraqi citizenship is not an unreasonable qualification for such employ-

ment. (c) "The Assyrians are settled in the best part of the country so far as climate is concerned." But he goes on to criticize them for growing rice, with its necessary corollary of malaria; for not troubling to drain swamps; and lastly accuses the ex-Levy soldiers, who, as he states, have learnt the elements of sanitation, for reverting to the "vile and unsanitary customs of their former life."

Truth lies between extremes, but looking at the whole position from an unbiassed point of view, I cannot help feeling that the truth in this case lies nearer to Dr. Petros' complaints than Mr. Cumberland's explanations.

To recapitulate the points already raised: Mr. Cumberland's statement that the Assyrians can now re-enlist in the new force is only partially correct. That force is about half the size of the disbanded Assyrian Levies and is a mixed force of Arabs, Kurds, and Assyrians; only a very small percentage of the old Levy soldiers can therefore be re-engaged. Mr. Cumberland further asserts that the Assyrians in the Levies received higher pay than is given in the 'Iraq Army. This again is only partially true. The "other ranks" received more than their corresponding position in the 'Iraq Army, but the Assyrian officers received less than 'Iraq Army officers.

With regard to the question of naturalization and employment, whilst many Assyrians, owing to national prejudice, were slow to avail themselves of the opportunity offered, it is known to all British officers who have recently served in Northern 'Iraq that, in actual fact, such naturalization was not freely given to those already in government service, and many Assyrians have been refused naturalization with the only apparent motive of getting rid of them out of the service.

It is on the last point, however, that Mr. Cumberland appears to be most unjust to the Assyrian complaint, and begins by contradicting himself badly. Having stated, as already quoted, that the Assyrians are settled "in the best part of the country as far as climate is concerned," and continuing by stating that their hygienic conditions are "no worse than those of the Yezidis and Kurds," he seems to have forgotten that at the beginning of his article he has already said that "naturally the inhabitants of the country, mostly Kurds or Yezidis, had for generations been occupying the best village sites and tilling the best soil and grazing their flocks in the best pastures."

This, of course, is the great and insuperable difficulty that those who wished to solve the Assyrian question have always been up against. Anyone who has spent time in 'Iraq knows that the places in that country which are habitable, but have been left unoccupied by the local inhabitants for "generations," are not particularly delectable or salubrious spots! He then accuses Levy soldiers of degenerating in cleanliness when returning to their villages. Cleanly habits are partly a matter of environment and opportunity. To go no further than Baghdad itself, has Mr. Cumberland ever visited the Assyrian village outside the South Gate? Placed near one of the rubbish dumps of the town and lying against a stagnant pool fed mainly from such sewers as Baghdad possesses, the writer doubts his own ability to maintain reasonably hygienic habits if put there for life.

Lastly, Mr. Cumberland repudiates the claim of the Assyrians to the description of "refugees." What else are they? Up to the present some have unavailing land and at least 15,000 have no land at all; they were driven from their country during the war, and many promises, but no definite plans for either settlement or status, have been made to them, at least till last autumn, or why a conference at Geneva about their future last October? Refugees they certainly remained until a few months ago, and what they are at the present moment I do not know.

It cannot be denied that these people have rendered us good service during the past fifteen years, and, whilst not closing one's eyes to the immense difficulties of the situation, the little we have done for them in return will in later years not be one of the brightest memories of British colonial policy.

P. M.

MERRIBGARDEN,
CLAPHAM,
WORTHING.

June 23, 1933.

Some publicity has been given to a statement made by Captain A. M. Rassam in the discussion following Captain P. Mumford's lecture, as reported in the January Journal, to the effect that "the new Bishop in Jerusalem will include the Assyrian Church within his see." This has been taken to imply that the Nestorian Church has ceased to be an independent body and is amalgamated with the Church of England; and the Bishop is at pains to make it known that "such a construction is entirely wrong and unjustified by the facts. . . . There has been no change in the relations between the Church of England and the Nestorian Church" (letter by Bishop Graham Brown to *Bible Lands*).

NIGEL DAVIDSON.

Open Court Magazine. Vol. II. Series 2. Russian and Chinese Central Asia.

So bounteous and so varied is the banquet of interests which Central Asia affords that there is always room for newcomers at the table. So now it is the pleasant duty of your reviewer to bid welcome to another Society analogous to our own and a new number of its Journal. The Society is the New Orient Society of America, which has its headquarters at Chicago. The President is Professor J. H. Breasted, who needs no introduction, and its Committee includes such well-known names as that of Mr. Henry Field and Dr. Berthold Laufer. The Journal has reached the second number of its second series—a series consisting of six numbers. It is produced by the Open Court Publishing Co. of Chicago and is well got up and illustrated. The latest number contains a preface by Dr. Laufer and articles on Tibet, Chinese Turkistan and Russian Asia by Dr. Sven Hedin, Mr. Owen Lattimore, and Mr. I. A. Lopatin respectively.

Dr. Hedin's contribution contains little beyond a somewhat desultory collection of standard information, which many a lesser man could equally well have produced, though we venture to think very few other men would have given it precisely the same form and content as Dr. Sven Hedin. Since Dr. Sven Hedin sets out to make mention of all the notable journeys performed in Tibet by Europeans, it seems strange that he should make no reference to Manning, the first Englishman to visit Lhasa, who went there in 1811. But when Dr. Sven Hedin speaks on Tibet, it is no time for little dogs to bark. "*Agnosco procerem*," say we, and pass on.

Mr. Lopatin's article on Russian Asia, after a brief preliminary historical sketch, is mainly devoted to an exposition of the administrative, social, and economic changes brought about by the Soviet Government, and we may agree that if the facts and figures with which his article bristles are to be relied on everything in the Siberian garden must be lovely, or in process of becoming so. But somehow very few people from outside seem to want to go and live there,

while those who are inside and contrive to get out seem overjoyed at having done so.

Mr. Owen Lattimore's masterly account of Chinese Turkistan discloses not only an accurate knowledge of existing conditions, but glimpses of real insight into the underlying causes and is illumined by the charm of his easy style, which we all know so well. On one minor point we may perhaps allay his fears. Money-lending by British subjects is not encouraged by His Majesty's Consulate-General at Kashgar—very much the contrary—and money-lenders get no support from British consular officials in Turkistan.

E. H.

OBITUARY

GENERAL SIR WEBB GILLMAN, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

THE Royal Regiment of Artillery was never richer in officers of ability at the zenith of their powers than it was at the beginning of the Great War. One of the best of these was Webb Gillman, and he quickly made his mark. A preliminary training in a horse battery, distinction as a player of all games, winner of the Kadir Cup, service in the South African War and on the West Coast, the Staff College, a short period at the War Office—all these enabled a man of exceptional knowledge of men and things to stand out so quickly as to be employed in the early days of the war as a Liaison Officer between the late Lord Ypres and his corps commanders—a ticklish job. From time to time Gillman escaped to command troops, first to a battery and later to a division, but in each case he was dragged away to staff appointments, and none of them easy ones. After taking a prominent share in the evacuation of Gallipoli, Gillman was sent to report on the attempts to relieve Kut. He saw at once that Kut was doomed, and that further loss of life was useless—a conclusion as unpalatable to the local command as surprising to the War Office at home, but it proved correct. Again Gillman had to bear the brunt, in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, of sharp reproof from home when he insisted throughout the summer of 1918 on the dangers of operating with inadequate forces in Transcaucasia and Northern Persia. The event again proved him to be right. The Escher Commission on the Army in India had no sounder member than Gillman, though the Report, like many another, has been allowed to bear little fruit. Later years have, of course, seen Gillman in smoother waters, but his services, especially in recasting the officers of the Royal Artillery, have been marked as always, with sound common sense, bonhomie, and smoothness. No one ever saw Gillman in a bad temper—not that he suffered fools for long, but he used a rapier, not a bludgeon, and with a skill nicely adjusted to the thickness of the skin to be dealt with.

An otherwise good appreciation in *The Times* is somewhat spoiled by the priggish remark that "without ever pretending to possess an outstanding intellect, he would surprise his staff by the clearness of his views." There was, indeed, no pretence in Gillman, and even the stupidest staff officer could not long fail to appreciate an unusual combination of brains and character fertilized by human understanding and ripened by wide experience. He was a great man whose natural simplicity compelled respect and affection. It is not surprising that when he was Commandant of "The Shop" every cadet wished to be a horse gunner, or that when he consented to sing at a Ghillies entertainment in the Scottish Highlands the hall was crammed hours before.

General Gillman was long an active member of the Royal Central Asian Society, and only left the Council when he became a member of the Army Council, his contributions to dinner club discussions, always humorous and apposite, being welcomed as robust reminders of the facts when too often sentimentality was running the experts off their feet.

Webb Gillman has gone long before his country could spare him, as did his brother, a distinguished member of the I.C.S. in Madras, but he had "the conscientiousness of duty done" written about, and lived up to, by another great gunner, the late Lord Cromer.

CORRESPONDENCE

MECCA, ARABIA.

April 27, 1933.

DEAR SIRS,

By the time this letter appears in the JOURNAL Mr. Thomas and others of your readers interested in the subject will have had an opportunity of realizing that I had a good deal more to say about Wabar than was possible in the course of a fleeting and perhaps somewhat flippant reference to the offending orthography of our Secretary on the occasion of my lecture before the Society last year. I will not, however, deprive your readers of the pleasure of purchasing my soon forthcoming work on the subject by repeating in your pages what I have already set forth in extenso therein. I will confine myself, therefore, to one or two points which seem to call for specific comment.

Mr. Thomas has indeed travelled a long way since the days when he startled us all with his dramatic announcement of the discovery in Southern Arabia of aboriginal Hamitic survivals discoursing with each other to this day in the non-Semitic accents of their long-forgotten ancestors. I found myself at the time quite unable to digest such strong meat, and I said so with my usual frankness. It is with all the greater pleasure, therefore, that I welcome Mr. Thomas back into the fold of orthodoxy. I have no quarrel with his present standpoint—namely, that the languages in question (and I would add the peoples speaking them) “will almost certainly prove to be survivals of Himyaritic, Sabæan, and Minæan, the old languages (and I would add peoples) of South Arabia.” Could anything be more natural? But it is nice to think that (subject, of course, to possible horrible discoveries of the future) Arabia can still pride itself on a clean Semitic bill of health.

Mr. Thomas still skates perilously along the edges of thin ice when he talks about non-Arabs, pre-Arabs, and that sort of thing in reference to Semitic inhabitants of Arabia. I cannot help wondering whether he has a clear idea of exactly what he means. I certainly cannot follow him, but it may help him and others if I explain exactly what I mean. In the first place I take Joktan (Qahtan) to be the ancestor of the true Arabs, including the Sabæans and Himyarites (the ancestry of the Minzans being doubtful.) Joktan was the great-great-grandson

of the redoubtable Shem himself, who was all but a centenarian before the Flood and survived that interesting experience by some five centuries. In all probability he personally directed the great family schism which was in due course to produce the Jew and Arab races, his elder son Peleg (born two years after the Flood) being the great-great-great-grandfather of Abraham and thus the ancestor both of the Jews and of the younger (Ishmaelite) branch of the Arabs. The exact date of the birth of Qahtan does not appear to be on record, but there would seem to be reasonable ground for placing both that event and the schism above referred to in the second century after the Flood. At this time the world, as we know from reliable sources, had a clean slate to write on but only one language to write in (what would we not give to know what that language was!), until this unfortunate state of affairs was remedied by strange occurrences at Babel, which probably prompted Shem to scatter his now bilingual or multilingual family over the face of the earth. Qahtan went to Arabia with his large family and, leaving out of account the Ishmaelite invasion of later times, there would seem to me to be no straining of the principles of logic in the assumption that the Arabs and Arabic of to-day's Arabia represent a parent racial and linguistic stem to which such comparatively modern tongues and peoples as Himyaritic and Sabæan (still feebly echoed in the population and language of Southern Arabia) stand in the relation of mere deciduous leaves and twigs. Thus as far as Arabia is concerned I cannot without decisive proof accept any suggestion of the actual or past existence (apart from casual sojourning) of any non-Arab or pre-Arab Semitic element. Perhaps some day Mr. Thomas will have travelled sufficiently far further to bridge the small gulf that still divides us.

Meanwhile I have travelled rather far from the point myself and must return to Wabar with an uncomfortable feeling that quite unconsciously, in the course of thus ruminating on the long and glorious record of the Arab race, I have dealt a death-blow to any hopes Mr. Thomas may still harbour of proving that the original form of the name was Ūbār. I am indeed quite accidentally on the point of announcing a great discovery, but I must keep your readers in suspense for a moment while I comment on some of Mr. Thomas' remarks on this subject. He seems to accuse me of taking the name of Wabar "out of a book with me to Arabia," and I can only ask him to accept my solemn assurance that I had in fact never heard the name until it was mentioned to me by Jabir the Marri in 1918 as related in *The*

Heart of Arabia. It was then that I put it tentatively on the map, together with another kindred group of ruins, and it has so turned out that this second group was in fact on the very pin-point marking the position of my meteorite crater. I have discussed the whole matter in the greatest detail in my new book and need not do so here. I am quite prepared to believe that Mr. Thomas' twentieth-century friends of Southern Arabia do in fact mispronounce (they are presumably incapable of writing) the name as Ūbār, but that, so far as we know, is the only authority for the form, and I cannot think that Mr. Thomas would have us accept such authority as sufficient evidence of the original form of the name, say 3,000 years ago. The form Wabar has, however, as Mr. Thomas admits, a quite respectable pedigree in company with such tribal names as 'Ad and Thamud; and I can only submit that, whatever we may think of Yaqut and Co., we have got to be content with it until we discover whether it or some other form of it was the real name of the place and/or the tribe. We may continue our researches in the records of antiquity, but we must not merely guess on present-day indications. I have in fact produced from the country's ancient ballad literature the alternative form of Aubar, which conforms perfectly to the rules governing the structure of Arabic words; and now, to come to my great discovery, I find the name appearing in Genesis in the form Obal, one of the many sons of Joktan! I should explain, perhaps, to the uninitiated that the letter *o* regularly represents the Arabic diphthong *au* in our inexact English transliteration, while the transition from *l* to *r* and vice versa is a common phenomenon.

Having now identified the people concerned we have to find their capital or at least their country. Mr. Thomas appears quite seriously to think that I seriously believe my meteorite crater to be the site of the ancient capital of the people called 'Ad! He evidently does not give me credit for much intelligence, but he will doubtless have seen before he sees this that I hold no such view and make no claim whatever to have discovered the site of the *historical* Wabar, though I do make two quite intelligent suggestions for the guidance of future seekers thereof. What I do claim to have found is a full and sufficient solution of the mystery of the *Badawin legend* of Wabar in the sands of the Empty Quarter. I found also plentiful traces of the rivers and human occupation of this vast area in prehistoric times, but I am convinced that there are no cities to be found anywhere in the Rub' al Khali.

I have not time to follow Mr. Thomas in detail through his geological and zoological observations, but he does not seem to realize that, before the foundering of the Red Sea trough, the whole of Arabia (not merely South Arabia) formed part of the African continent. That there should be affinities in the fauna of the two countries is therefore natural enough, just as there are affinities in the fauna of Arabia and the Palæarctic land-mass connected with it on the other side. He seems to press matters too far when he talks of desiccation bringing about "an invasion of Palæarctic fauna from the north." I should rather say that such Palæarctic fauna, having already established itself in the country, survived in spite of the discouraging conditions created by progressive desiccation; while the African fauna continued to exist in the southern and south-western mountains owing to the survival of climatic conditions comparable with those of the African mountain districts over the way.

With apologies for the length of this letter.

Yours truly,

H. STJ. B. PHILBY.

TRINITY COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

June 1, 1933.

DEAR SIR,

Mr. Philby's letter recalls an orchestral work in which there is an elaborate scoring of two simple themes—such elaborate orchestration indeed as tends to obscure the themes themselves. But as it is the themes that are basically so important it would never do to lose sight of them. Simply stated, they were my twin criticisms of two dogmatically made points in Mr. Philby's lecture—namely, I submitted—

- (i.) That the historical Wabar and the pin-point of a Wabar Mr. Philby had put on his map at the site of a meteorite crater were irreconcilable.
- (ii.) That his insistence on one exclusively valid word form Wabar was untenable.

As regards (i.), Mr. Philby's letter handsomely bridges the gulf between us by stating that "he makes no claim whatever to have dis-

covered the historical Wabar," but only "a full and sufficient solution of a Radawin legend."

As regards (ii.), it tells us that he has himself now discovered in ancient ballad literature the form Aubar (Arabic), and what is even more startling claims Obal (Hebrew) of Genesis to stand for the same place: wherefore, sirs, your form Ūbār (South Arabian), to which Mr. Philby dared to take exception, is brought into proper context for us by Mr. Philby himself. All this I welcome, and I have no desire in referring to what appeared the considered strictures of the lecture to try and improve upon Mr. Philby's own latest description of them as a "fleeing and perhaps flippant reference."

And now to disentangle Mr. Philby's two extra-contrapuntal themes. He invites us to share his view in—

- (i.) A "race distribution" of mankind which dates from Noah, of Ark fame, plus a "language distribution" which derives from a Babylonian Tower of Babel: and so a short cut to a common post-diluvian ancestor of "Arabic-speaking North Arabians" and "non-Arabic-speaking South Arabians."
- (ii.) A clean Semitic (sic) bill of health for Arabia? Or, as it is put elsewhere, he doubts whether I can have a clear idea of what I mean when I say that the people of South Arabia, speaking non-Arabic though Semitic languages, are a racially distinct group from the Northern Arab he is familiar with.

Some elementary anthropology will be sufficient to make my meaning clear. Modern scientific research has long ago decided for us that the Arab version (adopted from the Hebrew) of the evolution of the human race is untenable—i.e., the conception of a comparatively recent flood (geologically speaking) with an Arabian survivor, Noah, whose three sons—(1) Shem, (2) Ham, and (3) Japheth—become respectively the ancestors of (1) the Arabians, (2) the Africans, and (3) the rest of mankind. It is the conception clearly of a primitive pastoral people inventing a theory that best fitted the facts of the limited world as known to them two or three thousand years ago.

Shem = Sam = Semite, one of the first three legendary post-diluvian progenitors, the father of the Semitic race, to the Arabs the most important third of mankind, what could be more simple and satisfactory to the primitive dweller in the desert? So the Arabs have

gone on to formulate a regular folklore genealogy complete from Noah, through Shem, onwards to the present day—the rigmarole cited in the letter, including Joktan, Abraham, and the rest of the genealogical tree top figures, is, of course, familiar to all of us who have had anything to do with Arabs. But what of its historical value? The answer is that the evidence for it has probably the same sort of validity as the scriptural evidence for the story of the Garden of Eden or the dispersion of tongues in Babylonian times. Anthropologists prefer, however, to think of it all as a primitive attempt of a primitive people to rationalize their meagre knowledge—their early shot at a reconstruction of the universe, so to speak, within their own narrow horizons. If we could only bring ourselves with Mr. Philby to accept it, to accept the origin of languages from the Tower of Babel (involving us apparently in supposing that the ancestors of pigmy Africans, of aboriginal Australians, and of the Esquimaux spoke a common language in Babylonian times), how superlatively easy to accept a recent common racial origin for the neighbouring north and south peoples of Arabia who to-day speak tongues belonging to a single group—Semitic! Mr. Philby has indeed made himself clear.

But anthropological science has a different method of approach. The world is its field: its horizons the other modern sciences in their ever-widening scope. Neither folklore stories nor language affinities, important as they may be, are the deciding factors in determining race. The vital factors are the peculiar inherent and fundamental human characteristics themselves—head structure, skin pigmentation, hair structure, and a variety of physiognomical features scientifically examined.

Now as regards the South Arabians, Ibn Batuta as long ago as our Middle Ages noted their physical and cultural "African" affinities. Richard Burton and General Maitland (British Resident in Aden) in the last century were struck by the same distinguishing peculiarities. The German scholars Glaser and Rathjens do not shrink from declaring them Hamitic; and now my anthropometric measurements (the first done in the field), type portraits, and skulls have been worked up by one of our greatest living anatomists, Professor Sir Arthur Keith. Keith's explanation of the differences between North and South Arab is summed up in the following words: "A proto-negroid belt stretched across the ancient South Asian world from Africa to the Melanesian Islands. Intermediate parts of the proto-negroid belt became transformed, giving rise to the Hamitic peoples of Africa, to

their cousins the Dravidian and brown-skinned peoples of India; the Arabian peninsula was thus at one time occupied by a people intermediate to the Somalis on the one hand and to the Dravidian peoples on the other: this great belt was at some later uncertain date broken into in Arabia by an eruption of Caucasian Armenoids" (Mr. Philby's *familiar Arab friends*: the words in italics are mine), "but the present South Arabian represents a residue of the earlier Hamitic population."^{*}

What, then, of Mr. Philby's clean Semitic bill of health for Arabia? The term Semite is no longer used by anthropologists in a racial sense. Like the terms Celt and Aryan, modern science uses them in a cultural rather than a racial sense. When Mr. Philby, who has never travelled in their habitat or mixed with these people, is not afraid to disagree with Sir Arthur Keith and myself—also those of the eminent observers mentioned above who had actually been there—he is making his difficulty transparent. When he talks of a "clean Semitic bill of health for Arabia" he is, of course, thinking in terms of language, which, however, is not the same thing as race at all.[†] To take instances near at home: the dolicocephalic northern German and the brachycephalic southern German, whilst speaking the same Teutonic language, are racially different—the former is a Nordic, the latter an Alpine man: so, too, the tall blonde dolicocephalic native of Normandy and the short dark (also) dolicocephalic southern Frenchman, while speaking the same Latin tongue, derive respectively the one from the Nordic, the other from the Mediterranean race.

Until Mr. Philby is in a position to make a visit to South Arabia and see the inhabitants for himself I daresay he will continue to regard my use of the terms "non-Arab" and "pre-Arab" for purposes of differentiation from the Arab he knows as "skating perilously along the edges of thin ice." But I do not think he need be too squeamish about ice that Sir Arthur Keith has launched boldly out upon, to say

* See Appendix I., *Arabia Felix*, "The Racial Characters of the Southern Arabs," by Sir Arthur Keith, pp. 301, *seq.*

† "Mr. Thomas has travelled a long way," writes Mr. Philby, "since he startled us by the announcement of Hamitic Survivals *discoursing in non-Semitic. . .*" When, may I ask, did I propound this? Mr. Philby's memory must, I fear, be misleading him. Reference to my lecture to the Orientalist Congress at Oxford in 1928 shows that I set forth, at the outset, "It would thus seem that their ethnological and linguistic affinities are at variance." I held then, I hold now, that the languages of the South Arabian pre-Arab survivals are Semitic, but are structurally more closely related to the Ethiopic group of Abyssinia than to the Arabic of Arabia.

nothing of those other eminent skaters mentioned above who enjoy the advantage of having been there.

There remains the final paragraph of Mr. Philby's letter. The remark that I appear to be unaware that Arabia once formed part of the African continent is answered by reference to my book, *Arabia Felix*, page 226, in which I expressly say that it did: and in criticizing the phrase "of an invasion of palæarctic fauna from the north," Mr. Philby gives us an example of what thin ice really is like, for the words are a quotation and happen to be the actual words of the British Museum authority who examined our respective collections of snakes and amphibians—Mr. H. W. Parker.

Yours truly,

BERTRAM THOMAS.

THE ATHENÆUM,
PALL MALL, S.W. 1.
June 22, 1933.

DEAR SIRs,

May I briefly, before the Editor declares that "this discussion must cease," make it clear that I have no quarrel with Sir Arthur Keith. Mr. Thomas relies on his authority. So do I. Mr. Thomas quotes him. So will I, as follows (from the same Appendix to *Arabia Felix*):

"We are aware, however, that the anthropological facts may be explained in ways which differ radically from the solution we have offered. The dark-skinned indigenes of South Arabia may have been round-headed and, at a later date, Hamites from Africa and round-headed Caucasians may have invaded their land and their marriage beds. For aught we know many racial waves may have spread southwards or northwards in Arabia in long past times. As already said, the clues to such problems lie buried in the sands on Arabia."

With reference to Mr. Thomas's last footnote, I need only quote Mr. Thomas himself, as quoted in the same Appendix by Sir Arthur Keith: "They would appear to be more kindred with Hamites on the other side of the Red Sea than the familiar Arab of Central and North Arabia." Sir Arthur Keith adds: "A year later Captain Thomas again emphasized the Hamitic traits of the South Arabs."

Yours truly,

H. STJ. B. PHILBY.

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 77, GROSVENOR STREET, W. 1.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1932.

EXPENDITURE.

To Office Expenses:	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	RECEIPTS.	£	s.	d.
Salaries	263	16	0	By Subscriptions received:
Rent	160	0	0	1,350 Subscriptions	1,379 11 6
Telephone	12	4	4	Journal:
Stationery	27	8	0	Subscriptions and Sales	52 0 11
Printing	35	6	0	Interest Received:
Postage	71	5	0	War Loan	5 0 0
Office cleaning	52	9	2	Abbey Road Building Society	11 13 5
Audit fee	5	5	0	Bonus on Conversion of War Loans	16 13 5
Bank charges	7	18	4	Annual Dinner	1 0 0
Lighting and heating	9	3	2	Dinner Club:	167 18 0
Sundries	14	17	3	Contribution to expenses	25 0 0
Journal:	649	12	3	
Printing	548	17	10	
Postage	65	1	7	
Reporting	18	4	7	
Maps	—	—	—	
Lectures:	627	4	0	
Lecture halls	34	4	0	
Lecture expenses	58	6	10	
Lantern	6	0	6	
Lantern slides	7	11	0	
Maps	14	18	2	
Annual Dinner	121	0	6	
Library	164	13	9	
Income Tax Schedule "D"	5	4	6	
Corporation Duty	1	5	0	
Amount written off Society Promissory Account	1	16	7	
Balance, being excess of Income over Expenditure	27	11	0	
carried to Balance Sheet	43	16	3	
	£1,042	8	10	

£1,042 8 10

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 77, GROSVENOR STREET, W. 1.

BALANCE SHEET AT DECEMBER 31, 1932.

To	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	By	£	s.	d.
<i>To Sundry Creditors:</i>							<i>By Cash:</i>			
Subscriptions in advance	27 0 0	In hand	1 0 9
Office expenses	59 14 5	At Lloyds Bank	66 5 6
Lecture expenses	17 18 6	On deposit with Abbey Road Building Society	1 0 0
Dinner Club	14 18 2				68 6 3
Income Tax Schedule "D," 1932-1933	1 5 0				
Persia Fund, as per contra	13 1 0				
			183 17 1							
<i>Life Subscription Fund as at January 1, 1932</i>			118 15 0							
<i>" Persia Fund (representing Investments and Cash per contra)</i>			398 10 11							
<i>Income and Expenditure Account:</i>										
Balance as at January 1, 1932	141 17 11	<i>Investments (held against Life Subscription Accounts):</i>			
Add: Excess of Income over Expenditure for year to date	43 16 3	£100 34 per cent. War Loan at cost	100 0 0
			185 14 2				£150 War Savings Certificates at nominal value	150 0 0
										250 0 0
							<i>Investment of Persia Fund:</i>			
							£467 8s. 3d. 34 per cent. Conversion Loan at cost	331 17 3
							Cash on deposit with Lloyds Bank	53 12 8
							Cash in hands of Royal Central Asian Society	13 1 0
										398 10 11
							<i>Society Premises Account:</i>			
							Balance as at January 1, 1932	147 11 0
							Less: Amount written off	27 11 0
										120 0 0
										£386 17 2

I report that I have examined the above balance sheet, dated December 31, 1932, of the Royal Central Asian Society with the books and vouchers, and have obtained all the information and explanations I have required. In my opinion such balance sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs at December 31, 1932, according to the best of my information and the explanations given to me and as shown by the books of the Society.

22, BAURCHALL STREET, E.C. 2.
June 19, 1933.

HAROLD J. JONES, F.C.A.
(Williams, Dyson, Jones and Co.,
Chartered Accountants.)

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NOTICES

DR. ARTHUR UPHAM POPE and Captain K. A. C. Creswell have been nominated for Honorary Membership by the Council. Their names will be confirmed at the next Anniversary Meeting.

The Coat of Arms arranged by Mr. Omar Ramsden has been accepted by the College of Heralds.

The Hon. Secretaries will be at 77, Grosvenor Street, on Wednesdays at 12.30 p.m.

Members are asked to notify the office of any change of address. The following JOURNALS have been returned addressed to: Laurence Gray, Esq., Flying Officer J. R. Mathew.

Contributors and speakers are alone responsible for their statements and spellings in the JOURNAL. Any opinions expressed are purely individual.

NOMINATION FORM.

.....
.....
.....
(Name, with Rank and Appointment or Occupation)

being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend $\frac{\text{him}}{\text{her}}$ for membership.

Proposed

Seconded

His
Her connection with Asia is :

IN MEMORIAM

KING FEISAL OF 'IRAQ

DEATH has taken Feisal, King of 'Iraq, erstwhile the Emir Feisal, our valiant and faithful ally in war and peace.

Son of Husein, the Sherif of Mecca, who became King of the Hedjaz, he was educated in Constantinople, and played a considerable part in Turkish politics; but returned to Arabia after the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid.

The Great War came. Husein declared himself on the side of the Allies, and Emir Feisal was given command of his father's army. Associated with and assisted by a group of young British officers, he led that army northwards in close touch with the eastern flank of the Egyptian Expeditionary force, and took a full share in the fighting which resulted in the capture of Damascus.

After the Armistice Feisal, with the consent of the Allied Powers, unfurled the flag of the Hedjaz over Damascus; and in 1920 he was proclaimed King of Syria.

Friction with the Mandatory Power led to his removal; but in August, 1921, he became King of 'Iraq under a British Mandate.

On the expiration of the Mandate, King Feisal, as an independent monarch, paid his official visit to England; and, in June of this year, was the guest of our King at Buckingham Palace.

In his bearing Feisal was "every inch a king." Tall, graceful, and dignified, with well-shaped head held erect, high, intelligent forehead, features clean-cut and virile, eyes thoughtful and kind—his attractive personality won all hearts.

The years brought little of sunshine to his life. They were full of storm, and the path of duty was ever beset by difficulties and dangers; but courage and sound statesmanship triumphed over all.

A true king, Feisal sacrificed himself for his people. 'Iraq reveres his memory; our own country deplores the passing of a valued friend.

A.

MECCA AND MADINA*

By H. St J. B. PHILBY

THE vigilant committee which ever watches over your welfare appears to have thought that a small dose of Arabia would be a very good thing for you at the end of a session during which you have doubtless had a surfeit of richer fare. That is why I am on this platform once more after a comparatively short interval since my last appearance, and I must confess to you that, when I arrived back in England about a month ago, I thought and hoped to have the pleasure of listening quietly to others during what remained of the session without having to contribute myself to your entertainment. And my hope was firmly based on the conviction that in any case I had nothing whatever to talk about. I thought I was safe, but soon discovered my error, and if you discover in turn that I was right after all you must blame your secretaries, not me.

After all, a year is a long time, long enough for things to happen even in a country like Arabia, and it so happens that during the past twelvemonth or less a good many things have happened in Arabia of a rather astonishing kind. It is not perhaps so much that such things have actually happened as that they have shaped to happen in the near future. It is, for instance, rather thrilling to reflect that in a couple of years or so from now—in April, 1935, to be more exact if we can trust things to work out according to plan—it will be or should be possible to travel from Jidda to Mecca by railway. That reminds me that, when it was known that I proposed to talk to you to-day about the holy cities of Arabia, a suggestion was made to me very authoritatively that I should drag in the subject of the Haifa-Baghdad Railway. I do not propose to act on that suggestion, which concerns territory about 1,000 miles away from the scene of my normal activities. But that need not deter any of you from referring to the subject later on if I confine myself to telling you something about a railway which will, when it is built, represent the practical realization of a dream more than thirty years old. Many of you doubtless know that about the beginning of the present century the late Sultan 'Abdul Hamid of Turkey planned the linking

* Lecture given on July 19, 1933, Professor H. A. R. Gibb in the Chair.

of his capital with Madina and Mecca by railway. That railroad reached as far as Madina about the year 1908, the very year in which the late King Husain was appointed Amir to Mecca by the Turkish Government. He was, among other things, expected to use his influence with the Badawin to secure the completion of the line as far as Mecca. In fact, he used all his influence to thwart the project, realizing that it would give Turkey an effective stranglehold over the Hijaz. And when the war broke out in 1914 the terminus of the railway was still at Madina. During the war, as you all know, Lawrence and others spent their time making the line as unserviceable as possible. And during the peace that ensued the policy adopted by Great Britain and France has had the practical effect of perpetuating the derelict condition of the last 500 miles of the Hijaz Railway between Ma'an and Madina.

I have often during the last dozen years protested against that policy, but I should like now just to give you an idea of what it means to a city like Madina. In 1931 I travelled up the line by car for about 250 miles from Madina to Al 'Ula, and I can state as a fact that a comparatively small expenditure of money would be sufficient to recondition the whole line, but it would need a very large sum to supply the necessary locomotives and rolling stock to operate it, as the British and French Governments appropriated all the original engines and carriages belonging to the line for the benefit of their sections in Palestine and Syria. It is therefore quite out of the question for the Government of Ibn Sa'ud to take up the matter except on the basis of a reasonable redistribution of all the assets of the line between the three sections involved and, sad to relate, neither the British nor the French Government shows any sign of willingness to reconsider the question on such a basis.

So the southern section of the Hijaz Railway is for all practical purposes dead; and the great city of Madina, the City of the Prophet, one of the greatest and most productive agricultural centres of all Arabia, which in the short heyday of the Hijaz Railway grew rapidly to be a city of some 70,000 inhabitants—trafficking with Syria and Palestine and receiving and entertaining the pilgrims from the north—has sunk in the few years since the British assisted in the liberation of the Arabs from the domination of the Turks to the status of a petty borough of some 15,000 souls, whose single dream is still to see the restoration of the railway which once made them so prosperous and who in the meantime sell for a song the goods they produce in such plenty but cannot

market. A large basket of the most luscious fruit—grapes, figs, peaches, pomegranates, and the like—sells to-day at Madina for as many pence as it would produce shillings at Jidda or Mecca, while the spacious mansions of the Prophet's City sell outright for the ordinary annual rental of a house at Jidda. It is all a matter of communications, and it is difficult to see how Madina can ever overcome its existing disabilities.

In ancient times it was an important station on the celebrated spice route between Southern Arabia and the civilized world in the north. In those days it was occupied by a number of pagan and Jewish communities, the most famous of which was the one which gave the district its ancient name of Yathrib and which survives to this day in a heap of ruins about three miles to the north of the present city. In the seventh century it became an imperial capital as the adopted home of the Prophet of Islam, and since that time it has been the revered object of the visits of the faithful year by year at the time of the Great Pilgrimage. For more than twelve centuries they used to come from Egypt, Syria and elsewhere by camel—laboriously, dangerously, but with much pomp and ceremony. Later for a few happy years the railway brought them down with all the efficient fuss of modern civilization, and the pilgrims pouring out of the imposing railway station found the Prophet's mosque facing them at the end of the long vista leading to the further side of the city. Nowadays the majority of the pilgrims come up from Mecca and Jidda by motor-car, though many still prefer the camel, and quite a number prefer, or pretend to prefer, or have to prefer, their own flat feet to carry them over the 250 miles of the pilgrim road. But the motor-car certainly has the advantage in an extensive district like that of Madina of enabling pilgrims to visit within a comparatively short time some of the historic spots associated with the Prophet's activities.

To my mind the most interesting of these is the little "Mosque of the double prayer-niche," which preserves the memory of the earlier days of the Prophet's mission when the faithful turned their faces at prayer-time to Jerusalem instead of Mecca. This concession to Jewish tradition was cancelled owing to the stiff-necked contumacy of the Jews of Yathrib, and in this little mosque the first Mecca-ward niche was made as a *beau geste* to the relaxing opposition of the Meccan pagans. So Madina ceased to face north towards the civilized world of those days and turned its eyes to the south, as it still does both politically and spiritually in spite of Sultan 'Abdul Hamid's well-meant but short-

lived effort to make Constantinople at least the political Qibla of the Arabs. And now, if ever the railway does come to Medina, it seems to me that it will come up from the south after the completion of the Jidda-Mecca line, for the construction of which a concession was granted by the Arab King last March to an Indian group which is at present actively engaged with its plans to carry out the enterprise entrusted to it. It is perhaps too early to say much about its prospects of success, but it is not too much to say that the efforts of an all-Muslim group to provide the Cradle of Islam with railway communication will be watched all the world over with great interest and genuine sympathy. The railway should provide splendid opportunities of hard and honest labour for the Badawin of the Hijaz, who can no longer indulge safely in their ancient occupation of highway robbery, and I understand that the factories of India will have the privilege of supplying the metal and machines required for the railroad.

Like Petra and other localities, Madina claims the honour of being the last resting-place of Aaron, whose tomb is situated on the bleak summit of Jabal Uhud, some 2,000 feet above the Madina basin, which lies very picturesquely within a circle of lava representing ancient and comparatively modern volcanic explosions, the last of which is supposed to have occurred about 1,200 A.D. This sea of flat-lying lava gives the whole district a rather grim and dreary appearance, which is, however, relieved by the immense mass of the palm-groves within it and by the ragged crags of the mountains which almost surround it. Jabal Uhud itself is typical of these mountains, besides being famous as the site of one of the decisive battles of the Prophet's time, which was fought at its base, and in which the Prophet lost many of his companions, including his cousin Hamza. The tombs of these martyrs were for many centuries the object of superstitious veneration and excessive visitation on the part of ignorant devotees, but that unsatisfactory state of affairs was somewhat drastically remedied by the Wahhabis in 1925 when they captured Madina after a long siege.

Madina, as we know it to-day, shows clearly the stages of its growth from the original City of the Prophet enclosed within a massive wall pierced by bastioned gates giving access to the residences of the Prophet and his companions. Its chief monument is of course the mosque, which grew up to include the house and garden of the Prophet and his family. As we see it to-day, it is of comparatively modern construction, dating back only about seventy years to the reign of Sultan 'Abdul Majid, when the old mosque was destroyed by fire. The new building,

entirely built of the local red stone of the neighbourhood, is, however, a completely satisfactory architectural achievement and easily the most pleasing monument of the Hijaz, with the sole exception of the Great Mosque at Mecca, whose present shape and aspect date from the sixteenth century. The five Minarets and Green Dome of Madina dominate the whole city in a most effective and charming manner, while the demolition of the many domed graves of the Baqi'a cemetery and other spots by the Wahhabis in 1925 has left the central feature of the city in a splendid isolation which, as I thought when I first saw the whole scene from afar off, breathes the very spirit of Islam—the embodiment of a great ideal of democratic equality dominated and governed by a great religion, whose founder lived during his lifetime and was buried after his death on the spot now covered by the Green Dome. It is perhaps scarcely necessary for me in a Society like this to emphasize the strange error so common among novelists and other fanciful writers, who so often represent the Muhammadans as turning daily in prayer towards the grave of their Prophet at Mecca! As you all know, it is the House of God at Mecca they face at prayer-time and not the Prophet's grave at Madina.

Adjacent to the original walled city of Madina lies the extensive suburb of Manakh, which grew up through the centuries to accommodate the pilgrims and growing population of the city. Its most important feature is the great open space in which the old camel-caravans from Egypt and Syria and Mecca deposited their pilgrims and the wares they generally brought with them for sale during the pilgrimage season. Round it on all sides are the various governmental offices, the mansions of the wealthier citizens, the hotels for the accommodation of visitors and numerous mosques associated with the great personalities of early Islamic history.

Outside this area again and on the western side of a torrent channel which separates the two suburbs is the later suburb of Ambariya, whose name suggests that it was the original business and warehouse quarter. The original city wall has been extended to enclose both these suburbs, and to-day it is in this area that we find the garages which have been provided for the service of the growing motor traffic. The railway station is on the western extremity of the Ambariya suburb, while the broad new street which leads from the station towards the old city is adorned by many important buildings—the barracks, the Egyptian charitable institutions, and many fine private mansions, including the residence of the present governor. Many of the houses of Madina are

built on a lavish scale, with pillared halls opening on to pleasant bathing pools continually fed with fresh water from the great subterranean aqueduct of 'Ain al Zarqa. And, as one might expect in an oasis so richly blessed by Nature, many of the citizens of Madina own extensive palm-groves and gardens outside the city itself, where they have built comfortable and luxurious summer residences in which with their families they spend a great part of each year. Their main occupation is inevitably to wait for and cater for the pilgrims, but in the process they have built up a charming civilization of their own on a foundation of easy opulence, which at the moment seems doomed to a progressive decadence that we can only ascribe to the cutting off of the railway on the north by British policy and which can only be arrested, I think, by the coming again of a railway from the south to link Madina with the coast and the markets of the world. I cannot think that such a project will be long delayed after the completion of the railroad from Jidda to Mecca.

Like so many pilgrims coming from the north we have perhaps loitered too long in the charming City of the Prophet, and I must now take you with all haste over the long rough road through mountain and desert to the City of God—the "Mother of Cities" as the Arabs call Mecca. We pass now rapidly through the little outlying oasis of Abyar 'Ali, whither the citizens of Madina so often go for picnics, then up and down through the great mountain barrier by valleys which offer no serious obstacle to motor traffic and lead down through the village and pass of Shufaiya to the coastal plain and so to Jidda, whence we proceed at once to Mecca by the car track which will soon carry the railroad. The distance between Jidda and Mecca is only forty-five miles through a tract of rough volcanic hills of rather dreary aspect. The actual sacred territory of Mecca is marked off on every route giving access to the city by great boundary-pillars through which no one is allowed to pass except true Muslims, through which none have ever passed without making profession of allegiance to Islam.

Owing to the general structure of the country one sees practically nothing of Mecca until one is almost at its portals. But from some distance off one can see the great cone of Jabal Nur—the Mountain of Light—on which the Prophet, who could neither read nor write, received the first astonishing message from the Infinite that meant the birth of Islam and the opening of a new chapter in history. Jabal Nur is assuredly one of the outstanding monuments of Islam, and it is only fitting that it should be the first prominent landmark to

catch the eye of the approaching pilgrim, who soon finds himself at the only gate of the great unwallled city which occupies the troughs and slopes of a knot of valleys, of which the greatest is still known as the Valley of Abraham. Tradition represents Mecca as having existed from the earliest times, but its first appearance in what we may regard as actual history dates from the arrival of the patriarch with Hagar and her son Ishmael in the then waterless valley. It was Abraham who first built or rebuilt the Ka'ba on its present site, and it was there that Hagar and the young Ishmael lived after the distracted mother had discovered the bubbling source of Zamzam. It was at Muna, about three miles away up the valley, that Abraham in due course found the ram which saved the life of Ishmael, while at 'Arafat we have the scene of the meeting of Adam and Eve after the long separation that ensued upon their expulsion from the Garden of Eden. The Great Pilgrimage, of which I shall speak briefly later on and to which Mecca owes its present existence and importance as the centre of Islam, is in fact a great historical pageant—of the kind with which we have become familiar of recent times in England—designed to keep alive and fresh among Arabs and Muslims the memory of far-away historical events which accompanied the birth of the Arab race and prepared the way for the advent of Islam. The scenario, as it were, was written by the Prophet himself and has been staged annually from his time to our own without any substantial variation.

I should like now to show you something of the setting with which the pilgrim becomes familiar in the course of his few months' sojourn at Mecca. Passing through the gate to which I have referred, he sees on his left hand afar off a group of houses and gardens known as the Valley of the Martyrs on account of a battle that took place here about the year 780 A.D. and resulted in the death of a number of the Calif 'Ali's descendants who had rebelled against the Calif of Baghdad, the brother of Harun. One of the fugitives from that field found his way eventually to Africa and founded the Idrisi dynasty, which has played so important a part in North African history up to our own times, besides being responsible for the later Idrisi and Sanusi sects of Arabia and Libya respectively.

Beyond Shuhada, or the Valley of the Martyrs, we enter the first suburb proper of Mecca—Jarwal—a sort of garden city, in which we see side by side the many mansions built in more recent times by well-to-do Sharifs and the hovels of the coolie classes, mainly consisting of immigrants from Western and Central Africa, who seem to think

nothing of embarking on the several thousand miles' walk from Nigeria to Mecca, which takes them several years to do as they work their dreary way from place to place earning enough money in the labour markets of Khartum and Port Sudan and on the cotton plantations of the Sudan Gezira to bring them across the Red Sea. Most of them settle permanently at Jidda and Mecca, where under present-day economic conditions they constitute a rather serious problem. Many, of course, fall by the way and are buried where they fall. Such losses, however, are more than compensated by births on the road, while many of the children so born are disposed of by their indigent parents by sale to the well-to-do citizens of Mecca, in whose houses they at any rate live in such comfort as to be envied by their free relations. Some of them indeed live to inherit the names and fortunes of their wealthy masters, and there is, in fact, no limit to the possible advancement of slaves in the service of individuals or of the State. There is nothing to prevent them from becoming governors of provinces or princesses by reason of their intelligence or beauty, and that, after all, is about the best that is open to anyone who rejoices in the attributes of legal freedom. I am not concerned here to discuss the question of slavery in Arabia or elsewhere, but I do think it is a pity that so much nonsense is talked by sensible people on an issue on which it seems to me that the last word was spoken recently in this very Society by Sir Percy Cox when he said: "I cannot believe that treaties alone will stop the trade. The complete suppression of the supply by sea from Africa is the only practical remedy."

Lady Simon publicly laments the existence in Arabia of about 2,000,000 slaves, which, at a moderate estimate of £50 as the average value of a slave, would give the country a national wealth of £100,000,000 in slaves alone. Such an estimate of the country's wealth is too ridiculous to be taken seriously. I suggest that it would be difficult to find 50,000 slaves in the whole country, and if, instead of pointing the finger at Arabia as a hotbed of slavery, the European nations would contribute the cost of a few hours' European war, every slave in the country could be offered the doubtful advantages of legal freedom if he or she wanted it. And many, very many, would refuse.

To return from this inevitable digression to the garden city suburb of Mecca called Jarwal, of which I myself am a resident—it is perhaps the largest of all the quarters of the city, and it is now to a large extent occupied by the offices and garages of the motor transport companies which cater for the pilgrim traffic. The pilgrims are deposited here and have to walk for something less than a mile to the various hostels,

to say nothing of the new hotel, which exist for their accommodation in the centre of the city round the Great Mosque. Mecca itself is rather devoid of trees and vegetation, but here in Jarwal there are gardens attached to most of the houses. They are watered partly from wells and partly from the various distributing stations along the great aqueduct of Queen Zubaida, the wife of the Calif Harun al Rashid, which starts from a source on the flanks of the great mountains behind Mecca and runs underground for some 30 miles, traversing the whole length of the city itself until it finally pours its surplus water (if any) into a great reservoir in Jarwal, round which the famous Sharif of Mecca, 'Aun al Rafiq, established an extensive garden.

From here there are two roads giving access to the city proper, which lies in the main Valley of Abraham behind the ridge of Qaiqa'an. I shall take you into the town by the more roundabout route, which runs up to a col of this ridge, through which the late King Husain had a passage blasted for the convenience of traffic. This pass of Hujul (Hujun) is often spoken of in jest as the only good work ever accomplished by Husain. That is, of course, a somewhat exaggerated figure of speech, but there can be no doubt that the new roadway is a great boon to the citizens and pilgrims of Mecca. More than a thousand years ago the Calif Mansur, the founder of Baghdad, fell off his horse as he descended the precipitous slope of this ridge on his way into the city on pilgrimage and thus met his death. And doubtless similar accidents have been frequent enough to make the older people of Mecca remember with gratitude and to the exclusion of his other meritorious acts a public work regarding whose utility there is and can be no controversy.

Beyond this pass the road runs down into the upper end of the main street of the city through the great cemetery of Ma'la, which lies on both sides of the road within a low-walled enclosure. Formerly this famous cemetery presented a very different aspect from that which we see to-day, and the summary treatment meted out by the Wahhabi conquerors in 1925 to the many domed tombs of the saints and other historic personalities, whose remains lie in this enclosure, has been the subject of some sharp controversy within the fold of Islam. The Wahhabis have certainly sacrificed something of what one may term the head-line value—the propaganda value—of perhaps the greatest single collection of illustrious dead in the world in their zeal for the prevention of idolatry. The political wisdom of their iconoclasm may be questioned, but not their single-hearted sincerity, and, now that the domes which encouraged

so much backsliding among the faithful have gone, the very desolation which broods impartially over the dust of the illustrious and insignificant alike seems to stand out as a monument to the greatness of their creator and destroyer. At any rate, the sin of association of any human being, dead or alive, in the worship due to God alone is a cardinal factor in Wahhabi doctrine. They will have none of it at any price, and they are prepared to fight or suffer for their convictions as may be necessary. That, after all, is the acid test of their sincerity, though not perhaps the best way of making money out of the pilgrimage, which for the first time in history they have made completely safe and reasonably comfortable for all true believers who behave themselves according to the Prophet's own standards.

Beyond the cemetery one turns right for the centre of the city and the Great Mosque, but I propose to leave that till the end, and to conduct you now northwards to the quarters of Ma'abida and Al Abtah, in the former of which stands the royal palace, a spacious and pleasing modern building—constructed since the accession of King Ibn Sa'ud—in the wider part of the Valley of Abraham, where pilgrims coming from Najd and other parts of Arabia park their camels and encamp while waiting to perform the actual ceremonies of the pilgrimage at Muna and 'Arafat. The road to these two places forks right from the great trunk road to Najd, which runs up north-eastwards between Jabal Nur, already mentioned, and the imposing double-peaked hill of Jabal Ghurur (the Mountain of Pride), which dominates the palace area, above which on another lower hill stands a small fort garrisoned by Najdi troops. Behind the palace and the new wireless station completed only this year a third mountain, known as Jabal Khandama, looks down at different angles on the palace itself and the Great Mosque in the centre of the town. Within the main entrance of the palace is a very pleasing garden-vestibule through which one reaches the stairs leading to the great pillared hall, which is the ceremonial audience chamber of the King on all public occasions. It is here that His Majesty receives the leading personalities of the Islamic world when they come to visit him—men like ex-King Amanullah of the Afghans, Turkish princes of the fallen Ottoman dynasty, the exiled Sanusi now dead, ambassadors from Egypt or 'Iraq or Persia, and prominent Muslim leaders of India and elsewhere; and it is here, too, that each year he receives his guests for the annual pilgrimage banquet and, in his *de facto* capacity of leader of the Muslim congregation, harangues them in the manner of the Califs of old on the progress and prospects of Islam.

On the following day the whole body of the pilgrims moves out towards the plain of 'Arafat, where the chief ceremony of the pilgrimage programme known as the "standing" takes place on the ninth day of the last month of each Muslim year. The King himself, after spending the night at Muna in imitation of the example set by the Prophet himself on the occasion of the only pilgrimage he ever performed, rides forward at the head of his escort of several thousands of the men of Najd—the Arabs of the desert—all mounted on camels and advancing at a gentle trot. This cavalcade presents a most impressive picture every man bare-headed and clad in the two white towels which form the sole covering of the pilgrim—as it passes along the valley crowded with other pilgrims going in the same direction on foot, on donkeys, on camels, and even nowadays by motor-car.

At the Mosque of Namira, in a sort of no-man's-land between the sacred territory of Mecca and the sacred plain of 'Arafat similarly marked out with boundary-pillars, the King and his party camp in tents till midday, when the chief ecclesiastic—the Archbishop of Mecca, as it were—conducts the special pilgrimage service, after which the cavalcade resumes its march towards the little hillock known as the Mount of Mercy. The Zubaida aqueduct passes round the flank of this eminence, providing water for all the assembled pilgrims, who spread out for miles round the hillock across the plain, where the actual ceremony of "the standing" takes place. Strictly speaking, and as interpreted by the Wahhabi pilgrims from Najd, who rejoice in making the ordeal as severe as possible, this ceremony consists in remaining seated on a camel from about 1 p.m. till sunset—that is to say, throughout the hottest period of the afternoon and for five hours on end—under a blazing sun, bare-headed and scantily clothed. Others set up tents, in which they lie or sit in comfort to while away the time. Those who have no tents seek out such shelter as there may be behind the desert bushes or in the shadow of the hill, while the more opulent loll comfortably in the motor-cars that have brought them to the spot. The essential thing is that one should spend the whole afternoon of that particular day on that particular spot, but the King and his party of many thousands set the pace in the orthodox fashion beside the unfurled banners of the faith.

At sunset the whole assembly starts simultaneously on the return journey towards Mecca, and it is indeed an amazing sight as the growing dusk turns to darkness until there is nothing to be seen but tens of thousands of ghostly white phantoms jogging rhythmically in mid-air above the haze of dust stirred up by the invisible camels which bear

them up. The first stage of the return journey ends at Muzdalifa, a solitary minaret without a mosque, in contrast with the Mosque of Namira, which is a mosque without a minaret. Here the night is spent and here, on arrival, a simple but ample dinner of rice and meat is provided for the King's party, which feeds in relays until everyone is sated. Even then there is plenty of food left over, and the King's henchmen go forth to bring in the passing pilgrims of the poorer sort who may have had no food all day.

By that time one is ready enough for a little sleep, but long before the first sign of dawn one is woken up to resume the journey to Muna, where there is still an important ceremony to be performed—the stoning of the Great Devil with small pebbles collected during the night for the purpose at Muzdalifa. This ceremony, including the stoning of the other two devils at Muna, is repeated on the next two days, but it is permissible for the pilgrims—and most of them avail themselves of this dispensation—to complete the pilgrimage ceremonies after the first stoning by going down to Mecca to perform the two rites of the Circumambulation of the Ka'ba and the running between the places known as Safa and Marwa.

Meanwhile the workmen get busy changing the old covering of the Ka'ba for the new one—the changing of the holy carpet, in fact—and, if one gets down to Mecca in time, one may see the Ka'ba stripped and its simple construction of massive masonry exposed. I have not time to speak in detail of the outstanding features of the Great Mosque—the well of Zamzam, the Black Stone itself, the archway that marks the site of the gateway of the original temple or enclosure surrounding the Ka'ba. The pictures I have to show you must speak for themselves, and I must pass on rapidly to show you something of the buildings in this central part of Mecca.

In the tributary valley of Ajyad the most conspicuous feature is the great fortress which completely dominates the heart of the city. In its present shape it is of Turkish construction, but the massive glacis and walls on the slopes leading up to it suggest the existence of fortifications dating back to much earlier times. Many of the best modern buildings of Mecca lie in this quarter, including the hospital, which has been greatly developed and improved under the régime of the present King. Not far from it is the most important of all the Government buildings, the Ministry of Finance, which particularly during the recent period of general economic depression has been working at full pressure to make the exiguous resources of the State meet the ever-growing demands on

the exchequer. Of one project for meeting the difficulties of the situation I have already spoken—namely, the proposed railway. But that has not been by any means the only scheme under consideration. Some months ago the Government granted a concession to the ex-Khedive of Egypt for the establishment of a State bank, which should certainly some day be of great benefit to the country, though for the moment it would seem that the matter is hanging fire owing to the general financial and economic confusion prevailing throughout the world. The delay in bringing the bank scheme to maturity is, however, fully compensated in another direction, and some day it will probably be regarded as the greatest triumph of the present Ministry of Finance that it has been able to negotiate successfully and to the mutual satisfaction of both parties an arrangement under which a great American Oil Company has undertaken under the terms of its concession to explore and exploit the potential oil resources of a great area in the eastern part of Arabia in the Persian Gulf neighbourhood. It will indeed be a great day for Arabia when oil is found in the bowels of its earth. Hitherto the King and his Government have struggled manfully with but slender means to ensure the progress of the country. The motor-car has helped to reduce to manageable proportions the great distances of the desert. Even the aeroplane has come in, though rather timidly, to share in the good work. Wireless telegraphy has ensured the maintenance of effective communications at all times. And soon the railway will add its quota of blessings, while already much has been done towards extending the area under cultivation in the oases of the country by means of pumping machinery. But all such improvements mean heavy expenditure in a country whose resources have hitherto depended almost exclusively on an ever-fluctuating pilgrimage. And the great need of the Government has been to find a more steady source of substantial revenue, which will enable it in due course to treat the pilgrimage income as a windfall when the season is good and to do without it in bad seasons without serious prejudice to its administrative efficiency. In these circumstances it has turned with the ready approval of the King, and indeed of the whole country, to an examination of the mineral resources which for all these centuries have lain dormant under the grim surface of one of the barrenest deserts of the world. After all, the gold and diamonds of Africa have been discoveries almost of our own time, and to-day who can say but that the Wahabi King, who has toiled for thirty years to convert his desert realm into a decent scene of peace and progress, may not yet bequeath to the sons that will follow him in due course such material prosperity

as may ensure the permanence of the blessings he has conferred on Arabia as none has ever done before him?

And so we must take our leave of the great city of Mecca—passing out of it, like the pilgrims whom we have watched through the ceremonies of the pilgrimage, down the winding street that leads from the Great Mosque back to the suburb of Jarwal, where their cars and their camels wait to convey them back to the ships awaiting them at Jidda. I have, after all, in the time allowed to me, only been able to give you the briefest glimpse of some aspects of the holy cities of Arabia and of the pilgrimage that brings men to them yearly from the furthestmost corners of the globe. I hope, however, that I have been able to say and show you enough to stimulate your interest in a land which to some of you may seem somewhat forbidding, though some few at least will probably agree with my view that there is a good deal to be said for a country and people who still preserve something of the virtue and simplicity of an old world which has passed away from us almost unawares into the general chaos of modern civilization. That Arabia has a great future before it I have no doubt whatever. That it will achieve greatness without a tremendous struggle I do not for a moment think. But it is perhaps of happy augury that the accredited ambassadors of the two Kings who will have to work out its advance and ultimate salvation have both honoured us here to-night to visit with you in imagination the two great cities that have pride of place in the whole world of Islam.

Mr. A. YUSUF ALI expressed his appreciation of Mr. Philby's lecture, and especially of the slides which he showed of Mecca and Madina. Every Muslim household was familiar with pictures of the Ka'ba, but it was good also to see the actual life in the sacred cities and their surroundings at the present day. Madina was a city very dear to the heart of every Muslim because of the asylum it gave to the Prophet when his own city rejected him and cast him out. Madina therefore became in a special sense the Prophet's own city. Its fortunes and its communications were therefore of vital interest to the Muslim world. The lecturer had naturally been guarded in his reference to the Hijaz Railway. But it was a question of the liveliest interest to Islam and figured prominently in the recent Mo'tamarrs (Congresses) of representatives from the Muslim countries. He (Mr. Yusuf Ali) would put in a strong plea for the repair of the railway and its restoration and maintenance under

Muslim control. This would become a practical proposition only if the engines and rolling stock were returned. It must be remembered that the funds with which the railway was built and equipped were in the nature of Waqf funds. They did not belong to any particular State. They came from all parts of the world. He (the speaker) had in his own humble way made his contribution to them, and many people in India had sent large sums. In the post-war arrangements the Hijaz Railway should not be treated as an enemy asset by the Allies. Muslims had made valuable contributions in men and money in all theatres of the war, and it was a disappointment to them to see their sacred cities left isolated and Madina almost derelict. It was good news to hear that King Ibn Sa'ud was going to connect Mecca with Jidda and the sea by railway. The connection with Madina would follow from the south. But the land connections with Madina with the Muslim world were by the Hijaz Railway to the north. These should be restored. The return of the engines and rolling stock could be urged as a matter of expediency as well as of justice and equity.

A member spoke regretting that Mr. Philby had found it necessary to criticize so strongly the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Sa'udi Arabia, and pointed out that it was British blood and money that first won the Arab freedom from the Turks.

As regards the Madina Railway, he suggested that a less partial and more fully documented account of what had occurred would probably show that responsibility for its present derelict conditions did not rest entirely with His Majesty's Government.

In conclusion and after some further discussion, the Chairman said that, although many would regret to see those signs of modern life which were apparent even in these sacred cities, it was inevitable that pilgrims should prefer to travel by car rather than by the more picturesque camel. He paid a tribute to Ibn Sa'ud's work and to the personality of the King, and said how glad the Society was to hear Mr. Philby again—in 1935 he hoped he would tell them of the successful working out of the Arabian plans.

THE MANDÆANS OF 'IRAQ*

By E. S. STEVENS (MRS. DROWER)

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I hope it will cause no misgiving in anyone present if I say that I am here this afternoon to tell you something about the smallest minority in 'Iraq. Perhaps it may be reassuring that many of them have never heard of the League of Nations and that only a small number of them read newspapers. As a whole, they are quiet, hardworking, simple-minded craftsmen, living for the most part in villages and towns in southern 'Iraq, amongst the marshes and on the river banks. They are loyal 'Iraqis, without political aspirations or any desire to hold Government appointments, and they are perfectly happy if they are left alone and allowed to practise their religion without hindrance and interference. The only time that they apply to Government officials for help is when they see their free access to the river in places where they are many, such as Al 'Amarah and Qal'at Šālih, threatened by town-planning or private schemes, for the river is essential for the exercise of their religion, an ancient religion and one of the most interesting in the world.

Their 'Iraqi name, the Šubba, which means those who plunge or submerge themselves—that is, baptists—shows why the river is so important to them, for ceremonial ablution in running water is the most important feature of their cult. These Šubba, or, as they call themselves, Mandai (Mandæans), have received toleration from the new 'Iraqi Government, but they are already having difficulties of the nature I have mentioned, and access to the river, which may seem a trivial matter to a Moslem or a Christian, is to them a question of life and death—the life or death of a religion which they have held for thousands of years, and means more to them than riches or honours or

* Paper read to the Royal Central Asian Society, June 28, 1933, Sir Percy Sykes in the Chair. In introducing the lecturer, the Chairman said Mrs. Stevens had already written several delightful books on the Middle East, and her *Folk-tales of 'Iraq* had shown a deep insight into the life of the people. To-day she was speaking on one of the most interesting of the sects, a people whose customs and ritual dated from the earliest days of Christianity, if not from the pre-Christian era.

power or family. English people who have visited 'Iraq know them chiefly as silversmiths, and many tourists take back samples of their curious and well-made work. I believe that his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales possesses a cigarette-box made by them. They like to tell their Christian customers that they are followers of St. John the Baptist. However, they are not Christians, neither are they Jews nor Moslems. They are, however, certainly the Šābiyun who were counted in the Qur'an as people of a book and therefore promised toleration.

As a race they are dying out. According to the last census there are only four thousand eight hundred of them left in 'Iraq, and the small communities of Mandæans along the Karun River in Persia are not numerous.

The cause is not any physical deterioration, for the Mandæans are a fine race, and the reason of their good physique and handsome appearance lies largely in their religion, which provides elaborate rules and regulations calculated to promote scrupulous cleanliness, to preserve health, and to avoid marriage with, or any close contact with, those of lower race or different faith.

They have holy books of their own written in Mandæan, a language akin to Syriac and Aramaic. Many of the older generation still speak a modern dialect of this language, and in Khuzistan young people speak it also. The holy books are all written by hand, and the script is Mandæan, not Arabic or Syriac; for they have an alphabet of their own. The letters of this alphabet are looked upon as sacred, for each letter represents a power of light and, worn as an amulet, is a protection against evil. There are twenty-four letters, the first and last are the sound *a*, which is represented by a circle, the symbol of perfection and eternity.

There is a considerable amount of this sacred literature, only a portion of which has been translated into European languages. The most important book is the *Ginza*, or *Sidra Rabba*, the Great Book, which is a collection of religious fragments, teachings and hymns. There is no unity either of idea or matter, and we have in this book, compiled during Sasanian and early Moslem times, a picture of religion in decadence and teachings gathered haphazard under stress of circumstance. Lidzbarski translated it into German, also the *Drasha d Yahya*, or John Book. A translation from this German version was made by Mr. G. R. S. Mead, and this is the only English translation of any of the books which exists so far. Lidzbarski further translated the *Qulasta*, a collection of prayers for ritual, and two little books of devotions and

fragments from the Bodleian Library. We have also in Europe the *Asfar Malw-sha*, an astrological codex, and an illustrated *Diwan*, or roll. But I am told there are twenty-three other *Diwans* in existence. I have seen two in 'Iraq. There is also a sacred book called the *Haran Guweytha*, or *Alf Trisar Shiala*, a scroll of considerable length, a treatise about the body called the *Tafsir Paghra*, and a number of magical texts. All these are untranslated and, as far as I know, not in any European library. There may be other manuscripts; I do not pretend to have seen them all. So you will see that before any definite opinion about the Mandæans is arrived at we should know a great deal more about this literature, its origin and its sources.

One reason why one seldom sees a manuscript of any age (the earliest I have seen is sixteenth century) is that the Mandæans used to live always, and many of them still do live, in reed huts, which are easily destroyed by fire. One hears a great many stories of holy books being miraculously preserved and being taken from the ashes of a burnt reed hut almost unscorched.

All documentary evidence, then, is only partial evidence, and cannot be taken as the final word about the origin and religion of the people. Cults and customs, on the other hand, do offer evidence which is incontrovertible because it can be observed at first hand.

First and chief comes the rite of baptism, or rather lustration or ablution, for the use of the word *baptism* conveys a false idea. The so-called baptism is not with these people an initiation, to be performed once only, but immersion in the element which gives life to body and soul, and so, the oftener you are "baptized," the better. In a country where all life depends on irrigation—if any of you have flown over 'Iraq you will have seen how cultivation, towns, and villages hug the rivers and canals—it is a natural train of thought to consider water magical and sacred and possessing the divine gift of life.

That idea is very ancient, and submerging in this life-element of water became the principal magic or religious ceremony with the Mandæans. To begin with, there is the self-ablution which takes place daily at dawn and after any of the minor pollutions. This protects a man body and soul, against disease of the body and against the powers of darkness which assail the soul, and if he is not cleansed in this way, and has come into intimate contact with the magical life-element, he is in danger. Everything eaten must be washed in "living" water, running water. The Shiah Moslems have a rule that food bought in the markets must be purified by ablution; but they use pools in their courtyards,

often green and foul, so that the Mandæan observance of the point that the water must be flowing gains point by contrast.

All animals eaten for food must be healthy, washed, properly killed, and then consumed at once, and not kept until they are tender. This ensures good teeth. Slaughter is performed by the priests, and the process involves a long and apologetic ceremonial, for all taking of life is a sin.

Certain animals, birds, and fish are forbidden as food. Among these are the pig and unclean animals; but it is not lawful to kill the cow and ox, which are clean animals, because they are looked on as sacred to the Life. Very pious Mandæans think an entirely vegetarian diet is the best rule. Fruits and vegetables must be eaten whilst perfectly fresh, though an exception is made for sun-dried fruits. Boiled water is forbidden as a drink, and this causes trouble with the sanitary authorities, who find it impossible to prevent these people from drinking the river water during epidemics. The Šubba think that boiling removes the ether from the water and that the true life-element departs.

On the whole, Dr. Saleeby or some other health expert might have devised many of their rules. Here is a modern sounding but in reality ancient precept—namely, that if a person wishes to sleep soundly he should lie north and south. The magnetic north, the North Star, is the seat of strength and power, they say, and if a man wishes to think hard or pray he should face north. You will perhaps remember that the Babylonians considered the north the abode of the gods, and that the early Jews faced north when praying. Before a man dies he must be washed and dressed in his religious dress and be placed facing the north, and in this position he is buried.

Christian Scientists would approve some Mandæan beliefs. For instance, I have been told that if a man is perfectly pure, performs all his ablutions, and believes in the Life, the Great Life which is the cause and origin of all things, he cannot take infection or fall ill, for disease is an evil thing, of the darkness, and avoids a person protected by purity and light.

They are pacifists. Taking of life is sinful, and therefore killing is wrong. I have never heard of a murder amongst them, and it is rare. With the tribes of 'Iraq, and also in the cities, if a girl elopes with a man, or misconducts herself, or even if she is innocent but brings talk on herself, she is, as likely as not, killed out of hand by her father or brother. No such thing takes place with the Mandæans. They insist on the couple getting married, for they are a very moral people, but the

girl cannot be married by a head priest, for a head priest, corresponding to a bishop, can only marry girls who are virgins. So an official whose sole office it is to marry widows or unmarried wives performs the ceremony. A severe penalty is exacted from a head priest who unwittingly performs a marriage where the bride is not virgin. He must be baptized seven times a day by five priests and a deacon until he has been baptized three hundred and sixty-five times, and he cannot officiate as a priest until this purification is complete. Sheikh Dukheyh, head priest at Naṣoriyah, told me that this once happened to him.

Remarriage of widows is not approved. A man may marry as often as he likes, and some men have two or more wives, but a good woman is supposed to have one husband only; she should not remarry. This recalls Hinduism.

Women go unveiled and can inherit property. When they put on their festival dresses they look very attractive. Their religion orders them to wear nothing but white, but the injunction is universally disregarded and they put on bright colours and load themselves with gold ornaments and gay beads when they have the excuse of a feast. The beauty of the race is one reason why it is decreasing. Moslem and Christian neighbours fall in love with these pretty Šubbiyahs and marry them. To marry outside the community is to leave it, and no converts from without are accepted. The reason is that they consider outsiders to have the taint of uncleanness, and they will marry no one of alien—that is, unclean—blood. The priests have an aristocracy all their own, for no priest must have the least physical defect. Even the accidental loss of a finger-joint will disqualify him from being a priest. His hair must be uncut and his body perfect. The woman he marries must be healthy and of untainted stock. The result can be seen in the wonderful physique of the priests, who, although they live in the marshes in one of the worst climates of 'Iraq, live to extreme old age and keep teeth, sight, and hearing to the end. The priest may not eat any food but that cooked and prepared by himself, or by his wife if she is in a state of purity. He never eats leavened bread, nor drinks tea or wine, and smokes no tobacco. He rarely eats meat, must rise every day at dawn for the first prayer (they pray thrice a day), and sleeps betimes.

Black is a colour they will not wear, and blue is also forbidden, for blue throughout 'Iraq is a colour which may be worn as mourning. Christians when mourning a relative may wear a bright shade of blue.

The Mandæans simply will not think of death as an occasion for mourning. To give you an instance of this, a month or two ago I was

in Qal'at Sālīh at the time of the great yearly ablution feast, and I met in the street an old man I knew. His shirt was open, his white hair was blowing in the wind, and he looked excited and happy. He stopped me and said: "My brother died to-day. Splendid, splendid!" I began an awkward "I am sorry" but he went on: "We are glad, we are delighted. He had longed and prayed to die just now, for if a man dies during this feast he goes straight to the world of light. I have forbidden the women to weep."

There is no hushed mention of the dead as if it were a little embarrassing to refer to them. On the contrary, one of the most usual rites is to assemble together wearing the white dress of purity, and, after ablutions, prayers are read, food is washed and prepared, and then eaten in the name of some dead person and of dead relatives and ancestors. It is a cheerful ceremony, for they think that when they eat in this way that their dead friends and relatives are eating spiritual food in the next world, and think of and remember them, just as they think of and remember the dead. They do not use the word "dead" often; they say, "those in the body and those out of the body." No care is taken of graves after the first three days; they are left nameless and soon become level with the ground. "There is nothing there," they say; "the soul has gone."

However, truth compels me to say that they are no more anxious to die than anyone else, and the women do not obey the rule about not weeping. I heard women wailing the dead just like their Moslem and Christian neighbours, but some priests passing were apologetic. "Custom, not religion," they said.

They take great precautions, when a man has died, that the death and disease spirits do not return to take another member of the family. Contact with disease and death are defiling, and therefore, unless ablutions are carefully performed, and clothes and pots and everything which has been in contact with the dead man are washed with purificatory prayers, the living are in danger. Other curious precautions are the stone, the bowl of water, and the lighted lamp placed by the spot where the dead person lay, and the three bundles of reeds placed erect in the courtyard, which are daubed with clay and then sealed with a magic seal by the leader of the four men who carry the corpse to the tomb. This man, when the burial is complete, seals the tomb with the same magic seal and traces a triple circle round the grave with a piece of iron, or a magic knife. All precautions are only for three days. The Mandæans say that at death the spirit only leaves the body immediately,

and seems half asleep. It needs protection while it lingers about the grave and house in this semi-conscious state, and evil spirits can harm it or good spirits help it. On the third day it is ready to set off on its journey through the seven houses of purification; for it cannot enter the world of light and life until it is freed of all impurity.

There is another most interesting belief about a double, existing in a world similar to ours, but much purer. This double is linked to his human twin in this world. When a man dies in this world the double also leaves his body, which is an immaterial body. The soul of the dead man passes into the immaterial, invisible body of his double, while the soul of the double, with whom he is so mysteriously connected, goes into the world of light and awaits his coming there. The world in which these doubles dwell is called Mshuni Kushṭa, and it is a world where all is perfect and pure. It is never too hot and never too cold. People marry and have children, but there is nothing fleshly about their union. This Mshuni Kushṭa is just the idealized twin of this world.

The white dress of purity worn by Mandæans for all religious ceremonies is called a *rasta*. The *rasta* has seven pieces for a priest and five for a layman. Both laymen and priests wear the drawers, the shirt, the turban, the stole, and the white woollen belt. In addition to these, the priest wears a fillet of white silk, representing a crown of light, which he puts on his head beneath the turban. He must also wear a gold ring inscribed "Shom Yawer Ziwa"—the name of a light spirit—on the little finger of his right hand. Priests must always carry an olive-wood staff, symbolical of vegetation, water, and life. The belt is important, and the way in which it is tied. A Parsi soldier during the war allowed a Šubbi priest to make and invest him with a belt, for Parsis wear a similar sacred girdle, the sole difference being that the Mandæan girdle has sixty threads and the Parsi seventy-two.

From what I have told you about the Mandæans, you will not be surprised if you hear that they believe in ghosts. Now I have never heard from an 'Iraqi of a house haunted by the spirit of a dead man, and it is a proof that the Mandæans are of a different race that they do believe in hauntings by the dead. Not only do the Mandæans believe in ghosts, but they have very Western ways of communicating with them; or perhaps it is the Westerns who originally borrowed their methods from the East.

I was told of a priest who, coming to a house haunted by strange rappings, conversed with the spirit, which proved to be that of a mur-

dered man, by means of taps, which they call *tirkhaneh*. One tap means A, two Ba, three Ga, and so on. A little spiritualistic game that we have most of us played at some time or other is paralleled by a process called "Ilm Liwet," or "Venus knowledge." Two persons place a tea-glass inverted on a smooth surface and range the letters of the alphabet in a circle about it. One of them, said my informant, "must be pure and converse in his heart with the other world." The two place their fingers on the glass, and it moves about and spells out words by striking the letters. I was told that formerly a girl or boy were put into a trance by gazing into a bowl of water and by the incantations of a priest, and that Venus (Liwet) would answer questions put to her by the mouth of the youth or maiden. All this is contrary to the strict law of religion, but it is practised.

The Mandæans believe in trances, and think that a person who has developed the power can put himself into a state of trance, and that while in this state his soul can leave his body, move about the world and gain information, sometimes being seen like an apparition. I have heard many stories of this. You will say these are the fancies of ignorant people, but it is the nature of the fancies that is interesting, and the fact that they are not borrowed from their immediate neighbours.

They are great astrologers, and the science is entirely in the hands of the priests. A child's real, or religious, name is determined by astrological conditions prevalent at birth. Children have a real name (a Mandæan name) and a worldly name (usually Moslem in character) by which they are known to the outside world. Priests tell the prospective bridegroom on which day and hour he is to be married, and on what days it is lucky or unlucky to undertake journeys or business; in short, the priest plays the rôle of Old Moore's Almanack, and those who do not accept his advice are looked on as foolhardy. On New Year's Day (in autumn) the priests consult the great astrological codex, the *Asfar Malwasha*, and forecast the events and the dates of festivals for the coming year. They divide the year into twelve months of thirty days each—just like the Parsis—and to make the count come right they add in an extra five days—again like the Parsis. These five days are especially holy and are dedicated to five great spirits of light. During them every Mandæan goes barefoot and should be baptized as often as ever he can. The priests are busy baptizing and giving the sacraments from morning to evening, and there is much eating in the name of the dead, a ceremony known as *Lofani*, or *Dukhrana*.

I wish I had time to tell you more of the customs or some of the

delightful legends and tales which I heard from these people, but I hope to publish soon a book which deals fully with all these.

A Mandæan marriage, for instance, is a charming ceremony. There is no aping the European, no jarring note from start to finish. All is simple, beautiful, and emblematic. On the Sunday before the bride is decked out with all the jewellery fashionable in the marshes, and sets out to the river or to the cult-hut for baptism. A number of women accompany her, giving joy-cries and clapping their hands. Children carry a mirror before her, so that she faces it, and a lighted lantern, and boys carry trays on their heads on which are lighted candles and green stuff. The bride is veiled for the first and last time in her life, and her veil is green, the colour of fertility. Over her head she wears a white mantle. When she reaches the river she changes into her white religious dress and is baptized with the other women; the bridegroom has already been baptized with other men.

The final ceremony takes place on an auspicious day during the following week. Both must again be baptized, and the girl goes to the bridegroom's house, where, still veiled, she takes her seat under a white canopy in the bridal chamber, sitting, of course, on the ground. But in the courtyard of the house a light reed hut, intertwined with myrtle and roses, has been built. The priests enter and purify this with water. Before the bridegroom joins them in the hut a clay pot is broken against a grinding-stone on the threshold. A ceremony is performed in the hut, too long to be described here, a man of the bride's family speaking for the girl, and during its performance the bride's green veil is brought in and twisted about the body of the bridegroom. Then priests and groom go to the bridal chamber, at the threshold of which another pot is broken against a millstone, the bridegroom sits back to back with the bride, the canopy between them, and their heads are lightly knocked together three times three by the head priest. They are man and wife. The part of the ceremony I have not described is the solemn eating for the dead. That is just as if the ancestors of both families were invited to share in and bless the union of the pair.

(The lecturer then showed slides illustrating a marriage, baptism, and the sacraments, the religious dress, and the cult-hut, also of Mandæan types and crafts.)

I should like to read you a legend about John the Baptist as it was told to me. There is something about John the Baptist in two of the holy books, but nothing at all in the ritual. He is looked upon in no way as a founder of the religion, but as a Mandæan priest, a baptizer in

the ordinary performance of his duties. Fragments here and there in the Mandaean books show him as a leader of religious thought in his day, and legends as to his virgin birth and conversations with Jesus are probably interpolations after Christianity was well established in 'Iraq. A version of my legend is in the Ginza, but I prefer to tell it just as it was told to me, the story-teller being an old silversmith unable to read any script but his own. You will notice that it is "Knowledge of Life" and not the Christian Messiah who comes to John, and that perfect initiation comes as the messenger of death.

The legend began by the visit of a king, or sheikh, to a settlement of Mandaean brethren, and his miraculous conversion to their faith. Giving up all his worldly possessions, the king journeyed northwards till he came to the Jordan, where John was baptizing. When the king saw John he said to him, "Baptize me," and John baptized him. When the baptism was over, John and the king were talking together when a little child aged about three years approached John. The child said to John: "Come, baptize me!"

John said to the child: "I am tired now, and wish to sleep. I have baptized many to-day and need twelve hours' sleep. Come to-morrow and I will baptize you."

The child said: "Ay! Come out of the water now and sleep!"

He came out, and the child gazed at him, and immediately John sank into a deep sleep on the shore of the river, and he slept the sleep of a night in the space of half an hour.

The king gazed in astonishment at the child, who, though so little, had just looked at John and caused him to sleep.

After half an hour John awoke and spoke to the child, saying: "I have slept a long time, and you are still waiting! Have you no people [meaning parents]? Why did you not go to them?"

The child replied: "My people are everywhere."

Said John: "Your people are everywhere? How can that be?"

The child said: "Baptize me now, and I will tell you."

John entered the water, but when the boy stepped into the Jordan the water rose like a mountain and retreated before him, leaving dry land. The fishes lifted their heads from the waves and prayed.

John cried out: "Your honour is no boy! The water flees before you!"

The child said: "Baptize me!"

John replied: "I cannot, for the water rises and departs from you!"

The birds saw, and they came and hovered over their heads, crying the names of God and "Knowledge of Life" again and again.

John said to the child: "I am your suppliant! You are no little boy! Disclose to me your nature and your true form."

The child replied: "Have no fear! I am Knowledge of Life. Did you not hear the birds proclaim it? I am Knowledge of Life, and I have come to take your soul above."

So John left his body and looked down from above and saw his corpse in the water. The birds descended upon it and pecked at it, for it began to decay. The vulture flew down and began to tear out the eyes.

John gazed at it, and Knowledge of Life said: "Why do you gaze at that? That is a corrupt thing; it is of earth!"

And Knowledge of Life took soil and buried the body. John was glad, for he loved his earthly body and did not wish it harmed.

Then he was taken and borne to the Realm of Light, to the Sun and Lord of all Radiance, and he joined in the perpetual worship of the King of Light.

The story adds that the grave still appears in the Jordan like a mound, and the Mandæans call it "John's grave," or rather "Yahya's grave." The word "Yahya" has the meaning "he makes live," and that is naturally a meaning which they like.

Dr. GASTER: Mrs. Drower has placed all the students of the Mandæan language, literature, and religion under a great debt of gratitude. Excavations are going on all over the Near East and many a monument from the past has been rescued from the tomb of ages. But these are all like dry bones. It requires the ingenuity of scholars to piece them together, to cover them with flesh, and, if possible, to breathe life into them, and for all that, on the great problems of human life—birth, marriage, and death—they have remained practically dumb as the grave from which they have been extricated. It is with great difficulty that one is able to get a dim glimpse at the real life of the people who have left us only some religious hymns and records again of bloodshed and war, and a few documents of private transactions. Mrs. Drower has also gone on such an expedition of excavation and exploration, but she has gone to the fountain of living information. It requires great courage and great enthusiasm to go among the poor

sect of the Mandæans and then learn from their lips all those questions which affect human life more closely. Here we can learn now how the people live, their ceremonies, their beliefs, their practices, their peculiar superstitions, the human life, environment, the activity of the priests, the activity of the laymen, the life of the women. Above all, Mrs. Drower has brought us now the real interpretation and commentary on similar dry bones which hitherto were scattered among the various libraries of Europe. I mean the written literature. Hitherto only three books were known—the Genza, the Kolasta, and the Book of St. John—and also one or two strips found in the British Museum. Mrs. Drower has enriched also that literature by the discovery of many more books written either on pages or on very long scrolls which no doubt will greatly contribute to enlarge the horizon and to deepen the knowledge of that literature which has an importance of its own. Besides obtaining these invaluable documents, Mrs. Drower has also learnt the language—not a small achievement in itself—and also she has put down the way in which the Mandæans read those old Syriac texts. Of the pronunciation very little was known, and of how great its importance is for the grammar I need scarcely add a word. She will thus be in a position to give us also translations, which I hope will be forthcoming with as little delay as possible. The discovery of the documents is, in the first place, an addition to the language, the peculiar Syriac dialect similar to that of the Talmud, and of some of the charms found on bowls, all comparatively old, but it is far more important for the whole history of this remarkable sect. It is a venerable relic in language and in religion and of that syncretism which swayed the Eastern world from Egypt to the borders of India, and perhaps beyond, especially during those centuries so pregnant with religious developments which have so deeply influenced the civilization of the Western world. Every ancient religion has had a share in it, and out of it have arisen many sects which have come and gone, with the exception of this sect and perhaps that of the Yezidees. Prejudice and ignorance largely contributed to that lack of interest in the history and the religious life of the people. Thus because of the admirable work done by Mrs. Drower much of the prejudice will disappear, ignorance will be lifted, and a greater sympathy will be shown to these poor relics which, amidst the fanaticism and intolerance surrounding them, cling with tenacity to the ancient traditions and practices.

Having drawn the attention of the outer world to this small remnant, Mrs. Drower has also rendered them a special service, for through her

work will be enlisted the assistance of those whose duty it is to protect the life and faith of the small and the weak. The duty of a great power is not to protect the strong, but those who cannot help themselves, and the Mandæans come under this category. They have lost now even those rights which the Turks granted them, to be a millet with their own internal autonomy, and unless steps are taken rapidly their access to the river, which is to them the water of life, becomes more and more difficult as encroachments are made on the banks. Without the water of the river their faith and their life will be dried up. Nothing can crown more fitly Mrs. Drower's admirable work if in addition to enriching our knowledge and bringing home the treasures she gathered—not without great sacrifices—among the Mandæans, she secures for them that protection and safety of which they now seem to stand so much in need. It is to be hoped that Mrs. Drower will now complete her work by publishing, if not all, some of the most important documents she has been able to gather from many of the Mandæans. (Applause.)

IN KASHGAR, DECEMBER, 1927, TO OCTOBER, 1931

FUTURE historians of Central Asia will be grateful to Dr. Cherbakoff for the vivid account he has written of his life in Kashgar from 1927 to 1932, those years when Russia, following her historic policy of attacking in the place of least resistance,* concentrated on securing her position in Chinese Turkistan. Helped by the cupidity of the Governor and by the weakness of the Chinese Central Government, the Soviet officials succeeded in the end in getting a treaty signed which made them virtually rulers of the country. This was prior to the Dungan rebellion of this spring.

The narrative starts with an account of the misery of life in Russia for those members of the intelligenzia who did not take part in Soviet politics, and shows why the doctor, a specialist in tropical diseases, seized the chance of leaving the country offered by an appointment to Kashgar. He gives an account of the journey and of the Russian colony in Kashgar—the squabbles and intrigues, society riddled with Soviet spies. This life became for him impossible, and with great difficulty he managed to renounce his Soviet citizenship. Meanwhile he had incurred the hostility of the Soviet Consul, a Lett named Postnikov, who later persuaded the Chinese Governor of Kashgar to imprison him on the absurd charge of having helped the Basmachi leader, Jena Beg.

The more general part of the narrative is given here.

December, 1927

Greater interest than before was shown by the Soviet Government towards Chinese Turkistan after the events at Canton in December, 1927, when the Soviet Vice-Consul Khasis and several other workers were murdered. After the enforced rupture of diplomatic relations

* *R.C.A.S.J.*, "Russia's Foreign Policy," by Korostovetz, vol. xix., p. 121.

with the Nanking Government the Soviet Government began to seek a new theatre near Central China for the advance of the sphere of influence of the Third International and for the spread of propaganda. If before the events in Canton the S.S.S.R.'s main interest in Chinese Turkistan was as a source of raw materials, after those events it was found to be of political interest as well. Also the immediate proximity of Chinese Turkistan to India, where the high state of excitement was partly due to the influence of the S.S.S.R. on the credulous Indians through agents of the Third International, forced the Bolsheviks to pay more attention to this isolated province of China.

The peculiar conditions governing the transport of raw materials from this province to neighbouring countries were the primary factor in the acquisition by the S.S.S.R. of a predominating influence in the economic life of the country. Sinkiang is separated from Central China by the desert of Gobi, which is lacking in good communications. The cost of transport bears a high proportion to the value of goods conveyed, and such cumbrous loads as wool and cotton cannot compete with raw material found on the spot in Central China. But cotton, wool, and cattle form the chief article of export from Sinkiang.

India, another country contiguous to Sinkiang, is separated from it by formidable mountain ranges, which are completely impassable by caravans for five or six months. For the rest of the way the road passes across the Dipsang plateau, where for ten or twelve days there is no sign of life, no wood, and no food for horses. All these have to be taken by the caravan from Karghalik or Kohyar, and therefore only easily transportable material such as silk, and also felt and carpets, can be carried from Sinkiang to India. But these types of exports are of merely secondary importance. At the same time the road from Kashgar to the S.S.S.R. is open the whole year round; in summer it passes through the Alai valley, where there is an abundance of green fodder available for nothing, whilst in winter the caravans are able to get food daily at every stopping place.

Finally, caravans from Sinkiang go to Tientsin in China during not less than six months in the year, and from Kashgar to Srinagar in Kashmir during two months or more, whilst from Kashgar to Osh, where the railway now begins, caravans pass every two or three weeks.*

The Bolsheviks, as they gradually acquired the markets of Sinkiang, realized that it was the first step towards the increase of their political

* Air services are now operating between Urumchi and Tientsin.

influence in Chinese Turkistan, and after that in the neighbouring province of Kansu.

Anyone acquainted with the psychology of Chinese officials in Sinkiang, brought up as they are on bribes and presents, will not be surprised that Soviet gold gradually led to the enslavement of that province by the Bolsheviks, and to the conclusion on October 1, 1931, in Urumchi, of a commercial treaty, by means of which the S.S.S.R. set a firm foot on the throat of Sinkiang and became the actual ruler of that province.

The official for military intelligence and espionage in Kashgar in February, 1928, was one Anikeev. He came originally as secretary to the Commercial Agency, but his official work was only a cloak for wider activities as agent of Revvoensovet (War Office), for which he was allowed special funds. It would be as well if this were known to those European politicians who entertain the idea of peaceful co-operation with the Soviet Government.

He had completed the courses at the Soviet Military College and Institute of Eastern Languages in Tashkent (Chinese section), and had acquired a certain status in the various branches of the G.P.U. As he himself related, he had taken an active part in the organization of the murder of General Dutov in Kuldja. With the Consul Postnikov and his secretary Kalemin, who worked hand in hand, Anikeev organized an extensive system of espionage.

The office of the Transport Company, Sovtorgflot, where Anikeev at once took over the duties of manager, situated as it was in the town, was used by the spies as a rendezvous and reporting point. This was the more suitable, as they could go to the office as if to inquire about a question of transport, when a visit to the Consulate would be attended by the risk of being observed by the Chinese.

The Consul, Postnikov, began to look in at his office in the evenings in a casual way during his evening walks. Later on almost all the small traders became informers for the "Red murderer" Anikeev.

It was with the active assistance of this commercial representative that there occurred in March, 1929, on the pass of Ulug-rabat between Kara-su and Su-bashi, an attack by Kirghiz on the mail of the British Consulate General in Kashgar, who carried it off into Soviet territory. The mail was, in fact, returned later, with clear traces of having been

opened by the Soviet Government, which made every endeavour to capture the assailants. But this did not prevent copies of the contents from getting into the hands of the Soviet Consul. Merchants who expressed sympathy with Anikeev and were helpful in providing him with information were granted rebates on goods imported into Sinkiang and were allowed the right of manufacturing certain goods according to their choice, and various other privileges when the treaties were concluded.

Finally, in the autumn of 1928, after prolonged negotiations, Postnikov succeeded in recruiting as a spy a young Chinese, Lu-ming-ling, an intimate of Governor Ma.

His was an interesting and picturesque figure, and he played an important part in bringing about—for good money, to be sure—the desired attitude towards the Bolsheviks on the part of Governor Ma. I will therefore deal with him somewhat in detail.

Lu-ming-ling, who was twenty-three or twenty-four years of age, had received, like all Chinese in Sinkiang, a domestic education, but possessed remarkable linguistic ability; he quickly learnt the Chinese hieroglyphics, Turkish, which he spoke and wrote faultlessly, and Russian, which he spoke with hardly any accent, a rare thing amongst the Chinese. He wrote Russian correctly, and latterly was studying English.

Lu's father was an official, although more occupied with trade and commercial transactions than with official duties. But as a rule in Sinkiang all officials are at the same time merchants. They have their confidential agents, who carry out officially their commercial transactions. When Consul Postnikov arrived in Kashgar the post of dragoman at the Consulate was vacant; and so when conversation took place with the Governor, Mr. Van, his diplomatic secretary, who spoke Russian well, was asked to act. However, Lu shortly appeared on the scene, and with increasing frequency began to replace Van as interpreter. As appeared later, Consul Postnikov tried to buy Van's good offices, but the latter proved to be a more steadfast and decent-minded Chinaman than the Consul expected, and he refused to render any non-official assistance. Invitations to dinner which Van had hitherto received stopped at once, and the Consul began to ignore him. Since Van and Lu were at that time the only Chinese in Kashgar who knew Russian well, the latter began to be invited to the Consulate to

translate correspondence into Chinese, and before long Postnikov was sending him presents in the shape of gold watches, cameras, etc.

At the same time Governor Ma, who, especially after the events at Canton, had begun to take a deep interest in the Soviet representatives in Kashgar, was anxious to have men of his own about the Consul to get information as to his movements. The cunning Lu soon wormed his way into the confidence of the Governor and began to work on two fronts. On the one hand he kept the Governor informed about conversations overheard by him in the Soviet Consulate and gained more of the Governor's confidence and favour; on the other hand he communicated to the Consul all the news which he learnt in Chinese official circles. For his services Lu received a reward from the Consul.

Lu, who, like most Chinamen, was avaricious, quickly entered into his new rôle, and began gradually to collect the Governor's secret correspondence, which he copied by photography in the Consulate. He was being paid handsomely for this, and at last was offered the post of dragoman at the Consulate.

Postnikov, into whose cunning hands the no less worthy Lu had fallen, began to supply the latter with correspondence from the archives of the late Imperial Consulate and also with correspondence of the Soviet which was not of a secret nature. These documents Lu offered Governor Ma as having been stolen by him! The Governor began to trust him blindly as a devoted friend, and allowed him to take the place of dragoman in the hope that he would still further extend his labours in the interests of Sinkiang. After this Mr. Van was given full liberty to do nothing at all, since all business was carried out by the youthful but clever Lu. More than one secret note of the Governor was photographed with Lu's help in the Consulate. All diplomatic measures of the Governor, before they were translated into fact, were known at the Soviet Consulate, where counter-measures were taken.

In gratitude for his faithful service Lu received from the Bolsheviks the monopoly to sell spirituous liquors in Kashgar. Goods were often delivered to him to the prejudice of Soviet commercial organizations, but—on the authority of Postnikov.

Finally Lu, when dragoman of the Soviet Consulate, opened a wine shop at his home, and soon began a flourishing trade in wine and brandy which he had obtained for nothing. The matter got so far that when Postnikov gave a banquet he sent to Lu for wine and

champagne, paying him at an appreciably higher rate for liquor which had been provided from the Soviet cellars.

Postnikov's work gradually progressed, and by the summer of 1929 Lu seemed to be wholly in the hands of the Soviet Consulate. But this was only the first step, Postnikov had still to face the task of tightening the cord round the neck of Governor Ma himself.

The conflict between the S.S.S.R. and Chang-su-liang began in July, 1929, and the subsequent departure of the Soviet representatives from Manchuria reacted sharply in Western China. The Bolsheviks were concerned for the preservation of the *status quo* in Sinkiang, but at first were so distraught by fear of the Consulate being searched that a special telegram was sent to Consuls in Western China ordering the destruction of all secret correspondence. On the night of 9/10th August all representatives of commercial organizations who had received the Instruction from the Deputy Consul Kalemin proceeded to destroy the secret archives. Shutters were fastened to the windows, servants were sent away earlier than usual, and the destruction of all traces of the commercial activity of Soviet representatives in Kashgar was begun.

Later on an Instruction was received from Moscow ordering a greater show of amiability towards the Chinese. Then began a period of endless banquets and expensive presents to the Chinese officials. Those in Sinkiang were more accommodating than their colleagues from Manchuria and Central China! The goodwill of the Governor General of Sinkiang was soon purchased, and the latter reported to the S.S.S.R. that the Manchurian affair was the private concern of Chang-su-liang and did not affect Sinkiang. After Chang-su-Liang had capitulated to the S.S.S.R. in December, 1929, and accepted the Soviet conditions of the *status quo* on the Eastern Chinese Railway, the Bolsheviks raised their heads in Sinkiang, and a wide field again opened up before Postnikov for the development of his abilities as an adventurer.

And now Lu rendered his teacher a priceless service. He proved to Governor Ma that the time had come to take a big slice from the Soviet pie, and on the instructions of Postnikov inveigled Ma into commercial speculations. Through the kindly interest of the Consul, Ma concluded a treaty through his confident Khan-da-ren with the Commercial Agency for the supply of raw silk, and became a

monopolist on the Kashgar market. There were prospects of a yearly profit of hundreds of thousands of sar (1 gold rouble= $1\frac{1}{2}$ sar, at the rate of exchange in the autumn of 1931), and the Governor began to show strong sympathy towards the representatives of the Soviet.

Whereas in 1927, 1928, and 1929 Governor Ma would imprison anyone who was a frequent visitor at the Consulate or the Soviet offices, banquets were now the order of the day, and rarely did a week pass without the representatives of the friendly Powers drinking to one another. Expensive furs, carriages, and gold watches began to arrive for General Ma, provided from funds raised from property requisitioned from Soviet citizens. All this passed duty free through the Irkeshtam Custom House under a special label: "For the Governor of Kashgar, General Ma." In October, 1930, General Ma bought a motor-car from the Soviet Government, for which, through the hands of Lu, the Commercial Agency has paid in chervontsi, at their price on the Kashgar market, $\frac{1}{2}$ sar per chervonet. This at a time when, by Soviet law, the transfer of chervontsi to the S.S.S.R. was punished by confiscation of all property and imprisonment as for the smuggling of contraband.

(Here follows an account of the Dungans and of the unsuccessful rebellion in the early part of 1931. See ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY JOURNAL, Vol. XX., Part II.)

The position of the Government of Sinkiang became very shaky in the summer of 1931, when the detachments of Ma,* numbering more than three thousand men, having passed round the Hami mountains on which Chu's small detachment was sitting, advanced to a distance of four to five days' march from the line Urumchi-Kuchen-tze-Kuchar. In these towns a panic started amongst the Chinese officials and inhabitants. In Urumchi many people began to desert the town, making for the west to the line Chuguchak-Kuldja, whilst from Kashgar and other northern towns troops were sent northwards.

It was at this time, when the position of Sinkiang was becoming critical and the occupation of Urumchi by detachments of General Ma*

* General Ma, not to be confused with the Civil Governor, also called Ma.

was expected from day to day, that the Soviet Government, through the mediation of its Consul General at Urumchi, offered military assistance to the Governor General of the province.

Here the pharisaical conduct of the Bolsheviks is clearly revealed. In order to suppress Sinkiang and promote the cause of the Communist International in the heart of Central China the Bolsheviks did not hesitate to render military assistance to the Imperialist Government of Sinkiang in its struggle against the proletariat in revolt!

For the rest, the whole policy of the Soviet power is a continuous record of hypocrisy. What is to be said of the military assistance openly given to General Feng-yung-sen in China, a man who was very far from practising communistic ideals.

The Bolsheviks are ready to support anyone who is aiming at the uprooting of contemporary society, any organizer of disorder and destruction, anyone who troubles the water, making it easier to catch the fish for the communistic table! So it was in the summer of 1931 in Sinkiang. It was natural that the Bolsheviks' offer of military assistance to the Governor General of the province should meet with acceptance. The troops of General Ma were already threatening Urumchi, and consent to future privileges for the Soviet Government had to be granted in order to secure present military assistance. As a consequence three military aeroplanes were sent to Sinkiang with a compliment of pilots and observers, aeroplane bombs, machine guns, and a quantity of rifles and ammunition.

Soon after the despatch of the aeroplanes and military stores to the front the position of General Ma became critical. Before long he was completely smashed, but escaped himself with a small party to the region of the Hami mountains. And so ended the unsuccessful attempt of General Ma to capture Urumchi; so ended, too, the authority of the Governor General in Sinkiang.

Amongst the Chinese officials in Kashgar the opinion was widespread that General Ma had been put forward by the Bolsheviks, that he was one of the agents of the Third International and acted on directions from the Bolsheviks, receiving his orders through the Soviet Polkred (political representative) in Urga (Inner Mongolia); that the appearance of General Ma at Hami occurring simultaneously with the revolt of the Mohammedans of the Hami area was far from accidental; and that the combination of these events by which the Governor General had been compelled to ask for military assistance from the Bolsheviks was curiously appropriate. I cannot say to what

extent this is true, but knowing how ready was the Soviet Consul Postnikov in intrigue and provocation, I think that this supposition does not greatly err.

But Postnikov's intrigue in the summer of 1931, when he tried to involve the Governor of Kashgar in a quarrel with the Government of Sinkiang, merits our attention, for it adds another rose to the wreath of the Soviet diplomat. It is the more interesting in that the military adventure in Kashgar against the Provincial Government was being prepared with the help of the representative of the S.S.S.R. at the time when in Urumchi, with the co-operation of another representative of the S.S.S.R., negotiations were being carried on for the sending of military assistance to the same Provincial Government.

The Governor of Kashgar, also called Ma, was a Dungan, and exercised considerable authority over the Dungans in the provinces of Sinkiang and Kansu. Consul Postnikov, taking advantage of this circumstance and availing himself of the services of Lu, made Governor Ma believe that a suitable moment had arrived for action against the Chinese and for seizing power in the southern part of Sinkiang.

I do not know how Governor Ma reacted to this proposal, but I know that he placed an order for rifles and cartridges and machine guns through the Soviet Consul. The order was completed to date, and at the beginning of August the first consignment (labelled as sewing machines) passed through the Irkeshtam Customs addressed to the Commercial Agents of the S.S.S.R. in Kashgar.

But trouble arose both for the Bolsheviks and for Governor Ma. For in Ulugchat, where there was a Chinese military post, one of the boxes was accidentally broken, and to the astonishment of the military commandant there appeared in a dissembled state a machine gun instead of a sewing machine. There was a considerable scandal, which was only suppressed with great difficulty. Governor Ma informed the commandant that military stores had accidentally got into Chinese territory, having been sent to the wrong address, and that he, Ma, had nothing to do with the machine guns.

In proposing to give military assistance to Sinkiang in the summer of 1931 the Bolsheviks were naturally not acting for the sake of the Governor General's "face," but to "promote friendship" between the S.S.S.R. and Sinkiang (a winged phrase which the representatives of the Soviet love to repeat in all their notes), to advance their sphere of influence in the east, and to bring about the "suffocation" of Sinkiang. By no other word can I describe the effect of the treaty

concluded in Urumchi on October 1, 1931. This treaty was of a secret character and was not officially announced by either party.

I heard the phrase, "They have sold our Sinkiang to the Bolsheviks," from several important Chinese officials, and I think this expression accurately describes the unexpressed implications of the treaty. I must add that ever since 1924 or 1925 the Soviet Government had been vainly trying to conclude a commercial treaty in Sinkiang. All Bolshevik trade organizations existed at their own risk, and treaties made between Soviet organizations and merchants of Sinkiang were never officially registered. Journeys by Soviet trade representatives in Sinkiang were not allowed by the Chinese administration, and the tour of the Consul Postnikov in the summer of 1928 ended in a farce highly derogatory to the Consul General of the S.S.S.R. Postnikov had to cut short his journey and return from Shahyar to Kashgar escorted by Chinese soldiers, though he had permission to travel in Sinkiang from the Governor General of the province himself.

This commercial treaty with its four supplementary notes was signed in Urumchi on October 1, 1931, by Slavutski, the delegate of the National Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Chen, plenipotentiary of the Sinkiang Provincial Government. It gives to the S.S.S.R. :

1. The right (*post factum*) to open trade agencies in the towns of Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kuldja, and Kashgar.
2. The right to open offices in the towns of Aksu, Kuche, Yarkand, and Khotan.
3. The right of unrestricted movement of representatives of trade organizations and Soviet citizens for purposes of trade by defined routes between the above-named towns—that is, over the whole of Sinkiang.

It was an open secret that under the guise of merchants the Soviet Government was sending its agents to collect information, to spread propaganda, and to organize revolt amongst the population.

The "commercial activity" in Kashgar of Anikeev, representative of the Commercial Organization and "Revvoensovet" (War Office) at one and the same time, showed as clearly as possible that the Bolsheviks are like a two-headed Janus. One face, that of a well-dressed and well-educated youth to satisfy European public opinion, the other face, that of a fully armed bandit waiting for the moment when he can put a revolver to the head of the credulous and trustful Europe.

I would not be surprised if, after a tour of some such Soviet merchant as Anikeev, somewhere in the Khotan area or again near Hami, a new General Ma should appear and start another civil war in Sinkiang!

The treaty further provided for:

(a) Reduction of duties by the Chinese Custom Houses on goods of Soviet origin.

(b) Telegraphic connection between Chuguchak (China) and Bakhcha (S.S.S.R.).

(c) The right to send radiograms from stations in Sinkiang (Urumchi, Kashgar) to stations in the S.S.S.R. and *vice versa*.

(d) The opening for transport of the road from the S.S.S.R. to China via the Turgart Pass.

On the other hand, Sinkiang obtained:

1. The right of transit for Chinese merchants of goods of Chinese origin across Siberia from Sinkiang to Eastern China and *vice versa*, with the reservation that this right applies only to the goods on a list to be drawn up in Urumchi by the Chinese delegate and the Consul General of the S.S.S.R. on November 1st—that is, a month after the signing of the commercial treaty. It is doubtful whether the signing of the treaty gave Sinkiang any solid advantage.

2. The Provincial Government of Sinkiang “hopes” that, in view of its “historical” interest in the development of commercial relations between Sinkiang and the S.S.S.R., the Soviet Government will assist Sinkiang in the organization of transport, in electrification, and in measures for the improvement of agriculture in Sinkiang.

The Provincial Government also “hopes” that the Soviet Government will send specialists to Sinkiang to train Chinese citizens.

And that is all.

It is interesting to note that the treaty, from the point of view of Sinkiang, refers to assurances and hopes in respect of the blessings which the Soviet Government will, in the name of friendship, dispense with a liberal hand, in return for good money, whilst the Sinkiang Government consents to the granting of genuine privileges which the Soviet Government had for long been striving to obtain.

This is an example of the abolition of the “unequal” treaties, about which the Bolsheviks were so emphatic at the time of their seizure of power in Russia.

How did the Central Government of China regard this treaty? The Provincial Government of Sinkiang admitted its dependence on

the Government of Nanking and flew the Chinese national flag! Portraits of Sun Yat Sen are hung in every Yamen, though this does not deter the Sinkiang administration from flogging and torturing its subjects before the portrait of the creator of Chinese freedom.

And so one foot of the S.S.S.R. is already planted on the throat of Sinkiang. Will the Soviet Government finally succeed in crushing it with the other?

Standing, then, at the threshold of Kansu, will it unite with the "pink" General Fu-yun-san? Or will the whirlwind of time sweep those international bandits from the stage, as I hope the near future will reveal.

When the treaty of October, 1931, was signed the Soviet delegate demanded, in the name of the S.S.S.R. Government, the surrender by the Governor of a number of emigrants, amongst whom was the doctor. Although this was against any canon of international law, for there was no charge against him and the Chinese themselves had acquitted him, the Governor agreed to do it. Friends of the doctor immediately gave him warning, and he was able to escape, with some difficulty, leaving all his possessions behind.

The more personal part of his narrative will be published in a later number of the Journal.

A note received from Tientsin says that the Chinese have now regained control of the northern districts and hope the whole province may be subdued again shortly.

CYRUS THE GREAT, DARIUS, XERXES, AND THEIR CONTACT WITH HELLAS*

By BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES,
K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.

PERSIA is a country which can claim a civilization of great antiquity. So much is this the case that when objects similar to those discovered at Ur in Mesopotamia were unearthed in the Indus Valley, it seemed probable that the common homeland of the two civilizations would be found in Persia, and recent excavations are tending to prove the correctness of this theory.

I would first invite your attention to the province of Khuzistan, which represents historical Elam, or "The Mountains." It is watered by the Karun, the Eulæus of the Greeks, which, rising in a high range to the west of Isfahan, flows through Shuster and discharges into the Shatt-al-Arab at Mohamera in modern times. In the fourth millennium B.C. the Karun discharged independently into the Persian Gulf, as did also the Euphrates and the Tigris. There was no Shatt-al-Arab at this period. The ancient civilization of Elam was coeval with that of Babylon, and at Susa, the Shushan of the Book of Esther, de Morgan discovered pottery which he dated back to 4000 B.C. I discovered similar pottery in North-East Persia, thus proving the wide range of this early civilization.

Sumer and Akkad, the earliest states formed in the valley of the Euphrates, were absorbed into the kingdom of Babylon, but Elam continued to play a prominent rôle. An echo of these obscure but troublous times may be found in Genesis xiv., where Chedorlaomer, King of Elam, together with Amraphel, King of Shinar, and their allies defeated the Kings of Gomorrah and other city-states and carried off Lot. He was rescued by his uncle Abraham, who had migrated to Palestine from the vicinity of Ur, which was then a port at the mouth of the Euphrates. It is now about 120 miles inland.

Coming down the ages, Assyria became the dominant power, subduing Babylon and then Egypt. Elam was long marked down for

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 22, Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby in the Chair.

destruction, and, after fighting bravely against superior forces, Susa, the capital, was sacked in 745 B.C. and its population was carried into captivity.

We now quit the plains with their developed civilizations, and upon reaching the uplands we pass from areas dominated by Semitic influence to a country inhabited by Aryans. The Iranian branch with which we are especially concerned—Iranian is a form of Aryan—reached the land that is now Persia from the north. The Medes occupied the north-west, while the kindred Persians were their neighbours to the south in Pars—whence we have the classical Persis and, incidentally, the Parsis of Bombay. The date of this invasion can be fixed approximately by the fact that the Kassites, who founded a dynasty at Babylon about 1900 B.C., were Aryans with Aryan names. They had appeared on the scene some centuries previously and had introduced the horse into Babylonia, where it was termed the "ass of the mountains." The Assyrians led expeditions into Media, which penetrated as far as Mount Demavend and brought back thousands of captives. Media was educated—brutally, no doubt—by her intercourse with Assyria, and in time founded a state in which the Persians were absorbed. Its capital was the classical Ecbatana, the Acmetha of the Book of Ezra, and the modern Hamadan.

As the years passed Assyria became decadent and, in 612 B.C., great Nineveh was captured by a confederacy headed by the Medes, who for some sixty years played a leading rôle.

We now come to the mighty Achæmenian dynasty which reigned in Anshan, the ancient Elam, and in Pars. Cyrus the Great was King of Anshan, and in 550 B.C. he revolted from the Medes, captured Ecbatana, and absorbed the Medes and their empire. The Medes had been allied to Cræsus of Lydia, who immediately began to assemble his Greek allies for an attack on the Persians. Cyrus decided to forestall him, and, marching rapidly westwards for over one thousand miles, he defeated Cræsus on the River Halys and, following up this success, fought a decisive battle outside Sardis. In this battle he employed the famous ruse of frightening the Lydian horses by the smell of his baggage camels, which he placed in the front of his army. Sardis was captured by escalade. Cyrus, by this conquest, was brought into contact with the Ionian Greeks, whose city-states, being isolated, were attacked in detail and captured. He thereby subjected to his rule one-third of the Hellenic race without much difficulty.

The next great campaign of Cyrus was directed against Babylon, which was ruled by Nabonidus, the earliest of antiquaries, who had

alienated the priests of Merodach by bringing rival gods into the city. Babylon surrendered to the Persians, although the fort held out for some time. The cylinder of Cyrus, which represents his proclamation, runs: "In wrath because Nabonidus had brought the gods of Ur . . . to Babylon, Merodach sought out an upright Prince, after his own heart, Cyrus, King of Ashan. He named his name; to the kingdom of the whole world he called him by name." The language of the prophet Isaiah constitutes a remarkable parallel: "Thus said the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have holden to subdue nations before him . . . I have even called thee by thy name." It is indeed noteworthy that, among the nations of antiquity, the Persians alone were never doomed to hell by the Jewish prophets. This was partly due to the policy of Cyrus, who encouraged the conquered peoples to return to their homes, a striking instance being the signal generosity which he displayed towards the Jews, whom he repatriated. Probably he realized that they would serve him well in case he attacked Egypt. To use a modern expression, Cyrus understood the advisability of conciliating minorities.

Cyrus was killed in battle with nomads on his north-east frontier. Thus passed away the first of the very great Aryan rulers. The evidence of Holy Writ, of Herodotus, of Xenophon, and his own deeds, all prove him to have merited the title of "Great." Persians loved him and termed him "father," and we as Aryans may well feel proud of the splendid qualities he displayed.

Cyrus was succeeded by his son Cambyses, who conquered Egypt and then went mad. After an interregnum, Darius, Prince of the Pars line, slew the Magian pretender Gaumata and, crushing rebellion after rebellion, became master of the vast Persian Empire. His most impressive memorial, cut on the rock of Behistun, runs: "I am Darius, the Great King, the King of Kings, King of lands peopled by all races, for long King of this great earth, the son of Vishtasp, the Achæmenian, a Persian, son of a Persian, an Aryan of Aryan descent." These inscriptions, in Persian, Susian, and Babylonian, when deciphered by Sir Henry Rawlinson, furnished the key to the thousands of clay tablets which had been excavated at Nineveh and elsewhere. Indeed, Assyriology is based upon his wonderful decipherment.

Darius organized his empire into satrapies, and constructed a royal road from Sardis to Susa, a distance of 1,500 miles, along which relays of horses were posted, which carried couriers at the rate of 100 miles a day. A second route ran from Babylon to Hamvân, Rhages, and

distant Bactria. The influence of these roads on civilization and commerce must have been considerable. In 512, Darius decided to undertake an expedition against the Scythians of South Russia. Grote termed it "that insane expedition" and "the expiring effort of a frantic despot." In view of the remarkable ability which Darius invariably displayed, these expressions do small credit to Grote. Actually, it is clear to me, remembering the Persian tradition that each monarch must extend the bounds of his empire or be despised, that Darius, who conquered provinces in India to the east, decided also to annex the country up to the Danube. He also decided to punish the Scythians for their constant raids into Asia Minor.

Owing to the absence of a definite objective in the shape of a town—the Scythians were all nomads—and the fact that they avoided giving battle, the campaign was something of the nature of a military promenade. But, after recrossing the River Danube, Darius detached 80,000 troops, who conquered Thrace and received the submission of Macedonia. The Persian Empire had thus been extended to the Danube and over Thrace and Macedonia.

The invasion of Hellas was primarily due to a revolt of the Greeks of Asia Minor in 499 B.C. The Athenians and Eretrians despatched a small expedition which raided the city of Sardis. They then hastily retreated, pursued by Persian troops. Darius was naturally enraged at this unprovoked act of hostility. He despatched a force by land to punish the insolent Athenians, but, owing to the wreck of the fleet of supply vessels, it failed to reach its objective, although it strengthened the Persian position in Thrace and Macedonia.

In 490, Darius despatched a second punitive expedition across the island-studded Ægean. Its commander—wrongly, in my opinion—decided, in the first place, to attack Eretria, which, after a siege lasting six days, was captured and burned, its inhabitants being deported to distant Flam. The days spent on this act of retribution gave the Athenians time to recover from their panic and to organize their resistance. From Eretria the Persian force landed at the neighbouring Bay of Marathon, and the Athenians marched out to meet the invaders. After awaiting the arrival of a Spartan force in vain, the Athenians gallantly charged down on the Persians. Their weak centre was repulsed, but their wings won the day, and the Persians were driven back to their ships with loss.

"The intensity of Greek exultation can scarcely have been matched in the annals of warfare, as desperation gave way to triumph, and they

realized that they had battled down the Great King's warriors in fair fight. But, to Darius, it would seem nothing more than a regrettable check which need have no serious effect upon his policy." This I wrote in my *History of Persia* nearly twenty years ago, and I am stressing the question since most men and women of my generation have read Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, in which that author declares that Marathon was the first decisive battle. This is absurd. The campaign was a punitive expedition on a distant frontier of the Persian Empire, which had effected one of its objectives at Eretria, but which, mainly through the cowardice of its leader, had failed against Athens. Had Darius lived he would most certainly have conquered Hellas, but fortunately for the Greeks he died before despatching a more powerful expedition.

The successor of Darius was his son Xerxes, a man of great physical beauty, but distinctly deficient in the virtues of his ancestors. In 480 he invaded Hellas in great force, the main objective again being Athens. His army was very large, and, swollen by the personnel of the supply department and camp followers, its size must have constituted its weakness, more especially in case of shipwreck to the attendant fleet. The crossing of the Hellespont was effected by a bridge of boats under the eyes of Xerxes, who poured a libation into the sea from a gold cup and prayed that he might conquer Europe. The Greeks had first decided to hold the pass of Mount Olympus, but retreated, realizing that the position could be outflanked. The Thessalians consequently hastened to make terms with Xerxes. The Spartans were committed to the defence of the Isthmus of Corinth and advised the Athenians to leave Attica and join them. However, finally a foolish compromise resulted in the despatch of some 7,000 men under Leonidas with instructions to hold Thermopylæ, the strong position of Hellas. Had it been held with the full force of the Greeks, together with the mountain track that could turn it, Xerxes might have been foiled. But the situation really depended on the Greeks being able to hold their own at sea. In the event the Persians were shown a track over the mountains which the Phocian contingent failed to guard, and the Spartan heroes, who had defeated every frontal attack and had inflicted heavy loss, finding themselves betrayed, advanced on the Persians and fought to the death, winning immortal fame. I have recently seen the memorial to Leonidas at Sparta.

Meanwhile much had been happening at sea. The Persians had detached 200 ships to sail round Eubœa with a view to scaling up the

straits, hoping thereby to capture the entire Greek fleet, but this squadron was lost in a storm. The two main fleets engaged, the Greeks defending the right flank of Leonidas, while the Persians attempted to break through. The battle was going against the Greeks, many of whose ships were lost, when news came of the disaster at Thermopylæ, and the order was given to retreat. Xerxes then led his huge host unopposed into Attica and captured Athens, his main objective, which he burned. The inhabitants of Athens were evacuated mainly to Salamis; and Themistocles persuaded the Spartans to agree to make a final stand with the united fleets between Salamis and the mainland. The Battle of Salamis, one of the decisive battles of the world, was desperately contested, but at last the Greeks won. In the *Persæ* Æschylus, who makes a Persian describe the battle, wrote of the last phase: "They with oar-fragments and with shards of wrecks smote, hacked, as men smite tunnies or a draught of fishes; and a moaning all confused with shrieking hovered wide o'er that sea-brine till night's dark presence blotted out the horror."

Xerxes, heedless of Persian honour, decided to quit Hellas after this defeat, but left Mardonius with 300,000 picked troops to complete its subjugation. In 479 B.C. gallant Mardonius was defeated and slain at Platæa. The Greeks in their armour outmatched the Persians just as an ironclad outmatches an unarmoured ship.

It must not, however, be thought that Persia was mortally wounded by these disasters. There was no invasion of Persia by the Greeks, nor was there a revolution in Persia. Indeed, partly owing to the incurable treachery of the Greeks, Persia remained for 150 years—a long period in a nation's history—the great Power. It was Alexander the Great, a veritable god of war, who overthrew the decadent Persian Empire.

To sum up, Marathon, Salamis, and Platæa were victories not only for Hellas, but for mankind. It was the triumph of the higher ideal, and even to-day we cannot estimate fully what we owe to these intrepid heroes who wrought and fought as few had done before.

ADOLF VON WREDE

By MONA TRAUTZ

LOOKING back on the year 1932 we recognize it as the *annus mirabilis* in the travel literature of South Arabia. It has given us Bertram Thomas' *Arabia Felix*, a worthy record of one of the finest feats of desert exploration; H. StJ. Philby's preliminary account of the second great crossing of the South Arabian desert; and, in a different class, Van der Meulen's and von Wissmann's fascinating *Hadhramaut*. It is fitting that we should spare a thought for their forerunner, the pioneer who in 1843 first saw the sands of the Rub'al Khali from the south and first travelled in the Hadhramaut, using the term in the wider sense.

Mr. Van der Meulen writes: * "Adolf von Wrede was the first scientific traveller who succeeded in penetrating into the region of Hadhramaut and in collecting much [*sic*] valuable data there. Little is known of this remarkable man. . . ." He then briefly summarizes Heinrich Freiherr von Maltzan's biographical introduction to von Wrede's book,† adding only one fact: "After closer investigation we discovered that von Wrede finally enlisted in the Turkish army and died as a poor and unknown man in a hospital in Constantinople.

"We followed von Wrede's route for some time, both on our journey inland and back. We made much and grateful use of his detailed notes and of his map." After making two reservations, to be noticed later, he concludes: "As far as we could control the other parts of his country up to Sif in Wadi Doan, his northernmost point, and in Wadi Hadjr, his descriptions of the country are good and exact, and we still see in von Wrede the great explorer of Hadhramaut: those who followed did less than he, who blazed the trail."

It is true that but little is known of von Wrede's life, yet it is a good deal more than is contained in von Maltzan's sketch, which, as he himself pointed out, is very incomplete. Unluckily it has generally been

* *Hadhramaut: Some of its Mysteries Unveiled*, D. Van der Meulen and Dr. von Wissmann. Leyden, 1932.

† Adolf von Wrede's *Reise in Hadhramaut, Beled Beny Yssa und Beled el Hadschar*, Herausgegeben von Heinrich Freiherr von Maltzan. Braunschweig, 1870.

considered, notably by the late Dr. Hogarth in *The Penetration of Arabia*, as being within its limits completely trustworthy. Apparently it is not. The facts as given by Victor Hantsch in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (the German D.N.B.), Bd. 44, S. 243, 1898, are in many points inconsistent with von Maltzan's account. As Hantsch's article is based on one by W. Koner (*Berliner Ztschr. f. Erdkunde*, 1871, S. 248), I shall only deal with the latter.

Koner subjects von Maltzan's editing of Adolf von Wrede's work to a critical examination. The book had spent twenty years on a fruitless pilgrimage from publisher to publisher, first in England, then in Germany, coming to rest for about twelve years in the house of Andrée in Dresden. It had come back from England despoiled of its map and of a number of water-colours of ethnological and topographical interest, for the translator had committed suicide, and only the manuscript itself had been recovered. H. von Maltzan had the great merit of getting the book printed at last. Koner regrets that it was not published in its entirety: von Wrede's introduction dealing with the history of Arabian exploration and his descriptions of Jidda, Hodeida, Mochha, and Aden were suppressed. The Red Sea ports were considered to have become too well known to justify the publication; the question of expense may have been decisive. The passage Koner quotes describing the religious customs of the Zeidi in Yemen, and especially the celebration of the Beiram feast on Mount Horeib, near Moccha, which Wrede witnessed in 1836, makes one want to see the unabridged book. The severest criticism is levelled against von Maltzan, the biographer.

Koner had made the acquaintance of a sister of von Wrede's in Berlin, who lent him her brother's letters written to his family, with interruptions, over a period of thirty years. Of course, she was also able to give supplementary information, so that the article is authoritative. Two long letters deserve especial mention—from Aden (June 1, 1843) just before the Hadhramaut expedition, and from Cairo (March 10, 1844) soon afterwards.

Gustav Adolf von Wrede was born at Münster in Westphalia in 1807. After the Napoleonic wars his father exchanged the Prussian for the Hanoverian service, and was stationed at Stade on the Elbe. Young Wrede's imagination was stirred by the sight of the vessels on the river; he was destined for and perhaps actually put into the army against his will at the age of sixteen, and in the same year twice ran away from home, the second time successfully, going as a sailor on a Dutch vessel. But after three years on board, the rough, monotonous life and the

barbarous punishments he was obliged to witness were too much for him, and he deserted at Smyrna in October, 1826. A merchant hid him out of pity and afterwards gave him an introduction to a Frenchman, Colonel Barras, serving in the Turkish army. Von Wrede accompanied this officer as secretary on a mission to Baghdad. Koner says the diary the nineteen-year-old lad kept on the journey was worthless as regards geography or archæology, but contained accurate records of times and distances. In 1827 he was made instructor in a Turkish regiment at Diarbekr, afterwards at Aleppo and Kaisarich, and in 1828 was ordered to Constantinople with his regiment and took part in the Turko-Russian war. The appointment seems to have ended with the war. "Absolutely without means, he came near moral ruin in the midst of the demoralized soldiery." Von Wrede was rescued by another French officer in the Turkish army, Colonel Victor de Magnier, who had been one of Ney's aides. He persuaded young Wrede to write home and ask his father's forgiveness and gave him the means to return to his family. In November, 1830, the prodigal reached home, after an absence of seven years. His father managed to get him into a Prussian artillery regiment at Münster, but after a few months of garrison duty Adolf von Wrede was only too glad to accept an offer of de Magnier's. The latter had been given command of the sixth battalion of the Foreign Legion, newly raised for the conquest of Algeria. As soon as he had got his discharge, von Wrede joined the Legion at Chaumont as a sergeant, and reached Bona with his draft in November, 1832. There was much desultory fighting. After a sharp action in March the decimated battalion returned to Bona in triumph, carrying the heads of 350 Kabyles on their bayonets. Heat and exhaustion did their work; hundreds of cases of typhus and of subsequent madness turned Bona into a great hospital. Von Wrede's fever lasted from May till August; Colonel de Magnier went out of his mind and died next year in an asylum in Paris. Out of 900 men, less than 50 returned to France alive. Von Wrede was discharged at Marseilles as being no longer fit for military service.

He was too proud to go home, too poor to emigrate to America. He tramped to Switzerland and there subsisted for a time on his earnings as a copyist, finding some comfort in the beauty of the scenery. Von Wrede next determined to try for employment in the Greek army or in Mehemet Ali's, and actually went to Greece, but apparently without success, for we find him in January, 1835, in Egypt as instructor in the 16th regiment, later the 3rd. He accompanied it to Moccha, touching

at various ports, but owing to a gap in the letters we do not know whether he actually took part in the campaign against the Wahabites in Sana. Anyway, he was soon drilling new negro regiments in Sennaar, afterwards returning to Arabia with the troops and spending about a year in the Yemen. In May, 1836, von Wrede left Moccha on six months' leave, and touched, among other ports, at Yanbo on the way to Suez, becoming involved at Yanbo in a dangerous adventure. A poor renegade Jew, who was dying there, was persuaded by a well-to-do Hanoverian Jew, whose acquaintance von Wrede had made on the voyage, to return to his original faith. The poor Jew died; a lying Arab servant and a Janissary accused the rich Jew of poisoning and robbing his poor co-religionist, and haled him before the Qadi. Von Wrede tried to exculpate the innocent man and shared his fate. The two were kept for fifty days in a small, dark, filthy cell, both damp and hot; heavy iron collars which cut into the flesh were put round their necks and attached by a chain weighing about fifty pounds to a pole outside. Von Wrede soon fell dangerously ill from the bad food, foul air, heat, and anxiety, but succeeded in smuggling a letter to the French Consulate, and was finally freed at Mehemet Ali's orders.

When he reached Cairo the consulates, especially the French, took energetic steps in his favour; the Governor of Yanbo was cashiered and a claim for compensation was made against the Egyptian Government. This affair made some stir and was reported in the papers. In 1837 von Wrede won his case and the Government paid him 3,000 dollars (between £600 and £700), but at the same time deprived him of his appointment as instructor. The sum, however small it might seem in Europe, represented a certain capital in Cairo, and von Wrede determined to set up in business, for which he was little fitted. He married an Italian officer's daughter, Antoinette Odescalchi, and knew happiness and comfort for a short time. He had some leisure for study, the use of a good library, and could associate with several men who shared his tastes and had had better opportunities. But in 1841 his wife, the elder of their two small daughters, and two brothers-in-law died of plague. The speculations, successful at first, turned out badly, and the failure of another business carried off most of what remained. Small wonder that Wrede determined to leave Cairo and travel. It was doubtless in order to make some money for the purpose that he accompanied Count von Salm-Reiferscheid as guide and interpreter through Palestine, Syria, and Asia Minor. Bad luck still followed, for the traveller's long descriptive letters never reached Europe. On his return to Cairo he

applied to the Royal Geographical Society for a grant for an expedition to Abyssinia. As von Wrede had published nothing and had no connections in the scientific world, it was hardly surprising that the request was refused. He dropped that plan and decided to carry out his cherished desire and explore part of South Arabia with what means he still possessed.

On the way, in April, 1843, he spent some days at Jidda under his Cairo acquaintance, Fresnel's, hospitable roof. The great Orientalist, tied to his consulate, but in an unrivalled position for gathering information, never failed to do what was in his power to further the scientific penetration of Arabia. He used and inspired von Wrede, the soldier of fortune, and Arnaud the apothecary, both amateurs as regards Arabic study, and both most inadequately equipped with worldly goods. He gave Wrede every encouragement and got him a free passage to Aden.

Koner summarizes von Wrede's account of the journey inland from Makalla, over wooded mountains and a barren plateau, intersected by deep-cut winding wadis, where many towns and villages bear witness to the relative fertility of the soil. From Wadi Doan the traveller reached the "town" of Sava in Wadi Rachtiye, inhabited by collectors of desert salt, a day's march, as he there heard to his joy, from the great desert el Ahkaf. Koner quotes from the unpublished family letters:

"... After a six hours' march I reached the edge of the desert, lying about 1,000 feet lower than the plateau, which here falls precipitously. The illimitable sandy desert lay at my feet, ridged with hills of sand, which succeeded each other in regular waves and gave the desert the aspect of a rough sea. Not the slightest trace of vegetation enlivens the scene; no bird's song, nor even the hum of an insect breaks the death-like stillness that reigns over the grave of the Sabæan army. All around is silence, utter death! My two Beduins stood beside me and gazed at the scene. For a moment I thought that they shared the melancholy feelings which the sight of the desert had given me; but soon I saw that only the fear of spirits had made my chattering Beduins dumb, for one of them said in a low voice, pointing to three dazzling white spots: 'That is Bahr-es-Safi; spirits dwell in the depths and have covered with treacherous sand the treasure they have been given to watch over. Whoever dares go near is drawn downwards; do not go there.' Of course, I paid no attention to their warnings and demanded to be led to these places, as had been agreed. We took two hours to descend from the plateau to the sand of the desert, and afterwards rested close to two great rocks. Next morning I told my Beduins to accom-

pany me to these spots, but they were not to be persuaded; although otherwise they were brave men, the fear of spirits had mastered them to such an extent that they hardly dared to speak. So I started on the dangerous walk alone, armed with a lead weighing half a kilo and a line sixty fathoms long. In a quarter of an hour I reached one of the spots, about thirty minutes' walk in length and twenty-five in breadth, and shaped like a bowl. With every precaution I approached the edge, so as to examine the sand, which I found nearly *impalpable*. Then I threw the lead in as far as I could; it sank at once with diminishing speed, and after five minutes the end of the line, which had slipped out of my hands, disappeared in the all-devouring grave."

This account harmonizes with that in the book; even the wording is largely identical. The description in the book is, naturally enough, fuller and more precise; petroleum is mentioned oozing from between the strata in the ravine leading down to the desert; the ravine was partly filled with drift-sand; the time taken to reach the basin is given as thirty-six minutes; the surface of the white patch sagged in a little towards the centre, probably owing to the wind's action; von Wrede lay down and poked the edge of the basin with his stick; it was stony and fell away abruptly; the sand resisted no more than water when he stuck his stick into it; in fact, it was not sand, but a sort of grey dust, contrasting with the yellow desert sand; he would have liked to take a sample, but could not because of the suspicious Badawin; the rocks which appeared here and there in the desert appeared to be brown sandstone, much weathered.

Both descriptions give an impression of truthfulness, although there are difficulties—the length of the plumb-line, for instance, which is not six fathoms, as Mr. Thomas says, but sixty. The only inconsistency between the two accounts is the weight of the lead, given variously as one kilo and half a kilo; but that may be merely verbal. Von Wrede winds up the description in the book with the words: "I refrain from giving any opinion, but leave it to the learned to explain the phenomenon and restrict myself to describing it as it appeared to me."

The traveller returned to Choreybe (Khureba) in Wadi Doan, and from there tried to reach Kabr-el-Hud. But he got into a crowd of Badawin at a fair in the Wadi Doan and was ill-treated and imprisoned as a Frankish spy. All his money was taken away, to prevent his continuing the journey, and he was sent back to Makalla under escort.*

* Hogarth (*Penetration of Arabia*, p. 150). "After retracing his path to Wadi Doan, the pilgrim set out at last for Kabr al-Hud. His tardiness in performing

He reached Aden with the Sultan of Makalla's help and spent three months there before arriving in Cairo in December, 1843, where he at once began to write up his diary and work at a map, with the help of a German engineer. What could be done with primitive instruments—chronometer, pocket-compass, and surveyor's compass—had been accomplished; native ignorance and fanaticism had prevented the use of anything more elaborate. Borum and Makalla, two astronomically determined points, gave the basis. The peculiar terraced configuration of the country had allowed the use of many hill-tops for triangulation.

Adolf von Wrede had explored with a large measure of success one of the most fanatical and jealously guarded parts of Arabia, at a time when suspicion was particularly rife, owing to the recent English occupation of Aden and in less degree to Mehemet Ali's campaigns in Arabia. Von Wrede had no sort of official backing; he played a lone hand and, had he disappeared, no voice would have been raised in expostulation or enquiry. Mr. Thomas and Mr. Philby have repeatedly laid stress on the prestige they enjoyed from their known close connection with powerful Arab rulers. Mr. Van der Meulen expressly states that his journey would have been impossible but for the peculiar dual position of influential Hadrami families in the Dutch East Indies and their own country, to his own status as Netherlands' Consul at Jidda, travelling on an official mission, not to mention the good-will of the Aden authorities.

The first report of the journey appeared in the *J.R.G.S.*, XIV., 1844, p. 107; a letter of Wrede's appeared in the *Bulletin de la Soc. de Geogr.*, Ser. III., 1845, p. 41. Fresnel wrote him an introduction, but the book progressed so slowly that the introduction was turned into an article for the *Journal Asiatique* (iv. Ser., 1845, T. VI., p. 386). Von Wrede hated writing, and the book was only finished in 1848. He hoped to make enough out of its sale to pay for an expedition in East and Central Africa, although he was in very low water financially and was glad to act for a short time as dragoman to a rich Dresdener in Palestine. Then

this duty possibly accounts for the fact that he was never allowed to reach the tomb of the saint." But Wrede says this pilgrimage, like that of Mecca, had to be performed at a stated time. He came to the country, for obvious reasons, much too early, pretending it had not been possible to ascertain the right date in Cairo. He ascribed his ill-success to his visiting the fair; even if suspicion is aroused, it is usually only dangerous when there is a crowd (von Wrede, *op. cit.*, p. 259). Hogarth says most of the notes were confiscated; Wrede says only the original jottings, of which he had kept careful copies (p. 256).

a certain Baron von Müller, who was rather noisily engaged in organizing an expedition to the sources of the Nile, wished to engage him as topographer. A young naturalist, Alfred Brehm, later to become famous, actually was engaged. The two went to Lake Mensaleh, hunting for specimens, while waiting for supplies and funds to be sent from Europe. What was sent proved quite insufficient. Brehm was bound by contract and was obliged to start against his better judgment; von Wrede still had a free hand. The avoidance of this disastrous expedition was one of the few strokes of luck in his life, though at the time it meant yet another disappointment. To please Brehm, von Wrede accompanied him as far as Khartoum, returning thence to Cairo.

In 1850 Adolf von Wrede went back to Germany, after an absence of twenty-seven years, which had only once been broken for a few months. He had no personal acquaintances among the Orientalists and scientific men who might have been interested in his work;* he was unused to European ways, and his manners and shabby, prematurely aged appearance are said to have told against him. Various unfavourable reports had preceded him from the East, and although they were baseless they did harm in Berlin. Koner speaks of the curse of an interrupted education, and mentions the fate of the rolling stone. Still, at Ritter's invitation he read three papers before the *Gesellschaft für Erdkunde*: a sketch of his journey, which repeated the R.G.S. article (*Monatsber. d. Ges. f. Erdkunde*, N.F. VIII., 1850); The Position of Ancient Ophir and the South African Trade; The Home of Frankincense (same, IX., 1851). Ophir he held to be some part of the south coast of Arabia. By a process of exclusion he decided that frankincense could not have grown to any extent in Arabia, but was imported from Africa and distributed from South Arabian ports. Dhufar with its unique climate was, of course, unknown to him.

Alexander von Humboldt presented him to King Frederick William IV. at Sanssouci, but the audience was not a success. Koner says, referring to von Maltzan's report: "... We cannot believe that von Wrede allowed himself to play the braggart before the King in such a way that he lost all favour with Humboldt. There must have been other reasons why he should have forfeited Humboldt's good opinion to such an extent that the direct petition to the King for a grant for the resumption of his Arabian explorations was refused."

* Koner does not expressly mention that as early as 1846 von Wrede had been introduced, briefly but with great distinction, to a wide circle of readers, in Karl Ritter's classic *Erdkunde*, Bd. XII. (Bd. I., "Arabien").

Von Wrede then tried to get his book published in Germany. He had the manuscript copied by a retired clergyman, who saw fit frequently to alter the wording and sometimes the sense, and who left out most of the exact compass readings and angles which von Wrede had used in the original map. Koner collated the original manuscript with this, the Andrée version, which was all von Maltzan ever saw or heard of and on which he based the reconstructed map. The author was very naturally indignant at the copyist's licence; it is almost incomprehensible that Wrede should notwithstanding have sent the garbled copy to the various publishers.* I imagine he wished to avoid the work of recopying himself, perhaps to save his eyes—we know that they suffered badly on the Hadhramaut journey. He probably could not afford to have it copied a second time, and yet did not want to disgruntle publishers by submitting in the first instance an untidy manuscript, intending to substitute the original or make corrections at a later stage. However that may be, no publisher could be found, nor in view of von Humboldt's and von Buch's expressed incredulity was that surprising.

In 1853 Adolf von Wrede was glad to take up a position as forestry inspector on Freiherr von Haxthausen's estate in Westphalia, but gave it up next year owing to a disagreement in which he thought his honour had been questioned. He spent some time in a small Westphalian town, in bad health, for a time almost blind, writing a little for the papers, in bitter poverty. When he heard that a British Foreign Legion was being raised for the Crimean War, he enlisted at Heligoland as a sergeant. Shorncliffe, Malta, a camp near Scutari followed, but the Legion took no part in the fighting. After the war von Wrede was promised major's rank in a projected Turkish gendarmerie, and left England for Constantinople. There it turned out that his patron, Omer Pasha, had fallen out of favour, and no more was heard of the Turkish gendarmerie. Finally he obtained a humble post as manager of a quarry under the Danube Conservancy Board (*Donau Regulierungskommission*).

The last letter is dated Sschukurowa, October 25, 1859. He had

* Is this the explanation of a passage in Mr. Van der Meulen's book? "Von Wissmann, while surveying Wadi 'Amd, established the fact that von Wrede has described this wadi so differently from what it is like in reality, placing all the villages that lie up-stream from 'Amd down-stream, describing the steep 'aqaba leading from 'Amd to the south as a smooth slope, and failing so entirely in every part of his description that von Wissmann became completely convinced that von Wrede cannot have made this journey himself. . . ." (Van der Meulen and von Wissmann, *op. cit.*, p. 6).

been sent to the forests of the Dobrudscha to superintend the felling and transport of timber for embankment or engineering purposes. The letter speaks of work, shooting, boredom. One gleam of light fell on his last days: Andrée was going to publish the book. Fortunately Adolf von Wrede could not guess how many years were still to pass before it actually appeared. The end of his life was tragic, as the life itself had been: he died in hospital at Constantinople in 1863 from the effects of a bursting gun-barrel.

So far Koner's account. He does not name von Wrede's sister, nor give any indication which would help now to locate the letters and original manuscript, supposing they still exist. Koner ends on a note of regret that it had not been possible for him to get into touch with any of the travellers who must have known von Wrede in the East.

A few scattered references may be noted here.

Hogarth notices those of Arnaud and Fresnel. During Arnaud's brief visit to Marib he saw a Badu from the Hadhramaut, who said:

" . . . Qu'il avait vu tout nouvellement dans son pays, avant son départ, un homme blanc comme moi, qu'il croyait un Indien . . . qui ne savait dire en arabe que: *la ilah illa Allah wa Mohammed rasoul Allah*. D'après le portrait que ce Bédouin fit de l'étranger arrivé dans son pays, je n'eus pas de peine à reconnaître que c'était M. de Wrédé, dont je connaissais déjà les intentions,* ainsi que la direction qu'il avait prise. Craignant alors pour lui et pour moi, je m'abstins de questionner le Bédouin . . ." (*Journal Asiatique*, 1845, avril-mai, p. 311 seq.)

Arnaud also stated that they spent some time together at Aden, after his journey to Marib and von Wrede's to Hadhramaut (*Journ. As.*, 1845, février-mars).

Fresnel's article on Wrede's journey has already been mentioned; there is also a reference in a letter to J. Mohl, dated Djeddâ, May 9, 1844 (*Journ. As.*, 1845, sept.-oct.):

" . . . Vous savez qu'il y a d'immenses lacunes dans la série des rois yamanites (ou sabéens, ou himyarites, ou hadramites; appelez-les comme vous voudrez). Une partie de ces lacunes a été heureusement remplie par M. le baron de Wrède (Hanovrien), dont le

* This looks as though von Wrede had already discussed the Hadhramaut plan with Fresnel before visiting him at Jidda in April; Arnaud's visit had been "au commencement de l'année." Arnaud, coming from Sana, was not likely to hear of Wrede from anyone else.

voyage à Doan (Arabie méridionale) fera époque dans l'histoire de la géographie et des voyages. En attendant la publication de sa Relation, j'ai demandé et obtenu permission de faire insérer dans le journal asiatique une liste des rois himyarites qu'il nous a rapportée du Hadramaut . . . rigoureusement parlant, M. de Wrede n'a point pénétré dans le pays des Hadramis ou *Chatromotites*, mais seulement dans le pays des *Toanis* ou *Mineens*.

"Je ne vous enverrai point aujourd'hui cette liste de rois himyarites, extraite d'un manuscrit qu'on voulait vendre à M. de Wrede pour le prix de trent thalers (environ 160 fr.), et qu'il ne put acheter faute d'argent."

It is from the Cairo diary of G. A. Wallin—a Finlander, to adopt a convenient term sometimes used in Swedish and German for the Swedes of Finland—that we get the most distinct impression of von Wrede's personality. It has all the immediacy, the harshness, perhaps the distortion, we are used to in snapshots. Wallin's diary was quite unstudied; and final or considered judgments are not to be looked for there. It was his confidante in a time of loneliness and exacting work, when he was largely abstaining from European society and carrying on a long course of study to fit himself to travel in Arabia as a Muhammadan. Wallin was ruggedly independent, reserved, extraordinarily single-minded. He was a plain man and enjoyed the society of Swedish and Finnish sailors and skippers, Fellahin, and Badawin almost as much as that of scholars; but he had no taste whatever for Bohemianism. He got on well at sight, apparently, with such men as Quatremère, Lepsius the Egyptologist, Rawlinson and his traveller friend Commander Jones; a long audience given him after his return to Finland by a cultivated Russian grand duke gave pleasure on both sides. Wallin was critical and seems to have shared a prejudice, fairly frequent in the Finland of his generation, against nobility and titles.* Except for a common interest in Arabia, the two men cannot have been congenial.

We do not know what von Wrede made of the dour Finlander. He may have thought that Wallin had hitherto led a sheltered life.

One of the first entries, after settling down in Cairo, is as follows :

* The very ancient knightly family of von Wrede originated in the neighbourhood of Cologne, then settled in Westphalia, where it held a great deal of property, afterwards establishing itself in other parts of Germany as well, but not in Bavaria. The Bavarian princely family is much younger. Adolf von Wrede's family would appear to have belonged to the Protestant Herrin branch. He is not actually named (*Gothaisches genealog. Taschenbuch der Freiherrlichen Häuser*, 1856).

February 29, 1844 (E., I., 279).*

Murad spoke of Wrede and said he was a charlatan (or swindler, *škojare*) who had picked up Arabic by ear only, without being in the least able to read it; that he used to sell spirits here, or was himself a distiller; and that he had accompanied travellers as a dragoman and not been particularly honest.

(Murad was a Piedmontese dealer in antiquities.)

March 6 (E., I., 282).

Made Wrede's acquaintance, who really did seem to be a charlatan, with the usual German habit of talking big. He promised me useful information and advice for my journey; he best knew the way to travel in Arabia, for he had undertaken and carried out his own journey in the right, indeed the only right way, and so on.

March 8 (E., I., 283).

I went to Prunner,† who assured me of what I had suspected for some time, that Murad's reputation was none of the best; on the contrary, he is considered a mischief-maker.

Letter to Professor Geitlin, Wallin's first teacher of Arabic, April 13, 1844 (E., I., 320).

. . . I made acquaintances easily among the Europeans living here, such as Prunner, the doctor . . . a very pleasant, sensible, accomplished man. Then with another German, *Palme*, who went on an expedition to Abessynia and has published a description of it. Then with Herr Wrede, a Hanoverian, who has just returned from his journey in Yemen, where he collected Himyaritic inscriptions. He, like *Palme*, has learnt Arabic merely by ear; they can neither read nor write the language and know little or nothing of Arabic literature. The latter came here about ten years ago as a distiller, has lived here ever since, following various pursuits, has accompanied travellers as interpreter, and is said to be a charlatan. . . . [So that apparently Murad had really described *Palme* instead of von Wrede. Or did Wallin make a mistake in saying "the latter"?]

June 11 (E., I., 389).

Went to Wrede before 'asr. He read me the introduction to his book on his journey, which he has nearly finished. Went with him

* "E" is S. G. Elmgren, *Georg August Wallins, Resanteckningar från orienten åren 1843-1849*. Helsingfors, 1864.

† Pruner Bey, a Bavarian doctor at the head of a hospital in Cairo, who had accompanied the Egyptian troops to the Higaz and travelled among the Wahabis. Fresnel speaks very highly of his attainments, which Lane also appreciated.

to find his brother-in-law, a naturalist . . . and met his mother-in-law, an ugly, fat old German or Italian.

February 1, 1845 (E., III., 20).

To Prunner, to ask him to introduce me to Fresnel.

February 3 (E., III., 20).

[Prunner] took me to Fresnel, whom I found busy with Wrede; they were working at something that had to do with the book on his journey. Prunner soon left the three of us alone, and we began to discuss how I should manage my journey to Arabia. . . .

March 28, 1845 (E., III., 87):

[Clot Bey] had nothing at all of the quiet dignity which true learning is wont to lend its possessor (and which I thought I discovered in Quatremère and still more in Lepsius). . . .

March 30, 1845 (E., III., 90).

Had a visit from Wrede this morning, who was very boring and tired me out repeating the same stories, which I am obliged to listen to nearly every time we meet; and I suppose I was not able to hide my annoyance, for he asked me why I was suddenly so "tiefgesinnt."

December 14, 1847 (E., IV., 8).

. . . the suspicious inhabitants of Hadramaut and Wadi Doan. Their hatred and suspicion are said to be roused to a high degree on account of the English at Aden and Wrede's journey. They knew that he was a disguised European.

Letter dated London, January 11, 1850 (E., IV., 373).

. . . Not without a certain amount of fright, I read in the *Journal Asiatique* of the progress made in the literature on Arabia during the years I have spent abroad, trying to reach a goal I never did reach. A great deal of it is just "humbug"; for instance, Arnaud's journey to Sana, which plainly shows how little this traveller understood the Beduins' character, ignorant as he was of their language, according to his own naïve statement. Wrede's journey to Wadi Doan will appear soon too, I suppose; when I left Alexandria he was on the point of going on an expedition to the sources of the Nile, and was the last to take leave of me on the steamer before I sailed. May the outcome be satisfactory! But his personality and acquirements truly do not promise much, for although he has spent about twenty years among Arabs, he has not yet learnt to speak their language, much less read or write it; but he does possess promptitude and courage, which are absolutely necessary on such

journeys. Arnaud is said to be no better in the main, as I heard from Aden. . . . A great many things look different seen close at hand and seen from a distance.

It would be doing Wallin less than justice to see nothing but jealousy in these strictures. It was the contempt of the trained Arabist for amateurs, rushing in where he, after years of study, had not considered himself fit to tread. Wallin belonged to the Burckhardt tradition, and his patient study of the language, literature, law, theology of Islam did in the end allow him to play the learned scheikh in Arabia with great success. Only, the span of human life and health is limited, so that he was not able to carry out a tithe of what he hoped. The despised Arnaud had, after all, brought back his forty-seven inscriptions from Marib. To Wallin the successes of von Wrede, Arnaud, to some extent Wellsted, were in the nature of a fluke. Besides, travelling almost openly as Europeans, they roused avoidable antagonism and spoiled the chances of those better qualified.

But Wrede might with equal right have criticized Wallin's conception of an explorer's training as being far too narrowly philological; it is probable, indeed, that Wallin owed more than he ever quite realized to his talks with the experienced traveller. Wrede did know something of geology and of the botany of Arabia, and was able to provide route notes of which his successors, ninety years later, "made much and grateful use." But in spite of great natural aptitude, it was only after his first Arabian journey that Wallin understood something of the manifold training needed by an explorer; after the second he was fully alive to his deficiencies as to surveying, sketching, geology. But it was then too late.

Among the few contemporaries in Egypt who have written about von Wrede, Alfred Brehm must be mentioned (*Reiseskizzen aus Nordost Afrika*).* He speaks of von Wrede's usefulness during the preparations for von Müller's expedition, and praises his prudence in not joining.

Heinrich Freiherr von Maltzan, in his *Reise nach Südarabien* (Braunschweig, 1873), reports that during his stay in Cairo in the winter of 1870-71 he saw something of a colony of emigrants from Wadi Doan. Von Maltzan, who had just been editing Wrede's book, showed such knowledge of the country that he was at first taken for Wrede

* More accessible in the collection *Kreuz und Quer durch Nordost Afrika*, Reklam No. 6712-6715.

himself, and they showed dislike and reserve, as the unbeliever's visit had been resented. But an old man declared he had known the real Abd el Hud well and that he must be very old if he were still alive; von Maltzan could at most be his son. Reassured on this point, they became very friendly, testifying to the accuracy of Wrede's descriptions, even in some points that seemed rather fanciful; for instance, the periodic shooting of the inhabitants of Khureba by the paternally minded Sultan as a means of getting the taxes paid. Von Wrede's veracity was beyond all doubt.

To sum up: What scanty testimony we have by those who knew von Wrede in the East is in his favour, as far as it goes—all but Wallin's. And except for gossip, repeated for what it was worth, even he has nothing serious to allege. That Wrede could be a bore, was boastful and talkative, and had no standards of scholarship is probably true. The wonder is not that he should have grown a thick skin—that was perhaps a necessary condition of survival—but that a man so battered by misfortune should have kept so much resiliency, still held on to an honourable ambition; that a penniless youth who saw so much that was horrible and degrading, cut off from his natural connections, should, at any rate in the main, have kept straight.

But Wallin's superficial impressions make it easier to understand Alexander von Humboldt's disapproval and disbelief.

I have not been able to trace any contemporary notice of Humboldt's dealings with von Wrede, and have only the passage in von Maltzan's introduction to go upon. Leopold von Buch, the great geologist "was even wont, in his downright way, to call the traveller a liar and to relate how annoyed Humboldt had been over his swaggering account of his journey when Humboldt presented him to King Frederick William the Fourth at Sanssouci . . ." (von Wrede, *op. cit.*, p. 2).

There is nothing about this incident, which took place in 1850 or 1851, in Humboldt's or von Buch's or Ritter's biographies, nor have I found any reference in the sea—uncharted by index for the most part—of Humboldt's published correspondence. But that is only a fraction of the whole correspondence. However, no great flight of fancy is needed in reconstruction.

The great scientist, great in many spheres, the intimate friend and co-worker of Arago, Gay-Lussac, Gauss, von Buch, Ritter, and more scientists and mathematicians than can be named, was spending the last years of his long life as a chamberlain at the Prussian court. Humboldt had expended his considerable fortune on his journeys in South America

and on the monumental description of those journeys. After twenty years in Paris spent in research in varied fields and in seeing the mighty book through the press, he was glad to accept a post at court. He determined, besides keeping up with the progress of science, to devote his old age to the encouragement and furtherance of scientists and scholars, especially the young and unknown.* Thanks to his friendship with a high-minded and intellectual king, to his diplomatic gifts, his own immense prestige and connections, and to a stupendous, a literally sleepless power of work,† he was able to do a great deal with very moderate means.

Humboldt was extremely benevolent; he had always moved in the best society in Europe; ordinarily suave, he could be biting. He must have been sensitive to anything, especially anything ridiculous, that would tend to lower the King's belief in his judgment and diminish his own power of patronage for the good of science and learning. We know from testimony contemporary with von Wrede's stay in Berlin that Humboldt's position at court was not so absolutely impregnable as it seemed (*Briefe von Alexander von Humboldt an Varnhagen von Ense*, 1827-1858, S. 257). And the one thing that could rouse the urbane courtier to a passion of disapproval was the idea that "die Wissenschaft" was being invoked by the untrained or incompetent or was being used for personal ends (*Briefwechsel A. von Humboldts mit H. Berghaus aus den Jahren 1825-1858*, letter of November 6, 1850). Here he was quite at one with the irascible Leopold von Buch. The unfortunate Adolf von Wrede must have struck quite the wrong note, possibly more than one. His case must be booked as one of Humboldt's very few mistakes.

As to the Bahr es Safi incident, which was looked on then and has been since as particularly suspicious, a good deal of ink has been spilt.

The Swiss Werner Munzinger, a well-known traveller in Abyssinia, accompanied Captain S. B. Miles on an expedition to the interior of South Arabia. In his report, written in October, 1870, occur the words: "We heard, further—and Wrede's account corroborates the statement‡—that north of Wade Doan [*sic*] lies the famous Bahr-es-Safi, or sand sea—i.e., a very low basin filled with loose sand" (*J.R.G.S.*, 1871). See also the *Athenæum*, September 24, 1870, for his report to the British

* Cf. Max Müller's *Reminiscences*.

† "Sleep is a prejudice that has been conquered in the Humboldt family."

‡ Which he probably knew through Ritter's *Erdkunde*.

Association. I have not been able to verify this, which is referred to in Petermann's *Mitteilungen*, Bd. 16, 1870.

Von Maltzan tentatively explains the mysterious disappearance of the plumb-line as being caused by some mechanical hindrance—for instance, the slipping forward of a quantity of sand (Wrede, *op. cit.*, p. 3). He also suggests a deep petroleum spring.

Mr. Bertram Thomas says, speaking of desert quicksands: "The extent of Umm as Samim, as the area is called, is said to be a two days' march in every direction. In appearance a sheet of salt plain, it gives no indication to the unwary traveller of its treacherous bogs. Many have perished here. . . . Von Wrede . . . records a similar phenomenon, its place-name Bahr as Safi. . . . While I do not wish to impugn von Wrede's veracity, I should record that most of the companions of my journeys had raided in the sands to the north of the Hadhramaut . . . but none knew of the Bahr as Safi, and all averred that the quicksands described exist to-day only in Umm as Samin . . ." (*Arabia Felix*, p. 184). But von Wrede never used the word "quicksands" for his white patches. The negative testimony of Mr. Thomas' Badawi would seem almost conclusive evidence against von Wrede, if it were not for the partial rebuttal by Munzinger, whose veracity was never questioned.

Mr. Van der Meulen says: ". . . the story of his adventure at the border of the Bahr es Safi, where his measuring-line sank into quicksand as if in water, may have had its origin in tales he heard at Wadi Doan about caravans sinking into sands or more probably breaking into a salt-lake covered by a salt crust, invisible on account of drifting sand . . ." (*op. cit.*, p. 6).

It is a fact that "dust pits" (Staubgruben) have been reported in South Russia which have swallowed up men and horses (M. Trautz, *Handb. d. Chemie*, Bd. II., S. 195). In Iceland an impalpable greyish-white powder, *móhella*, is collected in hollows on the edge of the deserts; not, as far as I know, at any distance within the deserts themselves. It is used for powdering babies; hence its other name, *barnam-jöl*. It is a product of decomposing tillit (palagonite tuff), reduced by wind action to the finest powder. It is only found in Iceland in relatively small quantities; but although the wind conditions may be much alike in the deserts of Iceland and Arabia, the rainfall is, of course, totally different. It is hard to say what formation could yield such a powder as Wrede describes; not, I understand, sandstone (but his cursorily observed brown sandstone may have been something else); volcanic ash from a great distance might decompose in such a way and


be caught in such precipitous basins as Wrede describes. Gypsum patches in the desert have been noted by Mr. Thomas and Mr. Philby, but I am told that gypsum solidifies quickly and could never yield such masses of powdery material. Granted an excessively fine material charged with air, a plumb-line may be expected to behave unexpectedly; one may pay out far more line than is necessary, owing to the loops temporarily coming to rest, before the lead reaches the bottom. The mechanics of such media have even now hardly been studied. Colloid chemistry, of course, did not exist in Wrede's day. Besides, the lead may have continued to slide down an inclined plane after it had once touched bottom. The lead was light compared with the weight of the long line.

Wrede states that according to his Badawi these patches were to be found at intervals for eight days. If so, it is inconceivable that they should all have disappeared during the intervening ninety years. Till the district is flown over, or his carefully described ravine is visited, with negative results, he is, it would seem, entitled at least to suspension of disbelief.

February, 1933.

YEMEN AND ASSIR : EL DORADO ?

By COMMANDER C. CRAUFURD, R.N. RET.



YEMEN is a country about one-half the size of France, with its southern boundaries adjoining the Aden Protectorate. Its seacoast extends from the mainland opposite Perim and runs northward past Hodeida to a limit that is somewhat indeterminable. At its northern seacoast limit Yemen adjoins the land of Assir.

History suggests that Yemen and Assir together comprise the El Dorado land of the Middle East. Early historians did not write their records merely for the fun of the thing. Parchment and paper were too expensive for such recreations. There may be some exaggeration, but there is always an aim and also a certain amount of truth in ancient Arab histories. The aim and object of this paper is to show the truth regarding our Middle Eastern El Dorado myths.

Arabs place very little faith in boundary commissions and pay very

little regard to their conclusions. In this they are wise, for they do not need to give serious regard to frontier incidents unless it suits the policies of their rulers to do so. Raiding is a natural activity that should have free play, otherwise it leads to more serious incidents such as we face in Europe from time to time. In Arabia a country expands or contracts according to the influence of its ruler. Since 1920 Assir has contracted and is now nominally under the control of Ibn Sa'ud of the Hejaz. Actually, Assir is now a buffer state, with its inland tribes giving allegiance to Ibn Sa'ud or to the Imam of Yemen according to such opportunities as may face the tribal sheikhs. Yemen probably holds its name owing to its position, the country to the right as you face Mecca from the sea. Also there is a suggestion that it owes its name from an Arabic word for happiness. This suggestion is strengthened by Roman historians and their allusions to Arabia Felix. Roman occupation of Arabia Felix has left practically no marks, although some visitors with archæological inclinations will suggest that various water cisterns along the main high roads to San'a, the capital of Yemen, are relics of a Roman system.

Our own theory is that those water cisterns existed in the days of Bilkis, Queen of Sheba, went into disrepair during Yemen's darkest ages, were required by Ælius Gallus' soldiers, and have been kept in repair since that time. Certainly in the days of the great Bilkis Al Yemen, the Happy Land, was one of her richest provinces, and Assir, the Difficult Land, yielded its gold to the treasures of Ophir. I have received several invitations to visit those ancient gold mines of Assir, but unfortunately Assir lives up to its reputation as the land of difficulties. My host assured me that although I might visit the gold mines I should be very fortunate if I returned alive, let alone all dreams of wealth. European visitors are not welcomed to the Assir interior, and in Yemen the traveller finds definite discouragement of peaceful penetration offered in more courteous form.

So soon as a visitor enters Yemen the Imam sends him an invitation to visit His Highness at San'a, and the traveller finds that his route is by the beaten track. So long as the Imam pursues this policy it seems unlikely that any decent traveller will know more of Yemen than the Imam may choose. His Highness has received many offers to make geological surveys of his lands. He accepts such offers, sends the geologist to some little place that is of no importance to him, and then with many courteous thanks His Highness accepts the report of a very restricted survey area. The report is pigeon-holed and the keen geo-

logist seldom finds that he has any opportunity of straying one yard further from the main high road.

Knowing something of His Highness' methods I employed different tactics when first I visited the Imam Yehia, some ten years ago.

"Tell me, what are your ambitions?" he suggested.

"Lots of things," I replied. "Oil, salt, and so on. I am not above undertaking a little gold location, if that would amuse you."

"Ah, yes. Well, our historians tell us that there are mountains of gold in this land. Do you think you could find them?" he asked, and I knew he was playing with me.

"Show me where to start. Leave me alone for a week. Of course, you will start me on one of your areas of which you know all possibilities. Test my skill. If the gold is there I shall probably find it." I laughed. Now I have to some degree that curious power of water divining with a fresh-cut twig. Also I have learned that local knowledge usually assists such labours. If I am in good form my twig trembles as I pass over subterranean streams, but if by chance I should pass over a piece of gold my twig instead of dipping gives a throw.

I do not attempt to explain the matter, but merely recount what is well known to most water diviners.

I felt sure the Imam would not give me much chance to find gold, but I thought I might find water, and water is wealth in undeveloped lands. I hoped therefore to find water and answer that I had found wealth, while that would give me opportunity to develop my poor little jest. Local inquiries set me thinking as the answers came in. I took some trouble over my divining, made my discoveries, and put my twig in my pocket. My friend Saleh had his curiosity aroused.

"What have you discovered?" he demanded. "But I must tell the Imam if you have discovered anything of importance."

I really do not know what Saleh said, but the Imam sent for me. He had given me more of a run than I anticipated, for he had let me wander over an area known as "The field of gold."

"Yes," I replied, "I give you my information for what it is worth. Your gold lies over there and probably in that mountain." I suggested according to faint traces of a subterranean vein.

I have seldom exploded a bombshell that will disturb an Arab, but I rang the bell all right that time. "My word, you have done it!" Saleh exclaimed. "That is where the Imam has his secret caves. All the wealth of Yemen has been stored there for hundreds of years."

I hurriedly tried to turn the point. "But water is real wealth to a

land. You have a good water stream running over there." I was thankful to point in a different direction. In Yemen my reputation as a mineralogist has not been published beyond Court circles, but I was allowed to develop that water spring somewhat.

Yemen has been a land of great prosperity, and that prosperity reached its height in the far-off days of Bilkis, say 1000 B.C. Mareb, some seventy miles east of San'a, was her capital city. No European has yet reached Mareb, though one party, I think under Glaser, did get within sight of the ruined Mareb Dam. They were badly shot up, and the survivors were glad to escape with their lives and minus all notes of any value. After lengthy discussions with the Sultan of Mareb, when he visited San'a, I had hopes of making the journey. The Mareb Sultan first sold me some faked idols, which he had bought from a factory two miles from San'a. His assurances were so painstaking that I had not the heart to show him where the fake was obvious. We had a pleasant little argument while I promised him fat cows and sheep sufficient to stock the Ark. Of course that had nothing to do with the problem. The real matter was certain to be rediscussed at Mareb. "Is that the lot, Sultan?"

"Oh yes. Bring your wives with you," he added as an afterthought.

"Wives? You promised to get me out without any wives," I protested.

"So I shall. There is a shortage of womenfolk in my land," he replied, and the negotiations broke down.

In the days of Bilkis, Yemen was on the high road from the East to Palestine, the centre of Western civilization. In those days there must have been a great deal of traffic between India and Arabia via Ophir, a port on the eastern borders of Southern Hadhramaut. Many of the presents that the Queen of Sheba took to Solomon were obviously of Indian rather than Arabian origin.

Again, from the various archaeological specimens that have passed through my hands during seventeen years' close acquaintance with Southern Arabia, I am convinced that Southern Arabia, and therefore Yemen, was in close touch with Western India. That is no extravagant suggestion, since you can sail in a dhow from Ophir, or its modern representative Makalla, and reach Bombay in seven days or about the same time as a steam passage takes from Aden. There is not a shadow of doubt that in 1000 B.C. Yemen was a prosperous country. We must remember that in ancient days gold did not represent the wealth of a land.

Coins did not come into existence until the second century B.C., and although Azal (modern name San'a) held one of the earliest mints, we have direct evidence that coinage did not gain wide circulation till a far later date. In its early history Yemen was somewhat flooded with gold, but I am convinced that most of its gold was imported metal. Through wide areas a few gold deposits were discovered. They had their surface outcrops cleaned off by the simple mining methods of the ancients. Lime was hammered into a crack of the ore and was then wetted. The ore was gradually split by that method. Also a certain amount of work was done by charcoal fire driving. But probably the main outcrops were in Assir. Assir I have identified as Havilah, "and the gold of that land is good." But, in my opinion, the gold of Assir and Yemen are hardly worth present-day commercial consideration. Modern gold winning requires ample supplies of water, and most of the water supplies of Yemen and Assir are now subterranean.

In either land the terrain is deceptive to a European. You pass over dry desert where only cactus seems to flourish, yet there is plenty of water at nine or ten feet depth.

For the present we must cancel gold in our dreams of the Middle Eastern El Dorado, unless we are attracted by fascinating stories of buried gold. The Arabs tell me of the palaces which Solomon built for Bilkis. Some say he built nine and others thirteen palaces for her.

There is a certain amount of truth in the old tale, for the main mosque of Sanaa is built on the foundations of one of those palaces.

When he gave her "everything that she desired," her main requests were for skilled labour, including architects. Arab histories are positive that Sabbæan Kings and Bilkis, the only Sabbæan Queen, built their palaces on three metal foundations. First was a foundation of gold, next one of silver, and atop was a foundation of copper. When we allow for exaggeration we find truth underlying such histories. In all probability every palace—that is, every large house—did hold a precious metal deposit buried under the floor of the central room. I believe Imam Yehia has from nine to fifteen definite locations of ancient Sabbæan palaces.

Unfortunately my uncanny skill in finding gold at the first effort has robbed me of any hope of archæological exploration in Yemen. I may assure him that I do not want his mythical gold bricks. He does not accept such assurances—and can you blame him? What would you

do if in a land of inartistic barbarians you found a statuette or a locket of the days of Solomon?

On the Yemen main caravan routes there are dozens of indications of archaeological interest. One supposes that most archaeologists would try to play fair if they were given the chance to dig. That wretched myth of buried gold shuts down archaeology, though many an Arab gentleman would be prepared to take genuine archaeological interest in the relics of his land.

Yemen was evidently a land of great prosperity up to the days of Mahomed the Prophet. From then onward forces of circumstance have combined to force Yemen to its steady downfall. Keep in mind the fact that in ancient days agricultural wealth was the main prosperity of a country . . . while in these days we are overstocked with agricultural produce.

During several years' residence in Yemen I was puzzled by the riddle as to why Yemen agriculture has declined. Of course the rainfall has reduced through the centuries. Various learned reasons have been suggested for this reduction of rainfall; the most obvious reason seems to have escaped notice. The Yemeni, together with the Turks—his guests for four hundred years—would cut down trees but they would never plant one. Under a semi-tropical sun desert has increased. Desert heat throws up rain clouds that would lower and break on a surface cooled by trees. For centuries the condition of Yemen has deteriorated through lack of afforestation. Wyman Bury pointed out that fact, and I only echo his experience.

While I was doing a little voluntary work on water repairs I found that around San'a (and probably in most of the Yemen highlands) subterranean water is lessening in force or is sinking, with the result that pools have lowered about twenty-four inches in three hundred years.

That is a rapid decline, somewhat serious to agriculture.

But the real blow to Yemen is lack of efficient labour. European estimates suggest that the Yemen population is some one to two millions. If you multiplied that estimate by three you would probably be nearer the mark. There is no lack of man-power or woman-power for the fields. Yemen goes in for intensive cultivation and the women are good gardeners, working just as hard as the men.

I have often heard nonsense about the wretched state of Arab women. The healthy Yemen woman is happy enough, sharing with her man both labour and privileges. The unhealthy woman is in

pitiable state. She has no sufficient opportunity for medical aid, owing to that abominable purdah system, the legacy of the Turks.

Not only to Yemen but to all Southern Arabia I would make the same censure. If Christianity still means anything to our peoples, then let us give some proper attention to the Prophet of Healing. He healed women as well as men. We have held Aden nigh a hundred years. Let there be at Sheikh Othman a hospital for women as large and efficient as the Keith Falconer hospital. Its influence will spread through Yemen and through the whole of Southern Arabia. Very few Arab women of the interior dare consult a male doctor. Search out the facts for yourselves; to me the truths seem pretty grim. They are, in fact, among the worst of my nightmares, for through seventeen years I have been able to do nothing for the women beyond save a life or two.

In Yemen it is common enough for a woman to be giving nourishment to her baby and working hard in the fields at the time.

There is plenty of labour in Yemen. In fact, Yemen exports labour to the Sudan. Outside his own land the Yemeni is a good workman. In his own lands he is hopeless. *Khat* is his ruin. Since his religion forbids the juice of the grape, he chews *Khat Edulis*. A Yemeni will cheerfully pay a day's wages for a bunch of *khat* leaves. He chews his *khat* for hours and while he chews he does no work. Discussing the *khat* problem with a Minister of Yemen, I politely minimized the handicap. "Nonsense, Craufurd," he replied. "You spend a few minutes over your drink and get back to work. We chew *khat* the whole day long. If a European drinks to excess he does it after working hours. We eat *khat* to excess all day and every day." He chose a succulent bundle of leaves and crammed them into his mouth.

Khat is a very mild stimulant; its effects on body and mind are far more mild than those of our strong drinks. But the *khat* habit is so absorbing. *Khat* has ruined Yemen labour other than that of the Jews, who are not landowners. *Khat*, in fact, has ruined Yemen agriculture and also Yemen.

The coffee of Yemen, commercially termed "Mocha coffee," is still the best produce in the world. It is used in Europe mainly for flavouring and blending with other coffees that are then sold as Mocha coffee. Yemen could supply in large quantities, but those quantities are not forthcoming at present owing to the lassitude and disorganization that *khat* has given to the labour of the land.

Though our geological knowledge of Yemen and Assir is small,

there are good reasons for asserting that each land holds good promise for geological research. Yemen does hold one valuable mine that is part worked and is undoubtedly a paying proposition, for European management. The unfortunate matter is that neither Yemeni nor European can trust each other. There are faults on both sides, and the matter can be gradually adjusted so soon as the truth leaks out. I should never trust an Arab with credit, unless I held a grip on him equal to the credit I advanced. I should never trust a European in Arabia as far as his political promises. I have had some, and twenty years' work have been brought to futility. Each of the European nations, including the British, have proved untrustworthy to the Arabs.

Let me quote one case, for I could quote others. . . .

In 1917 we were war shaken. Among many activities we made a treaty with the Idrissi of Assir. It was a secret treaty and the Idrissi preserved that secrecy so long as he lived. He had been clever in his political negotiations, and when we looked into the treaty at a later date it appeared to our disadvantage and entirely to Idrissi advantage. Still, there it was, a small matter, and when a Briton has signed the written word he is strong enough to stand by it. We fought a great war on "a scrap of paper"; we tore up the scrap of paper that we gave to the Seyid Idrissi of Assir—the ruler of a small country that is practically off the map!

In Arabia the truth leaked out and was discussed in every coffee shop that I visited from 1920 to 1923. Personally, I bought an Arab copy and had it carefully checked with the official Assir copy and in my presence. That was a little matter of using *backshish* in a manner that every man knows so soon as he learns Middle Eastern customs.

I should not care to say what I read, but I am still ashamed of my nationality when I face an Assiri.

We made a political error, to put it politely. We are paying, and shall pay, for that error till we right it.

At the moment we were losing some of the advantages we held in India. The Fates were playing fair; we were offered practical methods for developing the "El Dorado of the Middle East."

Assir offered to place its commercial development in the hands of the British and definitely so as a monopoly.

Now look at the map and you will see what that offer opened to us. Arabia is a land larger than India. Its southern portions, such as Yemen and Assir, are rich agriculturally beside holding other undeveloped resources.

Its northern portions, and mainly the Hejaz, hold pilgrim lands, and, with them, pilgrim markets that are active for some nine to ten months of the year. Between them the two natural "halves" of Arabia offer Demand and Supply for the produce of that great peninsula. Their Tihama, or seacoast plains, offer natural ferry ground for practically all the motor transport that commerce should need, and with hardly a single bridge for a hundred miles at a stretch! Their seaports offer deep water approach, under a little development that would be proportionately inexpensive. Though the coasts are coral-fringed, the coral reefs offer wonderful advantages to deep water craft, when once those advantages are realized.

So soon as we play fair we are offered an undeveloped India. There may not be the resources of India, but there are better resources for immediate development—namely, a market to hand near its supply depots. My time is past; for myself, I care nothing about the markets. Let us look to the future. That same political opening will come again, and probably within ten years.

Let us play fair and reap the consequent advantages.

"An Englishman's word is his bond." Is it in Assir?

Yemen Affairs

In the Italian review *Oriente Moderno* for August is reprinted from the Damascus newspaper, the *Alif-Bá*, some information given by the Syrian Tahsín Páshá el Faqír regarding the Yemen, in which country he has completed the task, entrusted to him by the Imam, of reorganizing the army. This is reproduced here with all reserves. The army which the Imam is in a position to place in the field at short notice is stated to number 300,000 combatants, out of a population of five millions. The regulars, kept under arms for the maintenance of order, are armed with artillery, machine-guns, and aeroplanes. Tahsín Páshá's mission commenced two years ago, at the invitation of the late Prince Saif el Islam Mohamed. He substituted Arabic for Turkish, then still used for instruction in the army; he started two classes, each of seventy officers; and he is able to say that his undertaking was successful to the extent of 50 per cent. His pension from the Syrian Government being sufficient for his needs, he refused any salary while in the Yemen, and his task was facilitated thereby. In the recent expedition, led by the heir apparent, against the rebel tribes, the Imam employed 50,000 men, out of whom 3,000 were regulars. He subdued

and annexed the Dhawí Mohamed and the Dhawí Hussein tribes, and the Nagran tribe was about to submit. The Imam has sixteen sons, five of whom are at the head of the Ministries, while the remainder hold other offices in different parts of the country. The postal service works well, utilizing motors and, for the mountain tracts, horses and mules, and camels for the Tihámah. The Jews of the Yemen, of whom there are 15,000, pay an annual tax of five reals, without difference between rich and poor.

Elsewhere the review mentions that Ibn Sa'úd, having quieted the rebellion in the Tihámah of Asír, and made a new province of the latter territory, is seeking to come to an understanding with the Imam, who, now feeling secure in that direction, is renewing his territorial claims against the British.

A FAR-REACHING TURKISH PLAN

By SIR TELFORD WAUGH, K.C.M.G.

THE new Angora Government has a wide outlook in two directions; its plan reaches backwards and forwards. It aims at reconstructing Turkey's past history and shaping her future.

The ordinary Englishman thinks of the Turks as uncivilized nomads, who suddenly appeared from somewhere in Asia and took Constantinople in 1453, and who now form the population of an insignificant republic in Asia Minor. Two books have recently been published in Turkey which take quite a different view. One is a history, the other a book on language. Both are written in the new Turkish in Latin characters.

In August, 1931, the Turkish Ministry of Public Instruction published an Universal History in four volumes, compiled by a Commission over which Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha presided. This is now the only history book allowed in schools in Turkey. The preface declares that historians have hitherto represented the Turks merely as ruthless champions of Islam in its struggle against Christianity, and have passed over in silence the thousands of years of Turkish civilization before Islam was born. The new history relies on the recent archaeological discoveries in Anatolia, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Central Asia, Northern India, Northern China, and Southern Siberia to bring this civilization to light. It states that the Turks came to Anatolia at least 7,000 years ago, and that they were the people who created the civilization known as Hittite, to which the rock sculptures at Boghazkeui bear witness, and of which traces have been found by Professor Ramsay and others in different parts of Anatolia.

The object of this official history is to give the rising generation in Turkey a good opinion of itself, just as the Hitler State wishes to impress the youth of Germany with the sense of its own importance in the world; whereas all that the British schoolboy is taught of his remote ancestors is that they painted themselves with woad. The claim to Hittite civilization may be thought far-fetched; but the Turkish race played a more important part in the early Middle Ages than is perhaps generally recognized.

The Turks were a Turanian race from Central Asia. There is a legend, mentioned by Gibbon, that they and the Mongols had a common ancestor *Bos Kurt* (the Grey Wolf). Both Turks and Mongols were fierce fighters, and their hordes ("Ordu" is still the Turkish word for army) swept from the wilds of Asia over the civilized world. Two branches of the race, the Huns and the Bulgars, were converted to Christianity; the Mongols in India and the Turks, Seljuks and Osmanlis in Asia Minor followed the religion of Islam. But before Mohammed founded that great powerful Turkish dynasties had ruled in Asia.

About 550 A.D. a Turkish Empire, called by the Chinese "Tukyu," extended from Korea to the Caspian.. It left monuments in Mongolia, the most important being the Orkhon inscriptions, written in the oldest Turkish alphabet. This alphabet contained thirty-eight letters and was written from right to left and vertically downwards. Part of the Orkhon inscription is now in the national Finnish Museum at Helsingfors. The Tukyu Empire had relations not only with the Chinese but with Persia and Byzance. Chosroes, King of Persia, had married a daughter of the Great Khan of the Turks, but rejected overtures made to him for an alliance. The Khan, nettled by the slight, offered to the Roman Empire the friendship which Chosroes had scorned. A Turkish Embassy was sent to Constantinople in the year 568, and was graciously received by the Emperor Justin and a treaty of alliance was made. Ten years later an envoy named Valentinus, sent from Constantinople to announce the accession of a Roman Emperor and to renew the treaty, was met with the following haughty reproach:

"You and those who send you wish to deceive us. I will not hide my feelings towards you, for we Turks are not accustomed to tell lies. We shall avenge ourselves on your Sovereign. He, while always speaking of peace and friendship, did not shrink from making an alliance with the Avarhunits, who are our subjects and have rebelled against us. But you must know well that if I send my squadrons of horsemen against you, the sound of their whips alone will suffice to rout you. If you try to resist, you will be crushed and destroyed like ants under the feet of my horsemen. You vainly try to make me believe that there is no way to carry war into your country but over the Caucasus. But I am well acquainted with the Dnieper and the Danube routes and the road which my subjects the Avarhunits took to Rome. I am also well informed as to your strength. From east to west all countries have submitted to the Turks; no nation can stand against the unconquerable Turkish armice."

We are told that all commerce between the Byzantine Empire and Persia, China, and even India was at this time in the hands of the Turks, who were also advanced in industries and in the working of metals. Among other Turkish dynasties were the Uigurs, who also had an alphabet of their own.

The second volume of this Universal History devotes considerable space to the records of these different dynasties. The third volume compresses into 153 pages the whole history of the Osmanli Sultans from 1299 A.D. to 1922; while in the fourth 335 pages are given to the story of the rise of the Turkish Republic.

So much for the past. The plan for the future is put forward in a remarkable book published at the end of 1930. It is not likely to be translated into English, nor would it perhaps find many English readers if it were. But it offers material for thought to those interested in the study of language and in the development of nationality. Its title is *Türk Dili İçin*, which means "For the Turkish Language." The author is Sadri Maksudi, a Turk of the province of Kazan in Russia, now professor of the History of Law at the School of Law in Angora. The plan is nothing less than to bring together by the use of a common language the remnants of Turkish populations scattered over Asia.

The suggestion of an enlarged Turkey, which should serve as a barrier to crazy Bolshevik propaganda, was made to Mr. Lloyd George by the Angora delegate Bekir Sami Bey in 1921 (see *Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, page 197), but it met with no encouragement then.

The author estimates roughly the whole Turkish race in the world at 51½ millions. Of these, 12½ belong to Turkey, 28 to Russia, 5 to Persia, 3½ to China, 1½ to Afghanistan, and 1 to the Balkan countries. He tries to show how from the Ottoman Turkish language, adulterated as it is with Persian and Arabic, a purified tongue may be evolved which would be understood by, and would serve to unite, these scattered fragments.

The Turkish race—by which he means the groups using the Turkish tongue—is to-day, next to the Jews, the most widely dispersed race in the world. From Mongolia to the Danube, from Siberia to Tibet and to southern Persia, and from the Volga to Syria dwell people of that race, some fifty millions of them, mostly one in tongue, religion, and tradition. Any important work published in Stamboul is read by educated persons in Fergana, Baku, Tashkent, and Kashgar; and *vice versa*: but there are great differences in the spoken dialects. Our author lays stress

on the need of one common language, spoken and written, for all Turks; and the basis for this should be the most developed and refined of all the dialects, the Western Turkish of Stambul, purified from foreign words.

On the first page of his book are the following words in Mustafa Kemal Pasha's own handwriting:

"The tie between national sentiment and language is very strong. A rich national language has great influence on the development of national feeling. The Turkish tongue is one of the richest of all; it only needs to be wisely used. The Turkish nation, which has known how to establish its government and its high independence, must free its tongue from the yoke of foreign words."

The book opens with a scholarly review of the development of some of the most civilized languages—Latin, Arabic, German, French—and then cites the examples of the Czechs and Finns, two nations which, after centuries of oppression under foreign rule, built up their national languages and regained independence as a result of the World War.

The example of the Finns is particularly striking. Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century Finland was a province of Sweden and the inhabitants were simple villagers. The only books in the Finnish language were the Bible and certain religious works which had been translated. The Swedes opposed harshly all attempts to develop Finnish sentiment and culture. In 1809 the country was annexed by Russia and the Russians, anxious to efface Swedish influence, showed themselves at first more tolerant of Finnish education, though Swedish continued to be the language used in the schools and in the lawcourts. Gradually there came a movement for the use of Finnish in schools and courts, and in 1828 a course of Finnish language and popular literature was opened in the University of Helsingfors. Then one Elias Lönnrot began to make a serious study of the language spoken in the country districts of Finland. He went to live among the villagers and took note of all the sayings and stories he heard from them, and presently he stumbled upon an unexpected treasure. He discovered that the fragments of fairy tales and folklore which he came across in various parts in various forms pieced together and made up a whole. Lönnrot saw take shape before him a complete national epic telling of historic deeds in a long distant past. He understood that the Finns had been long ago a great renowned nation. He put together these fragments, words and phrases repeated and only half understood by the people of the countryside, and in 1835 he published the national epic "Kalevala."

Max Müller had a very high opinion of this work as in no way inferior to the *Iliad*; he said it should rank with the *Iliad*, the *Mahabharata*, the *Shahnameh*, and the *Nibelungenlied*. It had an immense influence among the Finns. Every Finn who read it felt that he belonged to a nation which had been in the old days great, renowned, and independent. The rapid growth of national feeling alarmed the Russians, and in 1850 they forbade the publication in Finnish of any but religious books. But a few years later they were obliged to cancel this prohibition, and in 1872 a Finnish theatre was founded for the production of Finnish plays. The Finnish writers are first and last nationalists; they use the language of the people and take their subjects from the life of the people. The tongue is built up from Finnish roots. More than other people they avoid foreign words. They have invented their own words for even such things as telephones. In 1919 a Commission was formed to invent military technical terms exclusively from Finnish roots. One of its members wrote to our author: "We find no difficulty in this task. Our tongue is rich in roots and suffixes, but not so rich as the Turkish. It would be easier to create scientific terms in Turkish, for that language has a very rich vocabulary, and the formation of new words by means of suffixes is part of the genius of the language."

Now if national sentiment can be fostered so successfully in a small country like Finland, why should not a similar result be attained by the unification of Turkish dialects?

Turkish, like Finnish, belongs to the group of Turanian languages called Ural-Altai. Our author enumerates some fifteen dialects of Turkish and shows by examples of popular songs in several of them how closely related they are. The differences are less than between French and Italian or Spanish and between Russian and Serbian, Czech or Polish. The pilgrims of different Turkish groups who passed through Stambul had no need of interpreters there. A traveller knowing only the Turkish of Stambul could pass from the Bulgarian frontier to the Eastern border of Chinese Turkistan without difficulty in making himself understood. The author himself travelled in Turkistan and the Kirghiz steppes among Oezbeks, Turcomans, Karakalpaks, and Kirghiz and made speeches in the dialect of Kazan, which were readily understood, not only by educated people, but by all. He mentions a talk he had at Ashkabad with a six-year-old Turcoman boy named Aydoghdu, who understood all his questions and gave replies.

Sadri Maksudi holds that of all Turkish dialects that spoken in Western Turkey is the most developed, the richest and the most musical.

Those who have heard it spoken by Turkish ladies will agree with him. He quotes Max Müller: "The grammar of the Turkish language is so regular, so perfect that it might be thought to have been framed by a body of professors."

Then what need is there for any change? The answer given is this. After the Turks came into touch with the Moslem world they made a great mistake. They changed and spoiled their own language by introducing Persian and Arabic words and phraseology. Their poets were steeped in Persian, their religious dignitaries in Arabic literature. The tendency to discard Turkish words and to use Persian and Arabic became especially marked between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The poets who wrote for the court thought it a sign of learning and refinement to copy the great Persian poets, and Turkish diction came to be considered vulgar. Legal and scientific terms were taken wholesale from Arabic. In the old Turkish civil code, "Mejelleh," almost the only Turkish words used are auxiliary verbs and conjunctions.

This invasion of foreign words was in no way due to the domination of foreign conquerors, such as led to the use of Arabic in Iran and of Norman French in England. The author describes how French words made their way into the language of the English people after the Norman conquest and by the thirteenth century had been digested and anglicized. The Arabic and Persian words have not been digested in Turkish; they may be compared with the French jargon, which became the fashion in the small German courts in what was known as the "alamodische Zeit." The great German writers of the eighteenth century set themselves to purify the language, and the manner in which they achieved this end and invented purely native technical terms for every branch of science may well serve as a guide for Turkey to-day. She also should concentrate on ridding herself of foreign words.

Sadri Maksudi lays down four rules for the systematic formation of a national civilized language:

1. To fix the spelling in accordance with the spirit of the language, so as to reproduce all its sounds and music and peculiarities. For this either a new alphabet must be created or an existing alphabet must be adapted.
2. To collect all the words and roots of words in the national tongue, arrange them and decide how they are to be written. This means a dictionary.
3. To fix rules of grammar, syntax, and prosody.
4. To form scientific and other technical terms from native roots.

The adoption of the Latin alphabet with the modifications required to reproduce Turkish sounds has settled the question of spelling. For instance, the English "j" sound is represented by the letter "c," and the sound of "ch" in church by "c" with a cedilla.

To write a Turkish dictionary demands a knowledge of all important dialects, old and new. The true original meaning of a word must be determined after considering its various uses in the various dialects. A knowledge of the languages of neighbouring foreign nations which may have had an influence on Turkish is necessary to distinguish foreign words which have crept in. Folklore and the spoken language of the people must be studied. Further requirements are scientific knowledge of phonetics and of the morphology of language, and, above all, a general wide education and a thorough mastery of art and science. For it must not be forgotten that naming things is a matter for experts. To give names in the vegetable world demands a thorough knowledge of botany, and only a zoologist can choose names for animals. The making of a dictionary is therefore work not for a single individual, however gifted, but for a body of specialists. Sadri Maksudi would send a number of carefully selected enthusiasts to rummage Anatolia for words, purely Turkish words. Each delegate should have a district assigned to him, and should collect the words used by the people in that district which are not in general use elsewhere in Turkey. Anatolia would be divided into twelve or more districts. The work might be done in a year or so. The words collected would then be sifted and classified and added to the vocabulary for the preparation of a dictionary. In addition, recourse should be had to old inscriptions and literature for words for which no suitable equivalent is found. "Every forgotten Turkish word is a possession which the Turks have lost." A tentative list is given of words from the Orkhon inscription and from pre-Islamic literature, which might be incorporated in the dictionary. Modern dialects outside Turkey should also be drawn upon, especially for botanical, zoological, and geographical names.

Turkish grammar fully deserves Max Müller's praise. It has no room for the tiresome rules and exceptions of Latin :

" Many nouns in *is* we find
To the masculine assigned."

Nor has the student to cope with the irregularities of declension or conjugation. All is simple and uniform. The weak point is the syntax. There are no relative pronouns. They are replaced by a peculiar use of

participles. "The man who does something" is translated "Something doing man"; "The thing which the man did" is translated "Of the man his having done thing." This participle construction is used to frame immensely long, complicated sentences of dependent clauses tied up together and governed by the principal verb which comes at the end.

On the other hand, a very simple formation of words is provided by the agglutinative system of the language. Regular suffixes are used to form verbs and adjectives from nouns, and to make a verb transitive, causal, reflexive, passive, potential or negative.

One of the author's suggestions for the formation of a purely Turkish set of words may be given as an example.

To replace the Arabic word "medeniyet" (civilization) he proposes to take the old Turkish word "kent," which meant "city," and is found in the names of towns in Central Asia, Tashkent, Yarkand, Samarcand; to this word he adds the adjectival suffix "li"; "kentli" would mean "civilized," "kentlilik" would mean "civilization," "kentlileshmek" "to become civilized," "kentlileshdirmek," "to civilize," and so on. One more example:

Take a word used in European philosophy "rationalist." What does this word mean? It means someone who believes in solving problems by reason (ratio). What is ratio? Is there a Turkish word for it? Let us seek. Yes, in old Turkish the word "us" exactly expressed this meaning. Then we must take this word from old Turkish. "Us" will be "reason"; "uscu" will be "rationalist"; "usculuk" will be "rationalism."

By this process once suitable Turkish roots were found the formation of abstract and scientific terms would present no difficulty. But he admits that to invent these is a long business. This task should only be attempted after the publication of the dictionary, and should be entrusted to separate sub-commissions for each branch of science under the direction of a central body.

What possible reason was there, he asks, for the recent adoption of the Arabic word "tayyareh" (meaning "kite") to denote an aeroplane, when it was quite easy to make a good Turkish word from the verb "uçmak," "to fly"?

"Uçar" would be "aeroplane"; "uçarcu," "aviator"; "uçarculuk," "aviation." The Arabic word is an insult to Turkish nationalism.

The language inherited from the Osmanli period will not do for the national democratic Turkey of to-day. The Ottoman Empire, com-

posed of various elements bound together only by political subjection to the Sultan, could put up with such a jargon, for it was itself a mixture of races and religions: Turks, Albanians, Circassians, Kurds, Arabs, Bulgars, Greeks, Jews, Armenians. The word "Turk" was an insult and never used. The greatest of all the Grand Vizirs were Albanians; of forty-nine Grand Vizirs between 1453 and 1623 only five were Turks.

All this is changed. In the Republic 93 per cent. of the population are said to be Turks. The new word "Türklük" has a great vogue, and a new pride is being fostered in the name of Turk.

Sadri Maksudi's appeal has already found response from the Angora Government. Since his book appeared at the end of 1930 a Language Commission called Dil Kurultay has been formed and held its first sitting in the Palace of Dolma Baghcheh at Constantinople towards the end of 1932.

A very daring step has been taken in substituting a purely Turkish call to prayer for the time-honoured Arabic "Allahu Akbar." The very name Allah, used throughout Islam from the time of Mohammed, is replaced by the old Turkish word "Tanrı"; and the whole formula is now chanted by the muezzins from the minarets in Turkish. This innovation might be expected to produce on the orthodox Moslem much the same effect as one of Oliver Cromwell's prayers would on an Anglo-Catholic. Small wonder that it stirred even the submissive Turks to protest at Brusa. But the reactionaries were sternly repressed.

The idea underlying the Ghazi's policy is to free the new Turkey from all trammels of Orientalism and to set her on the road to Western civilization. A national tongue, which would be at the same time an instrument for literature and understood of the people outside as well as inside Turkey, would immensely strengthen her influence and prestige. Sadri Maksudi hints that a counterpolicy, that of keeping the different Turkish groups in Russia apart by encouraging linguistic divergence, has been adopted by the Bolsheviks.

DAR-UL-ULUM-I-ISLAMIA, SARHAD

IN two recent lectures delivered before the Society reference has been made to the Peshawar Islamia College* (Dar-ul-Ulum-i-Islamia, Sarhad), and perhaps a brief account of the history of this interesting institution will not be out of place in the Society's journal. For there is no other college in India with such a romantic setting, situated as it is but six miles from the Afridi foothills, close to the entrance to the historic Khyber Pass. It stands on the British Indian border as an outpost of civilization and culture. The brown clock tower, the white domes and minarets of the college mosque, standing back from the Peshawar-Khyber road in their almost sylvan setting, are familiar landmarks to many military officers and frontier officials. The surrounding country is parched and arid, but within the college grounds a great change has been effected. Well-planned irrigation has brought about a metamorphosis in an erstwhile desert. To-day there is a veritable oasis—250 acres of green lawns and playing-fields, orchards and gardens, trees and flowers. Here is a transformation indeed, symbolic of the change which is inevitably creeping over a wild and turbulent people!

There is strong archæological evidence that the site of the college was once a centre of Buddhist learning and culture. It is concluded that a Buddhist monastery flourished here about 200 A.D. in the days of the Kushana dynasty. It is possible that Buddhist monks studied here during the reign of the great King Kanishka—himself a Buddhist convert—who ruled over vast domains from his ancient capital of Purushpura, the modern Peshawar, and whose name was later to become famous in Buddhist legends of far-away China and Tibet. Two excavated mounds are still to be seen in the college grounds. When opened some years ago they revealed evidence of ancient stupas and temple ruins. Stone carvings and other Buddhist antiquities were removed and to-day repose in archæological museums. One or two relics are kept in the Principal's bungalow.

Such is the romance of the Islamia College. The staff, however,

* "The North-West Frontier Province under the New Constitution," by J. Coatman, Vol. XVII., p. 342; and "Problems of Law and Order under a Responsible Government in the North-West Frontier Province," by Sir William Barton, Vol. XIX., January, 1932.

have perforce to put up with much that is uncomfortable. At night they are cut off from the amenities and attractions of a garrisoned town. As the sun dips "behind the Afghan hills afar," the iron gates in Peshawar's barbed-wire perimeter are shut by British sentries, and thereafter no one is allowed in or out. The road leading from the cantonment to the college becomes the haunt of prowling jackals, and maybe through the college environs occasional Afridi raiders, under shelter of night, are making homeward after the foray. Though there have been raids all round the college, no raid has ever been made on the Islamia College itself. It survived the Afghan War of 1919 and the Afridi operations of 1930. One hot afternoon in June, 1930, less than three miles from the college, British and Indian troops were in action against Afridi tribesmen, but after the engagement not one of the latter entered the college compound. Thirty armed *chowkidars* provide the only defence. Apart from this the college is protected by an invisible wall, a wall of sentiment. The Khyber Afridis hold it sacrosanct and would regard an attack on a Mussulman college as sacrilege.

The college was opened in 1913, and in opening the Rooskeppel Hall—the main college hall—Sir Harcourt Butler, then Education Member of the Government of India, uttered memorable words. He visualized a great and glorious future for the infant college and foresaw it as a strong and healthy growth, developing in the fullness of time into a university and reviving the glory that was once Cordova's.

Its foundation was due to the recognition of the educational needs of the Mahommedans of the North-West Frontier Province by the leading Mahommedan gentlemen in the province, who were successful in awakening great enthusiasm for modern education. Prominent in this movement were Sir George Rooskeppel, at that time Chief Commissioner of the Province, and Nawab Sahibzada Sir Abdul Qaiyum, then Political Agent in the Khyber. Their names will long be remembered. In fact, the development of the college owes its success in no small measure to these two vigorous personalities. The first principal was Mr. Llywelyn Tipping, M.A., of the Indian Educational Service. A sum of Rs.15 lakhs was subscribed at the outset, and with the help of liberal grants from Government the college, with an attached collegiate school and Oriental and science faculties, was started. The Oriental department administers a library rich in rare and valuable literary gems. The college is not confined to Mahommedan students (as its name would imply), but opens its portals wide to Hindu and Sikh students, who occupy one of the spacious college hostels.

The college, which is entirely residential, and as such has its own shops and ~~br~~er, workshops, post and telegraph office, electric power plant and water supply, and even its own railway station on the Peshawar-Khyber section of the North-Western Railway, is affiliated to the Punjab University, and prepares candidates for the arts and science degrees of this university, including honours courses and post-graduate work.

In practice, full administrative, executive, and financial authority over the institution is vested in the Council of Management, a small committee consisting of about eight prominent Mahomedan gentlemen in the province, together with the heads of various Government departments. The president is H.H. the Mehtar of Chitral, and the indefatigable honorary secretary since the inception of the college has been Nawab Sahibzada Sir Abdul Qaiyum. The Governor of the Province is ex-officio patron of the institution and has the right of veto. From time to time he may suggest for the consideration of the controlling body any measure which he may consider advantageous to the institution.

To-day the number of students in the college is in the vicinity of 350. They hail not only from the administered territory, but also from the transborder tracts—from the Malakand, Khyber, Kurram agencies. These young Pathans and their co-religionists from over the border—Mohmands, Afridis, Turis, Mahsuds, and Wazirs—are carrying back to their villages and tribes the civilizing influence of culture and education. They are to be found in every walk of life—as soldiers, civil servants, lawyers, teachers, doctors, and scientists. They will be the future administrators of the province. Among the college alumni are the future rulers of the states of Chitral and Swat. Slowly, but surely, therefore, enlightenment and learning are spreading into the remote valleys and passes of these rugged frontier hills, from Chitral to Baluchistan.

Western education has not been without its repercussions in the realm of politics. The young Pathans have taken to politics with no less avidity and enthusiasm than their Indian brethren farther south. After quitting the classroom for the world, these young men eventually found themselves leaders in the struggle for equal recognition with other provinces. They were not blind and indifferent to what was going on in other provinces. They saw the rest of India, from 1911 onwards, advancing through fertile fields of reform, while their own province was constitutionally kept at a standstill. Their *amour propre* was in-

jured. The sense of wounded self-esteem quickened the political consciousness. From platform and press, for wellnigh two decades prior to 1930, they led the agitation for recognition in their demands for reforms. And it must not be forgotten that the weapons they employed were constitutional and dignified, never violent. The winter of 1929-1930, however, saw other forces in process of being let loose. The movement had spread to the illiterate masses. Reasoned appeal gave way to mob passion and licence. The constitutional agitation of the urban intelligentsia had yielded place to the uglier methods of the rural population, which were fanned by agrarian and economic discontent. Keen observers had foreseen this development. The political upheaval of 1930 was but the fever rash of a patient suffering from an organic disease—a chronic condition of political inferiority. The medicine of reforms was administered in 1932, and it has gone a long way in restoring the patient to normal.

In the college the Pathan's better qualities come to the surface. Above all else he is a man fond of outdoor activities, excelling, perhaps, more on the playing-fields than in the lecture-rooms. Nevertheless, he is none the worse for that. His sense of humour, his manly bearing, his embarrassing hospitality, in many ways, make him an excellent student to deal with. Edmund Candler, discussing the question of educating the Pathan, says that "the state of mind of a Mahsud B.A. is unthinkable, whether he returns to eat his heart out in his village, scorned and scornful, or remains to drive a degenerate quill in a Government office."* Be that as it may, it is interesting to observe that the first Mahsud matriculate to enrol in the college became one of the best centre half-backs the college soccer eleven has ever had, and while still a college student met his death in Waziristan as the result of a blood feud. The story of the young Afridi student who claimed exemption from appearance at one of the college terminal examinations on the grounds that he was engaged in inter-tribal hostilities is well known on the frontier and is quoted, in part, by Edward Cadogan in his recent book.† The Pathan, particularly the transborder product, still possesses that inherent manliness, self-reliance, respect for his elders, and loyalty to tradition. Education, if it is of the right sort, will not spoil him. He has no real love for driving a "degenerate quill"; he is always after jobs in the army, police, or political department.

Serious disciplinary cases are rare: a remarkable fact when one bears

* *On the Edge of the World*, by Edmund Candler, p. 151.

† *The India we Saw*, by Hon. Edward Cadogan, C.B., M.P., p. 184.

in mind the Afghan temperament and its possibilities. Inside the college walls party feelings and feuds are kept under control, for the young Pathan is beginning to learn the value of co-operation and *esprit de corps*. In the students' union he is acquiring the art of expression and equipping himself for the legislatures and public affairs, for which, with his democratic instincts, he is well fitted. His sound, practical common sense came to the fore during those critical years of 1930-1931, when the writer was officiating principal of the college. On all sides there was provocation—hartals, riots, boycotts, military operations. The Red Shirt movement was at its height; there was intense political agitation in the neighbouring villages; the Afridis were troublesome. Yet throughout this turmoil there were no unedifying examples of mob psychology. There was no picketing, there were no strikes, which became so ugly a feature in other parts of India. The college remained open and classes were conducted as usual. It is true that there were exciting moments. One or two students did attempt to create trouble—one of them was a nephew of the Red Shirt leader himself—but prompt and vigorous action on the part of the authorities relieved the tension. The students were made to realize the significance and tremendous import of the changes taking place in their country's constitutional history, and they rose to the occasion. Although never losing interest in politics, yet, with commendable and praiseworthy effort, they put their studies first.

What of the future? Mention has already been made of the fact that the Islamia College is affiliated to the Punjab University. During the past decade, however, ample and unmistakable signs have been accumulating that the university, in several respects, has signally failed to satisfy the growing educational needs of the province. Whereas the population of the province is predominantly Muslim, the various governing bodies of the university are predominantly Hindu in character and composition. There are only two frontier representatives on the whole senate. Small wonder, therefore, that there is a justifiable spirit of discontent among the educated people of the frontier. The prime function of the university appears to be that of a huge examining body, inherently cumbersome and unwieldy in its *modus operandi*. This academic Colossus stalks over the Indus, striking terror into the hearts of frontier students. Such a system, based on the principle that examinations are the alpha and omega of all education, has many evils and shortcomings. Not only does it encourage cramming, but kills all initiative and independent thought.

There exists a strong movement in the province in favour of breaking away from the Lahore caucus and setting up a frontier university. Its establishment would merely be the logical consequence of, and natural corollary to, the recently enhanced status of the province. The writer is not one of those who pin their faith to a plethora of universities turning out their hundreds of disillusioned graduates year after year. The educational structure is already top-heavy, and so much has been written and published *ad nauseam* on the subject that it ill-befits him to make any further contribution. But he does feel that on historical, geographical, and ethnological grounds there is a genuine case for the creation of a new and independent frontier university. Sooner or later it must come. Not until then will the demands of the frontier intelligentsia be completely satisfied. Now that the province is a governor's province, the complement of a provincial university will go a long way to establish a strong and well-contented frontier—assuredly one of the best guarantees of peace on India's north-western border. But before the Act incorporating the frontier university is placed on the Statute Book there will be much work to do. There is plenty of talk but little real preparation. Few public men realize that here will be a glorious opportunity to avoid the beaten track and strike new paths. Those entrusted with the important task of fashioning the educational policy of the frontier should essay in all sincerity to avoid making the university courses too academic, too bookish. While paying proper attention to the true functions of a university, they would do well to study the educational policy followed in those parts of tropical Africa administered by the Colonial Office. Here the existing policy aims at providing an education that is

“adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations, and traditions of the various peoples, conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy elements in the fabric of their social life. . . . Its aim should be to render the individual more efficient in his condition of life . . . and to promote the advancement of the community as a whole through the improvement of agriculture, the development of indigenous industries, the improvement of health, the training of people in the management of their own affairs, and the inculcation of true ideals of citizenship and service. It must include the raising up of capable, trustworthy, public-spirited leaders.”*

The Islami College with its fine site and extensive grounds removed five miles from the temptations and distractions of a big city would be

* Parliamentary Paper Cmd. 2374 of 1925.

the obvious nucleus of such a university—a nucleus, moreover, capable of healthy growth and development. Since, however, the dominant factor in the North-West Frontier Province is poverty, the new university will have to depend heavily on the Imperial Exchequer for revenue. But in return the Government should demand and insist on a greater control in its administration. It should see to it that the authorities responsible for the direction of education are large-hearted men deeply imbued with the real spirit and wider conception of education. The Government and the public will then be assured of a supply of graduates well equipped with ideals of devotion to public spirit and a high standard of personal and moral conduct which will prove the backbone of the province in its future development. Who knows but that punitive expeditions and the bombing of recalcitrant and refractory tribesmen will then be things of the past? These are the ideals inspiring the small but enthusiastic band of educationists on the frontier to further and sustained effort.

W. R. J.

THE NEED OF DEVELOPING WATER SUPPLIES IN PALESTINE (1933)

It is a most extraordinary fact that very few people have the power to see political problems through a mind not unbalanced by prejudice and dogmatism. This article is an attempt to give briefly, without bias, some observations regarding the political and economic position in the Holy Land. It goes so far as to venture to predict the probable effects of true impartiality between Palestinian Jew and Arab.

We presume that anyone interested in this fascinating country is in possession of the main facts as to the population, size, and type of climate. Roughly the size of Wales, a local population of about 850,000 Arabs, including a small but financially powerful Christian minority, are still bitterly opposed to the Mandate which provides for an ever increasing immigration of Jews in addition to the 300,000—roughly—already in the country. The various High Commissioners have tackled the many problems in different ways, thereby giving rise to a feeling that the Administration has not any definite policy. Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner, appeared to believe in the possibility of co-operation between Arab and Jew. Lord Plumer appeared to believe that the first duty of an Administrator was to rule justly. Sir John Chancellor undoubtedly tried to be fair to Arab and Jew, with the result that he was compelled to "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds." The present High Commissioner believes in development, and appears to see a solution to most problems in general economic improvement.

It is said that International Jewry has placed over £45,000,000 into Palestine, but much of this capital has been spent on salaries, expensive drainage systems, education, hospitals, and machinery unsuited to the country and uneconomic in employment. A number of Jewish writers, the Committee of Jewish experts, and others have criticized the methods employed in the expenditure of their funds. It is difficult to see the real wealth behind the apparent prosperity of Tel Aviv or Haifa. However, a sum such as that mentioned above coming in to the country against an invisible export of "gratitude" is bound to lend an appearance of temporary prosperity.

The Arab peasant, on the other hand, is, more or less, self-supporting, but only just above the starvation line. The large landowner (Arab), who is often merchant and moneylender as well, is an important factor in the political and economic situation.

The Holy Land exports about one-fourth the amount it imports, an unhealthy sign. Palestine is potentially a rich country, *given more water*, and if Jewish immigration is to continue without further bloodshed the subterranean supplies which are known to exist must be exploited. The *Financial News* of February 27 of this year published a special supplement on Palestine, and pointed out that its geographical position, and British government, produced a field for investment safer and with better prospects than many better known countries. Co-operation between the British and either of the other two communities is possible and should be profitable, and it would appear that the Arab community is by no means ignorant of the value of co-operation; indeed, ironically enough, he is being taught co-operative methods by the Jew.

In the past the Arab has adopted as his last word in any argument the dagger or the bullet, but underlying the political situation is the economic position of the peasantry. The future depends upon the Government's attitude towards water.

NEW ROADS OPENED IN NORTH PERSIA

Teheran-Chalouss Road

THIS route, though not officially open, is now passable for passenger cars. The idea in building it was to shorten the time of transit from Teheran to the Caspian Sea. Before this road was made it took eleven to twelve hours to reach the Caspian at Pehlevi (formerly Enzeli), via Kazvin and Resht. By the Chalouss road the Caspian is reached at Deh Noh in six to seven hours. The distance from Teheran to Deh Noh is approximately 125 miles. At present the road has no commercial value, and it is very doubtful if it ever will have very much. It does, however, give the people of Teheran an opportunity of spending week-ends by the sea, which was impossible before. The turnings in the passes are very sharp, and the road too narrow to be easily negotiated by lorries. The present scheme is to build a port at the terminus of the road at Deh Noh. This is going to be a very difficult and expensive task. Unless large breakwaters are built, no steamers could possibly land at Deh Noh in rough weather. Orders have been given to hasten the construction of the port. In view of the Persian Government's determination to maintain a strict boycott of all trade with Russia, the reason for this haste is not apparent.

At Deh Noh the new road joins the existing coast road from Resht to Babol (formerly Barfrush). Regarding this latter route, the large concrete bridge over the Safid Rood, 20 miles east of Resht, collapsed last year, and is now being replaced by an iron bridge, which should be completed by September. All the ironwork has been imported from the firm Skodawerke of Prague, and the bridge is being constructed by their engineers.

Resht-Massouleh-Tabriz Road

Work was started on this road last June, and it has been completed for a distance of forty-eight miles west of Resht, and a mile short of Massouleh. From this point the road will go through the Khalkhal district, following more or less the Kizil Uzun River to Mianeh. From Mianeh to Tabriz the existing main road will be used to Tabriz, and

it is proposed to build a new road from Mianeh, almost due west, via Miandohab and Soujboulak to the 'Iraq frontier at Rowanduz. The idea is to provide an exit for the products of the provinces of the Caspian littoral, either via Trebizond or Rowanduz, independent of transit through Russia.

Incidentally, at present the cost of transport by either of these routes is absolutely prohibitive.

THE FRANCO-MUSLIM POSITION

With Special Reference to the North African Dependencies

By MICHAEL PYM*

THAT a state of increasing tension exists between the French and the Muslims in North Africa is not entirely a new fact. That news of riots and disturbances in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco should strike the French people themselves, and the outside world, with some astonishment is not very surprising either, in view of the close censorship exercised by the authorities in these places and the consequent difficulties in the way of obtaining accurate information.

The situation and the policies which have made it inevitable are of some importance to the world outside of France itself. Islam is a great international organization, and however loose it may be, or however differing in development in various parts of the world, still nothing affecting Muslims deeply in any one country is ignored by the rest of the Islamic world, so that events in one place may affect far distant areas. One may, for instance, trace the recent outbreaks against Christian missionaries in Egypt directly to the exacerbation caused by the French in their part of Africa.

The French hold their North African possessions under three different types of sovereignty. Algeria, theirs by right of conquest and their first foothold in North Africa, is now an integral part of the mother country, being divided into three departments, each represented by a deputy in the French Parliament. Of recent years some attempt has been made to decentralize the government a little more, and to this extent it differs from the ordinary French province.

Tunisia may, for want of better distinction, be termed a direct Protectorate. That is to say, its Treaty of Protectorate with France is untrammelled by any international complications. It has been a Protectorate since 1840 when the French, who had long coveted the country, took advantage of an ostensible chase after bandits into Tunisian territory to march upon the capital itself and force the Treaty upon the then Bey.

Morocco has an almost unique standing. There the Franco-Moroc-

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can Treaty of 1912 is limited by the fact that it did not abrogate the Pact of Algeciras. Certain special rights are still retained by various Powers in virtue of this Pact. The most extensive are those of America, which has consistently refused to recognize either the French or Spanish Protectorates or the international status of Tangier.

Among Muslim countries, too, Morocco holds a special position. Among its numerous shrines and sacred places are two of the holiest cities in Islam—namely, Fez and Mulai Idris. The Kairouine mosque, university, and library has been famous for centuries. From its people have sprung glorious dynasties which extended their rule to Spain, and were patrons of philosophy, art, music, and science. When Islamic power was broken in Spain the Christian conquest sent a stream of refugees to Morocco. Muslims, Christians, Jews fled there not only at the actual moment of the taking of Granada, but for many years afterwards. They brought two things to Morocco, the salvage of their own high culture and a well-founded fear and horror of the Church and of European States. Upon this tradition, I think, we may base the so-called fanaticism of the Moroccan people, which was further added to by the various attempts made, on the part of Spain and Portugal, to conquer Morocco for the greater glory of the Cross.

For years before the Protectorates Morocco was the focus of complicated European intrigue which helped to keep Chancelleries in an uproar. Among themselves Powers swapped "rights" in an independent sovereign State for "rights" in other parts of North Africa. England swapped "rights" in Morocco for French "rights" in Egypt. Italy swapped her "rights" for "rights" in Tripoli, and so on. Spain's vague "sphere of influence" had existed as far as Fez. France, pointing out that so far it had made all the "sacrifices of rights," induced Spain to consent to a delimitation much further back toward the northern coast. Germany, practically ignored, became more and more infuriated, and more and more certain of a French plot to restrict its "place in the sun."

Followed the usual intrigues to gain a financial stranglehold on the country. These need not be detailed, since they are always much the same—somehow the ruler is assisted in his various extravagances, induced to believe either that he wants this or that or that it is good policy to keep this or that country happy by useless purchases from it. The exact method differs slightly—according to the country, of course. A native ruler may be induced to buy golden dentist's chairs or what-not. A South American Republic, such as Nicaragua, is induced to

accept a loan for an electric railway which it neither needs nor desires.

France was the most successful in all these intrigues. The first great step toward intervention was provided by the Moroccan Loan of 1904, whose story, too long to relate here, is perfectly typical. Among other things the terms of the loan secured to France the sole right to make future financial advances to Morocco, and part of it was used to repay loans from other countries. This elicited the violent protests from Germany which led to the Algeciras Conference.

The ensuing Pact was a diplomatic victory for France; one of those victories, Caillaux commented at the time, which inevitably lead to armed conflict. As eventually it did, of course. But the Pact did guarantee the sovereign integrity of Morocco, the sanctity of its religion and institutions, the status of various Powers, and so on.

This being accomplished, the next business in hand was to find a pretext for direct intervention. How far France was concerned in the revolt led by Mulai Hafid against his brother Abd el Aziz is one of those things we shall never know until we know what happened between the Glaoui, then one of many Lords of the Atlas, but subsequently the acknowledged supporter of France, and the French authorities when the Glaoui so mysteriously and fortunately wandered, by mistake, into Algeria. From that trip he returned to induce Mulai Hafid to rebellion. Both Moroccans and Germans deny that Germany was behind El Rogui in his revolt from the North. On the eastern side of Morocco the people were kept in a continual uproar by incursions in the country, on the same useful pretext of chasing bandits, by the French. There Lyautey, viewing Morocco, in his letter to E. M. de Vogue may be believed, with "the emotions of the Hebrews in sight of the Promised Land" was, to quote further, "dreaming of penetrating Morocco further and further, sure of my tool and my method." There he had decided, after the Pact of Algeciras, says his biographer Maurois, that it was "necessary and urgent to amend the Algeria-Morocco frontier," and so resolved: "*de pratiquer la politique du vilebrequin, sans faire crier l'Europe.*"

Mulai Hafid, having risen to the throne as leader of a revolt against European influences, showed himself unexpectedly sincere in resisting French efforts to force a Treaty of Protectorate upon him. Debauched as he became after ascending the throne, I do not think it is accurate to say, as certain writers have said, that he was merely bargaining for more money as the price of his country. From all I have been able

to gather talking to people who knew him and were in Morocco during that period—and had no axe to grind—he struggled vainly against the net thrown over him, and, like most Orientals, when he was finally caught made the best bargain he could. The actual circumstances surrounding his signature of the Treaty are extremely obscure, but one thing is certain—the so-called Massacre of Fez, which was wholly directed against the French, was not a purely military revolt, as many French authorities claim. It was provoked by the circumstances of this signature, as reported by palace servants and officials which, as the people heard them, aroused them to a state of complete fury. In the course of the revolt the Mellah was burnt, and the sight of the rising flames brought the outlying tribes down upon Fez hoping for sack and plunder. Lyautey was besieged for some days, until relieved by Gouraud, and the French troops, according to accounts given me by Western eye-witnesses, in turn proceeded to exact a bloody penalty from the unfortunate city.

It is interesting to note that a number of Americans in Fez at the time were all protected by Fassi families.

The Treaty thus obtained outlines as its aim the establishment of a stable native government in Morocco, based upon internal order (the pacification of revolted Berber tribes) and general security, which will permit the introduction of reforms and assure the economic development of the country. Article 1 states that both parties agree to the introduction of a new régime with such military, scholastic, economic, and other reforms as the French Government might consider useful in Morocco. This, however, is qualified by express guarantees and safeguards as to the religious situation of the Sultan, his traditional respect and prestige, the exercise of the religion of Islam, and the position of all religious institutions, especially that of the *habous* (religious endowments).

Article 2 guarantees French support of the dynasty and the actual Sultan. The rest of the Treaty places Moroccan relations with foreigners and Moroccan subjects abroad under French jurisdiction, and does much to emasculate the Sherifian Government, in spite of the first article, which states that the object of the Treaty is the setting up of a "reformed Sherifian Government."

As I said before, the Pact of Algeciras is not abrogated by the Treaty of 1912. Thus economic equality for all foreigners remains assured, as well as certain other rights, mostly in the nature of capitulations. British, French, American, etc., still have the right to "protect" natives under certain conditions, and thus withdraw them from

Sherifian jurisdiction. The British have their own post offices. Americans, since they do not recognize the Treaty, have their consular courts, etc. Lip service is paid to the guaranteed integrity of the Empire by the fact that the Spanish Zone is governed by a nominal "Khalifa" of the Sultan, and a Sherifian representative is also appointed to Tangier.

The French position in Morocco has been ably defined by M. Poincaré in a letter written on April 27, 1912, when he was *Président du Conseil* to the then President of France. Speaking of the "difficult and complex task" before Marshal Lyautey, he says: "Il faut qu'il mette notre protectorat en valeur *en observant nos engagements* vis à vis des Puissances, et en faisant notamment respecter l'égalité économique que la France a promise. Il faut qu'il demeure fidèle à la conception même du Protectorat qui est seule conforme aux traités internationaux et qui est exclusive du gouvernement direct."

It was again outlined by Marshal Lyautey himself, in a speech to the Sultan, Mulai Yusuf, December 17, 1919: "Je tiens à renouveler personnellement à Votre Majesté les assurances formelles qu'elle n'a cessé de recevoir du Gouvernement de la République à l'égard du régime du Protectorat, garanti par les traités fondé sur la souveraineté de Votre Majesté, sur le fonctionnement du Makhzen, sur le maintien des institutions traditionnelles de l'empire Cherifien, sur le respect des populations. C'est dans ce cadre intangible de ses institutions propres que le Maroc assurera le mieux son développement matériel et social . . ." etc., in the best official style.

I have gone into this Treaty situation at great length because it has a very important bearing both upon French colonial policy and upon Franco-Muslim relations. The Moroccans are a virile and intelligent people—perhaps the most intelligent in French North Africa. French intervention in their country coincided with the opening of a new period in Western history which, though it has many unfortunate features, is decidedly marked by a lessening of the ignorant self-complacency which made the raw "imperialism" of the nineteenth century possible. It has also coincided with the stirrings of a renaissance, a reform movement in Islam itself, and the course of events in French North Africa, especially in Morocco, may have a marked influence upon the political direction assumed by this movement. Muslims are not yet anti-Western largely, in my opinion, owing both to their well-grounded dislike of Soviet Russia and also to the esteem felt for Great Britain by her Muslim subjects.

It seems, therefore, worth while devoting the greater part of this article to Moroccan conditions not only because Morocco is the most influential, in the Muslim world, of all the French possessions, and therefore the testing ground of French relations and French policy, but because it is there that the French, guided by the genius of Marshal Lyautey, are supposed to have basically reformed their policy.

In a speech in London, November, 1931, the Marshal dwelt at some length on his opposition to the method of "direct administration" practised in "our other oversea colonies," and stated that to leave the people within the framework of its own traditions and beliefs, its own forms of government, controlling only such actions as might lead to damaging its good relations with the outside world, was the system he himself believed in and had practised.

This system applied to Morocco is, of course, the only one, legally speaking, permissible under the terms of the various treaties, both international, such as the Pact of Algeciras, and, if one may use the term, bi-national, such as the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1912. In the same way, when the Marshal on that occasion spoke of "abandoning the policy of false assimilation," for one of "sympathetic collaboration," he spoke of a policy which, however much he may have approved of it, was, in the last analysis, dictated by necessity, by the Treaties.

Yet, as one studies the Moroccan situation, it becomes perfectly evident that the basic policy of assimilation has not really been abandoned there any more than elsewhere. The policies carried out there are essentially the same as those put into practice in the rest of North Africa, except for certain necessary limitation requiring more diplomacy, or eyewash, to make them possible. And it is on this very question of assimilation that the whole struggle between Muslims and French turns.

In all fairness to the French it must be realized that, given their aims in North Africa, and given their type of national organization, the policy of assimilation would seem to be inevitable for them. The French want North Africa, exactly as the Romans wanted it, as a source of man-power and supplies, especially in time of war. There are but three or four ways of holding peoples together so as to make a fairly united organization. One is by sheer military force. Another is by means of some central point of attraction which they can all follow, to which a common allegiance may be given. Another is by the imposition of a common culture, laws, language tending to bring

all the peoples concerned into general conformity of type. The fourth, and to-day negligible, force of unity is that provided by race.

While, of course, it is very rare to find unity attempted by means of just one of these methods, still the political circumstances of a given people will cause one or the other to be more or less emphasized. Certainly the emphasis so required must affect the colonial policy of such a nation. Thus the British Empire, having a central point of allegiance in the person of the King Emperor, does not, as the basis of its very existence, require conformity of its varying inhabitants. Peoples speaking different languages, obeying different sets of laws, different social usages, all unite in a common loyalty. The very looseness and flexibility of the organization, the individuality of its parts, constitutes its immense strength.

Republican democracies, having no such fixed central point of attraction, must standardize their peoples to a very much greater extent. Otherwise internal dissensions are likely to develop which can only be handled by sheer military force, as the history of the American Civil War has shown. The fact that conformity is sometimes achieved by the creation of a racial myth, or type-figure, as recently in Germany, or some of the newer States of Europe, or, at times, in America, makes no difference. The actual process is one of standardization in certain essential ways, such as language, legal systems, general attitude, and sometimes even appearance.

France is in many ways the most perfect example of this standardization, which is a very important factor in modern nationalism. The amazing unity of the French, their clarity of form, and so on, are by no means natural phenomena, but the result of a very long process which has moulded them into what they are, eliminating provincial variation more than in most countries. The French, moreover, being a clear-minded people, have few racial illusions. They know that a modern democratic nation is created and united not by common origin, but by common culture and language. To hold their colonial possessions by sheer military force would, especially in the case of North Africa, make of them a liability rather than an asset in times of crisis. The French have no central point of attraction, no focus for a common loyalty in the person of a monarch or a religious representative. Therefore they must attempt assimilation; their policy must tend toward cultural unity, the imposition of a common law, language, and type of living.

Islam is the greatest barrier to the Frenchification of North Africa.

As everyone knows, in Islam law and social organization are inseparable from religion, and everything is based upon divine revelation and sanction. It is not, I think, accurate to state, as some French writers do, that this paralyzes the Muslim peoples and makes it impossible for them ever to progress or to adjust themselves to modern attitudes. As Senores Manzanque and Riano point out, in their *Compendio del Derecho Musulman*, dealing with the question in Spanish Morocco, the laws of Islam can be purified, reformed, and adjusted to modern or even local requirements in many ways. There has always been plenty of flexibility and latitude within Islam. But because of its divine origin the Law cannot be fundamentally altered and is binding upon all Muslims. Deliberately to abandon the jurisdiction of Islam is equivalent to giving up one's status as a Muslim.

Even in Algeria the French have never dared force such abandonment upon the natives. They have instead offered them the choice of naturalization as French citizens, or remaining within Muslim jurisdiction, but in tutelage. Algeria has become an integral part of France, but the Algerians who do not wish to abandon their own Law are not French citizens, and thus have less rights in their native land than any naturalized foreigner.

That the Muslim does regard naturalization as equivalent to loss of his standing as a Muslim is clearly shown by recent events in Tunisia. Although Tunisia is a protectorate, the French are trying there to pursue the policy of Frenchification as far as they can. Of recent years an active naturalization campaign has been going on, to which there has been comparatively little response from the Muslims. Just as in Algeria, the French, failing colonists from France, have been naturalizing masses of Italians, Spanish, Maltese, etc., offering them various inducements such as land and jobs, all given, say the Tunisians, at the expense of the latter.

Matters came to a head last April when a couple of naturalized Muslims happened to die and were promptly refused burial in the Muslim cemetery. Seeing what this meant to their campaign, the French tried to force the issue, whereupon the Tunisians organized processions of protest. The French countered with an astonishing display of force and repression, filling Tunis with troops, even bringing up tanks and machine guns from Bizerta, indulging in cavalry charges, mass arrests, and similar exaggerated measures. At Ferryville, about the middle of April, during a similar Muslim demonstration, naval planes swooped over the unarmed crowd and poured

machine-gun fire into them, killing and wounding some fourteen or fifteen, all shot in the back as they fled to shelter.

Decrees issued by M. Lucien Saint, now Resident General of Morocco, and then in Tunis, in January, 1926, had already made something like a legal reign of terror possible. In addition to the very severe censorship established over the Arabic Press by one decree, another provides (Article 4) penalties of from two months to three years, plus a fine of from one hundred to three thousand francs, for anyone guilty of inciting or provoking hatred, contempt, or "deconsideration" (bringing into discredit) of the government, the French administration, or of any French or Tunisian official connected with these by means of writing, words, or actions, *whether public or non-public*.

Public incitement to sedition or violence is, of course, an offence punishable in any civilized country. But under the terms of this harsh decree a Tunisian can be imprisoned for, say, shrugging his shoulders at a policeman, or writing a private letter to a friend in Paris criticizing either the administration, or a particular official's conduct, or his private life. He can be imprisoned for remarking, at his own dinner table, that he thinks So and So, being an official, is a stupid man and not fitted for his position.

Since last May a further decree imposes two years' internment, or restriction of movement, upon any individual guilty of even criticizing the government, or being hostile to it, thus wiping out all opposition. Thus the Liberal Constitutional Party of Tunis, which has been working for a constitution, was immediately and forcibly dissolved, its offices searched and all papers confiscated. Another decree has placed all French language papers under the same strict censorship as the Arabic Press.

An interesting point of this naturalization campaign in Tunisia is whether an alien government has the right, in territory belonging to a technically sovereign State, of recruiting and naturalizing citizens either from among the subjects of the protected, but still sovereign, State, or from among foreigners residing in that State. I can find nothing in the treaty of protectorate to justify this proceeding.

Nevertheless, throughout North Africa naturalization and colonization—the formation of a French *bloc* in each possession—are two essential factors of French colonial policy. The third is the destruction, as far as possible, of Islam.

The French attitude toward Islam is admirably summed up by

M. Sicard, an official attached to the staff of the Sultan of Morocco, in *The Muslim World in French Possessions*. "Islam," he says, "as regards its fundamental genius being a power contrary to our aims, aspirations, and tendencies, which can be appeased and calmed without ever being vanquished, it is evident that, as far as possible, we avoid its spread among our subject peoples." Avoiding the spread of Islam among "our subject peoples" includes, as events in Morocco have shown, stamping it out wherever possible.

After the first ebullitions in Fez, which were severely repressed by the French relief expedition, the Moroccans generally were not entirely averse to the Protectorate. The Treaty reads very well, and seems entirely designed for the benefit of the country. It is, in fact, almost too altruistic to be true. French aims and the French position in Morocco are, however, best expressed by Commandant Marty, one of "Lyautey's young men," and adviser to the Muslim Ministry of Justice, in his book *Maroc du Demain*, pages 219-220, from which I extract the following quotations: "It has been said that we are prisoners of the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1912. We are told that in working for the religious and political exaltation of the Sultan the Protectorate strives for the subjection of the Berbers to their traditional enemy, the Makhzen; that the French are the missionaries of Islam in Morocco; and that our work in Morocco will be crowned by the building of a unified and centralized empire which will one day be turned against us. These considerations and conclusions are wholly inexact. . . . We are not introducing the Makhzen among the Berbers. . . . Politically the name of the Sultan is a screen for our external action, an assistance for our Berber policy . . . nothing more. . . . But religiously the Sultan is the Imam of Morocco, recognized even by the tribes which fight him; they pray in his name even while giving battle to his troops in order to escape his jurisdiction. . . . We must not be duped by words and, in Algiers more than anywhere (referring to criticism from Algiers), we should not take the screen (*pavillon*) for the merchandises it covers. . . ."

The whole book, extremely difficult to procure, especially in Morocco itself, is most enlightening as to the aim of the French in Morocco—which, as we have seen, is by no means expressed by the Treaty. International pacts or no international pacts, treaty or no treaty, the French are in Morocco to keep Morocco as a French possession, and to do that it must be Frenchified along the traditional lines of French policy.

First, by means of colonization, a strong French *bloc* must be created. In order to attract colonists, naturalized foreigners for the most part, as throughout North Africa, land must be allotted at low prices. But every bit of cultivable land has been owned and worked, either for cattle or crops, for centuries. In order to get hold of it, therefore, land reforms must be instituted.

Prior to the Protectorate no foreigner could hold land in Morocco without the express, and rarely granted, permission of the Sultan. The usual procedure adopted by foreigners wishing to acquire land was to find a Moroccan man of straw with whom to be associated. The putative Moroccan "owner" could then, as provided for by treaty, be taken under the protection of the real owner's Consulate, and in this way the acquisition was safeguarded. Nevertheless, all land litigation had to be judged by the Sultan's *kadis*, never in the Consular Courts, the only distinction between foreigners and Moroccans being that the former had the right of appeal to a special council set up by the Sultan for that purpose.

Under the Protectorate, from its inception, the right to purchase land was extended to foreigners, certain safeguards being instituted for "public domain," *habous* (the Egyptian *wafā*), and, during the war, certain enemy property. The French divided the country into "secure" and "insecure zones." In the former land purchase could be effected in the normal manner, that is to say, permission is obtained from the *kadi* to make the necessary declaration before two *adouls*, or Muslim notaries. This declaration is then forwarded by the *kadi* to the local authority, Kaid, Pasha, or whatnot, and in the case of opposition or counterclaim the matter is tried before the *kadi*.

In the "insecure zones" the pre-Protectorate necessity of buying through a native man of straw still held good. On the other hand, in these zones the almost unchecked authority of the military or the officials of the "Bureau des Affaires Indigènes" made it possible for these to exert much more pressure on the native owner.

As they did in Algeria, the French administration in Morocco proceeded first of all to classify the various types of land, which have now been placed under four headings, as follows:

1. *Public Land*, or "*biens domaniaux*."—Before the Protectorate this was always understood to mean Crown lands, the Sultan's private estates. All their revenues went to the Imperial treasury, there being no division between the public and the privy purse. "*Makhzen*," or government land, meant land belonging to the Imperial family, or confiscated by the Sultan from his subjects. There was no such thing

as public land. Unoccupied land not belonging to the Sultan could be used for various purposes, such as putting a road through it, or an irrigation *canal*, by anyone.

2. "*Habous*," or Religious Endowment and Gift.—While this was usually administered by public or private trustees, according to the terms of the gift, the government usually controlled its administration with some strictness because as a general rule, under its terms, the estate was likely to revert to a public institution. However, it must be admitted, such estates were all too habitually considered legitimate pickings, either in the form of direct stealing or by somehow breaking the trust. This tradition does not seem to have been entirely ignored even by the French administration which, having set up a special bureau for the reform of these abuses, arbitrarily allots a proportion of the revenue derived from *habous* to the institutions concerned, and diverts all the rest to the general Budget. This practice has very definitely contributed to the decay of certain great institutions, such as the Kairouine University of Fez, which has not even enough funds to keep its world-famous library in proper order, much less add to it.

3. *Collective Lands*.—This definition would seem to have little or no legal or historic justification in Morocco. It has no basis either in French or Islamic law, but appears to have been created by the Affaires Indigènes and given legal form by M. Milliot sometime during the late war. Its origin, if any, might lie in the fact that the Berber tribes have always been in the habit of setting up neutral zones, where no fighting was allowed. These neutral zones included, on the one hand, the markets and *souks* of the interior, and on the other strips of territory between each tribe. As the French understand it, however, these lands may be either "frontier" or cultivated land, belonging either to the tribe as a whole or divided among certain families, and administered by the *jama'a*—an institution which I found to correspond exactly to the tribal *jirga* of the North-West Frontier—under the direction of an agent of the Affaires Indigènes or of the "Civil Bureau of Collective Lands." Theoretically such lands are inalienable.

Actually they may be, and are, leased to colonists by special permit from the C.B.C.L. for ninety-nine year periods. The procedure adopted is first to "recognize" land as collective, next to issue a decree for their survey and delimitation, and finally to confirm this by another decree.

4. *Private Land*.—The system of holding private land in Morocco has in its elements of both strength and weakness, and might very easily be construed as collective ownership with a little point-aux-vingt.

Islamic law provides for an exact sharing of the patrimony. Each member of the family may demand his or her share separately. In the case of personal estate such sharing usually takes place, but when it comes to land the very intelligent Moroccan has realized for generations that its constant partition and repartition would end in an infinity of small parcels of land all confused and not only highly uneconomic, but also detracting from the strength and power of the family as a whole. It will be remembered that this constant repartition of land is one of the economic problems in certain parts of India.

Therefore, with his strong sense of family and clan organization, the Moroccan tries to avoid dividing the land at any cost, and prefers to hold it jointly. In the case of a female member of the family who might claim her heritage, efforts would be made to induce her to take money, jewels, or cattle instead. The right to claim his or her legal share is never forfeited, however, no matter how long the land may be held jointly, and this is the weakness of the system, since after many generations an inextricable tangle of claims arises.

For purposes of colonization the French system is first to make a survey of the land decided upon. This is usually done with an eye to strategic possibilities, such as the separation of two tribes, holding a point of junction, etc., etc. Armed with survey and plan, Rabat divides the land into lots of about equal value, and a ministerial decree is then issued permitting the deposit of claims against these for a period of three months.

During this period the officials of the *Affaires Indigènes* proceed to negotiate with the original owners of the soil. Unless they are so lucky as to have a European friend or a lawyer the native owners can usually be "induced" to take between 150 and 350 francs a hectare for land really worth between 1,500 and 3,000 francs. With outside assistance they can often get something nearer the true value.

This system worked very well, from the administration point of view, until Europeans came in larger numbers to Morocco, and the natives gained more and more support from them. In 1927, therefore, it was modified by a *dahir*, obtained in December of that year by M. Steeg, then Resident, which decrees that for purposes of colonization land may be expropriated *for the public good*. This *dahir* applies even to land of which the title has been registered under the Land Law of 1914, whereby such registration is stated to ensure permanent and final ownership.

In defence of such a measure it might be said that land owned but

not cultivated can thus be brought into use. But, as I have said, for many centuries all possible land in Morocco has been actively used either for cultivation or for the grazing of the many herds of cattle and flocks of sheep for which Morocco was once so famous. The only uncultivated land is "bad land." Actually very good land, in a high state of cultivation, is often thus confiscated. I saw thousands of acres, the very best the former owner had, thus expropriated by simple decree, and it seemed, in numerous cases, as though the weapon of expropriation was, among other things, used for political purposes to break the power of some great family or tribe. The land so grabbed is not turned over to native owners, but allotted to European colonists, often French only by naturalization. Its dispossessed owners receive perhaps a small indemnity, or are transferred to other and inferior land, in its turn taken from some tribe or individual. Besides these "legal" methods of obtaining land for colonization, there is yet another and very ingenious proceeding. The French have established in Morocco a *Bureau d'Immatriculation Foncière*, or registry of title-deeds. Everyone who knows the East knows the endless litigation and dispute often produced by the tangle of claims and counterclaims to land. A resident in Morocco can, under the French, either retain his title within the *kadi's* jurisdiction or he can register it in the Bureau, and after the usual three months' delay it becomes final and inalienable. During those three months notice of the claim is posted in the Bureau office, in French, of course. Or should the somewhat tardy official gazette be published, it may appear therein.

Your average native peasant or farmer rarely speaks French, and often enough reads but little, if any, Arabic. This being so, the would-be "brave colon," wanting land, enters into negotiations, let us say, with such a native owning, for the sake of illustration, 400 hectares. The "colon" negotiates say for 40 acres and, the price agreed upon, sends for the French surveyor. A survey is duly made—of the entire 400 hectares, to which claim is promptly filed in the Bureau. The native, of course, realizes nothing of all this. At the end of three months the "brave colon" throws the native out, and the entire 400 hectares are his for the price of 40.

Urbain Gohier, the French writer, in his minute study of the situation, quotes just such a case as I have described, and which I have based on my own observation. In the Fez valley, the most fertile region of Morocco, a colonist bought 200 hectares from the members of a certain tribe. He deposited title to 1,700 hectares. In order to

destroy all proof of his usurpation he went so far as to attempt dynamiting all the native dwellings on the land in question. Under British administration, of course, the tribe would instantly have appealed to the nearest British official and our land pirate would have found himself in goal. Under French administration—Urbain Gohier is happy to report that the owners in question were eventually able to associate themselves with a fraction of another tribe under American protection, whereby they also became United States "protégés," and from then on have been safe.

Pages could be filled with instances and descriptions of this land scandal in Morocco and other parts of North Africa; how the payments, small enough to begin with, are stretched out over a period of years in minute sums, and eventually not paid at all. I remember the history of one of Morocco's most famous hotels, built on the site of an old palace with lovely gardens. The original owner died, and left the palace and grounds to the city for the good of the poor. Whereupon the municipality, French controlled as always, was persuaded that the poor would be best benefited by the lease of the whole place to a French hotel company, on condition that it built a hotel there, for the sum of one franc a year, for ninety-nine years.

The net result of this land policy has been, and is, the progressive destruction of the small peasant proprietor and native landholder, who is reduced to misery or wiped out of existence just as in Algeria. He goes to swell a growing class of day labourers, unemployed, semi-criminals, "wandering men" in the already over-populated cities and towns. There, if anywhere, lies the possibility of Communist agitation, a possibility feared by Muslim leaders apparently more than by the French. While I was in Morocco two natives died of starvation at the very gates of Casablanca. One has only to glance at the thin, miserable cattle belonging to the natives to-day and remember that once Morocco produced the finest cattle, leather, and wool on the Mediterranean shores.

As to the colonization itself, it has been admitted by the French themselves to be a complete failure. The colonists have been allowed, where they were not encouraged, to get themselves deeply into debt with over-expensive equipment and buildings and, in my opinion, entirely the wrong kind of farming, especially the over-production of wheat as a more or less single crop. The government has had to come to their rescue with loans, obtained in Paris, for "the development and equipment of Morocco," in order to avoid the scandal of

a general bankruptcy. The excellent, but extravagant, hotel system designed to attract tourists is now also on the rocks. A glance at the loans progressively granted to Morocco tells a vivid story. The sums mentioned are all in francs, of course :

Ante-Protectorate:

1904 : 62,500,000

1910 : 101,124,000

Post-Protectorate:

1914 : 170,250,000

1916 : The above was increased to 242 million.

1920 : 744,000,000

1928 : 819,822,000

1932 : 800,000,000 for the Fez-Oujda Railway.

1932 : 1,650,000,000 (the sum originally required was 3½ billion).

Even allowing for the depreciation of the franc, these loans show a dizzy increase. As far as one can see they represent money thrown down a well. Morocco has very little mineral wealth except phosphates. With the utmost squeezing and taxation of the most oppressive kind the annual Sheriffian Budget cannot be brought, on the revenue side, to more than a billion francs, if that. The annual debt service is over 200 million. It would be very much greater were the interest on the Moroccan Loan of 1904 to be paid as the bondholders, whose case came to the Tangier courts while I was there, argue it should be paid—namely, at the actual rate of exchange between gold *hassani* and French francs instead of at the formerly fixed rate in present depreciated francs. In other words, this loan was secured by a customs lien, further specified not to fall below a minimum sum in gold *hassani*. The gold was to be paid into Tangier and there converted into francs, as the coupons are clipped in Paris. The then rate of exchange was mentioned. Since then the franc has depreciated, whereas the gold *hassani* naturally remains the same. Advantage has been taken of the fact that the then rate of exchange was mentioned to pay the bondholders the same number of francs as they got prior to depreciation—leaving a very large profit for somebody. So far the case has been dismissed in France on the score that France had no jurisdiction where a foreign Power (Morocco) was concerned; dismissed in Morocco on the score that Morocco had no jurisdiction where France is concerned; and, I believe, dismissed in Tangier also on the score of no jurisdiction—two judges being French and one Belgian.

Fifty-six per cent. of the Moroccan Budget goes to pay official salaries, which would seem to leave very little for actual development and so on.

As I said before, taxation is very heavy. Even the beggar who sells a handful of locusts in the market-place has to pay a tax for doing so. Tea, oil, fats, *semoules*—the main ingredient of the standing dish of Morocco, *kus-kus*—are taxed 20 per cent. *ad valorem*. When I was in Fez the courts were filled with natives brought up for non-payment of taxes, and I was told that some 30 per cent. of the Fassis were annually sentenced on this count. Petitions for relief were recently presented by the merchants of both Fez and Marrakesh, alleging the economic crisis, the numbers of failures, inability to pay debts, etc., but these have been rebuffed.

At times ingenious methods of ensuring tax payments are invented by local French officials. At Khemisset, for instance, the collector saw fit to "sequester" tardy taxpayers for fifteen days. In the Hayaina tribal region would-be Benedicts may not marry if they have not paid their taxes, receipts for which must be seen by the *adouls* before the marriage can be celebrated.

In justice to the French people, and to the Home government, it must be admitted that they know very little of the true state of affairs. The tendency, always existing among colonial administrators, to feel that the Home authorities ought to give him a completely free hand, and that they are mostly a nuisance, is very much accentuated in French possessions, where it is felt the less the "Métropole" knows, the better. There is no Arabic Press in Morocco except the subsidized, semi-official Sa'adi. Since the death of Carette Bouvet, who was expelled once or twice by reason of his acute criticisms of official conduct, there has been no independent French Press. Visitors to the country are most carefully shepherded and watched—for instance, when President Doumergue visited Morocco, in the earlier days of the agitation against the Dahir Berbère, members of notable families known to be among the protestants, and who would have had to be presented and might have complained, were quietly arrested and removed elsewhere, many being lodged in goal at Taza. Letters and telegrams are continually intercepted and often never reach their destination when sent by the French post. A special "service de surveillance" now exists for the benefit of foreigners in Morocco, instituted by the military authorities.

Thus it is possible for M. Saint, the Resident General, to make

speeches in Paris, as he did in January, 1933, claiming continued and increasing prosperity for Morocco. In that particular speech he used, as the index and proof of this prosperity, the rising consumption of tea. Tea is a luxury in France. In Morocco, as on the North-West Frontier, it is a daily necessity. Moroccan tea is prepared with green tea, coarse mint, and other herbs designed to produce a soothing or a stimulating effect as required. A glass of hot tea can be had for a very few centimes, and when a man is hungry and has not money for a decent meal, tea stops hunger and helps him to go on. To-day numbers of Moroccans are living almost wholly on tea and bread, hence the rising consumption of the former. The nearest parallel is, I think, to be found in a study of opium consumption in Bihar, published a few years ago by either the *Statesman* or the *Times of India*, in which it was shown that its rise usually accompanied hard times because, failing proper food, opium is cheap and soothes hunger. The same is true of tea or *kif* in North Africa.

Moreover, it is not easy to arrive at a true picture of the financial state of Morocco by studying the official Budget, unless the student has some experience with Budgets. French Budgets are always a trifle confusing, what with supplementary credits and other intricacies of bookkeeping, and in the case of Morocco this confusion is added to by a pleasant habit on the part of various departments of asking for an appropriation for a specific object, such as a dam or a barrage, and, without notice, diverting the sum obtained to entirely different purposes.

But, it may be asked, if Morocco is so hard up, and so much is taken out of the Budget for salaries, debt services, European colonists, and the like, how are the magnificent roads, public buildings, and new cities paid for?

The answer is that most of this work has been financed by loans, not yet repaid. Casablanca, for instance, received fifty million from the 1914 government loan, and has since borrowed another 100 million at long term from the *Crédit Foncier*. In its peak year, 1929, the city revenue was a little over 15 million. Roads have cost comparatively little, since most of the material lay at hand and was just taken, while where labour could not, as in the Atlas, be procured on the *corvée* system, it was, and is, very cheap. It is true that, as official French books claim, Morocco contributes more than other North African possessions to the "Métropole," taking on her Budget many items of service not so included elsewhere, but the constantly increas-

ing loans seem to make this really a matter of bookkeeping. Except that an advantage may lie in thus obtaining a financial stranglehold.

However, none of these things—financial situation, colonization, or land policy—could have stirred the whole of Islam as profoundly and immediately as the "politique Berbère" has done.

The whole Berber policy seems to be compounded of a mixture of ignorance, insincerity, and miscalculation. It has been, I think, inspired by the success of the White Fathers among the Algerian Kabyles, where now whole villages speak nothing but French, and have completely forgotten their native language. Algeria never had the brilliant cultural development of Morocco, and never was completely united under its own dynasties. Its rulers never were both sovereign and Imam of the peoples, as the Sultans of Morocco have been. Consequently the line of division between the various inhabitants of Algeria, Arabs, Kabyles, and, at one time, Turks, was always fairly clear. Even so, the French had to put down terrible revolts, religiously inspired, among both Arabs and Kabyles, so that leading families were often almost exterminated.

When the French came into Morocco on the pretext of clearing up the general disorder then existing, and especially of pacifying the revolted Berber tribes, they found two distinct classes of population, one mainly in the cities and the "plain," mostly the Fez valley, living very much in the orthodox Muslim tradition, following the Malekite school of Sunni thought, and using Arabic. The other mostly in the mountainous regions, living a fairly independent life, using "berber," often most unorthodox as far as strict Sunni practice is concerned, very often regulating their internal affairs according to local customs through their tribal *jama'as* or *jirgas*. To the orderly French mind insistent as it is upon formalism, they seemed to be Muslims only in name. And this "weak hold of Islam," as Marty puts it, seemed, to quote the Commandant once more, "to offer a field and possibilities of action."

"Our interests demand," said Marshal Lyautey, in a circular addressed to his officers, "that we develop the Berbers outside of the framework of Islam."

The first mistake lies, I think, in imagining Morocco to be inhabited by two distinct, sharply divided races, the Arab and the Berber, and in further taking it for granted that the Makhzen, including the dynasty, is Arab, and therefore hated by the subject Berbers. In the first place, if authorities such as Odinet and Montaigne are to be

believed, there is no such thing as a distinct Berber race. The term arises from the generic name "barbarian" given to all North African inhabitants by the Romans. The so-called Berber tribes are of widely varying ethnic origin. Some are, for instance, Jewish. Kbhena, the great Kabyle queen, who for long successfully resisted the Arab conquest, was a Jewess. Some appear to be of fairly ancient Arabic origin, possibly Himyarite, others of more recent Arabic strain. The origin of others, again, is wrapt in mystery. The great Berber ruler, Al Mansur, was perfectly black.

Nor is the so-called Arab population of very pure origin. In Fez, which is the purest centre, the entire Andalou quarter was populated by refugees from Spain, many of whom had already mixed their blood with that of the Visigoth families of Sevilla and elsewhere. Among these refugees, then and later, were a certain number of Christian Spanish, who later became Islamized. A certain amount of rivalry and ill feeling for long existed between the Andalou and the Kairouine quarters of the city. Owing, however, to their somewhat superior culture, Moroccan government officials were more and more drawn from among the Spanish-Moorish refugee families.

During the many centuries in which Arab families have been settled in Morocco alliances have been formed with various Berber families and tribes. Certain much revered *chorfa* families, such as those descending from the Prophet's grandson, Mulai Idris, never allowed their daughters to marry outside the clan, but Berber women are very beautiful and much sought after as brides, and in this way almost every family has its Berber connections on the maternal side.

As regard the Makhzen, there, too, the two groups mingle, for while the officials have so largely been of Spanish-Islamic origin, the ruling dynasties for century upon century have been of predominantly Berber origin, mainly from South Morocco (the mountain) at that. I need only instance the Almoravides, the Almohades—under whose rule Spain produced some of its most brilliant Islamic culture—and the present dynasty which, I believe, originated in Tafilalet, beyond the Atlas, though it claims *chorfa* blood.

The French have chosen to interpret "Berber" revolts as a long struggle against "Arab" domination. In view of the fact that the dynasties have for so long been "Berber," this is really absurd, especially when the term "Arab" is subtly confounded with "Muslim," as the French do confound it. The true parallel is to be found in

Spanish psychology, with its marked individualism leading to a long, and not yet terminated, struggle on the part of the provinces against Madrid, representing centralization and standardization. The proof of this lies in the fact that whenever the Sultan has been weak in Morocco, not only have the Berber tribes thrown off the government yoke, but Fez itself has had something to say, and in the north certain *chorfa* families, especially the Ouazzanis, who are descendants of Mulai Idris and predominantly Arab, have at all times held a position of semi-independence, the latter especially as heads of a vast secret religious confraternity whose influence extends throughout North Africa.

The Berbers have been Islamized since the seventh century, when Mulai Idris, grandson of the Prophet, fleeing alone, except for a servant, from his enemies in Arabia, was taken in and protected by a Berber tribe living on the site of Volubilis, next to what is now the holy city of Mulai Idris where the sovereign-saint lies buried. Muslim missionaries had already penetrated to Morocco, but the Berbers as a whole were first converted and united into a nation by Mulai Idris and his son Mulai Idris II., whose tomb is the centre of the great sanctuary in Fez.

The insincerity of the French lies in their contention that these people, because they are often so ignorant and superstitious, are not true Muslims, or are Muslims in name only. In the same breath (*cf. Maroc du Demain*, pp. 215 on) French writers speak of the difficulties they face because of the religious hostility of the Berber tribes, incited by their marabouts, or mullahs, and of the sincerity of their faith and their pride in their Muslim status. They admit that even while combating the Sultan's troops they "pray in his name, as Imam and religious head," and in the next breath say that mostly they do not pray at all. Yet it is from among these same "mountain" Berbers that many revered saints and religious reformers have sprung. There are few shrines more visited by pilgrims from everywhere than those of Sidi Ibrahim in the High Atlas.

The first step in the development of "la politique Berbère" was taken by Marshal Lyautey himself in 1914, when he induced the then Sultan, Mulai Yusuf, to issue a Dahir rather mildly laying down the principle of "respect for the customs of certain Berber tribes." No special tribe nor any special set of customs was mentioned, nor, in fact, any details. And since throughout the history of Morocco tribal custom, especially in internal matters, had been tacitly permitted, though

not strictly legal, no one thought the matter one of great importance. But it was, in fact, the opening breach. The French immediately proceeded to classify the tribes whose customs were to be "respected," in accordance with their usual passion for "classification." Some of these are quite extraordinary. For instance, the Gerouan tribe, near Meknes, is thus cut in two, one half remaining within Muslim jurisdiction, the other regulated by custom.

It is interesting at this point to compare Spanish action in the matter of legal jurisdiction with the French. In certain parts of the Spanish Zone, especially in the region of Melilla, the former found the Riffs and Berbers, for long cut off from the Sultan's rule, in what the invaders considered a state of anarchy, ruling themselves according to custom. The general effect has been, however, not to do away with Muslim law, but gradually to introduce it while, in the matter of emphasis and penalties, attempting to bring it more into line with modern Western ideas. To-day the Spanish are infinitely more popular than the French throughout Morocco, in spite of the bitter fighting they have had with the natives.

From 1924 onward the French Commission which had prepared the Dahir of 1914 was anxious to push on to the second stage—namely, the complete detachment of the Berbers from Islamic jurisdiction and from the Muslim world. Mulai Yusuf, however, was old enough and still powerful enough to stand in the way. Moreover, mere removal from the Muslim legal system was not all the French intended. The Berbers, according to their policy, must be completely divorced from all contact with Islam, and for this purpose an educational policy had to be devised. As General Bremond said: "To Islamize the mountain Berbers, imposing on them a *kadi* and the Arab tongue, is a mistake. We must teach them French." M. Le Glay, another official, writing in the *Bulletin* of the Department of Public Instruction (*L'Ecole Française chez les Berbers*), puts the policy even more clearly. All religious teaching and the Arab language must be taken out of these schools and the Berber dialects transcribed in Roman letters. "Teach," he says, "the Berbers everything except Arabic and Islam." With this in mind, M. Steeg, M. Saint's predecessor, hastened to create the Normal School of Azrou for the training of teachers in Berber, exclusive both of Arabic and Islam.

Mulai Yusuf died, and the extremely youthful and pliable Sidi Muhammad (it is significant that the Moroccans do not think of him as Mulai) was selected in his place. On May 16, 1930, the famous

Dahir Berbère was at last promulgated. Its gist is entirely to remove the Berber tribes from Muslim jurisdiction.

Some explanation of the Dahir is necessary in order fully to grasp the position. In Morocco the Sultan represents both temporal and religious power. His temporal representatives are the Kaidis, who deal with criminal offences. Article 1 of the Dahir states that in Berber territory "la répression des infractions commises par des sujets marocains qui serait de la compétence des Kaidis dans les autres parties de l'Empire, est de la compétence des chefs des tribus." Article 1 therefore, amounts to temporal abdication by the Sultan, since the only authority remaining outside the tribal *jirga* is that of the French controller, who does not derive his authority from the Sultan.

Religiously the Sultan is represented by the *qadis*, who deal with inheritance, personal status, and so on. Articles 2 and 3 set up a jurisdiction known as *tribunaux coutumiers* for such civil suits, "les tribunaux coutumiers sont également compétents en toute matière du statut personnel et successoral," and thus does away with the *qadis*, a virtual abdication of religious authority.

Article 4 appears to regulate the Compétence des Chefs des Tribus by setting up a *tribunal coutumier* for criminal suits. Article 5 puts on a further check by specifying the appointment of a government notary by the regional authorities to each of these tribunals. Article 6 goes further yet, since it provides that: "les juridictions françaises statuant en matière pénale, suivant les règles qui leurs sont propres, sont compétents pour la répression des crimes commis en pays Berbère quelle que soit la condition de l'auteur du crime."

In other words, the Berbers are removed from Islamic jurisdiction, to be allowed to "develop within their own cadre" according to the general policy I have quoted as being Marshal Lyautey's—subject to the penal clauses of the French Code Civil.

The reason for this is simple, and shows up the complete insincerity of the whole proceeding. There is no such thing as a "loi coutumière" or any form of Berber law. All that exists is an infinitely varied tangle of tribal customs purely local in origin and application and often distinctly retrograde compared with Muslim law. Thus under Muslim law women have right of contract, right of inheritance, rights over their person and property far in advance of anything but the most modern Western laws. Among Berber tribes, such as the *Zemmour* and the *Beni Matir*, women are chattels. They cannot inherit, but as widows actually form part of the inheritance. In other

tribes the *lex talionis* exists in all its ancient savagery, the entire clan of the victim seeking vengeance upon the clan of the aggressor, so that prolonged vendettas and blood feuds are the order of the day. As Professor Louis Massignon pointed out in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France: "Such customs cannot ever be codified and serve as laws for a people."

Infinite possibilities of muddle are created by this Dahir. What, for example, is to happen in the case of an Arab owning property in Berber country going to law about it with a Berber? Both are technically Muslims, one is subject to the Shariat, the other only to custom or the Code Civil. The question is even more complicated where *habous* are concerned.

Again, what is the status of Arab women married to Berbers? One of the important reasons why a Muslim woman cannot marry an unbeliever, though men may do so in certain cases, is precisely that of her civil status. But a Berber is technically a Muslim. A Muslim must obey Muslim law, at least technically. The Dahir removes the Berber from Muslim legal jurisdiction. Then there is the question of contracts between "Berbers" and "Arabs." The law of Islam does not recognize private contracts; they must be witnessed and signed by two Muslim *adouls* (notaries). Now in the case of the Berber tribes all the notaries so far appointed are Algerian Christians.

How, for purposes of the Dahir, can "Berber territory" be justly defined? There is no real demarcation. The usual situation is more or less like that of Fez, a city of predominantly Arabic culture with numbers of tribes surrounding it. The real distinction in Morocco, apart from the *chorfa* families, is, as I have said, between country and townspeople.

Therefore to allege, as French apologists do, that the Dahir is a charter of freedom for oppressed Berbers is nonsense. To say that it does not contravene the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1912, to say nothing of the Pact of Algeciras, guaranteeing the status of the dynasty and the sanctity of religious institutions, etc., is also an untenable assertion in the face of Articles 1 and 2. To say that it does not attack religion, also repeatedly guaranteed, is also inaccurate, to put it mildly, in the face of Islam's basic structure. Finally, to allege that this is part of the policy of developing the natives "within their own cadre" is rather absurd when it is remembered that the Berbers have been Muslims for thirteen centuries.

Gaudefroy-Demonbynes, in his work *L'Œuvre Française en matière*

d'Enseignement au Maroc, referring to the educational aspect of the Berber policy, is perfectly frank: "This policy consists in artificially isolating the Berber from the Arab peoples and attempting to bring them into our sphere." And again, referring to the Franco-Berber schools: "They tend to maintain, as discreetly as possible, the linguistic, social, and religious differences existing between the Islamized plain and the Berber 'mountain' ('qui est,' says the author: 'non moins islamisée'); they try . . . to resist the invasion of the Arab and Islam."

Thus even the Arabic script is forbidden, and Berber must be written in Roman letters. Thus too we find Maître Picard and the Commission for the study of Berber justice deciding that the proceedings of the Berber courts shall be taken down in French. And, following this, the civil controllers of the Taza region decline to accept in their courts any documents written in Arabic. "Au point de vue linguistique," said Marshal Lyautey in the circular from which I have already quoted: "nous devons tendre à passer directement du berber au français."

In pursuance of this policy of "artificial isolation" not only is the teaching of the Koran and of Arabic forbidden inside government schools, but outside. The Chaouch of Midan, for instance, having engaged a *taleb* to teach his son the Koran, was promptly ordered to expel the *taleb* and close the school. In order to keep Muslim missionaries out of the Berber zone passports are required to go from one to the other. Thus a friend of mine in Fez, wishing to attend the marriage of a relative, was obliged to obtain a passport to travel in his own country. Meanwhile Christian missionaries are definitely encouraged, for, as *Maroc Catholique* (November, 1927) says, speaking of Marshal Lyautey's policy: "If he (the Marshal) has essentially held to the installation of the Apostolic Vicarate of Rabat under the direction of a Franciscan bishop, assisted by his brothers in religion, if he favours their schools, it is because he recognizes the important influence these Christian marabouts will exercise over the Muslim, above all on the day when they succeed in making them accept what is the very soul of French civilization—Christianity." De Jurque de la Salle again says, in the *Histoire des Missions* (September, 1927), speaking of French policy: "Christianity will be permitted to work on the Berber soul . . .; this doubtless will facilitate to an important degree the dissolution of the Arab *bloc* and consequently the Islamization of North Africa, to the profit of our race and civilization."

Hence we find Berber chieftains forbidden to build mosques at their own expense, and the people taxed for the construction and maintenance of Christian institutions.

The publication of the 1930 Dahir roused the already questioning Moroccans into a movement of horrified protest. In the cities the people swarmed to the mosques to recite "Ya latif," the Islamic prayer in time of great calamity, what time the French brought their troops and guns into position. Fez, Raba, Sale, etc., sent delegations to the Sultan, one of which, headed by Sidi Abderrahman al Korch, former Minister of Justice, eventually secured access to the Sultan's presence. Newspaper reports state that the young Sultan wept on hearing the speech made by the aged minister, but his tears did not prevent the summary dismissal of the delegation by the Wazir nor the subsequent arrest of the principal delegates.

Nor were the Berbers more tranquil. A typical incident occurred when the French Controller summoned the Zemmour tribe to his presence and presented them a letter, which he said they must sign and send to the Sultan to thank him for freeing them from the Arabs and their law. Realizing its meaning, a tribal elder promptly refused. It did not add to the Berbers' gratitude to see the Controller thereupon slap the elder's face and order his arrest. A delegation of the tribe trying to go to Rabat, was also arrested, and a similar fate befell another delegation of the Ait Chegrouchen, from the Sefrou region. These arrests seem rather an ironic comment on a letter previously issued by M. Urbain Blanc, as Acting Resident, stating that tribes wishing to remain under the *kadis* could do so. Yet another delegation, I was told, was put into irons and thrown into a silo to encourage it, for a couple of weeks. If I am inclined to credit this story it is because of the perfectly ruthless and brutal repression of all agitation which is still being carried on by the French authorities. Numbers of people have been imprisoned and exiled; many have been shockingly bastinadoed in prison, not for rioting or armed resistance, but for orderly protest and similar light offences. In 1930, for instance, a rumour spread among the people praying at the sanctuary of Mulai Idris for relief from the Dahir that one of their number had been arrested. The entire crowd thereupon surged up to the house of El Baghdadi, then Pasha of Fez, to find out the truth. A Fez crowd has no arms, not even a dagger, nothing to approach a *lathi*, for instance. El Baghdadi told them that if ten of their number would form a delegation he would listen to it, provided the crowd dispersed mean-

while. This agreed to, he re-entered and telephoned to the French officer in charge for instructions. The crowd having retired, the volunteer delegation entered, and, before a word could be said, was seized, thrown into prison, and bastinadoed. This I confirmed personally.

Another incident is reported in a telegram of protest sent by the Fassis to M. Herriot, then Premier of France, and concerns a boy of 15, a member of the great Ouazzani family, arrested for having in his possession a pamphlet against the Dahir. This child, arrested on July 5, 1932, was immediately given one hour and a half of the bastinado—that is to say, beaten with rods on the stomach, head, and feet, the sentence to be repeated two days later. At the time of sending, the telegram goes on to say, the boy had already received a thousand blows and was in a serious condition. The telegram further states that other prisoners have, in this and various ways, been quite simply and deliberately killed in prison.

While I was in Fez nightly raids were carried out in the city, sometimes with unwarrantable cruelty, on pretext of searching for the authors of placards against the Dahir which appeared mysteriously on the walls. Thus a woman just recovering from an operation was dragged off her mattress by the soldiers, and, as a result of shock and ill-treatment, died. Nothing was found in the house. The extraordinary attitude of the French authorities is, however, best illustrated by the case of Sherif Djebli El Aydouni. The Sherif is married to a White Russian, protégé of France, and therefore is himself a protégé of France who is not subject to Moroccan jurisdiction. A search party entered his house on April 2, 1932. Arriving during the search the Sherif found himself arrested and all his papers, letters, etc., impounded and taken away. On May 6, over a month later, the Sherif, a man of 60, was brought before the Khalifa to answer to a charge of writing prayers and protests against the Dahir. Meanwhile his wife had tried to secure a French lawyer, but the latter, after a visit to Rabat, felt obliged to give up the case.

Djebli, from prison, wrote to Deputy Jean Longuet and to his son Robert, by registered air mail, for help from Paris. But the letters never arrived, until, fortunately, the deputy heard of the matter through a messenger. Then the Quai D'Orsay produced the letters, "lost en route," and delivered them with apologies, but no explanation. Longuet went personally to Rabat and saw General Nogues (it will be noted that this question, though tried in Sikkilian courts, is directed

by the military authorities). General Nogues made this classic remark, which illustrates the entire mentality governing administrative actions: "Djebli, you know, is perhaps not guilty. Or if he is, he is only very slightly implicated. But let him give us the names of the real culprits and we'll let him off after a few months. We have to make an example after the recent events in Fez."

After eight months' struggle his liberty was regained, and after fifteen months' fight the invalidity of Sherifian jurisdiction was admitted.

Another instance. From 1932 on the *assas* and chief guards of the various quarters of Fez—the city is divided by means of huge wooden gates shut at night—have been given orders to arrest, search, and, if they think fit, imprison any passer-by whom they suspect. Should a passer-by fail to respond to the order given, to halt, they may fire upon him. In this manner the aged Sherif Alaoui was murdered by guards, two of whom were thereafter decorated by General Marquis, commanding the district, with the Order of Ouissam Alaouite. Sometime later, as a result of agitation in Paris, the case was reopened, and resulted in one year's imprisonment for the *mokaddem* who ordered the firing and three years each for the guards. There are, I believe, quite a number of instances of people shot and killed by these guards in broad daylight.

In the light of these facts it seems undeniable that "la politique Berbère" is really "la politique anti-Islamique." A glance at the educational policy and its execution by the French, not only in the Berber zone to which I have already referred, but in the Arab zones, completes the picture.

The Moroccan Budget amounts, as I have said, to something under a billion francs yearly, of which 73 million are paid to Paris. Of this latter 73 million, 30 million odd constitutes direct payment and maintenance of French troops in Morocco.

By contrast, less than 20 million annually is devoted to education, and of these 20 millions, 16 millions are allotted to schools, etc., for European children and 3 million only for native education.

The official French attitude toward native education is explained by M. Colliez in an inspired article published in the *Revue de Paris*, 1932. In the course of this the author points out that prior to the Protectorate Morocco had an organized, graded system of education, in which the French "could not fail to be interested." But, he remarks, France will only intervene with a view to creating what

schools are necessary for turning out trained labour for her colonists or subordinate employees for the administration. (This, one cannot help remarking in parenthesis, is very largely the type of educational policy which has produced so much trouble for the British in India.)

With this in mind, it is not wholly surprising to discover that in all Morocco there are but two government secondary schools, one at Fez and one at Rabat. In cities such as Fez, Marrakesh, Casablanca there are barely two or three government primary schools, whose inadequate curriculum is mainly given up to the teaching of French. I think that some two hours a week in these schools are allotted to teaching Arabic.

As far as Oriental education goes there is but one university in Morocco—the Kairouine in Fez—which, like the University of Tunis, has its own endowments, though the revenue from these has been much curtailed by the French. Both in Fez and Tunis a clamour has been raised for the reform of their universities. M. Colliez candidly characterizes the reforms of the Kairouine as "eyewash." And eyewash they are, consisting mainly of putting various professors out of their jobs in favour of those politically pleasing to the Residence.

Moroccan students desirous of higher education are not only discouraged from going to Europe by means of propaganda, personal interviews with parents, and all conceivable red tape, but even more so from seeking to study in the Orient. Passports are delayed, visas are held up so as to prevent them from getting away in time to enter the university, all possible pressure is brought to bear on their families, and so on. At the same time moneys are allotted from the Moroccan Budget to provide higher education in Europe for French youths.

Without any sort of government interest, and with the funds of the mosques on which most of them depend so shrunken, the Koranic schools began to decay. In any case they would need modernization in order to provide a reasonably adequate education for the children. Realizing this, a group of Fassis decided in 1926 to take the matter in their own hands, and founded in each quarter of the city a primary school destined to take the place of the old type Koranic school. By 1927 the government (evidently in accordance with its policy of non-intervention as described by M. Colliez), seeing the growing popularity and importance of these, decided to take notice. One of the schools was closed and its master exiled on political grounds. The others were less directly attacked, some by offering their masters other jobs, by

fundamenting discord between the founders, and so on. To-day not one remains, and meanwhile officialdom has managed to interpret a clause in one of the various Dahirs, that of October 14, 1919, which specifies that "any individual or association in Morocco may open primary schools within the Empire for the use of foreigners" to mean that these may not be opened except with permission for the use of Moroccan Muslims. For instance, when a group of Muslim notables combined in 1932 to hire a French governess for their children, eight in all, the authorities took the position that her action was illegal, and only after great difficulty could temporary permission to continue be obtained.

None of the old Koranic schools, which closed to give place to the new ones, have ever been reopened, so that out of 200 such establishments existing in Fez before the Protectorate barely one hundred survive to-day. In October, 1932, according to official figures, more than 1,200 pupils had to be refused admission to the Fassi schools for lack of room.

Not content, moreover, with leaving the university to a sure decay, the French authorities at times attempt to intervene either from political motives or with a view to discouraging the attendance of pupils. They have always been reluctant to allow Algerian students visas for Morocco, but the climax came, I think, when a student was recently expelled by the French on the score that, while he had a Moroccan visa, it did not specifically mention Fez. Another line of intervention developed last December, to be exact, on the 15th, when the *Service des Renseignements* (political police) of Fez instructed the Council of the Kairouine—a private university and not, it must be borne in mind, a government institution—to call before it three students who had just passed their examinations.

Appearing before the Council, Messrs. Mohammad Ali el Fassi, Brahim el Kattani, and Abd el Aziz were informed that they could not be given their diplomas unless they signed the following declaration: "I regret my attitude during the protests against the Dahir Berbère, which is unbecoming to my rank. I apologize. I promise formally not to behave thus again, and to execute all the orders of the government and to obey it always."

Naturally the three refused to do anything of the kind. Thus are political martyrs and anti-government leaders created.

I cannot repeat sufficiently that these are essentially policies which have been for many years pursued in Algeria with bad results. The

same sort of educational policy and repression has recently led to riots in that part of North Africa, the situation being briefly this:

After roughly a hundred years of French occupation the classic mosque universities and Koranic schools have undergone considerable decay. Special institutions were founded by the French in Tlemcen, Algiers, and Constantine to replace these mosque universities, and the same policy pursued as that of Morocco—namely, refusal of passports and other discouragements to prevent would-be students from going to Tunis or Fez.

The Algerian Muslims are strongly dissatisfied with the Franco-Arabic schools, which they accuse of anti-Muslim propaganda. I have not been able to inspect these schools personally, but if the type of education, as regards Muslim matters, may be judged, first by the "Arabic" grammars and dictionaries turned out for their use, and secondly by the histories of Maghreb and similar works produced by Algerian university professors—the Muslims have some reason to be dissatisfied on scholastic grounds alone. It does, in any case, seem foolish, in a school designed for Muslims, to attempt disparagement of the not unworthy past of the Arabs or to refer with scorn to "arabiscants"—lovers of Arabic. The reaction is bound to be one of annoyance.

Be that as it may, some years ago the various *ulemas* met and decided to do something about filling the need left by the decay of the mosque schools and universities. Thus the Society of Muslim Savants was founded, with branches in every Algerian city. It began its work by reforming the few remaining Koranic schools and founding new ones. Subsequently some of its members, all men of standing and reputation, undertook to give lectures in the mosques. Sheikh Sidi el Okbi, for instance, lectured every Friday on Koranic exegesis in the mosque, Al Jama'a Jedid in Algiers. Sheikh Hadi Senussi and Sheikh Bashir Ibrahim lectured in Tlemcen, and so on.

The society, be it noted, is strictly non-political, all its efforts being directed toward religious and cultural reform within Islamic circles. Nevertheless, a decree issued February 16, 1933, suppresses all its lectures and courses and closes all its Koranic schools in Tlemcen, Sidi Bel Abbas, and elsewhere throughout the department of Oran.

Meanwhile some 60,000 Muslim children in Algeria have no schooling, and are deprived of all hope of schooling. Consequently last February saw a gigantic demonstration in the streets of Algiers against this decree, followed by similar protests and demonstrations throughout North Africa.

From now on it seems perfectly evident that every action taken by the French authorities in North Africa, "good, bad, or indifferent, is likely to be regarded by the Muslims with fear and distrust. I have not spoken of the Syrian massacres, nor of the fighting in the Atlas, nor of the many needless provocations leading to the revolt of various and previously peaceful Moroccan groups, from 1912 onwards, which were then bloodily suppressed. It is, for one thing, too difficult to judge the actions of troops under these circumstances, and especially when the narrator has not seen them in action. But it is perfectly evident that the course of French policy, as I have outlined it, has brought the French to the point of being considered as definite and open enemies of Islam by all Muslims, and this is a tragic and dangerous situation.

REVIEWS

Persian Miniature Painting. By Lawrence Binyon, J. V. S. Wilkinson, and Basil Gray. 15" x 11". Pp. xiv + 212. With 114 plates (16 coloured). Oxford University Press.

The work, which includes a critical and descriptive catalogue of the miniatures shown at the Persian Exhibition of 1931, is divided into six main sections—viz.: (1) Persian miniature painting before the Mongol invasions, and the Mesopotamian style, (2) the early Persian style and fourteenth-century changes, (3) the Timurid school, (4) the later fifteenth century, Bihzād, etc., (5) the early Safavid period, and (6) painting under Shāh 'Abbās and his successors.

The reader is thus presented with a clear chronological concept of the evolution of Painting of Islam, illustrated by a large selection of reproductions of fine examples of all periods, over one hundred of which are definitely dated, as may be seen by inspecting the list on pp. ix-xiv. It may well be doubted if any other work on the subject has been based on such a secure chronological foundation, and the material includes miniatures from a number of hitherto unknown, or comparatively unknown, works, lent by the Governments of Persia, Egypt, and Turkey.

The earliest surviving illustrated Mesopotamian manuscript dates from about A.D. 1180, when the Seljuks had been masters of Mesopotamia for over a century, so the authors suggest that "Seljūk school" would be a far more correct title. During this period, which lasted into the thirteenth century, the Persian genius appears to have been temporarily submerged, and partly so in the fourteenth century when Chinese influence dominated—e.g., the miniatures in the *History of the World*, by Rashid ad-Dīn—but by 1392 the force of Chinese influence was spent, the Persian miniaturist had assimilated whatever he found suitable to his purpose, and by the end of the century the Persian style was fully formed.

The authors point out that the so-called Timurid style existed before the invasions of Timur; for example, the high horizon, large plants, and curious tree formations so characteristic of Timurid art are found as early as 1388 in the copy of Qazvinī (Bibl. Nat. supp. pers. 332) written for Sultan Ahmad Jelair of Baghdād. The Timurid style is also to be found in the Shāh-nāma completed at Shirāz in 1393 (Plates XXIX-XXX.).

The early fifteenth century, with its delicate flowers, brilliant and beautiful pigments and wonderful grace, was a fitting forerunner of the splendour of the school of Bihzād.

At the end of the fifteenth century Herāt "became the undisputed centre, for the whole world of Islam, of every imaginable refinement," and it was here that Bihzād, the greatest of Persian painters, produced his masterpieces. A considerable space is devoted to a study of his work, which has been the subject of so much controversy.

Herāt, however, fell before the uncultivated Uzbeks in 1507, and Tabriz and later on Qazvin became the new centres of artistic work under the new Safavid dynasty which arose in Persia. The culminating example of this, the richest and most sumptuous period of Persian painting, is the *Khamse* of Nizāmī belonging

to the British Museum (or. 2265), produced at Tabriz between 1539 and 1543. Thirty-one plates are devoted to this glorious period.

At the end of the book are three appendices. The first consists of a selection of the more important passages in Dūst Muhammad's account of past and present painters, written in 1544, first noticed by Dr. Aga Oglu in an album from the Library of Top-Kapu Serai at Constantinople. The second consists of brief notices of painters of the Herāt school, which occur in the unpublished portions of the *Ta'rikh-i-Rashidi* of Mirzā Haydar. These two appendices are very valuable.

There is a very full index, but the bibliography might, with advantage, have been at least doubly as extensive. The only other criticism of this valuable book that we have to make is that references to the plates might have been much more numerous in the text; in many cases the miniatures of a manuscript are described and analyzed without such reference, so that it is necessary to turn to the catalogue part of the book to see if reproductions of them are included and on which plates.

The authors' estimate of Persian painting can scarcely be contested: "Persia contributes to the world's art a type of painting which is unique in character and in its own kind supreme. It is easy to disparage it by dwelling on qualities it does not possess and does not attempt. But rate it high or low, its uniqueness is incontestable; it yields a special kind of pleasure which no other art gives us."

K. A. C. CRESWELL.

An Introduction to the Sociology of Islam. By Reuben Levy. In two vols. Vol. II. 9" x 5½". Pp. v + 426. Williams and Norgate. 1933. 21s.

Mr. Reuben Levy has now published the second and concluding volume of his *Introduction to the Sociology of Islam* for the Herbert Spencer Trustees.

This volume comprises six chapters: on the Religious Conceptions of Islam; Moral Sentiments in Islam; Usage, Custom, and Secular Law; Government in the Provinces of the Caliphate and the Succession States; Military Organization; and Science under Islam. They comprise a good deal of research from a non-Muslim point of view. But they form a loose agglomeration rather than a unity such as is required in descriptive sociology under Herbert Spencer's scheme.

It is doubtful whether religious conceptions and moral sentiments, derived almost exclusively from books many centuries old, come strictly within the province of descriptive sociology. Moreover, these books were produced under many social systems, and in countries as widely separated in geography as Arabia, Iraq, Persia, Turkey, North Africa, Spain, and Central Asia, and in point of time between the seventh to the twentieth centuries. To include the various schools of philosophy, religion, and science is to widen the scope of sociology beyond all manageable limits. In religious and philosophical speculation the human mind travels far beyond the regions in which sociological data are of any value. There is the further difficulty that the appraisement of abstract conceptions is a matter often of violent controversy, and the human mind in such matters works not on a social but on an individual plane.

Nor will the picture drawn by Mr. Levy of the religious conceptions of Islam be accepted by Muslims as accurate. He sometimes puts a quaint interpretation on passages from the Quran drawn from different places and put together in his own way. For example, on p. 7, in speaking of Jinns, Mr. Levy remarks: "And Allah disavows kinship with them." The relevant passage from the Quran refers to and condemns the blasphemy of those who ascribe to God a relationship with

jinns. "Ichor," as a translation of the Arabic *ghassāq*, is not without precedent, but quite unjustifiable with reference to its Homeric associations.

The chapter on usage, custom, and secular law collects together a number of points in which there is a departure from Islamic usages. They occur mostly among communities only half reclaimed from Paganism. In so far as 'urf or custom supplements the usages of the *Shari'at* a study of them is of value in elucidating local conditions. But these vary so widely among different communities and in different countries that no fruitful generalizations are possible. In the domain of law Mr. Levy has wholly misapprehended the position of custom as recognized by the British Indian Courts. "In the Punjab and elsewhere," he says (p. 173), "local practice has been used by the administration as a basis for legal codes." He goes on to say that certain village records "have been employed in the formulation of a code for native requirements." As a matter of fact, the very authority which he quotes for this statement confutes it. Mr. (afterwards Sir) C. L. Turner, a distinguished revenue officer in the Punjab, was very keen on ascertaining local and tribal customs in the Punjab, and wrote an interesting report (*Punjab Customary Law*, 1881) advocating their codification. The Government disagreed with him as to the need or desirability of codification. While courts were (and are) competent to give effect in the matters of inheritance to an ancient custom strictly proved as applying to a particular tribe or family in each case as it arises, it was held that codification would petrify the law and make progress impossible. In those days the social structure of the Punjab was considered to be more tribal than religious. Since then, things have slightly altered. Many of the families of Rajput descent have abandoned, and are abandoning, the Hindu custom of excluding females from inheritance. Quite recently proposals have been made to abolish or limit by legislation the place given to custom in litigation about Muslim inheritance. As customs have to be proved strictly in each particular case, the law that will eventually be applied is very uncertain, in contrast to the definite and well-worked-out (and also more equitable) system of Islamic law. This uncertainty has sometimes given rise to a demand for some sort of codification. There was a conference on the subject in the Punjab in 1915, and the report of that conference, together with the Government resolution on it, may be of interest to Mr. Levy. In any case, it is not correct to say, as Mr. Levy does (p. 147), that "in most lands of Islam it is the exception rather than the rule for daughters to inherit." The exception and the rule are the other way about, certainly in India and, I believe, in most lands of Islam.

The chapter on military organization is interesting, but it goes back to the first four or five centuries of Islam, when the Muslim nations were much more of a political unit than they are now. They have practically no application to modern conditions, even among so conservative a people as the border tribes of Afghanistan. Even during the period covered the art of war developed gradually with changing needs and changing conditions, and has very little to do with the "sociology of Islam."

A. YUSUF ALI.

Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad 'Abduh. By C. C. ARLOSON.
Oxford University Press. 1933. 7s. 6d.

Modernism in Islam is a subject of absorbing interest, not only to Muslims, but to the world generally. The Muslim mind is awakening from its torpor. New movements are manifesting themselves in literature, politics, and social institutions. Islam played a great part once on the stage of the world's history.

There is no reason why its Renaissance in thought and co-operative activity should not again give it an opportunity to bring its quota to the world's thought and activities.

But Modernism in Islam denotes different things to different people. To a certain school of Western thought Modernism and Islam are a contradiction in terms. There are enemies of Islam who view Modernism as a death-knell of its institutions. They imagine that a Muslim modernized ceases to be a Muslim. Others welcome the modern movements as giving Islam a place in the world's co-operative commonwealth. To them it may be a valuable counterpoise to Bolshevism and many untried forces of revolution and chaos. Others, again, are alarmed at the signs of an imaginary Pan-Islamism which is supposed to be planning an overthrow of the existing order in the non-Islamic world. Among the Muslims themselves there are several schools of thought in relation to Modernism. To some people of extreme conservatism it means nothing less than irreligion, materialism, hypocrisy, or atheism. To the politically-minded it means the recovery of lost independence. To the spiritually-minded it is associated with a return to the mystical side of Islam. To the Puritans it suggests the discarding of mediæval customs and institutions and going back to the Quran and the purest and the earliest of the traditions. Some, again, want to adapt the old spirit to new conditions and express old principles in new forms, claiming that as European civilization itself owes much to Islam, so Islam should take the arts and sciences of modern Europe as logical developments of movements set in motion by itself. The Indian poet, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, recently associated himself with the epigram that the problem is not so much to modernize Islam as to islamize modernity.

Every Muslim country has felt the throb of modernity and expressed its point of view in literature and the lives of its leaders. But Arabic-speaking countries have a peculiar advantage in this respect. Arabic is the sacred language of Islam, and, as such, commands an influence in Islamic countries with which it is difficult for any other language to compete. It is also the spoken language of South-Western Asia and Northern Africa, comprising the densest Islamic bloc. Egypt from its central position has a commanding influence. It is an old and settled country. Its Arabic Press is the most prolific and the most influential of any Muslim Press. Controversies in the Egyptian Arabic Press find an immediate echo in Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, Arabia, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, and indirectly in Turkey, Persia, India, Central Asia, and Java. Egypt is well fitted to be the pivot on which many Islamic movements will base themselves.

The Modernist Movement in Egypt goes back many generations. Mr. C. C. Adams, of the School of Oriental Studies in the American University at Cairo, has grouped it mainly round the personality of the late Shaikh Muhammad 'Abduh. His study is the first part of a dissertation which was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University in Chicago in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. As might be expected, his standard of scholarship is high—so high that the reader (like the reviewer) will hope that the second part, containing an English translation of the much discussed book of 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāzīk, will soon be given to the world by Mr. Adams. In discussing personalities, doctrines, religious views, and politics, the author has been indefatigable in his search for authorities and has collected practically all that has been written about Muhammad 'Abduh. He has treated the whole question in a perfectly objective spirit, and there is not a trace anywhere of any sort of prejudice or bias, racial, religious, political, or literary. The author modestly expresses some diffidence in offering the work to the public. He may rest assured that it will be welcomed.

not only by those interested in Islamic studies, but by the wider public, which is sure to appreciate its fullness and impartiality.

Saiyid Jamāl-un-din Afghani (1839-1897) was a remarkable international figure in the Muslim world. Claiming to be an Afghan by birth (though it is possible he was actually born in Persia), he travelled to India and made his first pilgrimage to Mecca in 1857. After some useful service to the Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, he had to leave Afghanistan after Dost Muhammad's death. He paid a brief visit to Egypt in 1869, and was received with honour in Turkey under Sultan Abdul Hamid in the following year. But he was a stormy personality, and his keen interest in cultural and political tendencies as he viewed them on the wider stage of Islamic politics brought him into conflict with vested interests, and he had to leave Turkey. He returned to Egypt in the spring of 1871, and was for eight years in the very centre of affairs in that country at a time when Ismail Pasha's extravagance had brought Egypt to the verge of bankruptcy and foreign influence was (as he considered) laying a stranglehold on the country. On account of his anti-foreign tendencies he was expelled on the accession of Taufiq Pasha in 1879. During his stay, however, his magnetic personality got hold of many young men, among whom was Shaikh Muhammad 'Abduh, then a young student at the Azhar University.

The Azhar University grew out of the great Mosque founded in Cairo in 970 under the Fatimid rule. It is the oldest university in the world, and to-day forms the most important centre of traditional Islamic learning, to which promising students come from all parts of the Muslim world. Jamāl-ud-din, with his modernist and international outlook, had tried to influence the atmosphere of that ancient foundation. But his most fruitful effort was in taking hold of young and eager minds like those of 'Abduh, who did so much in later life both for the University and for the cultural regeneration of Islamic institutions in Egypt.

Shaikh Muhammad 'Abduh was born in an Egyptian village about 1849. He received a good education of the old type mainly in the Mosque schools, but he was thoroughly dissatisfied with the methods and results of the antiquated system of education to which he was subjected. It was his meeting with a Sufi that entirely changed the whole course of his life, for the Sufi, according to Shaikh 'Abduh's account, delivered him from the prison of ignorance or antiquated learning and brought him into the open spaces of knowledge. But while the Sufi's influence inclined 'Abduh to mysticism, his second and greater teacher, Jamāl-ud-din Afghani, took him into the wider fields of scholarship and practical activities. 'Abduh came to appreciate modern knowledge and the value of the sciences which have done so much to advance the material civilization of Europe. It now became an absorbing passion with him to infect with his enthusiasm his own people and, through the modernization of the Arabic language and literature, the whole of the Arabic-speaking and Islamic world. As teacher and journalist, he worked hard at his self-imposed mission for five years (1877-1882). Then came the 'Arābi rebellion, and 'Abduh was in exile from 1882 to 1888. He joined Jamāl-ud-din in Paris, and travelled widely, maturing his mind and character. "I never once went to Europe," he wrote afterwards, "that there was not renewed within me hope of the change of the present state of Muslims to something better."

The Khedive Taufiq Pasha pardoned him, "under British pressure" according to Lord Cromer.* When he returned to Egypt, he was appointed to various judicial posts, in which he not only performed his ordinary duties with con-

* *Modern Egypt*, ii, 179.

spicuous success, but he even kept his ideals of reform before him. The Khedive Abbas II. listened to his plea for the reform of the Azhar University, and appointed him to a Committee, in which 'Abduh's personal influence soon made him the strongest force. Certain reforms were carried out, and 'Abduh was successful in carrying the 'Ulama of the Azhar with him up to a certain point. But it cannot be said that 'Abduh's ideals were fully realized. But the seed which he sowed was not lost, and though there have been setbacks the reform of the Azhar University is still a live question, although the reforms must necessarily march at a much slower pace than 'Abduh or men of his school of thought could wish. But the parallel modern State University of Cairo, though entirely outside the Azhar circle, must by its work influence the Egyptian mind, and indirectly help in the creation of an atmosphere in which the Azhar must eventually come under the influence of modern thought.

Meanwhile Shaikh 'Abduh was appointed Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1899. He thus found himself placed at once at the head of the whole judicial system of the country. Under Islamic law he could now deliver Fatwas or authoritative declarations on questions of the *Shari'at*, which, though of binding legal authority only in Egypt, were of profound interest to the whole of the Islamic world. He applied the accepted principles of Islamic jurisprudence to modern conditions, and led a movement whose results will only be apparent after they have sunk into the judicial systems of Muslim countries. He reformed the procedure and organization of the Courts and made salutary changes in the administration of the *Auqāf*, a department which handles large public funds for pious, charitable, and religious uses. He also devoted a great deal of his time and boundless energies to his work in the Legislative Council and to the establishment and working of the Muslim Benevolent Society. His literary work continued till his death in 1905.

Mr. Adams gives a careful, reasoned, and well-documented account of his doctrines in the many spheres of thought into which Shaikh 'Abduh threw himself with such indefatigable energy. By way of supplement an account is given of his chief pupil Muhammad Rashid Rida and the paper *Al-Manār*, which is the chief exponent of his school of thought. The younger Egyptian Modernists are also mentioned, and a valuable and complete bibliography is appended.

Of 'Abduh's influence in Egypt there can be no doubt whatever. Lord Cromer underestimated him, as he underestimated generally the strength and vitality of the Muslim renaissance. His successors have, however, seen 'Abduh's work in better perspective. It was more fruitful of results than his master's activities, because he wisely used his own country for the basis of reform. But his name and fame have spread to all Islamic countries among men of modern outlook. The problems for Muslim Modernists in each country are different. Though a universal Islamic Brotherhood is a compelling and a living ideal, the experience of many centuries shows that solid practical work can only be built on foundations that sink deep into the soil and take account of the open and underground forces which act on the soil in a variety of ways. Reformers who have spread themselves out over too wide an area have found themselves left in the air, while those who have attacked specific problems, used special opportunities, and removed special obstructions have made lasting progress and left an example that ultimately acts as a potent force in other spheres besides their own.

A. YUSUF ALI.

Le Reveil de l'Islam et des Arabes. By Eugene Jung, Ancien Vice-Résident de France at Tonkin. 9" x 6". Pp. 124. Published by the Author, 50, Avenue M-lukoff (XVI^e), Paris. Printed by Les Presses Modernes, 45, Rue de Maubeuge, Paris, at their workshops in Reims (Marne). January, 1933.

This is a disappointing and unconstructive diatribe on an important and far-flung subject. Most worthy of attention are the details of the principal resolutions of the Pan-Islamic Congress (Jerusalem, December, 1931) contained in Appendix I. These include resolutions concerning the return of the Hedjaz Railway to Moslem control as it was built and financed solely to facilitate the Holy Pilgrimage; the exploitation of the line by the French and British contrary to the stipulations to the Treaty of Lausanne and the Mandatory engagements regarding pious foundations; a demand for the return of the privileges extended to the railway by the Turkish régime, and for the reversal of the decision of the Ottoman Debt Commission to partition the railway between France and Great Britain. The Congress appeals to the League of Nations for intervention and support in these matters.

Other important resolutions include the question of the "Wall of Lamentation" (Al Borac) on the plea that the findings of the International Commission were unjust, the wall being a Moslem Holy Place forbidden to Jews; a protest against Soviet injustices to Moslem subjects in the Caucasus, Urals, and other parts of Russia; a strong protest against the colonization of Moslem countries by European Imperialists, a procedure contrary to the natural rights and principles of the Moslem religion; a strong protest against the "atrocities" in Lybia which militate against the prestige of Italy and of the League of Nations; a strong protest against the de-Islamization of the Berbers; demand of the repeal of the relevant French decrees; and request to the League to intervene on the behalf of the Moslems against the French methods of reprehensible evangelization, etc.

It is around and in support of certain of these resolutions, particularly as they affect and are affected by French colonization in North Africa, that M. Jung, a retired French Administrator, who after seventeen years' service in China has written several volumes on French colonial problems in her near-to Moslem world, lashes out at the atavistic propensities of Germany and her allies, the puerile inefficacy and latent devilments of the League of Nations, the high-flown moral precepts of Allied War Leaders, the lack of good faith to the Moslem world of Allied Post-War Statesmen.

While he criticizes, inaccurately and with but little effect, the sins of British administration in Iraq and Palestine, of France in Syria, Tunisia and Morocco, and of Italy in Lybia, he reserves his main attack against what he is sure is the well proven, short-sighted, out-of-date, and iniquitous French administration of Algeria. He concludes with unconvincing diatribes, railings, and warnings in his confident appeal to the better spirit of France.

While there is little fresh meat in either the first chapter of general considerations or the last chapter of general conclusions, the second chapter is of interest in that it gives the list of all those Islamic Conferences that have taken or are about to take place in the wake of the Islamic Congress of Tirana, Albania (1930). In particular is of interest the reference, by a member of the "Ligue Arabya," to the aims of the Conference of European Moslems that, due for May, 1933, did in fact take place at Geneva in August. This person in stating that the aim of the Geneva Conference, in extending the scope of the original Tirana Conference, was an attempt at a post-war Moslem Union that would ultimately have a defensive value, found his own inspiration, for the strengthening of union and friendship between different peoples, in a revival of the annual review of

current social and political problems by the Khalif on the occasion of the annual Hajj assembly at Arafat. There is also an interest in minority problems, so the Conference becomes a sort of Moslem All Peoples' Association and Minority Congress.

M. Jung is definitely anti-Jew and definitely pro-Arab, quite at the expense of the League of Nations, his own country, and other European colonizing Powers. He admits Moslem hostility to Russia, but vacillates regarding Moslem peaceful intentions. He brandishes the danger of instant Arab attack not only before Turkey and Russia, but before all the—in his view—overweening, atrocity-breeding, non-co-operating, Moslem-enslaving, out-of-date and bigoted Imperialist Powers of Europe. He rails at the latter's ostrich-in-the-sand attitude to the Pan-Islamic Congress, and at the putting of the Moslems on a permanent black list by a mediaeval Pope.

The book has a distinct value as propaganda for any Power wishing to curry favour with the Moslem world to the detriment of Great Britain, France, or Italy. It is unfortunate that the book comes from a patriotic Frenchman who naively informs his readers as to how he has had unsuccessfully to take up the cudgels on behalf of one of his principal Moroccan informants who was receiving money from Berlin (*vide* the Appendix II.); how time and time again in Paris and North Africa he was birked of his repeated attempts to discuss matters with high officials; and as to how many of his books were banned from publication—all done (according to M. Jung) by a *laissez-faire* Government in the midst of a France ignorant of the atrocious administration of her North African colonies.

It is particularly unfortunate, in view of the present stresses and strains of the European situation, that, whereas the principal attack of the Pan-Islamic Congress is against the French and British retention of control of the Hedjaz Railway, originally built under German inspiration as a strategic threat upon the Suez Canal, M. Jung should paint such a lurid picture of conditions in Algeria, the very fount of all French reinforcements whenever she is threatened on her Eastern frontiers. Due to propagandists and Jewish-Arab tensions, 1933 has seen unrest among the generally-contented and well-conditioned Moslem populations in Western Algeria and in Northern and Southern Tunisia to an extent unknown since the French occupations. All this, coupled to the necessity of recent French action in the High Atlas, makes the present appearance of the volume very ill-timed.

M. Jung's description of King Feisal as always being at daggers drawn with Great Britain since his arrival on the throne, his questionable figures regarding the distribution of Moslems in Europe, his description of Great Britain as the instigator of Jewish-Arab frictions, his affirmation that Great Britain broke allied post-war co-operation by asserting her independent superiority, only gives to English readers some indication of how carefully they must take M. Jung's facts and figures regarding the delinquencies of North African French Administrators. Nor can the late King Feisal be blamed for refusing M. Jung's proffered assistance at the Peace Conference.

It were well for both M. Jung and the Pan-Islamic Congress to remember the contributions made by Great Britain, France, and Italy to the problem in hand. Leaving aside all material advantages developed, Great Britain undoubtedly so trains the character of her more apt Moslem subjects that their morale is so stiffened in integrity and judgment that they continue to govern themselves without the erstwhile undue despotism or tyranny, slow though it may be. France, in a way accomplished by no other nation, practices in North Africa social equality, and has accomplished good government with the minimum of

interference with native customs and the minimum of curtailment of the jurisdiction of the native élite, according to native habits of government. If the Malekites wish to remain a race apart, practising their own religious laws and customs, it is their own and not France's desire. Italy, in her decidedly drastic rule of Lybia and Cyreniaca, has only enhanced thereby her prestige in Arabia proper, as witness the remarks of Mr. Bertram Thomas in this connection. And Italy, in that the nationals from her southern provinces find themselves able to compete successfully with the Berber, not only in skilled but in unskilled conditions of labour, have, despite French distaste for this accomplishment, proved that a virility, such as is easily recognized, is still the possession of at least certain of the elements of Europe.

With M. Jung's premises that friendly feelings of co-operation between Moslems and Europeans are desirable, and that law and justice should obtain, we are in entire agreement. And that France is wrong in pursuing a policy of assimilation, rather than one of a cautiously slow march to progressive self-government, is an opinion to which an Englishman would naturally tend, and obtain thereby Italian and Arab sympathy—each due to their own legitimate self-interest. But we are quite unable to consider that any immediate releasing of Colonial control from those Moslem areas that at present enjoy such, including North Africa, would in any way, at this date, increase the pacification and good government of the world, nor can we but uphold a French ban on the ruling of European underlings by Arab proprietors. France has already gone far further in this direction towards social equality than Great Britain.

With the value of the friendship of the Moslem populations, from Mogador to Kashgar, to the liberty loving and God-praising elements of Europe, we certainly concur; but we disagree with M. Jung in thinking that such co-operation can be arrived at, even by France, by over-stressing her own deficiencies and over-stressing Moslem virtues. Fiction never bred faith and friendship.

E. S. W.

Harun al Rashid. By H. StJ. Philby, C.I.E. 7½" x 5½". Pp. 159. London: Davies. 1933. 5s.

This well-produced little volume has very little in it about Harun al Rashid, and what there is shows him to have been a tyrant, a fanatic, and, by proxy if not directly, a murderer. It is only justice to the author, however, to say that he is to blame neither for the scantiness of the materials at his disposal nor for his incapacity to turn the real Harun into a hero. In the circumstances it might almost have been advisable frankly to take Haroun al Raschid (rather than Hārūn al-Rashid), treat him as the best-known character of the *Arabian Nights*, and write a biography of him, as has been done for Hamlet and Sherlock Holmes.

Mr. Philby does not solve the mystery of how Harun acquired his reputation for greatness, and a key to it is perhaps to be found in the parallel case of the Sasanian king Khusraw I., who was granted by the priests of the established Magian cult the title of *Anushirwan* ("He of the Immortal Soul") for having suppressed with the utmost cruelty the communist heretics who professed the religion of Mazdak. Harun's "greatness," perhaps, rests on no firmer foundation; for his title of *al-Rashid*, "The Upright," was given him by his father, and the fact that for the twenty-three years of his reign he scattered money on the most extravagant scale and, incidentally, nourished a host of panegyrists, may have been a contributory factor.

The book's preoccupation with the Abbasids occasionally by implication grants credit to Harun where none is due to him or is due to the members of the dynasty as a whole. Thus he had little to do with the establishment or improvement of the "postal" services (p. 44), and his "scientific contributions . . . to the world's renaissance" (p. 122)—dangerous phrase—was little more than that in his day Baghdad produced paper, and so presumably made the study of Greek mathematics a less cumbersome pursuit. It was rather his son Ma'mun who encouraged the importation of Greek scientific works and their translation into Arabic.

One might find other points for criticism (e.g., Umayyad for the well-established Umayyad, and Khaizaran for Khaizaran), but it must be admitted that this was a difficult subject to paint, and Mr. Philby has given us a very successful group portrait in which the principal character has a prominent seat in the front row.

R. L.

Majnun Layla. By Shawki. Translated into English Verse from the Arabic by Arthur John Arberry. 9½" x 6¼". Pp. 61. Cairo. 1933.

Everyone interested in modern Arabic poetry should read this excellent version of a love-story born in the Nejd Desert twelve hundred years ago, and since then told over and over again by Persian and Turkish romanticists. The last to handle it was Ahmad Shawki, the greatest Arabic poet of his generation, who died recently at Cairo. While retaining the traditional setting of the tale and leaving its main features intact, Shawki has recast it into something strange and new. The dramatic form, the treatment of the subject, and the style itself show how deeply he was influenced by his youthful studies in France; yet the play is no imitation: modern as it is, it has its roots in Arabian antiquity and definitely belongs to a national literature receptive, but not subservient, to the spirit of the West.

The curtain rises on a party of young men and girls of Layla's tribe chatting beside the tents in the cool of evening. Their talk is of Qays (Majnun), his passion for Layla, and his songs which have caused so many to think lightly of her. Layla, though she loves and pities her cousin, is jealous of his honour and will not yield. Finally she marries Ward, a noble chief, who chivalrously takes her under his protection without forcing her to be unfaithful to Qays. The crisis comes in the fourth act. It opens with a striking interlude of diablerie, when Qays, roaming about the desert, encounters a company of Jinns headed by al-Amawi, his own familiar demon and poetical "genius." They guide him to Layla, he urges her to flee with him, and when she replies that honour forbids it, he flings away in a frenzy of passion, leaving her heart-broken. The lovers never meet again, but the last scene—Qays dying on Layla's grave—assures us that their love is immortal.

This is the bare outline of a picture which the artist's imagination has filled with innumerable touches of delicacy and charm. To reproduce them in another language is often as impossible as it would be to copy the varied metres and monorhymes which mark changes of *tempo* in the movement of the piece and enhance its dramatic effect. The translator, I think, has done well to disregard rhyme altogether, except in few lyric passages. Everything considered, his choice of Elizabethan blank verse, with a large proportion of feminine endings, is the best that could have been made. The results are very pleasing, for Mr. Arberry can write what really is verse and not merely prose in chains. While paying tribute to the taste and scholarship with which he has accomplished a singularly difficult task, I may offer one or two criticisms on points of detail. The idea of

fame being *hoisted* (p. 11) or a line of poetry *burgled* (p. 42) seems to me unhappy. In some cases desire for accuracy has been carried too far, as when we read (p. 30), "thy heart is *convolute* with a most trivial rancour"; the metaphor, though normal in Arabic, sounds odd in English. I have noticed a few slips in translation. The most curious of these occurs in a passage where Qays is represented as saying (p. 27):

"From childhood we have loved, and passion
Fills all our purpose."

Obviously *shā'i Laylā wa-shā'iyā* means "both Layla's goats and mine," and the sentiment is just the same as that of Damoetas—

Idem amor exitium pecori est pecorisque magistro.

Majnun Layla is fine poetry. Mr. Arberry's version will be enjoyed by those who cannot read the original and even more highly appreciated by those who can.

R. A. N.

Indo-Tibetica.—I. "Mc'od Rten" e "Ts'a Ts'a" nel Tibet Indiano ed Occidentale: Contributo allo studio dell' arte religiosa tibetana e del suo significato. By Giuseppe Tucci. 9½" x 7". Pp. 158, with 43 plates. Rome: Royal Italian Academy. 1932.

Waddell, the author of *The Buddhism of Tibet*, was acquainted mainly with Southern and Eastern Tibet. Professor Tucci, the author of many studies of Eastern religion and philology, has pursued the investigations on which his *Indo-Tibetica* series is to be based in Ladákh (Eastern Kashmir) and the Himalayan tracts of Kunuwar and Spiti, and also in Guge, the area of the vanished kingdom in the west of Tibet proper, which had its capital at different times at Toling and Gartok. To the casual observer, the religion of the Tibetans sometimes seems to be little else than a combination of lama-worship and devil-dancing. Professor Tucci approaches it from the other end, addressing himself to the study of its genuinely Buddhist element. The special feature of his work is that he has collated his observations on the spot with the old doctrinal and mystical treatises in the Tibetan language, consisting of translations or exegeses of the Sanskrit Buddhist texts. He wishes to convey by this means some idea of the spiritual experiences of Mahayanist Buddhism not only in Tibet but in India; for Tibetan Buddhism casts back light upon the otherwise somewhat obscure Greater Vehicle of India.

He commences with a volume on the pagodas of Tibet and on certain clay tablets deposited in them. His book is a monograph with a minimum, or almost total absence, of comment or comparison. It is necessary to premise that the edifice known to the Indian Buddhists as a *stupa* or *chaitya*, and designated in Ceylon a *daghoba*, is commonly referred to by British travellers in Tibet as a "chorten." The correct transliteration of this word from the Tibetan script is *mch'od rten*, or, by Professor Tucci's continental system, giving an Italian value to the "c," *mc'od rten*. The great hemisphere of the old tumulus-*chaitya* shrank in the course of time to much smaller dimensions, and assumed the outline of an inverted vessel; it was mounted on a base, and the wheels or umbrellas of the spire grew in number, with the result that the structure assumed a more pointed form, differing alike from the onion shape of the Hinayanist countries and from the many-storied tower of Chinese practice. Under Tantric influence, Professor

Tucci informs us, the small vase at the summit became a symbol of the moon, and became surmounted by the globe of the sun and by a sort of acuminate spheroid representing fire. Buddhist traditions assigned to every part of the edifice the name of some element of moral practice or some religious attribute or power, the former constituting the base and middle, and the latter the spire. The larger divisions of the edifice were also connected by Tantric mysticism with the shapes and colours symbolical of the five elements; and this interpretation Professor Tucci found to be widely accepted in the Lamaist communities visited by him. Each of the eight types of chorten recognized by the Tibetan texts was traditionally stated to have been a copy of the *chaitya* marking one of the eight chief sites in India connected with the Buddha. Of these eight types, by far the commonest in Western Tibet at the present time is that of the "Great Enlightenment"; but those of the "Many Doors" and of the "Victorious One" are also found, while that of the "Descent (of the old gods) from Heaven" is found only in the close vicinity of the older monasteries.

What are the motives by which the Tibetans are inspired to build pagodas? The act of founding a pagoda is regarded as specially meritorious for several interconnected reasons. In the first place, the disbursement of the money required for the purpose, which is very considerable, is an act of renunciation. Secondly, the act is classed with the erection of statues and pictures of the divine beings. The third reason is a little less simple. Those *chaityas* which did not contain relics—and it was rare, in Professor Tucci's opinion, even in early times for them to contain remains—were anciently called "*chaityas* of the Body of the Law." An important part of the ceremonies preparing for and accompanying the construction of a chorten consists of the reading aloud of doctrinal books. The *ts'a ts'a* deposited in it very commonly contain an imprint of the short Buddhist creed. The inscriptions on stone blocks commemorating the name of the donor of the chorten recite sometimes that it was erected to obtain liberation for the donor and his deceased relatives, or other objects of a personal nature; but they nearly always conclude with the formula "that all beings may attain the condition of Buddha." The pagoda is, at least in strict theory, an instrument for renewing the preaching of the Law, and its donor is a *kalyāṇ-mitra*, or "friend of the welfare" of others. In erecting it, he practises the Mahayanist virtue of "Transference" (*pariṇāmanā*)—i.e., of transference of his merit to other persons; a feature worthy of the attention of those who criticize Buddhism too closely as a religion of each for himself. While the Mahāyāna has its temples proper in addition to its pagodas, acts of veneration and the presentation of offerings at the pagoda are strictly enjoined by Buddhist authority, and it may be judged from Professor Tucci's account that the pagoda is something very like a temple with the Law substituted for the deity. A philosophic interpretation of the significance of the chorten is to be found in the passages from the old Tibetan translation, the *buTan agyur*, upon which Professor Tucci draws. The Law is both cause and effect. As cause, it embraces moral practice and the strict observance of religious precepts; as effect, it connotes the "complex purity" of those by whom the latter are completely observed, which constitutes the attributes and essence of those who realize the supreme good. As the chorten represents all things, having regard to their being partly cause and partly effect, and the Body of the Law represents the perfection of all things, the chorten, though made of earth, stone, wood, gold or silver, is able to stand as image of the Body of the Law (which means, Professor Tucci explains, the Absolute). There is no reason to doubt but that these two aspects of the chorten, as means of renewed preaching of the Law and as an emblem of the Law in all its varied relations and as Absolute, are

present, however dimly, in the minds of Tibetans. But Professor Tucci omits to examine the significance of the enormous output of chortens. He refers to their numbers as "endless" (*infiniti*). Those readers who have visited Burma are aware that this unmeasured spawning of pagodas is not confined to Tibet or to the Maháyána. Can it be fairly construed, the cynic will inquire, as intended for the renewal of the faith and the glorification of the Law? Is it not largely a sort of "fire-insurance"? Is not this, like the prayer-wheel, an example of the abstract spiritual inwardness of Buddhism being more than half transposed into magic and externalism? We may note, however, on the other side Professor Tucci's reference to the "profound religious piety of the Tibetans . . . which guides all their actions."

The chorten serves as repository for miscellaneous consecrated articles for which there is no present use, including books, pictures, or statues in good or bad condition, and also for the *ts'a ts'a*. These latter began by being lumps of moistened earth stamped with a seal, but came in time to be a sort of clay medallions—though not necessarily circular—moulded by a die. Among the earliest designs borne by them was the representation of one or more chortens. Professor Tucci gives reasons for connecting the *ts'a ts'a*, in their origin, with the *ex-voto* objects found at all the former Buddhist places of pilgrimage in India. Reproductions of the particular *chaityas* by which these places were marked were evidently, our author thinks, distributed to pilgrims, first in India and afterwards, *mutatis mutandis*, at places of pilgrimage in Tibet. Later on, representations of the numerous Buddhas and other sacred beings of the Maháyána became commoner on the *ts'a ts'a* than the chortens. In recent times again the chorten has become by far the commonest design. The intention being everything, it was just as meritorious, in theory, to represent a chorten on a clay tablet and get it consecrated as to found a chorten. The *ts'a ts'a* is consecrated with an elaborate liturgy, including an invocation to the sacred being to descend into the object, just as is done, Professor Tucci points out, in all Indian rituals. The representations of deities, which are by no means wanting in artistic merit, vary from peaceful, seated Buddhas to their wrathful Tantric counterparts, brandishing thunderbolts or swords, or coupled with their Saktis, embodiments of terrors, mysteries and sexualities which could find no expression in authentic Buddhism. In Tibet the new religion was tainted almost from the first by the Tantrism of the Indian Maháyána.

Professor Tucci makes some remarks, finally, on the Bon—i.e., the pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet, a worship of the spirits of the earth, of the mountain, of the waterspring, and so on—discussing how far it survives as a definite religion, independent of the sheltering wing of Buddhism. He promises us a separate study of the subject, and is more of a sceptic than Francke, the author of *Antiquities of Indian Tibet* (1914), refusing to accept the latter's interpretation of the fresco at I-mayuru as a picture of a Bonpo priest, or the shrine as a Bonpo shrine.

The stratification of religion in Asiatic countries is a subject of perennial interest, and even within the compass of this small book Tibet appears as possessing a richness of beds, outcrops, and intrusive masses of aspiration and belief such as only a few countries in the continent can excel.

A. F. K.

Ceylon under British Rule, 1795-1932. By Lennox A. Mills, D.Phil. 8½" x 5½". Pp. vi + 311. Map. Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1933. 15s. net.

Mr. Mills is Assistant Professor in the University of Minnesota and brings to his task the detached and judicial manner of a scholar well versed in research methods and a thorough acquaintance with the available documents. The result is an impartial objective treatise which, for at least that period of roughly 100 years which elapsed between the annexation of Ceylon by the British and the first articulate movements of the Sinhalese towards self-government, should remain for long a standard work of reference. Two chapters are little more than summaries, the first of British relations with Ceylon from 1762 to 1796, which culminated in its conquest, and the last of the economic and political history of Ceylon from the nineties to the present day. The period covered by the first chapter has been the subject of much research already. The last chapter is admittedly meagre in detail, and the author does not claim for it the value, which undoubtedly attaches to the main body of the treatise, of a close and original study of all available sources of information. In view of the interest which Ceylon has recently aroused owing to the constitutional experiments of the Donoughmore Reforms, it may be as well to warn readers that less than five pages of the last chapter deal directly with Ceylon's political progress in the twentieth century. This is not to belittle the value of the author's contribution to the detailed history of Ceylon's administrative and economic progress during a period which was essentially the period of effective rule by British administrators. For his work in this respect much praise is due, whether for the mass of detailed information which it contains or for the manner in which Mr. Mills has selected and arranged his material. Most histories are propaganda. The present treatise escapes the charge, and the author is to be congratulated on his frank and impartial record of the good and bad in an administration of Ceylon.

The strategic and commercial advantages of control of Ceylon to the British are obvious, and the story of our efforts to secure a foothold in the country through treaties with the King of Kandy with those advantages in view is clearly told. There follows an account of the actual conquest based largely on the publications of Mr. L. J. B. Turner, C.C.S., whose work receives a well-merited tribute in a footnote to page 9. Mr. Mills uses the "Cleghorn Papers" among other documents relating to the conquest, and refers to the effect on the Dutch defenders of Colombo of the transference of de Meuron's regiment of Swiss mercenaries to British service—a transference which Dundas considered to be "one of the most essential circumstances which contributed to the conquest of Ceylon." The "Cleghorn Papers," it may be noted in passing, have, apart from their value for the history of the conquest, an unusual interest for students of the Near East because of Cleghorn's account of his journey through Egypt and the Red Sea and the light it throws on the condition of Red Sea life and ports at that time. There is an incidental interest in the fact of an academic officer conducting secret service enterprises in remote countries while still on the rolls of his university as Professor of Civil History. It gives us the unusual spectacle of a professor living history instead of teaching it to his pupils.

The chapter on the Madras Administration (1795-1798) is melancholy reading. After the conquest Ceylon was made a dependency of the Madras Presidency under a dual civil and military control. There appears to be nothing good to record of its governance. The civil government did its best to favour the people of the country by supplanting the Mudaliyars and other native officials and appointing foreigners from Madras in their place, and further by abolishing the

familiar systems of taxation and land tenure. These measures, combined with rapacity and cruelty of the native officials imported from Madras, led to serious revolt among the Sinhalese. A committee of enquiry set up in 1798 advised that the Madras revenue system be abolished and the ancient Sinhalese system restored, as it had existed under Dutch rule. It further recommended the return of all Madras native officials and tax-farmers to India and the reappointment of Mudaliyars. In October, 1798, North arrived in Ceylon to take up his appointment as Governor. His arrival marked the end of the Madras régime. The chapter dealing with this régime should certainly be carefully studied by those, if there be any, who would link Ceylon politically with India, though it need not be suggested that as an independent member of a federation Ceylon would inevitably fall an easy prey to its immediate Indian neighbour.

There followed a curious experiment in dual control of another type, whereby Government was shared between the Crown and the East India Company. The reasons for this experiment are obscure unless it be that Ceylon is fated to be used as an *experimentum in corpore vili* (cf. various expressions by statesmen in England on the Donoughmore scheme). In effect, the Governor and the administrative authorities were to be appointed by the Crown, but under the control of the Governor-General of India and the Directors of the East India Company, while the revenues, especially cinnamon, were to be under the Company's control. For a time the Governor had still to rely on Madras civil servants, who did not hesitate to show their resentment at North's appointment. North was moved to press for the creation of a Ceylon Civil Service. Everything, in fact, pointed to the desirability of separating Ceylon from Indian administration and making it an independent Crown Colony. The inevitable happened in 1802, when the control of the East India Company was abolished and Ceylon became a Crown Colony under the Colonial Office with legislative and executive power vested in the Governor alone, subject to confirmation or rejection of his measures at home.

The beginnings of a separate Ceylon Civil Service had astonishing features. Thus many members entered the service at the age of fifteen, and an officer became pensionable after eight years' service. The initial pay was bad, and the average member of the service regarded his career as "a kind of disgusting but necessary prelude to his deciding what line of life he will adopt" (quoted from C.O. Records). One youth, who went to Ceylon in 1798 at the age of thirteen, was made Agent of Revenue (the precursor of that distinguished senior official of modern times, the Government Agent) in the vast area of Jaffna in 1804. Such anomalies could only lead to corruption and inefficiency, and steps were taken to organize the service on a sound basis. These steps, in their succeeding stages, are described in Mr. Mills's chapter on the Civil Service—a chapter which contains much food for thought and an important lesson to the modern reformer who for one reason or another aims at reducing the status and salaries of the public services. It is the fashion now in Ceylon, under the influence of economic depression, to decry the public servant and represent him as a pampered parasite. It was necessary that we should be reminded of the disastrous Acts of the Colebrooke recommendations of 1833 with their sweeping reductions of Civil Service salaries. The circumstances of the case were not unlike those of the present day. "Colonel Colebrooke," writes Mr. Mills, "had more than a tinge of the doctrinaire idealist, and was guided by his own notions of abstract justice rather than by actual conditions." In the result his recommendations played havoc with the Civil Service through its formidable reduction of salaries, its abolition of pensions, and its slowing down of promotion. By 1845 a complete

reform of conditions of service had become imperative and was introduced by Lord Stanley. Nevertheless in 1846, in a time of severe economic depression, the Budget deficit led to the usual recriminations from commercial quarters against Civil Service salaries. It is perhaps not surprising that the attitude of the European planting industries in such matters has been and is determined more by the fortunes of their industries than by the merits of the case.

There follows a chapter of exceptional interest on the Governor. Mr. Mills maintains that under the conditions of the nineteenth century the Crown Colony form of government was inevitable. The position of the Governor, in relation both to the Colonial Office and to the local legislature in the Crown Colony scheme, is made clear. Paradoxical as it may seem to some in modern times, the Governor and his official majority in the Legislative Council when such was created were in reality the guardians of the people's interests where they conflicted, as sometimes happened, with the interests of the European commercial group. "The sole object of Government," wrote Maitland in his *Guide to Collectors* at the beginning of the nineteenth century, "is, and always ought to be considered to be, to ensure the prosperity of the island through the medium of generally increasing the prosperity and happiness of the natives." How true successive governors and civil servants were to their trust is amply demonstrated in the chapter on "Aspects of Native Policy," whose opening sentences constitute the author's most explicit judgment on British rule in Ceylon: "The record of British policy in Ceylon is not free from blemishes, but on the whole it is one of which the Empire has no occasion to be ashamed. Throughout the nineteenth century the British Government conscientiously tried to improve the condition of the people, and to hold the balance even between the conflicting interests of the planters, the native aristocracy and priesthood, and the raiyats. A century before the League of Nations enunciated the principle of the trusteeship of backward peoples the Ceylon Government had acted in its spirit without ostentation and without definition."

Chapters IX. and X. describe the conquest of Kandy and the Kandyan revolt of 1847-1850. Opinion is bound to vary on many incidents and policies which attended the conquest of Kandy and the "small risings," as Mr. Mills calls them, which occurred between the conquest and the major revolt which is described in Chapter X. Though the world has changed vastly in the twentieth century, it is still possible to learn from the past, and one cannot resist the impression that if those who had charge of Ceylon's affairs during the troubles of 1915 had only known their Ceylon history, if they had read, e.g., the retrospective comments of Philip Anstruther, the Colonial Secretary, on the trial of the Kandyan chiefs in 1835 as they appear in Parl. Pap. H.C. 36 of 1851 (*vide* p. 167 of Mr. Mills's book), they would not have panicked or listened so readily to the reports of unscrupulous informers. Mr. Mills quotes Major Skinner's statement that the effect of the trials of 1835 "was seriously to impair the influence and authority of Government in the minds and affections of the people." The same might perhaps with justice be said of some of the 1915 trials and of the effect of our handling of that situation also on Ceylonese opinion generally. Experience, someone said, is the name we give to our mistakes; but it is only experience if we profit by the lesson. Incidentally Mr. Mills makes no reference to the riots of 1915 and our handling of them. But his book should be judged chiefly by the record of events as far as the nineties: it is admittedly and obviously inadequate for the later period. In his account of the Kandyan troubles, Mr. Mills makes more than one reference to the opinion of Major Skinner. Skinner's *Fifty Years in Ceylon* is a record of quite exceptional interest and value. Few Englishmen have known Ceylon and

its peoples so well or contributed more to its prosperity by a long life of devoted and able service.

Chapters XI. and XII. on "The Cinnamon Trade during the Nineteenth Century" and "Coffee and Transportation" concern aspects of Ceylon which perhaps more readily come to the mind of the average man than its conquest or its political history. They concern its agricultural industries and the development of roads, railways, irrigation, and other material services. The vicissitudes of cinnamon and coffee and tea in one of their great homes of origin should be of interest to a wide public. Unquestionably the most startling event in their history in Ceylon was the complete annihilation of the coffee industry by the famous "Coffee Bug," which first appeared in 1868 and quickly spread through the whole of the planting area. The reader may be referred to Frederick Lewis's *Sixty-Four Years in Ceylon* for a vivid personal narrative of the human suffering which attended this disaster. It was, curiously enough, the depression in the coffee industry which induced the planters and other Europeans engaged in commerce to renew an old European cry for an increase in the number of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council and for some approach to self-government. It is true that when trade improved the agitation died down, and that in later days the Europeans in Ceylon have been on the whole hostile to self-government in Ceylon. It is also true, one imagines, that they expected to have the lion's share in control of affairs or among the unofficial majority if the Secretary of State had been willing to accept their proposals. Yet it remains the oddest of odd facts that the demand for self-government for Ceylon first came from their quarter and not from the permanent population. It is surprising that politicians who are not above using statements or events out of their context have overlooked this apparently powerful plea from a wholly unexpected source.

The book ends with a chapter on the evolution of Ceylon since the nineties which cannot be regarded as adequate. It would have been better if it had closed with the nineties, or, better still, if the chapter had been included as an appendix, honestly summarizing in the briefest fashion the main headings of a possible further treatise. It is not yet the time for such a treatise, since no man can rightly appreciate the effects of the Donoughmore Reforms at this stage. Nevertheless many want to know more about the Ceylon of to-day than about the Ceylon of the nineteenth century, and some reference to recent events was unavoidable. In Mr. Mills's last chapter we find something of the bare bones of modern Ceylon, but little of the soul of its political entity. There is enough to indicate the friendly attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the legitimate aspirations of the Ceylonese, an attitude which has fairly followed the maxim of the Church of England: "To keep the mean between the two extremes, of too much stiffness in refusing, and of too much easiness in admitting any variation from it." There is also enough in the last chapter, and indeed throughout the book, to demonstrate the inapplicability of Ceylon examples to the vastly more difficult and complex problems of India.

Meanwhile Mr. Mills has given us a solid and reliable history of an important period which is scholarly and readable and constitutes a valuable study in Crown Colony government.

Years of Destiny—India, 1926-32. By J. Coatman. With a Foreword by Lord Irwin of Kirby, K.G. 9½" x 5½". Pp. 384. Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d.
India in Transition. By D. Graham Pole. 7½" x 5". Pp. xii + 395. The Hogarth Press. 8s. 6d.

Some apology is needed for the delay in reviewing these two books upon the Indian situation. As, however, Lord Irwin observes in his Foreword to Professor Coatman's book, we are too near the picture to judge finally of the perspective, and even the short time that has elapsed since the publication of these books has seen events which must seriously affect the correctness of the author's views.

To take Mr. Coatman's book first, we need not quarrel seriously with his survey of past history. We do not expect a professor, however, to tell us that Nadir Shah's invasion took place in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and that it was the last of the historic invasions from the North-West. Perhaps he was thinking of Ahmad Shah Abdali. We wish, moreover, that Mr. Coatman would not speak of Mr. Tilak and Dr. Moonje as Mahrattas. Apparently he really believes that they are of that race, as he speaks of the Congress leaders belonging to the powerful and martial Mahratta community. Now, it is true that Chitpavan Brahmans, such as Mr. Tilak and Dr. Moonje, and, it may be added, Mr. Kelkar, a modern leader of whom Mr. Coatman takes singularly little notice, do sometimes call themselves Mahrattas, but no one else in Western India does so, and the mistake is the more flagrant because there is a strong Mahratta party which is bitterly anti-Brahman. The Chitpavan is as typically Brahman as the Kashmiri Pandit whom Mr. Coatman regards as the Brahman *par excellence*. These are, however, professorial points. More serious objection might be taken to the manner in which Professor Coatman applies the old-fashioned Liberal theory that democratic institutions, which had been successful in England, and moderately successful in the Colonies, were equally inevitable and equally likely to be successful in India. Yet it was an old Liberal in Lord Morley who less than twenty-five years ago declared parliamentary institutions to be unthinkable in India. Mr. Coatman's principal thesis is, however, Lord Irwin's Viceroyalty, and his conclusion is that history will record the verdict that Lord Irwin's policy was right. With much of Mr. Coatman's panegyric everyone will agree: there are no two opinions about Lord Irwin's high-mindedness, his unwearied patience, and the great personal regard in which he was universally held. We may not, however, equally follow Mr. Coatman's view as to the wisdom of all his actions. Let us take the three episodes which Mr. Coatman selects for detailed treatment: his handling of Mr. Patel, the President of the Legislative Assembly; his declaration about Dominion Status; and his long-drawn negotiations with Mr. Gandhi. We believe that everyone acquainted with the egregious Mr. Patel was astonished at the amount of rope given him. Mr. Coatman himself says that "the Indian Press resounded with the triumph of Mr. Patel and the humiliation of the Government of India," and that this petty incident proved to be quite one of the most important of Lord Irwin's Viceroyalty. The declaration of Dominion Status was admittedly intended to satisfy the *amour propre* of India. It has since been declared impossible of realization without further parliamentary intervention—a fact which was indeed almost immediately announced by Lord Russell, the Labour Under-Secretary of State, in a speech which is severely reprobated by Major Graham Pole, but which only stated what is now admitted to be correct. The announcement then aroused hopes which it has been impossible to fulfil. As regards the interviews with Mr. Gandhi, it may be agreed that Lord Irwin won a strategic victory which had far-reaching results, since it ensured Mr. Gandhi's presence at the Second Round-Table Conference, where his impossibility

and his deficiencies were made manifest to politicians in Europe and to the other Indian delegates. But, as Mr. Coatman admits, there were heavy tactical losses, and we may well doubt the wisdom of such negotiations with one of whom Mr. Coatman writes: "As a politician, he is a sham and a dangerous sham." We may, however, be permitted to judge of the general picture drawn by Mr. Coatman of Lord Irwin's régime. He admits that during the early months matters were quiet. "Indian politics were strangely apathetic" is his expression. Then the temperature of these politics rose, and there was a gradual "drift into anarchy." Finally, Mr. Coatman sinks into the gloom of what he calls "the darkest hour," and he expresses serious doubts as to whether Lord Willingdon was handling the situation in the best possible manner. We trust that his doubts have by now been enlightened. India is at the present moment quieter and better governed than it has been for years. A recent instance may be given of the change. The news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest was announced one morning in Bombay; on the same day the Viceroy arrived and was given a cordial reception. Two days later three motions of adjournment on account of Mr. Gandhi's arrest were defeated in Bombay municipality. All this would have been impossible in Lord Irwin's time. We fully agree that there have been many contributing causes to this improvement: the growing impossibility of Mr. Gandhi, the increased tension, as federation grows nearer, between Hindus and Mahomedans, the satisfactory atmosphere at the Round-Table Conference; but the main factor has been the feeling of the great law-abiding masses of the people that they would be firmly governed, and of the provincial administrations that they would be supported by the Government of India. No feature of the change is more pleasing than the good feeling now shown to Europeans, not only in Bombay, but all over India.

In the publisher's "blurb" Major Graham Pole is stated to have an intimate knowledge of India. It is, however, a knowledge acquired entirely from one point of view and with a marked bias against his own countrymen. He credits, of course, all the stories of police violence; he even sympathizes with the twenty Sikhs, who, brave fellows, surrounded themselves with a cordon of women volunteers when resisting the police. He believes that the railways have not been planned to help the people, and he argues with the Madras politician who thinks that Indians can undertake the entire responsibility for their defence in a period of something like thirty years. He repeats the ancient fable that the village system "was destroyed by us." The truth is that the village unitary self-government only fully functioned, *faute de mieux*, where there was no central government. It was not encouraged in a comparatively efficient indigenous system like that of the Peshwa's Government, and it has been destroyed far more effectually in the Indian States than in the British Provinces. The writer of this notice is acquainted with one State in which an attempt (by a British administrator) to restore it has proved very unpopular with the people. The book contains a good deal of useful information about mines and labour, but we do not think that either it or Mr. Coatman's can be taken as a safe guide to the present situation.

Reconstruction and Education in Rural India. In the Light of the Programme carried on at Sriniketan. By Prem Chand Lal. With a Foreword by Rabindranath Tagore. 8½" x 5½". Pp. 262. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 10s. net.

It is indeed a healthy sign that village life in India is at last interesting a public wider than the missionaries of the various religious denominations and the officials

of the Government services labouring in its midst. For many years village welfare work has been the task of officials whose records of the progress achieved can be found in numerous Government reports. The publication of Mr. F. L. Brayne's book in 1929, *The Remaking of Village India*, made known some of the aspects of this work. This book, *Reconstruction and Education in Rural India*, is really, in spite of its grandiose title, the description of a similar experiment, though on a much smaller scale, than that carried out by Mr. Brayne and his colleagues. Its activities are confined to the area around Santiniketan in District Birbhum, Bengal, which has become known to many through the writings of Sir Rabindranath Tagore, the founder of the school. The author makes no attempt to convey any idea of the extent of the experiment, for nowhere does he state the numbers of the pupils dealt with at Santiniketan. But he does state on p. 97 that the school at Sriniketan, a small village $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant, started with only six boys, increased in 1926 to thirty, only fifteen of whom were boarders, as there was no accommodation for more. Nowhere does he give any indication of the staff employed at these places, whilst at the same time he produces an impression that all the work done at these two places is pioneer work. He makes no mention of the well-known training school for village teachers at Moga in the Panjab or the missionary training school for rural teachers at Chapra, District Nadia in Bengal, where for years excellent work has been done; and one wishes he had seen something of the work of Dr. D. Spencer Hatch begun in Travancore in 1916. The most important chapters of the book are the fourth and fifth, in which he describes the activities of the "Institute" and the rural experimental school. All the work done is exactly on the lines advocated by officials for years past. The Government Weaving School at Serampore gets no mention, although it was due to its work in perfecting hand looms that village weaving could again be put on a paying basis. Similarly no credit is given to Government for its work in starting and organizing the work of co-operative societies. Instead of that Dr. Lal takes every chance of belittling Government activities. He even, on p. 190, makes the ludicrous statement: "It is therefore extremely difficult under the present conditions to do anything instructive, creative, and uplifting without being suspected of encouraging sedition. The nationalist leaders, no matter what field they may be engaged in—even that of purely social and educational work—are always under suspicion; their work is always hampered, and at times they are even harassed." If this be so, he might be asked to explain why Rai Bahadur Dr. Gopal Chandra Chatterjee, mentioned on p. 77, and many others have succeeded so well in obtaining Government co-operation in their instructive and creative works. The only new feature for Bengal in all the range of activities described is the Rural Circulating Library, which is admirably suited for a small community.

The rest of the book is taken up with Dr. Lal's ideas of what should be done in rural areas in schools and social service. These problems have all been stated many times already. Experiments along these lines are now needed. And in this small community with its large staff there is everything at hand to bring success. An explanation of the paucity of results may perhaps be found in the want of method and the complete lack of discipline pervading the whole institution. For an emotional race like the Bengali this is fatal.

The value of the book is vitiated throughout by its attitude to Government. In the preface Dr. Lal states: "In places I have criticized the Government for its neglect of the rural problems and for its being responsible in many ways for the poverty of the villages." No one would object to a criticism of Government work or policy if the facts were correct. Thus he describes Lord Macaulay conceiving

a scheme to make a class of brown Englishmen by the introduction of English education, whilst the fact is that the demand came from educated Bengal twenty years before it was granted. He also states that the Government of India can no longer assume the *laissez-faire* attitude towards the poverty of the people, without taking any cognizance that only through the prolonged efforts on the part of Government officers were co-operative societies started; any attention paid by educated Bengalis to mass primary education; that means of combating epidemic disease were discovered; that, in short, the conscience of educated India was aroused, so that work in these fields at last began by private individuals like Dr. Lal. On p. 34 Dr. Lal's mention of the Rural Primary Education Act shows that if he has read it he has not understood it. That Act refers only to rural areas. Any town that wished it could have had compulsory primary education by means of an Act passed in 1920, but the first town to take action was Chittagong in 1928—a commentary on the enthusiasm for popular education amongst educated Bengalis! Dr. Lal doubts whether a proposal to teach religion in elementary schools would be accepted by Government, overlooking the express provision made in Bengal for that very purpose in the above-mentioned Act. It is neither Government nor the Mohammedans who objected to religious instruction, but only the Hindus. Dr. Lal does mention the work of the Saroj Nalini Association organized by the Collector of Birbhum and his late wife, but he omits any reference to the work of the Bengal Women's Education League, which is transforming the outlook of women teachers in Bengal.

Dr. Lal is right in saying that "the key to rural reconstruction lies in co-operation," and that "what is needed is good leadership." It is doubtful how much of these can be expected out of Santiniketan, whose founder stated in 1930, "Just think how England is starving India," and whose exponent is so blinded by his worship of the poet he cannot see any good in anything governmental.

J. H. L.

Burma and Beyond. By Sir George Scott. 8½" × 5½". Pp. 349. Illustrations and map. Grayson and Grayson, Ltd. 1932. 18s.

This book is chiefly an encyclopædia of the lives, customs, dress, etc., of the innumerable tribes and clans which inhabit the Federated Shan States with offshoots into other parts of Burma, the whole making a jig-saw puzzle which only a chronicler such as the author who had spent his life among them could attempt to deal with. As a work of reference for those who are lucky enough to be stationed in the Shan States and for the student of ethnology, it has no equal. As a guidebook for the visitor and traveller it is out of date, although it is full of interest. Times are changing and nowhere more rapidly than in this hinterland of Burma. Anyone who had not visited the country since the war would be amazed at the changes wrought by the opening of motor roads and the advent of the motor bus and the lorry. Places which took weeks of marching to reach are now within a few days' journey by motor. In the open season one can motor from Rangoon to Kengtung and Siam and from Rangoon to Namkham on the Yunnan Frontier. People come by bus from remote villages to attend the bazaar at Taunggyi, Lashio, etc. When trouble threatens, military police can be rushed out in motor lorries to what were once almost inaccessible districts, thereby saving days of marching. The establishment of Shan States Chiefs College at Taunggyi, the enlistment of Shans in the military police, the spread of education by Government and missionary schools, the settlements of Gurkhas, the development of industries, such as the cultivation of potatoes, have all added their quota to

the civilizing of many parts of the country. There are, of course, many isolated tribes only visited by officials, and others such as the wild Wa's still unadministered and whose country is a closed book. For the traveller on and off the beaten track there is still an endless variety of interests. Superstition still rules the lives of the people, but increasing contact with the outside world must tell in the long run. Incidents such as those related by the author still happen, and the book is well worth reading, but it is in many respects a chronicle of the past.

A. L.

Soviet Economic Policy in the East. By Violet Conolly. 7½" x 5". Pp. ix + 168. Map. Oxford University Press. 6s. 6d.

This book by Violet Conolly shows praiseworthy endeavour to gather statistics and important facts about the Economic Policy of the Soviets in the Far East. The Graduate Institute of International Studies has made a grant towards the publication of the book, and, as a handy work of reference on its subject, it has considerable value. The map at the end of the volume showing Soviet railway development in Central Asia gives an idea of the huge amount of peaceful penetration which is going on over a large area. This development, based on the Trans-Siberian, the Trans-Caspian, and the Orenburg-Tashkent lines, is stretching enveloping fingers southwards to the fertile lands of Chinese Turkestan and to the plains of Mongolia.

Projected lines in Mongolia include Kiachta to Urga, Biisk to Kobdo, and Sergiopil to Chuguchak, three termini covering the western two-thirds of Mongolia. The line proposed to Urga, the capital, is perhaps the most important. A very few years ago China proposed to carry the Peking-Suiyan Railway on from Pao-To-Chen to Kiachta through Urga.

Chapter V. is devoted to the Soviet economic relations with Mongolia and Tana Tuva. The latter sounds so much more like an island in the South Seas that it is difficult to remember that it is a Central Asian Republic wedged in between Siberia and Mongolia.

The figures quoted show how China's trade with Mongolia has deteriorated, and correspondingly increased with Russia. Mongolia's exports come out via Russia, and Russia's exported oats, barley, millet, etc., find a ready market in Mongolia. Miss Conolly rightly says that Russia looks on Mongolia as an excellent place for carrying out an experiment in World Revolution; also that it acts as a reservoir from which certain raw materials required by the Soviet can be drawn. During the last five years trade held by Chinese, British, and American firms has slipped from their hands into those of the Russians.

Tana Tuva is said to have great agricultural possibilities. The upper reaches of the Yenisei run through the country and thereby form a basis of communication from Mongolia to the sea.

Russia has introduced many new commodities to these undeveloped Far Eastern countries, and figures quoted show an increase in Russia's Far Eastern trade from 6 per cent. of her total trade in 1913 to 14 per cent. in 1932. The textile market has been almost entirely captured by Russia, but one wonders when Japan will attack this sphere. One melancholy fact stands out, and that is that British goods are definitely ousted by Russian. Russia has been almost equally successful in Persia and Afghanistan.

The absence of any mention of Japan or China is explained by the fact that Miss Conolly promises another volume covering those countries, which I, for one, shall look forward to reading.

H. StC. S.

Young China and New Japan. By Mrs. Cecil Chesterton. 8½" x 5½". Pp. 310. 45 illustrations. Map. Harrap. 10s. 6d.

This book is a record of Mrs. Chesterton's impressions gathered on a journey to the Far East last year. She travelled out and returned home by the Suez route, visiting Malaya, China and Japan, and recounts in detail almost everything she saw and heard, the ships and trains in which she travelled, the places where she stayed and the country she passed through, and the conversations she had with all manner of people, from Marshal Chiang Kai Shek down to guides and richa coolies. There is much in the book that is trivial and not a little that is inaccurate, and a good many of the more superficial opinions Mrs. Chesterton expresses will certainly be questioned by those who have a longer acquaintance with the countries she visited. But the observations of a fresh and alert mind are always interesting, and the general conclusions at which Mrs. Chesterton arrives merit the serious attention of those who are concerned with the problems of the Far East.

Mrs. Chesterton is an expert in "atmosphere," and the picture she paints of the atmosphere of the Far East as it is to-day is one at which few observers will cavil. China, devastated by floods (there is a very interesting description of post-flood conditions on the Yangtze, and of a visit to a refugee camp near Hankow) and helpless in face of Japanese aggression, but with an underlying strength in the vast mass and unconquerable vitality of her people. The aggressive materialism of Japan, with her break from ancient standards and her determination, under a military oligarchy, to follow the dangerous path of foreign adventure and Imperial ambition. The apathetic disinterestedness of the British Colonies, Hong Kong more especially and to a lesser extent Malaya. The colour consciousness of the British residents, though here Mrs. Chesterton makes the mistake, not uncommon among casual visitors, of attaching undue importance to the attitude of the more vocal type of "Shanghaiander," who shortsightedly applauds Japanese aggression, forgetting that it will probably end in his own extinction. All these are portrayed with insight, though sometimes not without intolerance; and Mrs. Chesterton's conclusion is that the future in the Far East lies with Japan and that neither European nor American influence will count for very long in China's future. Who shall say that she is wrong?

The chapters on China are the best in the book, and Mrs. Chesterton was fortunate in getting interviews with several of the leading personalities in that country, both Chinese and foreign. It is a pity she was not so well equipped with introductions in Japan, where most of her contacts were with guides and hotel porters. The leading figures in Japanese life are extremely difficult of access, but if she had met some of them she would surely have had some most interesting impressions to give us.

It also seems a pity that Mrs. Chesterton did not complete her journey by returning home across Manchuria and Russia. She could then have told us about what she was allowed to see in Manchuria, which would not have been much, and would probably have laid more emphasis on the part which Russia has to play in the Far Eastern drama. That part is likely to be greater than a reader of this book would realize.

The book is well illustrated with photographs, mostly taken by Mrs. Chesterton herself. But the photograph of a Hong Kong sampan, opposite page 65, is quite clearly taken in Shanghai, as can be seen both from the design of the craft and from the background.

This book makes an interesting companion to Professor Arnold Toynbee's description of a somewhat similar journey made in 1929, published under the title of *A Journey to China*.

J. S. S.

China Yesterday and Today. By E. T. Williams. 8½" x 5½". Pp. xxiv + 743. Illustrations and map. Fifth edition revised. London: George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., Bombay and Sydney. Printed in U.S.A. 18s.

Where two or three are gathered together and one says to another, "Tell me about China; I know hardly anything about it," Professor Williams' book would be most suitable to put into the hands of the enquirer.

The author first went to China as a missionary; he then became Chinese Secretary at the American Legation, Peking, and acted, during a ministerial interregnum, as *Chargé d'Affaires*. In these capacities he was in a position to make himself *au fait* with all that was going on. And when he retired from China he took up work in the Far Eastern Department of the American Foreign Office at Washington, and so was able to keep in touch with Oriental affairs. He is now Professor of Oriental Languages and Literature in the University of California.

With such a history one could reasonably have expected a book conceived on different and more original lines. But there is very little that is new throughout the volume—little that anyone interested in China has not read again and again, in all the many books that have been published about that country. It opens with a geographical description which is followed by a chapter on the early history of China; then it tells us about the family, marriage customs, the farmer's life, and towards the end there is a readable chapter on the struggle for democracy.

One seeks in vain for reflections or deductions made from the Professor's own observations on the spot, more especially when we are told on the cover that "his long years of residence in China have given him unequalled knowledge of that country," also that it is "the most complete survey of China available."

In the second part of the book on China of To-day, the changes that have taken place are greater than those that the author describes. Feminism, education, the demand for foreign goods, the extension of railways, the activities of bandit soldiers and opium racketeers, and the establishment of Manchukuo are scarcely touched upon, although they are all important phases which are changing the face of present-day China.

Writing from the sanctity of academic cloisters, the author gives an incomplete picture of the country as it really now is. Provincial misrule, the evils of Communism, and the cleavage between North and South, as well as the lack of any proper head of the State, are factors which are retarding proper governance among a people who are longing for it and are making life hazardous for the greater part of the Chinese people. They are problems which the Professor makes no attempt to dissect.

His final summation of China is that "the outlook is discouraging. Will history repeat itself?" but what particular phase of China's age-old history he does not say.

Otherwise the tale is pleasantly told, and if we can wait till a rainy afternoon in the winter this book will make a good companion by the fireside, to browse among its pages and read again an oft-told story.

G. D. G.

Co-operation for Africa. By C. F. Strickland, C.I.E., I.C.S. (ret.).

Lord Lugard, in his introduction to this book, writes:

"The fundamental principle of the system (co-operation) is identical with that of 'Indirect Rule'—which could be better named 'Co-operative Rule' the essential aim of both being to teach personal responsibility and initiative.

"The Governor of an African Dependency who desires, before introducing the system, to appreciate fully the nature of the societies and to consider how the methods proposed will affect the existing order, will find in this little volume precisely what he and the heads of his departments need."

Here is a very striking tribute to the co-operative ideal paid by one whose word is sacred in the counsels of African Administration. The theory of this new science will entail a readjustment of administrative values, and its application will introduce far-reaching reforms in the countries of its adoption. The Government of India in a report has written:

"There can be no doubt that a new factor in Administration, which cannot be disregarded, has come into being, and that new duties and responsibilities have been thrown upon the District Officer." So, at the very outset, the interest of the student of African Administration is aroused, and, to the Political Officer, Mr. Strickland's book becomes an invaluable guide.

The thesis may be expressed thus: The world has become small and its movement swift. Africa, in common with the world, is being hurried forward in the maelstrom of economic pressure and social progress. The traditions of the past, the old tribal sanctions, the slow-moving day-to-day interests of the African native are inevitably upset. A new earth has come with the speed of wings and in its train are Healing or Destruction.

Such is the choice before the trustees of Africa's future.

Mr. Strickland offers to the white powers, in whose hands the destiny of the greater part of Africa lies, a plea for co-operation. Not an imposition of Western civilization—there lies destruction—but an adjustment along straightforward economic and social lines. Co-operation involves the basic principles of a corporate life. It means union and strength, and its societies aim at a goal of moral and social well-being. The co-operative movement is unconcerned—and by nature unconcerned—with politics and agitation. Outside of Great Britain only one Society, in the author's vast experience, has ever assumed a political attitude. This is a matter of vital importance, and, mayhap, the pitiable, coffee-housing intelligentsia of today, the product of an over-expansive educational policy, without tradition and without balance, will find their metier in the "thrift" and "better living" co-operative societies of an African to-morrow. Politically it is worth a trial.

In *Co-operation for Africa* Mr. Strickland has succeeded admirably in drawing an easily understood picture of:

- (a) What co-operation is.
- (b) What it has achieved.
- (c) And how the main principles can be applied to the development of a better Africa.

He writes as an expert who has "brought up" a family of 20,000 societies in India to a realization of a better—and attainable—birthright. That Africa is not unprepared to receive his gospel is shown in the second part of his book, where "The Co-operative Ordinance of Tanganyika" is given in full text. The student would be well advised to study this Ordinance in detail, as it provides a survey of the practical application of co-operative principles.

Lord Lugard has said: "The task of the Administrator is summed up in one word, 'Adaptation.'" The French have another word, 'Assimilation,' which may soon be rendered 'Association.' "Both nations" (I quote from a recent article in *The Times*) "may well speculate on the future relationship of French and British West Africa when the people so arbitrarily and intricately distributed between them begin to draw together and find that the pink and yellow portions of the

map are stamped with such different cultures and turned towards such different political destinies."

In trusteeship there can be no speculation. Sociology here meets Administration, not surely at the cross-roads, but on the straight and well defined path of mutual co-operation.

Mr. Strickland has offered, in his little thought-inspiring volume, a general policy of Administration for all Africa, to realize Africa's destiny.

E. C.

The Himalayan Journal. Vol. V. Pp. 168. 34 illustrations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1933. Price 8s.

The editor of the *Himalayan Journal*, having migrated from India to Oxford, has obtained new publishers for the volume, which is the first to come from the Clarendon Press. We may say at once that everyone concerned is to be congratulated on the result. The publishers have given us excellent paper, with pleasing and very legible type, while the reproductions of the illustrations could hardly be surpassed. The editor also has done his share in collecting a series of papers which should cater for all tastes.

The volume opens with an article by Lieut.-Colonel B. E. M. Gurdon, entitled "Chitral Memories," dealing with the events leading up to the siege of Chitral in the spring of 1895. Colonel Gurdon was the Political Agent in Chitral at the time, and therefore writes with first-hand knowledge of a very difficult time.

Mr. Hugh Rutledge, the leader of the party now attacking Everest, follows with a brief account of Nanda Devi and the previous attempts to climb it, and of his own unsuccessful attempt in 1932. A beautiful photograph of the mountain is reproduced with his paper.

This is succeeded by an account by Dr. Hellmut de Terra of his 1932 expedition into the Eastern Karakoram. The party explored the country on both banks of the Indus river between the Tso Moriri and the Pang Gong Tso, with an extension up the Chang Chemno. The country traversed can hardly be considered unknown, but a very useful survey of some 4,600 square miles was completed and much valuable geological, biographical, and zoological data collected. A sketch-map and several very fine illustrations accompany the paper.

We then come to what is possibly the most interesting article of the volume, an account by Mr. F. Kingdon Ward of his expedition with Lord Cranbrook in 1930-31 to the sources of the Irrawaddy river. In these sparsely inhabited Alpine valleys travelling is no light undertaking, as, in addition to the problems of supplies and transport, climatic and political difficulties have to be overcome. Mr. Kingdon Ward is an experienced traveller and has made previous journeys in these regions, but though the geographical results of the expedition were not as satisfactory as he had hoped for, the natural history and botanical collections were very successful, while if the three reproductions are average samples of the scenery, it is quite certain that he had nothing to complain of in that direction.

Dr. Allwein, a member of Herr Bauer's 1931 Kangchenjunga expedition, then gives a short account of a diversion from the main party's return journey into the Purnanram valley; and Herr Merkl follows with an account of his Nanga Parbat expedition in 1932. Although success was not achieved, much useful information was obtained about possible routes. Two lesser peaks were climbed. Some fine illustrations and a sketch-map of the mountain and its approaches add to the interest of the narrative.

Messrs. Hamilton and Gorrie then respectively contribute papers on the Kulu

and Saraj tahsils of Kulu. This beautiful valley is not as well known as it deserves to be, and anyone contemplating a trip there should not fail to read these excellent articles, which contain much useful information for the prospective traveller.

A short account of a Hunza folk tale by Captain Clark, an account of an attempt to climb Chomiono by Mr. Spence, and an article by the editor on the Chong Kumdan glacier conclude the main portion of a particularly interesting volume. Accounts of various expeditions, obituary notices, notes on varied subjects, with many fine photos, reviews, correspondence, and club proceedings and notices, bring the journal to an end.

H. W.

Legends of Palestine. By Zev Vilnay. 8½" x 5½". Pp. xiii + 492. Illustrations. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. 1932.

This is a delightful book. The legends are derived from Hebrew and Arab sources, and date from earliest Biblical times to A.D. 1929. The author has known how to set down the tales of simple people of ardent faiths with a delicate and sometimes humorous touch which in no way savours of sophistication.

In no country does the remote past live more vividly than in Palestine, and the names of the Patriarchs and Sages of old still echo daily in the ears of the most casual wayfarer. Life centres round simple things, such as fields, valleys, rocks and wells, mountains, rivers, trees; and over all there is the glamour of tradition. Even the winds have their story. Of mosques, synagogues, and tombs of holy men and women many wonders are told. It is through song and legend that the spirit of a people best reveals itself, and in these pages will be found echoes of that faith and endurance in adversity which has always been a characteristic trait of the Palestinians. All lovers of Palestine will welcome this book, and the traveller could have no better guide.

The book is divided into parts according to district, and a subject index makes it easy for the reader to find any particular legend quickly. The sources of the legends are given in a supplement which should be useful to students. The numerous illustrations, some reproduced from old prints and some from photographs, add point and charm to an already fascinating book.

A. M. SOLTAU-SYMONS.

The Sealand of Ancient Arabia. By R. P. Dougherty. 10" x 7½".

Pp. xii + 203. Yale Oriental Series, Vol. XIX. London: Milford. 1932.

Professor Dougherty has produced a volume which is scarcely likely to rank as a "best-seller," but is none the less interesting and fascinating for the fact that it will have but few readers. Delving in the limited field of available cuneiform inscriptions, his aim is to prove that the country mentioned therein as "Mât Tāmtim," or the "Sealand," "was predominantly an Arabian region." He has done that to the complete satisfaction of at least one reader, who only wonders indeed that he does not go a good deal further than he does. As a scholar perhaps he feels that he must stop short with the exhaustion of his inscriptions, but he cannot surely have delved so deep into the subject without pondering on the possibility, almost certainty, that the Sealand of the ancients is nothing more nor less than the Island of the moderns.

Why Arabia should ever have come to be known to its own inhabitants and their immediate neighbours as Sealand or Tel-ud is probably now an unanswerable

question. Certain it is that it has never been known to them as Arabia: a foreign term of European origin used to indicate the area inhabited by the Arabs. But Professor Dougherty only mentions the term *Jazirat al 'Arab* once, and that in a footnote (p. 158). Yet it would be almost as difficult to define in exact terms the area comprised in the modern Jazira as Professor Dougherty, with the scanty material at his command, has found it to prove that certain parts of it (roughly the northern half) were included in the old Sealand. And it is scarcely likely that anything like all the cuneiform material mentioning or discussing the Sealand has yet come to light. We know now therefore that all the Sealand of old, as known to us, covered part of what we know as the Island. For the rest of the Island no name has come down to us from the inscriptions. The inference therefore seems obvious, and, to rewrite the opening sentence of the Introduction, we are left with the position that "in ancient times Arabia played an important part in the history of Babylonia and Assyria." What could be more natural? It still does.

Professor Dougherty introduces Arabia to us as "a strong and influential region," or, in other words, as an organized state as far back as about 2500 B.C. in connection with the ambitions and operations of Sargon of Agade. From about 2000 to 1600 B.C. we get proof positive of an Arabian dynasty of eleven (or twelve) kings ruling contemporaneously with the later monarchs of the Amurru and the earlier kings of the Kassite dynasties, and controlling at any rate part of Mesopotamia. It is certainly a curious fact that the names of about half these kings are Sumerian rather than Semitic, though this may be due to the Sumerian scribes who recorded them or to other factors, such as the fashion of the times, or perhaps indeed to the actual interpolation of Sumerian usurpers between the earlier and later Semitic kings of the dynasty (though this is apparently not probable in the light of existing knowledge). In any case, after about 1600 B.C. the Kassites appear to have had the field to themselves, and the Arabs did not emerge from their long eclipse until the eleventh century, when a short-lived dynasty of three kings once more ruled in Babylonia. A further eclipse was followed by the emergence of another Arabian dynasty of seven kings spanning the eighth century, while Professor Dougherty favours the view that the neo-Babylonian dynasty of the seventh and sixth centuries, following on the last-named dynasty, was of Sealand—i.e., Arabian—provenance, which possibly explains the long residence of Nabonidus at Taima in the desert.

Seen against this distant background, the more modern irruptions of Arabia on to the stage of world history become less difficult to understand, and, though we cannot yet apparently date with any certainty the beginnings of Sabeian and Himyarite history, we can begin to see dimly, as through a mist, the counterpart of Arabian repercussions on Babylonia in the ancient civilization of the Yaman. As climatic influences slowly but surely converted the Island of the Arabs into an ocean of sand and rock, the tide of civilization ebbed away from the centre to the sides, leaving behind only a core of virility which ever and anon surged out from the desert to vitalize the decadent civilizations round its circumference. With Professor Dougherty's assistance we begin to realize the true significance of Arabia, and no student of that country should miss his book or lay it down for want of patience to follow him through the maze of his patient research.

I have not space to discuss in detail a work almost every page of which sets one thinking furiously; but I cannot refrain from reference to one or two matters which seem to me far from unimportant signposts on the road to an understanding of Arabia. We are told that, in due course of their decadence, the efforts of the Arabs "to throw off the Kassite yoke was unavailing. Agum [the successor

of Ulamburiash and the son of Kastiliash, the previous Kassite king] assured the complete downfall of the [Sealand] dynasty by capturing Dûr-Ea, a principal city if not the capital of the Sealand, and by destroying . . . the temple of Ea, who was evidently a prominent deity of the Sealand." Can it be—I scarcely dare suggest it—that the Egyptian Pasha of 1818 A.D. repeated the exploit of the Kassite prince of 1500 B.C. when he captured and destroyed the city of DAR'YA, the capital of Wahhabi Arabia? We have yet to find Dûr-Ea; and "all the more regrettable," as Professor Dougherty says, "is the fact that Arabia's archaeological remains will be recovered very slowly."

A good case is made out for not dismissing as impossible the identity of the 'Aqaba of the inscriptions with the modern village of the same name at the northern end of the Gulf of 'Aqaba, but Professor Dougherty seems chary of claiming the Hijaz as a part of his Sealand in spite of much evidence which to me seems most encouraging. "Ibi-Tutu, whom the sun god burned in the midst of the Sealand, crossed the Sealand . . ." surely refers to experiences not in the Arabian desert, which is not alarmingly hot, but rather in the Hijaz—and the very form of the word translated Sealand here is *Ti-amat* (cf. *Tihama*), not the apparently commoner *Mât-Tâmtim*. But other evidence is even more convincing, although Professor Dougherty takes a very different view of it, and he may be right. In the middle of the ninth century B.C. Shalmaneser III. had to reckon with a powerful Arabian dynasty, and it is difficult to see the Persian Gulf, as Professor Dougherty does, in the conqueror's proud picture of his triumph. It is true that he represents himself as descending into Chaldea, but it looks to me as if he goes off at a tangent to other things when he says: "I drew near to the city of Baqânu, the fortress of Adina. . . . I stormed and captured the city. . . . As for Adina . . . silver, gold, copper, lead, iron . . . and elephants' (hides) I received from him. While I was staying by the side of the sea I received the tribute of Yâkinu, King of the Sealand . . . silver, gold, lead, copper . . . and elephants' hides." Even if Baqânu cannot be equated with Bakka (Mecca), these tribute items suggest the produce of the Arabian mountains rather than of the sedimentary lowlands. And the following is even better: "As for Marduk-apla-iddina, son of Yâkinu . . . he came to the city of Sapîa (? Sabiya) into my presence and kissed my feet. Gold, the dust of his land in great quantity, utensils of gold, necklaces of gold, precious stones, the products of the Sealand . . . I received as his tribute." It is difficult to resist the inference that the Sealand of the inscriptions embraced the Hijaz and possibly also the Yaman, but much research will be needed among the yet undiscovered inscriptions of millennia before we can effectively link up the localities named in the Babylonian and Assyrian documents with their modern equivalents.

Professor Dougherty is indeed to be congratulated on a brilliant and provoking contribution to the ancient history of Arabia.

H. STJ. B. PHILLIPS.

THE ASSYRIANS

Each of the following Notes on the Assyrians is written from a totally different standpoint. Each, however, reaches the same conclusion, that the Assyrians must be evacuated from 'Iraq.

ON Friday, September 22, the Council of the League of Nations refused the application of the 'Iraq Government that the enquiry into the recent massacre of the Assyrians should be postponed, and stated that this question would be examined before the end of the present session. The question of apportioning blame is a relatively minor one. No one will condone the massacres, but ultimately responsibility rests not only with the British Government, who left the 'Iraqis with an almost insoluble difficulty, but even more with the League of Nations, whose original decision leaving Hakkiari north of the 'Iraq frontier has been one of the main reasons for the situation. Also the League must remind itself that the Assyrian women have now been machine-gunned on two occasions since they came under League responsibility, firstly in Hakkiari in 1924 by the Turks and now in Simel and other villages in 1933. The facts have been given wide publicity.

Much controversy, however, may be expected over the position of the Mar Shimun and the degree of his responsibility for the Assyrian rising under Yaku Ismael, and the most difficult question of all will be the provision of a tolerably safe future for the twenty thousand Assyrians who still remain to be settled.

In certain quarters there has been a tendency to over-estimate the religious difficulty of the problem, and while there is no doubt that their being Christians has been a serious and added aggravation against the Assyrians, it is to the political factor that their main unpopularity amongst the 'Iraqi Arabs is due. The fact must be faced that the Arab Nationalists of 'Iraq are and always have been anti-British, and it is singularly unfortunate that when the Mandate was terminated last year no arrangements had been made to safeguard a people whose presence in that country was due to their having been our allies during the Great War and subsequently to having formed the personnel of the 'Iraq Levies, a British force and not (as has erroneously been stated in the press on several occasions) a branch of the 'Iraq army. By raising the Assyrian Levies, the British Government saved themselves no small expense, as, had it not been for this force, white troops would have to have been retained in 'Iraq for a considerably longer period. It is also true that by doing so the Assyrians were assured of a comfortable living whilst the force lasted, and it is also true that they benefited materially in many ways from their contact with and training under British

officers. But it must not be forgotten that by using them in this manner we were responsible for increasing their unpopularity in 'Iraq by reason of such service. Indirectly we encouraged their already over-zealous martial ardour and gave them a superiority complex, causing them to associate themselves too closely with the British and adopt a superior attitude to the other native races in 'Iraq.

It must be remembered that the Assyrians shared with Arabs and others the delusion that the British would never really leave 'Iraq. It was incomprehensible to the average native mind that the powerful British Government had spent so much in blood and money to conquer the country in order voluntarily to relinquish it within such a relatively short period, and the example of Egypt was freely quoted in the bazaars. The Assyrians therefore saw little reason to ingratiate themselves with the Arabs, whilst the Arabs, also disbelieving in British promises of withdrawal, became more anti-British and more anti-Assyrian.

The first cloud upon the Assyrian horizon was the League of Nations' demarcation of the Turkish-'Iraq frontier in 1926, giving Hakkari to the Turks, but even this failed seriously to alarm them, and it was not until June, 1932, when our departure was imminent and no provision had been made for them, that they awoke to the seriousness of their position. Then followed the incident when the Levies put down their rifles and refused further service unless their grievances were attended to—a difficult situation which was temporarily averted by the Mar Shimun, who advised his followers to remain calm, while he, on the recommendation of the High Commissioner, proceeded to Geneva. Seeing the impending danger, the Permanent Mandates Commission recommended that the Assyrians should be settled in a homogeneous group, but they were overruled by the personal assurance of the British representative, who assured the Council that satisfactory arrangements would be made in due course, and in the name of his Government assumed moral responsibility as to the future. Quite naturally the Mar Shimun, when he returned to 'Iraq, agitated for settlement upon the homogeneous plan and obstructed the subsequent attempt to scatter his people amongst their old enemies, the Kurds, although the Assyrians prefer the Kurds to the Arabs. Then followed the inevitable Turkish plan of "divide and rule," and every effort was made to discredit the Mar Shimun and encourage his personal rivals, whilst he himself was kept a virtual prisoner in the Y.M.C.A. in Baghdad.

Political heat and anti-British feeling increased in Baghdad, and it looked as if the unfortunate Assyrians would be ground to powder between the upper and the nether millstones.

This, then, was the situation when Yaku Ismael marched some thousand followers into Syria last August, an adventure which ended in the massacre by the 'Iraq army of unarmed villagers at Simel, together with extensive looting by Kurdish irregulars and armed

Bedouin. The subsequent reception of the victorious 'Iraq army in Baghdad leaves no room for doubt as to the strength of anti-Assyrian feeling in that country, and, in view of such feeling, it seems hardly likely that there was ever a hope that the Assyrians would be given reasonably good treatment.

There remains the problem of their future. Syria and Cyprus have been suggested as possible places to settle them; doubtless there are difficulties in the way of these or any other solution, but this time the problem can no longer be postponed. The Nansen International Refugee Office might be ready to undertake the task if provided with the necessary funds. Part of such expense would naturally fall upon the 'Iraq Government, but doubtless the British Government, remembering its moral responsibility, would not cavil at bearing a reasonable proportion of the cost.

PHILIP MUMFORD.

SARN, N. WALES,
August 21, 1933.

To the Editor of the R.C.A. JOURNAL.

SIR,

I am provoked by Sir Arnold Wilson's letter in *The Times* of August 19 to assume the rôle of *advocatus diaboli*. Is it not indeed high time that the Arab side of this regrettable incident was heard? Everyone knows that the Assyrians kicked like mules against Great Britain's surrender of her mandate for 'Iraq. Every argument against such a step was adduced before and heard by the assembled nations of the world, who in due course gave their blessing to the British Government's proposal to confer independence on 'Iraq in fulfilment of a promise of long standing. From that moment 'Iraq became responsible for handling the question of its minorities, and, as far as I know, not a shred of evidence has yet been produced that the 'Iraq Government or its officials have given the Assyrians any reasonable cause for offence. The Government has indeed been unable to accede to the Assyrians' demand for settlement in a homogeneous block on the reasonable ground that such settlement would involve the unreasonable disturbance of those already settled in the areas available. It has indeed been constrained to circumscribe the liberty of movement of the Assyrian chief, Mar Shimun, on the reasonable ground that his freedom of movement would be a menace to the peace of the State. Apart from these matters, have we any evidence of anything having been done to goad the Assyrians into rebellion?

I think not, and the moral responsibility for the partial exodus into Syria rests with the Assyrians themselves in so far as it was the actual origin of the subsequent trouble. Why on earth the French authorities

did not disarm them for good and have done with it I cannot imagine. They may have thought that the Assyrian gesture was but a transient fit of ill-temper which would evaporate as soon as the real inconvenience of their homeless situation made itself felt. At any rate, whatever the reason for their action, they enabled a party of these unfortunate people to return fully armed into 'Iraq territory for the ostensible purpose of making peace with the 'Iraq authorities. Instead of that they made war on the small contingent sent forward to receive them back into the fold. And they were then hunted down by a ruthless military commander of a kidney not uncommon in other lands. Their fate was inevitable and is deplorable, for which reason the commander will presumably suffer some sort of punishment which will not deter other military commanders from being ruthless in suitable circumstances. But their fate was brought upon themselves by their own act of treachery, against which we have not so far heard a single unkind word. It was, in fact, rather a fine, desperate thing to do, though foolish. And now we blame the 'Iraq Government for the consequences of their folly and the British Government for the existence of the 'Iraq Government.

I suppose, and it is indeed to be hoped, that no machinery exists (except, of course, war) for depriving King Faisal and his people of their independent status. Judging by the standards of history, they have done nothing to merit punishment of that kind. So the problem remains one of the disposal and future of the Assyrians. They obviously cannot remain in 'Iraq as enemies of her King and Constitution, as has already been demonstrated in the case of Mar Shimun, who has refused to take the oath of loyalty to King Faisal and has been removed to another sphere. His followers can follow him, if they like, to Cyprus, but Sir Arnold Wilson would have the British taxpayer foot the bill of settling them in Syria. Why Syria? Of course, it is a charming country, and the French might be glad of more weightage against the Arab majority. But Syria is, after all, only mandated territory, and is liable at any time to suffer the regrettable fate of 'Iraq by becoming an independent State. What then? Will the Assyrians refuse the oath of loyalty to the new (Arab) Government? Surely the step recommended by Sir Arnold Wilson is little better than a leap from the fire into the frying-pan, and, in their own interests, I would advise the Assyrians to make their peace on reasonable terms with King Faisal, claiming the ancient guest-right of the Arabs. If that is impossible, there are the Turks over the way; and stranger things have happened than the reconciliation of ancient enemies, in which case their own fair mountains of Hakkiari still apparently stand empty against their return. They are by no means the only people who "no longer trust British promises," but they, like the Jews in Palestine, must learn to live in harmony with the Arabs if they would make their home on Arab soil. Unless they can reconcile themselves to such a change of temper, they can scarcely expect of Great Britain the

miracle of keeping so many mutually incompatible promises made in her name at various times and under various stresses.

Sir Arnold Wilson incidentally drags into the argument against 'Iraq the Kurds "goaded into rebellion by official ineptitude." Has he already forgotten 1920? It takes more than ineptitude to create rebellion, and I thought, and still think, that it was a grave mistake to saddle 'Iraq with the Kurdish problem. But we had promised ourselves a different future when we pressed for that solution, and that promise too we have broken to keep another! So 'Iraq will have to shoulder the burden until she discovers the disadvantages of an imperialistic outlook.

One more word. Sir Arnold Wilson claims the concurrence of the Royal Air Force in his verdict "that the Arab cannot be trusted to guard its aerodromes in 'Iraq." I challenge the Air Ministry to endorse that verdict as publicly as it has been pronounced.

With apologies for the length of this letter.

Yours, etc.,

H. STJ. B. PHILBY.

N.B.—This letter was written before the death of King Faisal, and I have thought it best to leave it as written.

'IRAQ AND THE ASSYRIANS—1932-33

By ERNEST MAIN, M.A.

IRAQ'S Assyrian trouble in the late summer of 1933 is perhaps worth setting down in detail and putting on record in the JOURNAL. I was the only special correspondent in the country, having been sent out by the *Daily Mail*, but even without the trammels of business connections with 'Iraq, I found it hard to send anything out of the country, except such information as might obtain the approval of the Ministry of Interior.

Article XV. of the 'Iraqi Constitution Law of 1924, as amended in 1925, says: "All postal and telegraphic correspondence and all telephonic communications shall be secret and free from censorship or detention, except in such circumstances and in such manner as may be prescribed by law." I have not been able to get the text of any qualifying law, but there exists a species of "Dora," which empowers the Ministry of Interior to impose restrictions in the public interest. Under these powers the control of communications from 'Iraq to foreign countries was exercised when necessary.

In August and September, 1933, there was a definite censorship—and in some cases stoppage—of cables, and it was commonly said among the British community that many letters to Europe, posted in 'Iraq, were never received by the addressees.

But news of the troubles did get out. Some of it came from indignant, even hysterical, British people; some of it from the Christian minorities, who, as will be seen, were in part terrified and in part opportunist. All this mass of material was one-sided—pro-Assyrian and anti-Arab. Except for the official and secret records, my account of the 1933 happenings is the fullest and most impartial that has yet appeared. It may be impugned on a few details, but substantially it is a fair and full report.

The beginnings of the affair are to be found in the tangled war history of the year 1916, when the Assyrians—subjects of the Ottoman Empire living in the Hakkari country between and among the Kurds and the Armenians—were encouraged by the Imperial Russian Government to rise against the Turks. The Russians did not employ the Assyrians so much as fighters. They used them rather as little organized bands of assassins to creep round the Turkish villages at night, murdering sleeping Turks in their beds and generally doing what they could to create a reign of terror in the country where the Caucasian armies were operating.

In 1917 came the two revolutions and the military collapse of Russia.

The Assyrians, left in the lurch, had to fight their way south, and by 1918 the survivors had reached Mesopotamia, where they were established in 1918 in a large concentration camp at Baquba, some little distance to the north-east of Baghdad. For two years the Assyrians remained there, at the expense of the British tax-payer, who maintained them on the "dole" to the tune of two millions sterling. About this time it was decided to enlist Assyrians in the Levies which were being raised locally to make good to some extent the loss of strength caused by the withdrawal of the Army. It thus becomes clear that there is not much foundation for the claim that the Assyrians are ex-allies of the war: they did not as a force fight on the side of the British during any major operations against the Ottoman Empire.

In this way the Assyrian Levies came into being—maintained by the British Government, officered by British officers, trained and armed on British lines. It is undeniable that the Assyrian Levies for the past dozen years have been a splendid force. Keen soldiers, of martial spirit and bearing as might be expected of free-minded highlanders, they developed an *esprit de corps* which almost made them more British than the British. They despised the Arabs in general and the Arab Army in particular. In this, it must be said, they were largely encouraged by their officers, who were reasonably and justifiably proud of the men they commanded; by the British Royal Air Force, with whom for a decade they have been in close touch, either when serving as aerodrome guards, or, when time-expired, as mess-waiters and batmen; and by the British community in general who appreciated their smart soldierly bearing, their fine spirit of independence, and their British sense of training and discipline.

The Assyrians thus became arrogant and swelled-headed. The pay received by the Levies and sent home by them to their families in the north raised to an unheard-of extent the general standard of living to which they were accustomed. Until they emerged into the foreground of the international picture, they were rude, simple tribesmen, living a hard life in the mountains, from which they wrested with difficulty a frugal existence. Suddenly they found themselves the pets of the British, who, as most people in those early days, thought they were going to exercise the right of the conqueror and remain in a conquered country. It was a great opportunity for the Assyrian Patriarchal family to consolidate its power, and with the support of religious and radical circles in Great Britain, the Assyrians were the more encouraged to press their demands.

All this the Arabs and Kurds found most galling. The Arabs in particular took grave exception to the swaggering conceit of the Assyrians, but as they were the protégés of the Mandatory Power, nothing could be done but grin and bear it. The Kurds for centuries had known the Assyrians as cut-throat mountaineers, cut on their own amiable pattern. The Arab, being a plainsman and a lowlander, disliked both, the Assyrians rather more as being Christians. About 1927

the British Government made known its policy in respect to the termination of the mandate, and soon 'Iraq realized that 1932 would see independence. In those days 1932 still seemed a long way off, and there was surprisingly little firmness shown by the minorities during the negotiations of the 1930 Anglo-'Iraqi treaty, the object of which was to regulate the relations between the two States on the termination of the mandate. It is true that both Kurds and Assyrians pressed for guarantees, as both feared intolerance, if not worse, from the Arab Government which would take over the control when Britain went out. The official British attitude was that guarantees regarding minorities should, properly speaking, find no place in treaties between independent states, a diplomatic argument sufficiently impressive to ensure that the guarantees which the Kurds and Assyrians demanded were not included in the treaty. Even so, 1932 still seemed a long way off.

In the summer of 1932, however, it suddenly began to dawn upon people that independence was due in the following October. The Assyrians suddenly became restive, and threats of wholesale withdrawals from the Levies were met, as will be remembered, by the transfer of the Northamptons by aeroplane from Egypt. The Mar Shimun, with his aunt Lady Surma as always active behind the scenes, was very largely responsible for the situation which arose in July, 1932, and which necessitated the recall from leave of the British High Commissioner.

The Mar Shimun and his family had for some years enjoyed the bounty of the British Government and the support of large and influential sections of British public opinion. What the Patriarchal family wanted above all was the establishment of themselves in a dominant political and financial position, and to this end they employed to the utmost their spiritual authority over the Assyrians. It has been said that the Mar Shimun and his family were never very particular what hardships their people were asked to undergo so long as their own position remained secure. This seems a callous statement, but it is an opinion which is largely held, and by people whose opinion is worth having.

When independence came in October, 1932, the question of the settlement of the Assyrians became one of the major questions in 'Iraqi politics. The Assyrians numbered in all some 37,000 souls. Of these approximately 10,000 were time-expired Levies—that is to say, young men, or men in the prime of life, who had done their service in what was to all intents and purposes the British Army. Many of them were non-commissioned officers of excellent type and distinguished record. A few had held commissioned rank. Every one of them on discharge went out with a modern service rifle and a supply of ammunition. In some cases the rifle issued to them was in lieu of the weapon brought with them on enlistment, but in general it was understood that the rifle was given to them to enable them to defend themselves against the Kurds, who were all known to be armed.

The Assyrian demands formulated by Lady Surma and her nephew the Mar Shimun were that, as a definite racial and national unit, the Assyrians should be settled in one homogeneous *bloc*. To this later the Mar Shimun was to add a demand for temporal power. The 'Iraqi Government, supported by the British Government and by most fair-minded people, argued that it was impossible both in practice and in principle to have an armed Assyrian *enclave* within the new State of 'Iraq. The Hakkari country, from which they originally had come, was still denuded of its population, but for various reasons it had been allocated to Turkey by the League's Frontier Commission of 1925. The Turks refused point-blank to accept the Assyrians, on the very reasonable ground that having once been stabbed in the back by these people, they did not want to have anything more to do with them. Within 'Iraq itself there was no suitable area for settling the Assyrians *en masse*, except by dispossessing Kurds. Apart from the illegality of such a step, no Arab Government in Baghdad could have dispossessed Kurds in favour of Christians without civil war. Those were the practical difficulties: the difficulties of principle were just as serious. If the Assyrians were settled *en masse*, including ten thousand highly trained armed men and a spiritual leader claiming temporal power, the step to complete Assyrian independence would be a short one. Clearly such an *imperium in imperio* was impossible.

The 'Iraqi Government decided, therefore, that the Assyrians should be settled as and where possible in scattered villages, pointing out that even if the Assyrians were thus planted in the middle of Kurds, this was what they had always been accustomed to, and indeed it was for this very purpose that they had been given their arms. The difficulty thus seemed insoluble, and in the high summer of 1933 it came to a head.

While the late King Faisal and his suite were in England the trouble began. The 'Iraqi Government took a firm stand and insisted that the Mar Shimun should sign an undertaking, *inter alia* renouncing any claim to temporal power. About the same time one of his emissaries approached two diplomats in Baghdad, urging that pressure might be brought to bear on the Turkish Government to permit the transfer of the Assyrians to the Hakkari country. When it was once again made clear that this was impossible, the said emissary declared, and made no secret of it, that the Assyrians were determined to do something which would focus world opinion upon them.

About this time it was decided to bring an experienced British officer from the Sudan to undertake the settlement of the Assyrians in accordance with the decisions of the 'Iraqi Government. As things turned out, this officer arrived too late, and all he could do was to take over the organization of the relief camp at Mosul in which the 'Iraqi Government is maintaining some 1,500 Assyrian women and children.

The Mar Shimun being in Baghdad, a prominent part in the dis-

cussions on the spot was taken by one of his henchmen, a good soldier and a respected man named Yaku, hailing from the village of Simel, which is a police post about twenty minutes by car from Dohuk, where there is a qaimmaqam of the Arab Government. It was with Yaku, therefore, that the local authorities in Mosul had attempted to enter into discussion. After a good deal of persuasion by British officials of the 'Iraqi Government, Yaku, who had never ceased to express his distrust of the Arabs and of the Baghdad Government, finally consented to come into Mosul on a safe-conduct. When he arrived the 'Iraqi mutasarrif, or governor, asked for a bond for Yaku's good behaviour. This bond was entered into by a Church of England missionary (an American citizen) who had worked in the district for some ten years and to whom Yaku was well known as a man of integrity. Yaku undertook to go to Baghdad to put the 'Iraqi case, as learned by him in Mosul, before the Mar Shimun, and I understand that he gave some kind of promise to try to persuade the Mar Shimun to modify his attitude. But Yaku never went to Baghdad: instead, he led a party of armed men across the flooded Tigris into Syria. In all the discussions I have had on this question, the Assyrian spokesmen say that Yaku took this action on being told by 'Iraqi officials that if the Assyrians did not like the settlement plans that were being arranged for them they need not remain in 'Iraq. The 'Iraqi officials say that the Assyrians misconstrued, deliberately or otherwise, what they were told, which was that if they did not like the settlement plans that were being prepared for them and refused to accept them, it would be difficult to see how they could remain in 'Iraq.

Other bands followed the first band, and in all some 1,900 men got across. The 'Iraqi authorities, realizing that the migration of these armed men into Syria might embarrass the French, gave orders that no more were to be allowed to leave 'Iraq. At this point it may be stated that some weeks later about sixty of these 1,900 men were interrogated on their return to 'Iraq by a British officer. Being mostly men of limited intelligence, their evidence is all the more valuable. They were to all intents and purposes unanimous in declaring that the reason why they went to Syria was that their leaders, including Yaku, had told them that the French were willing to settle them on the most favourable terms, and that they went across with a view to seeing the country for themselves before moving their women and children and belongings. Be this, however, as it may, the fact remains that within about a fortnight they apparently decided to return—according to the testimony of the sixty interrogated men the decision to return was taken when they discovered that the promises of favourable settlement were false.

This brings us to the beginning of August, 1933. By the time they decided to return the Tigris, which they had had to cross in rafts, had gone down and was fordable. The 'Iraqi Army had posts about a mile

par along the frontier, with a considerable concentration in rear. Accounts vary as to what happened, and the exact truth will probably never be known. But it does appear that near the Christian village of Faish Khabur an 'Iraqi post was hailed by a small party of Assyrians, who said they wished to re-enter 'Iraq and give up their arms. When requested to advance, they attacked the post and wiped it out. On this a larger body of Assyrians, numbering between 300 and 500, waded across, and through the gap created by the destruction of the 'Iraqi post moved against the concentration of troops behind. This was an overt act of rebellion. Some comment has been made upon the fact that the 'Iraqi Government had previously declined to accede to British requests for the removal from the Northern Command of Bekir Sidky Beg, the General Officer Commanding, on the ground that he was a notorious anti-Assyrian and that his presence at the head of the 'Iraqi Army in that area was a standing provocation.

The 'Iraqi Government's refusal to remove him was, however, reasonable. The only danger threatening the state was in the north, and as Bekir was one of the best 'Iraqi serving generals, why should he be removed? The question was a particularly pertinent one having regard to the situation at the moment. Here were the rebel Assyrians—for the Mar Shimun's movement had by now taken a definite military form. It was the first occasion on which Arab troops had come in conflict with the much-vaunted Assyrians. The Arabs themselves were doubtful, having for fifteen years been hypnotized into an inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* the Assyrians. Moreover, they knew well that the Kurds were watching closely, and if a signal initial success had been gained by the Assyrians the whole of Kurdistan might have gone up as well. It is well known that during the periods in which the Kurds have been quiet in the past, what very largely has kept them quiet has been the uncertainty whether or not they would be bombed by British aeroplanes. The 1930 treaty provides for British military co-operation against 'Iraq's external enemies, and according to an official reply given some time ago in the House of Commons, the British Government would discuss on its merits any question of intervention in any internal trouble that might arise within 'Iraq. If the returning Assyrians had been successful, it is fairly certain that British co-operation with the 'Iraqi troops against them would at least have been discussed. As things turned out, however, this question never arose, and the Kurds still remain in doubt as to British action in the future. But in the early days of August all that the Arabs could see was that they were now arrayed in open warfare against the famous Assyrians. For them it was absolutely essential, the Yaku rebellion having begun, to strike down the Assyrians once and for all. The Assyrians on their part never anticipated that the Arab Army would beat them in a straight fight.

Yet that is what happened. When the returning Assyrians met the Arab Army concentrated behind Faish Kabur they got as good as

they gave. It may be that no one was more surprised than the Arabs themselves, but at all events a pursuit of the retreating rebels began, and about August 4 to 5 there was a good deal of savage fighting in the hills, quarter being neither given nor asked on either side, as is the genial Central Asian custom.

In the meantime, while the pursuit was going on, a number of Assyrian "friendlies"—that is, Assyrians who, like the majority of the nation, were unwilling to follow the Mar Shimun in all his wild ideas—thought it advisable to seek the protection of the 'Iraqi police. In the area affected there was a police post at Simel with the 'Iraqi flag flying above it, as it had been flown daily for years. To the protection of this flag there came nearly a hundred men of the Baz tribe, voluntarily and of their own free will, to ensure that they should not be slaughtered as the result of becoming involved in the guerrilla fighting which was going on in the mountains around. It was also put about in the surrounding villages, notably by the police sergeant in charge of the Simel post, that any Assyrians wishing to make sure of their lives should come in. By August 10 about 400 male Assyrians had arrived at Simel, and on that day all those who had arms were disarmed.

Next day the Army arrived at Simel. It is clear by now that the Army had taken the bit between its teeth. According to pro-Assyrian propagandists the events I am now to describe were premeditated. It is argued that, by collusion between certain civil and police authorities on the one hand and the Army Command on the other, the stage was set for a thorough-going massacre. It is pointed out that the British inspecting officer of police was suddenly transferred to Baghdad and a British Army officer serving with the 'Iraqi Government was suddenly sent to Mosul, the alleged object being to get these Englishmen removed from the possibility of seeing what was going to happen. This, however, is by no means proved, and in my opinion the allegation that they were deliberately sent out of the way is unfounded.

On the other hand, while the actual happenings of August 11 may not have been planned, there seems little doubt that on that day the 'Iraqi Army Command found themselves, after several days' savage but victorious fighting against the feared Assyrians, in a position where they had about 400 of these enemies at their mercy. The slaughter began in the morning and went on till afternoon. The unarmed Assyrians were segregated by the police sergeant referred to above, and were then murdered by the 'Iraqi Army, some being shot with revolvers, some clubbed with rifle butts, and the rest machine-gunned within their houses or as they tried to escape from them. While this was going on several Assyrians tried to change into women's clothes, but the same police sergeant busied himself going round the huts and forcing these men out into the open, where the troops dealt with them. There is no evidence of any massacre of women and children, although a few inevitably were killed.

Following the old Turkish custom, the authorities brought in tribesmen, Kurds and Shammar Arabs, to loot and destroy. They did their work so well that twenty villages were completely and utterly destroyed, little being left standing, while twenty more were partially destroyed. The looting got so bad that the police finally took it upon themselves to intervene, and they attacked the marauders so heartily that the great Shaikh of the Shammar, Ajil al-Jawer, came in personally to complain to the police authorities that they were "pressing" his people unduly.

To show how completely the Army Command took control of things, it may be pointed out that on August 11 there were 2,000 armed police within easy telephone call had there been any disturbance at Simel calling for police action. Moreover, a veil of silence was drawn across the north for five days. It is said, and also denied, that British aeroplanes were forbidden to fly north of Mosul. I believe it to be true that during these days the British R.A.F. rest camp, which for a number of years has been established in the mountains of Ser Amadiya, was not once flown over and the troops there, who had heard vague reports of trouble, began to wonder how serious things were. What is certain is that the qaimmaqam of Dohuk, the chief local government officer in the area and only a few miles distant from Simel, did not learn of the massacre until the 16th, on which date the Minister of Interior, who was then in Mosul, also got the first news of what had happened, Baghdad having become somewhat uneasy and having asked him to investigate. He went to Simel and at once hurried back to Mosul, giving instructions for medical and every other kind of assistance to be sent up.

The bodies were buried within a day or two, one officer being known to have buried those of three hundred and five men, one woman and four children. As late as September 19, a British officer found a few bodies of men still unburied in the houses, the whole place being completely uninhabitable.

In two other districts, Kirkuk and Rowanduz, trouble was narrowly averted. The Moslem bazaar in Kirkuk, where it is still remembered that in 1925 the Assyrian Levies ran amok and murdered about 300 Arabs, was extremely excited by a rumour that a young Moslem girl, who had been reported missing, had been murdered by the Assyrians. The timely discovery by the police that she had, in fact, been murdered by her aunt prevented the outbreak of an anti-Assyrian movement. The 'Iraqi authorities kept a firm hand on the situation and Kirkuk remained quiet.

In the Rowanduz area it is known that a high 'Iraqi police officer had for some little time previously been going round the Kurdish tribes, endeavouring to incite them against the Assyrians. It is believed that when he learned that a small party of Assyrians decided one night to leave their village, he arranged for an "incident" to take place between them and the police. Fortunately, a certain person

in the neighbourhood, whose identity I have been specially asked not to reveal, heard of the departure of these Assyrians and sent out messengers with instructions at all costs to bring them back. The messengers succeeded in intercepting them and bringing them back before any such incident could take place. Thus nothing happened at Rowanduz.

At Baiji, however, while there was no actual killing of Assyrians, there was a disturbance sufficient to hold up work on the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's pipe-line for a week. The Assyrian workmen employed by the company became very nervous; a sub-section of the Shammar came in on motor-lorries and attempted looting and incendiarism. The 'Iraq Railways, a Government department, also had trouble with their Assyrians, who declined for a time to work except in a body and insisted on sending their women and children to Baghdad—where possible to the R.A.F. camp at Hinaidi.

Many people in Baghdad still do not know what happened in Simel. Wild rumours of course circulated among the Christian minorities, and all kinds of atrocities were alleged. These allegations, however, can be discounted: the correct story is substantially as I have narrated it above. The total number of Assyrians killed will probably not have exceeded 700—in all likelihood 600 will be found to be nearer the mark. The number of dead at Simel probably did not exceed 350. Those killed in fair fight, whether during the actual clash near Faish Khabur, or in the subsequent pursuit through the hills, totalled probably 250 to 300. Of the 1,900 Assyrians who crossed into Syria there were on the day on which I left 'Iraq (September 23, 1933) about 550 still in Syria, a nominal roll of whom had been supplied by the French authorities. The rest appear to have drifted back into 'Iraq and are scattered through the north. In the meantime the Mar Shimun is understood to have adopted the attitude that by the killing of these Assyrians the Arabs have started a blood feud, and in the interests of future peace this should be expiated, not by the slaughter of Arabs by Assyrians, but by the payment of blood money—presumably to him on behalf of his people.

The Moslem reaction to these events, in so far as the news was known, was extremely interesting. What every Moslem realized was that, Simel or no Simel, the Assyrian bubble was finally burst. The first days of August proved conclusively that in open fight the Arab troops were as good as the Assyrians. Moreover, whatever one's views about the Simel incident may be, there is no doubt that it clinched the matter—to use a grisly pun, the Assyrians were "settled." Today in 'Iraq the Assyrians are like the Chaldeans, or the Armenians, or any other Christian minority. Their spirit is gone although it is conspicuously notable how loyally the Assyrians actually serving in the Levies have stood fast. They have not been shaken at all, although naturally they have been rather nervy.

Moslem opinion among the more intelligent people was distinctly

relieved. Among the lower classes there was evidence of great excitement. While everyone who stops to think for a moment realizes that the Assyrian question is a complicated problem, containing racial, national, political, and religious factors, it remains true that, the moment the issue comes to arms, everything is forgotten except the religious factor.

This explains the state into which the Christian minorities in general were thrown. In Baghdad they were extremely nervous: in Mosul and the north I found them in a state of acute terror. When I left Baghdad I saw Hikmet Beg Sulaiman, the Minister of Interior, who gave me full permission to visit any part of the north I liked, including Simel which I had specially mentioned. When, however, I reached Mosul, I found that the Mosul taxi-drivers, who are nearly all Christians, had been informed by the Army Command that any of them taking "an inquirer" around or giving any information to such a person would be killed. It was thus impossible for me to go further north than Mosul. Even in Mosul I came upon one taxi-driver who refused to overtake and pass a body of troops marching along the street, obviously afraid that the "insult" would later be visited upon him. In Mosul I found the general feeling very strongly anti-Christian and in great part anti-British. When I left Baghdad the anti-British feeling was beginning to subside, the reason being that the Arahhs had begun to see that they must depend on British support at Geneva in any League inquiry into Assyrian affairs.

For British policy must of necessity be to allow in this particular instance the dead past to bury its dead. The Christian minorities are agitating for a restoration of some kind of British control in the north of 'Iraq, if only over the army and the police. They are understood in this to have the backing of the French, whose interest it is, in order to prolong their mandate over Syria, to emphasize and magnify whatever troubles 'Iraq may have met in her first year of independence. While British official policy is to stave off awkward questions at Geneva, private British opinion in 'Iraq I found to be rather mixed. Personally, most of the British people were blazing with indignation over Simel. The business community, however, was inclined to take the view that there was much to be said for the official policy that Britain had adopted. Even the big Christian merchants, in their terror of the Moslem reprisals that might follow any anti-Moslem and pro-Assyrian outburst in Europe, are anxious to leave well alone, although one has only to talk to them for a few minutes to realize the depth of their feeling over the murder of Christians, even to the insignificant number of 300. As an old Shiah carpet seller said to me, just before I left. "What is this at Simel? If you want killing, why not have big killing? Why all this excitement?"

The British policy of whitewash, if without disrespect it can be so termed, is officially justified on the twofold ground that business interests in 'Iraq must depend entirely on the maintenance of security,

law, and order, and that as British political interests in the Middle East (notably oil and imperial communications) demand a strong Iraq as a buffer against any possible thrust from the north, whether through Turkey or Persia, it is a cardinal point of British policy to support the 'Iraqi Government in unifying the country. There can be no question that the Mar Shimun's movement represented a deliberate and dangerous threat to the authority of Baghdad. The Arabs could not afford to allow a successful rebellion in the north, and it seems that Britain cannot afford to back the minorities against the Central Government in Baghdad.

This brings us to the final point—namely, that Britain, and Britain alone, is responsible for the plight in which the Assyrians now find themselves. Britain has subsidized and encouraged these people—in the beginning, no doubt, in the honest belief that British control would remain, at least as long as the present generation. Now Britain has to all intents and purposes abandoned them, and as Sir Francis Humphrys said at Geneva during the discussions on the 'Iraq mandate by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League last year, the moral responsibility rests with Britain. Now, there are about 8,000 indigenous Assyrians in 'Iraq—that is to say, Assyrians who were occupying their present villages in pre-war times. These in the main have not supported the Mar Shimun and are perfectly willing, if not actually anxious, to remain settled where they are. Probably about 5,000 would be willing to take their chance and remain. This leaves out of the total of 37,000 of the Assyrian people say about 20,000 or 24,000 who now cannot possibly remain living within the frontiers of 'Iraq. There is no confidence or faith between them and the Arabs, and if they remain further "incidents" are bound to happen. It is quite clear that Britain must settle these people somehow. Turkey and Persia have refused point blank to have them. It seems clear that the French do not want them in Syria. There has been talk of settling them in Cyprus, but doubtless the Cypriotes will have their own views on that—they have already seen themselves out-Greeked by the Armenians! Germany has suggested very tentatively, and of course not officially, that she would be willing to settle the Assyrians in Tanganyika, provided Britain were to hand this territory back.

The above is a *résumé* of the 'Iraqi-Assyrian situation as I see it, fresh from leaving the country and after long talks with all classes of the population, with people of many nationalities and all walks of life.

ISTANBUL,

September 29, 1933.

